LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES

Practice and Theory

Edited by

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PREFACE

Edited volumes, like all texts, have histories, and in this case it is a long one. This book grows out of a full-day symposium on “Language Ideology: Practice and Theory” organized by the present editors, sponsored by the Program Committee of the American Anthropological Association, and held at the Association’s annual meeting in Chicago, November 1991. The premise of that symposium was that language ideology stands in dialectical relation with—and thus significantly shapes—social, discursive, and linguistic practices. Not merely an epiphenomenon, but rather a crucial link mediating human acts and institutions, language ideology merited more scholarly attention than it had thus far been given.

In that early attempt to bring an area of inquiry to the attention of the discipline, we adopted a relatively unconstrained sense of “language ideology.” We included cultural conceptions not only of language and language variation but also of the nature and purpose of communication, and its role in the life of social collectivities. In order to build toward a general understanding of the cultural variability of language ideologies and their roles in social and linguistic life, the symposium brought together a broad spectrum of anthropologists. Some worked in more traditional societies, others in postindustrial settings; some focused more on linguistic structure, others on social process.

Most of the papers presented in that symposium were expanded and appeared in a special issue of Pragmatics on “Language Ideology” (1992, 2:235–453). Since then, language ideology has increasingly coalesced as the focus of scholarly attention. Both the symposium itself and the special journal issue led to a number of conversations and events organized around the proposition that language ideology
Anger, Gender, Language Shift, and the Politics of Revelation in a Papua New Guinean Village

DON KULICK

In a number of recent publications, Catherine Lutz (1986, 1990) has explored the network of associations in Western culture that link women with emotion, which in most cases is overtly devalued. A contrasting situation is described by Bambi Schieffelin (1990), E. L. Schieffelin (1976, 1985), and Steven Feld (1990), all of whom argue that among the Kaluli people of Papua New Guinea, it is males who are “stereotypically culturally constructed as the emotional gender” (Feld 1990:262) and that this emotionality is encouraged and strongly valued in a wide variety of ritual and mundane contexts. Studies like these, as well as many others by anthropologists (e.g., articles in Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990, Bloch and Parry 1982, Watson-Gegeo and White 1990, White and Kirkpatrick 1985), have shown that in probably all communities throughout the world, the expression of affect is engendered and that, therefore, in Catherine Lutz’s words, “any discourse on emotion is also, at least implicitly, a discourse on gender” (Lutz 1990:69; see also Ochs 1988:172–83, 215–16).

Because both emotion and gender are indexed and expressed in large measure through language, we can augment Lutz’s generalization with the observation that discourses on emotion and gender are also bound up with discourses, or ideologies, of language (Ochs 1992:341). We can, furthermore, expect that at certain periods in the history of a language and its speakers, the links that exist among discourses on affect, gender, and language may come to salience and work to com-
pel speakers to engage in linguistic practices that may result in changes in the language itself.

Michael Silverstein has drawn attention to this type of process in his discussion of the Quaker challenge to the seventeenth-century English system of distance and deference (Silverstein 1985). Silverstein argues that two factors were decisive in the shift from a pronominal system signaling deference and intimacy (through the second-person ye/you—thee/thou opposition) to one in which those affects were no longer encoded grammatically. The first factor was an emergent yet widespread idea about the value of "plain English" as a means of both signifying opposition to traditional knowledge and authority and directly apprehending religious and scientific "truth." The second was Quaker applications of this idea in their everyday speech practices and in their rhetoric about language. Quakers defied contemporary sociolinguistic norms by refusing to use the polite deference (ye/you) forms when addressing others, partly because English scriptural prose used the familiar thee/thou forms and partly because they felt that the ye/you forms contradicted their religious doctrine that all people were equal before God. Quaker usage was in this sense "explicitly subversive," as well as being "societally shocking [and] insulting" (1985:249) to non-Quaker interlocutors, who spoke to the Friends with the polite 'you', only to be answered with the familiar 'thou'. A situation thus arose in which:

Friends [i.e., Quakers] use symmetric T [thee/thou], and hence others had to avoid it, lest they be mistaken for members of the sect; Friends avoid symmetric Y [ye/you], and hence others must use only it. Consequently, a new system emerges, in which societal norms abandon T decisively as usage indexing speaker as Quaker and take up the invariant usage of Y. A STRUCTURAL change in the norms of English has been affected. (1985:251; capitals in original)

Silverstein summarizes and generalizes this process as follows:

Ideological rationalization [can] engage ... with language at and through an intersection of structural form and indexical usage, producing tension in the highly charged "metaphoricization" of indexical meanings and forms. The resolution of this tension seems to move the very structural system into new configurations, generally unforeseen by the users of the language. (1985:252)

I draw attention to this analysis by Silverstein because in this chapter I focus on a similar, though much more far-reaching, process of ideological and linguistic change that is under way in a small village (population ca. 110) in Papua New Guinea called Gapun.1 Gapun is located about 10 kilometers from the northern coast of Papua New Guinea, roughly midway between the lower Sepik and the Ramu rivers. It is a relatively isolated village, and the villagers are self-supporting through a combination of swidden agriculture, hunting, and sago processing. Despite their isolation and their consequently low level of participation in cash cropping or other money-generating projects, the villagers of Gapun are very keen to 'develop' (kamaŋ), and thinking about how this might happen occupies a great deal of their time. The villagers have been nominally Roman Catholic since the late 1940s, and their hopes for development are pinned in elaborate ways on Christianity and on the imminent second coming of Christ.

In Gapun, a language shift is currently under way from the village vernacular—a Papuan language called Taip—to Tok Pisin, the creole language that has become Papua New Guinea's most widely spoken national language. Children are no longer learning the vernacular, and when I last visited the village in 1991, no one under fourteen years of age actively commanded it. The reasons behind this shift are complex and many-stranded, but here I focus on what I see as one of the most central reasons behind the shift—namely, links that exist in village discourses among gender, the expression of anger, and particular ideologies of language that see language as indexical of sociability and the ability to handle knowledge.

Two specific speech genres invoke these links very clearly for the villagers. The first is a kind of dramatic public display of anger that occurs virtually daily in the village. The word by which the villagers most commonly call this speech genre is a Tok Pisin word, kroes, which literally means 'anger' (in the village vernacular, the name is puasangum nam, literally 'angry talk'). Kroes are considered by Gapuners—both men and women—to be stereotypically feminine expressive modes.

The second speech genre I discuss is called 'men's house talk' (ambagina nam). This talk is oratory, by men, that occurs inside or in the immediate vicinity of one of the men's houses in the village. Unlike kroes, which foreground and proclaim anger, men's house talk is not always and explicitly concerned with anger as such. However, a central structuring characteristic of men's oratories is a concern to downplay conflict and reframe disputes so that everyone appears to be content and harmonious. On certain occasions, such as during meetings called to help heal a sick person, anger is made an explicit topic of discussion, and men are urged to "expose" their anger and "reveal" their complaints.3

In my discussion of kroes and oratories, I concentrate on the ways in which discourses of gender, affect, and language are mutually reinforcing and sustained through specific linguistic practices. Ultimately, my point is that those discourses, and the practices that constitute and inform them, are nowadays invoked by villagers to position women and men in different and opposing relationships to those institutions and values that everyone in the village agrees are important: namely, Christianity, modernity and civilization. This positioning constitutes the kind of "tension" to which Silverstein refers in the preceding quotation. And as he sug-

Language Ideology and Knowledge

A basic tenet of Gapun villagers' language ideology is that speakers do not normally say what they mean. That is, unlike much Western philosophical tradition and unlike the values generally associated with contemporary middle classes, which view language as "a transparent window to truths both formulable and communicable in it" (Silverstein 1985:248; see also Reddy 1979), villagers in Gapun inter-
interpret speakers' words neither as a reflection of their inner state nor as an accurate representation of their opinions on a matter. In fact, the general assumption is that language 'hides' (ba'mul/a'ma) meanings that the speaker either cannot or will not state openly. Consequently, interpretation in the village is geared toward getting "behind" or "inside" or "underneath" the words actually used in speech.

The realizations and consequences of this linguistic ideology have been discussed in earlier work on Gapun with relation to literacy (Kulick and Stroud 1990), language socialization (Kulick 1992:223-47) and codeswitching (Stroud 1992). In those works, Christopher Stroud and I have examined the villagers' ideas about language by embedding them in local notions of personhood that make it very risky to appear too blunt or demanding. Here, I foreground a complementary consideration that is mentioned but not elaborated in those earlier analyses: in addition to being linked to and reinforced by conceptions of personhood and sociability, village language ideology is also related to particular village ideas about the nature and consequences of knowledge.

In Gapun, a great number of forms of knowledge consistently carry with them associations of danger. All those forms of knowledge that were traditionally valued—as such as knowledge of healing chants, knowledge of certain myths, knowledge of the men's tambaran cult, and of special skills such as yam planting or woodcarving—are bound up with hazard. Knowledge about any facet of the tambaran cult, for example, is believed to have the power to cause the deaths of women and noninitiated boys who might somehow acquire such knowledge. Even initiated men must carefully guard their knowledge of the cult secrets, for to reveal them to the noninitiated would cause the cult deities to murder the speaker. Magic chants, even benevolent ones, link their knower to ancestral spirits or men's cult deities that may act entirely on their own to bring harm to anyone who displeases the knower, even if the knower does not wish this. Overhearing certain myths is viewed as having the potential to cause sickness, and uttering secret names may cause environmental disturbances, or even death, for large numbers of people. Even private knowledge is fraught with danger. Unlike some Melanesian societies, such as the Sepik river Avan, where knowledge appears to be dangerous only to the extent that it is made public (Harrison 1990:102), in Gapun even the private discovery of knowledge is enough to put the knower in danger. On one occasion, for example, a senior man explained to me that he had repeatedly tried and finally managed to re-create, on an era he was weaving, a specific mythologically important pattern that he recalled as a boy. "Nobody taught me to weave the design," he told me. "I exposed the (kumapim) in my thoughts." This exposure, however, apparently angered the ancestral ghost-owners of the design, who retaliated by inflicting the old man with a serious illness.

This kind of understanding of knowledge makes possessing it and imparting it a somewhat risky business. Knowledge is valuable, but it is also—and this, of course, is part of what constitutes its value—potentially lethal. It must be handled, passed on, and made public in very delicate ways. Anthropologists working in Papua New Guinea have noted that this kind of orientation to knowledge seems very widespread throughout the area. They have also noted that practices of knowledge throughout Melanesia tend to pivot around an oscillation between concealment and revelation. At certain times and under certain conditions, knowledge of sensitive matters—say, of cult secrets (Barth 1987) or clan wealth (Strathern 1979:249)—is revealed to initiates or trading partners. But such knowledge, once revealed, is almost immediately hidden away again, and, furthermore, it frequently carries with it an implicit tag (made explicit in subsequent revelations) that the revelation disclosed only part of, or perhaps even a false impression of what there is to know.

Gapun villagers' language ideology, which privileges ambiguity, hidden meanings, and meanings construed by listeners rather than those conveyed by speakers, provides them with ways to traffic in knowledge without putting themselves or their interlocutors in too much danger. By oscillating between "inside" talk and "outside" talk (Stroud 1992:147), by making deliberately ambiguous, self-contradictory statements (Kulick 1992:127-31), by pressing into service specific structural features such as codeswitching (Stroud 1992) and diminutives (Kulick and Stroud 1993), and by deploying discursive features such as repetition and dissociation (Kulick 1992:127-36), speakers in Gapun manage to reveal, discuss, and circulate knowledge even as they conceal it and thereby gingerly sidestep many of the potentially fatal consequences that stark, unmitigated knowledge is known to have.

**Anger**

Anger enters this discussion as a singularly inflamed object of knowledge. In village discourses on emotion and knowledge, anger in adults is always linked to danger. If anger is not voiced or acted on, it will, villagers explain, remain in the stomach (the seat of emotions) and 'rot' (string/pisimb). The purification of anger may mobilize the ancestral spirits associated with the aggrieved person, and these may cause harm to whosoever provoked anger in that person. Alternatively, rotting anger may "give bad thoughts" to the aggrieved, driving them to seek out the services of a sorcerer, who will be paid to murder the object of the anger.

If anger is voiced or acted on, there is a risk that its expression will provoke the wrath of the ancestral spirits associated with the person who is abused or attacked. Abusing or attacking another person may also drive that person to a sorcerer. So, no matter how it is ultimately dealt with, anger is dangerous. People in Gapun die from anger. Village deaths (all of which are held to be caused by sorcery) are almost inevitably accounted for at least in part by recalling past arguments or fights that the deceased or his or her close family members or matrilineal relatives had with other people.

Anger (krol/pisap-) is one of the relatively few affects that villagers regularly speak about and attribute to themselves and others (the other affects that feature in village discourse are shame [sem/mahak-], concern and sadness [stoi/pisak-], dissatisfaction [tei/minda-], and fear [prei/reu-]). Of these emotions, anger and dissatisfaction are seen as the earliest and most basic. They are tied to a dimension of personhood that the villagers call bed in Tok Pisin and ḅeke in the vernacular. Both these words mean 'head'. Each individual, the villagers maintain, has bed. By this, they mean that each individual has a basic and volatile sense of personal will and autonomy. The concept of bed in Gapun signifies egotism, selfishness, and
maverick individualism. It denotes emotional bristliness and defiant, antisocial behavior, and it is roundly condemned in village rhetoric.

For the villagers, one of the embodiments of kros, of this volatile dimension of personhood, is small children. Babies and toddlers in Gapun are routinely said to be, and treated as if they were, continually dissatisfied and angry. A child cooing softly on its mother’s lap may suddenly be shaken lightly and asked “Ah? What are you mad about? Ah?” (Ahi! Ya helbat loam vanem samting? Ah?). Likewise, a mother who sees her eight-month-old daughter reaching out toward a dog lying beside her will comment, “Look, she’s mad (kros) now, she wants to hit the dog,” and she will raise the baby’s hand onto the dog’s fur, telling the child, “That’s it, hit it! Hit it!” One of the clearest indications of how villagers view the affective state of children is in the first words they attribute to them. In the village, a child’s first word is generally held to be oki, which is a vernacular word meaning, approximately, “I’m getting out of here.” Attributed to infants as young as two months, this word encapsulates the adult belief that babies “do what they want” (hibainim laik bilong ol yet) and go where they want to go regardless of the wishes of others. The two words that villagers consider to rapidly follow oki also underscore the notion of a baby as a gruff, independent individualist with a “strong” bed. These are the Taip words munda (I’m sick of this) and niata (stop it).

In the villagers’ view of the socialization process, children should come to understand that bed and the display of anger and dissatisfaction that typifies it must be suppressed (daunim). The expectation is that, as they mature, children will curtail their expressions of anger, that they will begin to accept and accommodate others, that they will share with others and conduct themselves “quietly” (iit/riwir). Anger, in this cultural understanding, in addition to being fraught with danger, is also seen as childish and immature. Although it is explicitly recognized to be a central component of all people, it is one that adults should do their best to suppress and conceal.

Unfortunately, however, people do become angry at the actions of other people: other people who steal betelnut, who neglect to collect firewood for the evening meal, who forget to return a borrowed item, who engage in extramarital affairs, who talk behind people’s backs, and so on. Villagers have developed a number of ways of dealing with the anger they see as being provoked in them, including destroying their own possessions and outright fighting (Kulick 1992:50–52). The single most common way in which anger is conveyed, however, is through the village speech genre known as a kros.

Proclaiming Anger in a Kros

The best way to give an impression of the general tenor of kroses in Gapun is to briefly examine an extract from one that was recorded and transcribed in June 1991. This is a kros between two sisters who live next door to each other. It arose because for several weeks the younger sister, a woman in her thirties named Sake, had been complaining loudly about the fact that children who played in the area near her house littered the ground with coffee beans, which they shot at each other and at
tive in nature (Kulick 1992:286, n. 7), do not appear to have been accorded the same type of cultural significance as those of men, and women are and continue to be represented as divisive troublemakers whose selfish actions constantly threaten the solid, manly group. Echoing a statement heard all over New Guinea, village men sometimes remind one another that “we fight over women”; that is, we would not fight if there were no women. Women, with their anger, their kroes, and their unwillingness to “suppress” their beds, are the root of all conflicts.

Individual women in Gapun do not share this view of themselves as destructive troublemakers. Women who have kroes do not interpret their own behavior in reference to the stereotype. When Sake, for example, has a kro, she does not consider that she is being divisive; she is legitimately defending herself and her rights from some violation and attack. When another woman has a kro, however, Sake is often quick to sniff that the woman is “a woman who always gets angry for no reason” (meri bilong kro nating nating).

The existence of a culturally elaborated stereotype of women as quarrelsome means that such a role is available for any woman to act out, however. And as a stereotypically female role, it is unattractive for men. Men in the village like to pretend that they have no conflicts with others, and they dismiss kroes as samthing bilong ol meri/mampu trak (what women do). The village stereotype of what represents ideal male behavior puts pressure on the men to be more sociable, generous, dignified, and temperate than their wives, who are expected to fly off the handle and have a kro at the slightest excuse. In most cases, in a manner remarkably similar to that described by Elinor Ochs ([1974] 1989:137-38) for Madagascar, a married man is able to uphold this stereotype and simultaneously announce infringements by simply informing his wife about some slight or infraction that he has been subjected to (such as someone’s failure to return a borrowed ax or shovel). The wife can usually be counted on to take it from there, and in doing so she reinforces the stereotype of quarrelsome, loud-mouthed women. Even on those occasions when a man publicly bebat (gets angry, shouts), the anger is usually directed at his wife or close female relatives. Public arguments thus almost inevitably involve women at some level. Both men and women blame (other) women for making trouble, for not being able to contain their anger, and for “showing bed” (see also Goldman 1986:236, Nash 1987:105, Harrison 1990:162).

Concealing Anger in the Men’s House

In very marked contrast to women’s kroes, oratories in the men’s house are occasions on which men in Gapun engage in speeches that downplay tension, smooth over disagreement, and stress consensus in the village. Oratories occur whenever meetings are called in the men’s house: to announce the need for labor to clear overgrown paths or repair rotten footbridges; to work out the arrangements that have to be made for funerary feasts; to discern the meaning of messages and news items that villagers bring back with them from their travels to other villages or to the Marienberg mission station; to arrange to help a village man and his wife in some task that requires a number of laborers, such as carrying house posts, roofing a house, or clearing the forest to plant a garden; or to discuss any number of other public issues.

Because they are so strongly associated with the men’s house, oratories, by definition, are male discourses. Only men in Gapun are considered to orate. There is no rule or explicit consensus in the village that women cannot orate, and there are a few strong-willed women in Gapun who do occasionally speak in public gatherings that concern both men and women. Women’s speeches contain many of the same rhetorical features, such as repetition, that are predominant in oratories, but they differ importantly in that they are much briefer than most men’s speeches (which usually last about ten to fifteen minutes but which can go on up to forty-five minutes), and they never contain any of the particular formulaic tags that the men use to mark their speech as oratorical. Furthermore, women, who are not allowed inside the men’s house, obviously cannot speak from there, and so their contributions to a discussion have a peripheral character that is underscored by their spatial placement. Because of factors like these, women who make short speeches at public gatherings are not considered to be orating; they are, rather, “complaining.”

Usually, anger is not an explicit topic of discussion in contexts dominated by oratorical speechmaking. Quite the opposite. Skillful orators draw on a wide variety of paralinguistic cues (e.g., speakers are called and assembled under the same roof), metalinguistic cues (e.g., speakers address their talk directly to a general public and use politeness markers to assume and relinquish the floor), and linguistic cues (e.g., there is a marked preference for speakers to use diminutives in order to downplay their own status and talk, and orators are characterized by supportive repetition from listeners). All these semiotic devices are drawn on to pointedly ignore and downplay the tensions that infect daily life in the village and to promote an illusion that everyone is in agreement and that there really is no anger and consequently no conflict at all. In creating this illusion and bringing the villagers together in this way, orators demonstrate for others their own social awareness and skills, even as they work to create a context in which others can demonstrate their sociability by listening and contributing to the buildup of the consensus by repeating and agreeing.

Sometimes, however, village men focus explicitly on anger, and there are contexts in which they spend much time and talk urging one another to “expose” (autim aroti gur) their anger, to “break it open” (brukim/kro), to “reveal” (kamsipim/mamani) it. This kind of speechmaking occurs whenever somebody in the village is struck down by a serious illness that people conclude is being caused by ancestral spirits. When this happens, men gather together in a men’s house and talk about conflicts. When everybody who wants to talk has had a turn, senior men invoke the village ancestors and call on them to stop causing the sickness. Everybody present in the men’s house then dips his forehead in a glass of water, which is subsequently used to wash the sick person. The idea behind this procedure is that the men in this context embody both themselves and their ancestral spirits, and by first “revealing” their anger and then dipping their forefingers in the water, they “cool” the anger that is causing sickness in the afflicted person.

The following text is extracted from a meeting in the men’s house, attended by all village men, called to effect a cure for the author of this paper, who in June
1991 became afflicted with disabling pains that the villagers, on hearing the symptoms, immediately identified as "a sickness of the ground" (i.e., a sickness caused by village ancestral spirits). Note how anger is talked about here.

**Mone** Whoever feels that something isn’t right, all right expose it. It’s like we’re breaking open the talk now. It isn’t good if this [anger] remains in our stomachs, because he [i.e., Don] will suffer. We have to expose all the little talk.

**Kawri** Yeah.

**Mone** Like yesterday too I talked about doing work for him [Mote means that yesterday he exhorted the villagers to get to work building a house for me. Work on this house had been progressing extremely slowly, because even though the villagers had volunteered to build it for me, they found themselves unwilling to work together due to various village conflicts]. We were all lazy [and therefore did no work yesterday]. Or maybe we have some worries, or maybe we’re tired of doing work, or maybe we’re just tired for no reason, or like that.

**Kruuni** That’s it.

**Mone** All right we’re gonna reveal all these little worries: “This man said something to me and so I’m unwilling to work,” this kind of thing. All right, when we’ve finished talking we’ll or we’ll talk about the spirits of the village, of the men’s house, OK, and we’ll put our fingers in the water all right Don will/we’ll hold Don’s pain, wash it in the water of our talk. Like just try it. It’s not this [i.e., a sickness caused by a village spirit], it’s a [white man’s] sickness he’s got, he’ll go to the hospital.

**Kruuni** At the hospital it’ll finish. We’ll try it our way [first].

**Mone** There’s no talk [i.e., no dissension]. Like we can/maybe we don’t have any talk, or maybe we can talk about the spirits of the village, we don’t think that something is as it should be we can talk about work or about something that is amongst us giving illness to him, all right we’ll talk straight about that. Talk straight and put fingers in the water.

Later, toward the end of this session, after several men had revealed “little” irritations or conflicts that they were involved in or had heard about, the talk was summarized like this:

**Kem** We’re gonna hold the water and rub his pain. These things, there’s not plenty of complaints.

**Sair** No.

**An don** There’s no complaints.

**Kem** Our [little talk, that’s it.

**Kawi** [little crumbs of talk.

**Kem** We’re making it.

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The aspect of this talk to which I wish to draw attention is the way in which anger, even though it is explicitly spoken about here, is consistently embedded in speech characterized by hedges (“maybe we don’t have any talk”), the presentation of alternative positions (“or maybe we’re just tired for no reason,” “it’s a [white man’s] sickness he’s got”), and specific denials that the anger the men are supposed to be exposing is in fact anger at all. Choruses like the one here, in which several men hasten to agree with one another that there are no complaints, occur throughout meetings like this, and they become particularly insistent whenever somebody actually does “expose” a happening or occurrence that caused them to feel anger.

At one point during this meeting, for example, a senior man “revealed” that the men present were reluctant to work on my house because they were angry at Allan, my adoptive village “father.” The anger, it was pointed out, stemmed from the fact that Allan and his wife had moved into my previous, communally built, house when I completed my original fieldwork and left the village in 1987. The couple made this move in defiance of received village opinion, and the other villagers now accused Allan and his wife of “ruining” that previous house. Every person present at this meeting was acutely aware of the truth of this senior man’s “revelation,” because in private villagers routinely expressed bitter resentment toward Allan and his wife for having moved into the house. In the men’s house, though, the revelation was handled in the following way:

**Kem** All right, you all gave up on poor Allan, he’s by himself [i.e., working on building my new house by himself]. You all have this thought, I know, you can’t cover it up it, we’re showing Christian belief here. It’s not anger (krou), it’s like you’re talking straight. OK, and you hold the water now and the spirit will go inside it. It’s like that.

**An don** Is it anger? [rhetorical question]

**Kruuni** It isn’t anger.

**Marama** There’s no anger, it’s talk.

**Mone** Yes.

One of the most significant ways in which men’s public talk about anger differs from women’s is in this kind of cooperative recontextualizing work, where speakers weave together their words to reframe anger as not anger, and where they sometimes even go so far as to congratulate themselves on talking about anger as a way of “showing Christian belief” (autim Bilip). I interpret this kind of supportive discursive interaction between men to be a linguistic manifestation of the village orientation to knowledge as something that in many cases is safely revealed only if it is somehow subsequently reconcealed.

And that is the main point. One of the most significant differences between women’s kroues and men’s oratorics—and the difference that seems to evoke the greatest degree of discomfort in villagers—is not so much that female speakers publicize anger. In many ways this is, in fact, commendable, since villagers agree that it is much better to express anger than to let it remain unexpressed and rotting in one’s stomach (indeed, the public exposure of anger is the whole purpose of the
kind of gatherings in the men’s house just discussed). What is unacceptable and dangerous about kroes is that women complete only half the discursive equation. Women reveal anger without subsequently reconciling it. They expose anger and leave it uncovered, where it is thought to act like a throbbing, hot lightning rod of unleashed dissension, pulling sorcery, sickness, and death into the village.

Women’s linguistic practices for dealing with anger are in almost every way inversions of men’s practices. In addition to exposing anger without hiding it again, women’s kroes emanate from inside or nearby private dwelling houses. Men’s oratores, on the other hand, occur in or near the communal men’s house. Kroes are organized as competing monologues. In oratores, the people being orated at are free to contribute sympathetic interjections throughout the speech and follow the orator by producing a speech or a summation in which they “give support” to the orator. Kroes are dramatic declarations of self-display in which speakers assert themselves and their personal autonomy by broadcasting throughout the village that these have been violated. Oratores are characterized by self-effacement; speakers repeatedly remind their listeners in polite, muted tones that they only have “little crumbs of talk” or “a little worry” to draw everyone’s attention. Kroes are meant to shame a specific, named person or a specific unknown, unnamed culprit. Oratores are intended to generalize and address people as members of a group; even in those cases where the topic of an oratory is some sort of transgression committed by some specific person, blame is inevitably diffused and generalized, and listeners are reminded that others in the village (though not necessarily they themselves) are just as lazy or uncooperative or big-headed as the (always unnamed) individual(s) who committed the transgression. For both men and women, kroes are associated with (other) women and divisiveness. Oratores, on the other hand, are seen as concrete evidence that men in Gapun really are more placid, consensus oriented, sociable, and reasonable than their tempestuous, forever bickering wives (Table 4.1).

**Language Shift**

In the ways I have outlined, we can consider anger as a kind of locus where ideologies of language, gender, and affect all converge, creating in that convergence a discursive space in which gender stereotypes are both imagined and acted out. In large measure because of their linguistic practices for publicly dealing with anger, men in Gapun are credited by everyone with greater knowledge about how to handle knowledge, as it were. By exposing anger even as they deny it and conceal it, men present themselves, and are understood by others, as providing and embodying a protective buffer against the ravages of naked anger is known to be able to summon forth. Women, by contrast, brazenly expose anger but subsequently do nothing to mitigate the negative consequences that may be generated by this exposure. This particular linguistic practice of handling anger has become representative of “what women do,” and it permits the maintenance of a stereotype that demeans women as childish, destructive, and irresponsible.

Although there are differences, this situation in many ways parallels Silverstein’s example of the sociolinguistics of seventeenth-century British society, discussed at the beginning of this chapter. In the case of both Quakers in Britain and women in Gapun, a specific group of people comes to be symbolized in meaningful ways through their linguistic practices. Once this symbolic bond becomes marked, it becomes important for people who do not wish to be identified with that group (non-Quakers in Britain and men in Gapun, as well as individual women in the village who do not wish to be negatively labeled by others) to begin avoiding the type of verbal behavior that is seen as indexical of the group. Thus, non-Quakers avoided the familiar second-person address forms, and men in Gapun avoid kroes. The question that arises now is the one with which I began this essay: namely, how is the convergence of anger, gender, and the politics of revelation working to produce a tension in Gapun such that the linguistic situation of the village is moving toward new configurations?

The answer to that question lies in the ideology and practice associated with the two languages that villagers use in their day-to-day talk. Basically, the situation is one in which the vernacular language, Taip, is nowadays associated with tradition, the land, the local concept of bed, and women. Tok Pisin, on the other hand, has come to be bound up with modern processes and phenomena. Tok Pisin is tied to Christianity, white people, money, and schooling; significantly, it is also tied to men and those affective stances that are seen to characterize them.

These associative networks are frequently made explicit in men’s house talk. At some point during each meeting in the men’s house, no matter what the original reason for the meeting happened to be, somebody will inevitably make speech in Tok Pisin extolling Christian ideals, reaffirming the value of education, devaluing the ways of the ancestors, and urging the villagers, and specifically the village women, to suppress their anger and stop their fighting so that everybody can “come up” (kamap ‘change, develop’). The men’s house has thus become an important arena in which individual men can publicly assert their familiarity with the modern world by reminding others that the Catholic Church, school, “Papua New Guinea,” and busia (cash-generating enterprises) have altered the nature of village relationships and must be accorded a central role in village life. In making these assertions, Gapun men are able to substantiate their claims to knowledge about the modern world by choosing to orate primarily in the language through which that world is understood to be constituted—that is, Tok Pisin (cf. Sankoff 1980:44). Angry women employ what amounts to a similar discursive strategy in their public

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<th>Table 4.1 Summary of contrastive features of kroes and oratores</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kroes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>enunciated by women</td>
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<tr>
<td>emanate from individual houses</td>
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<tr>
<td>vulgarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>self-display</td>
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<tr>
<td>competing overlapping monologues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reveal anger</td>
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<td>address intravillage affairs</td>
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<td>vernacular language (Taip) predominates</td>
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speeches. They substantiate their dissatisfaction and foreground their claims to having been violated and impinged on by choosing to announce those claims primarily in the language through which affective discourses is constituted—that is, the village vernacular, Taiaip.

Those practices and the ideas that inform them are moving the village vernacular toward extinction. Powered by its links with women and the associations bound up with stereotypes of them, it seems likely that the Taiaip language itself will increasingly come to be associated with negatively valued aspects of life, such as affective excess, discursive irresponsibility, and dangerous knowledge. This process is already well under way and is evidenced by villagers who sometimes pointedly refuse to speak their vernacular among themselves in order to prove that they are not “hiding” talk (e.g., during periods of millenarian activity or during sensitive meetings with people from other villages) or by village children who understand purposeful parental switches from Tok Pisin into the vernacular as conveying disapproval and anger (Kulick 1992:217).

Like the particular linguistic forms that became connected with seventeenth-century Quakers in Britain, it seems probable that the Taiaip language itself will eventually be abandoned. The main relevance of this in the context of a collection of papers on language ideology is that what we see in Gapun is the way in which particular linguistic practices reinforce and are reinforced by particular ideas that exist in a community about language, affect, gender, and the relationships among those phenomena. By speaking in particular ways, women and men in Gapun activate complex webs of associations that link a wide array of discourses. So women in their krokes are not only spitting curses, and men in their oratories are not only making dispassionate, measured speeches that smooth over conflicts in the village. By using language in the specific ways they do, speakers embody and re-create salient stereotypes about what women and men are, they engender affect, and they position themselves in socially meaningful ways in relation to Christianity, civilization, and the modern world.

One of the contributions that I believe this example from Gapun can make to our discussions of language ideology is the reminder that language ideologies seem never to be solely about language—they are always about entangled clusters of phenomena, and they encompass and are bound up with aspects of culture like gender, and expression, and being “civilized.” Furthermore, this inherently snarled and delicately layered nature of language ideology can provide colonial discourses of Christianity and modernity with numerous sites of entry into local practices and understandings, as well as with ample possibilities to penetrate and, as has happened in Gapun, enmesh themselves with both linguistic practices and local ideas about gender, affect, and language.

NOTES

I am grateful to my colleague Christopher Stroud; to Michael Silverstein, who was my discussant at the invited session “Language Ideologies: Theory and Practice,” organized by Paul Kroskrity, Bambi Schieffelin, and Kit Woolard at the Ninetieth Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Chicago, November 1991; and to all the participants in that session who commented on an earlier version of this paper.

1. Fieldwork in Gapun was carried out during fifteen months in 1986-87, and for two months in 1991. Fieldwork in 1986-87 was financed by the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) and the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR). Fieldwork in 1991 was conducted as part of a postdoctoral fellowship at the Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, and was financed by that department.

2. Throughout this text, words that are underlined and italicized are vernacular language words. Words that are only italicized are Tok Pisin words. In addition, the following transcription conventions are used in the examples:

(  ) unintelligible utterance 
[ ] overlapping utterances
/ self-interruption or false start

Notes on situational context and nonverbal action are given in square brackets [ ] in the body of the transcripts.

3. See also my discussion of oratorical paragranges in Kulick 1992:139-47.

4. Those men known throughout the village as ones who sometimes have krokes are men who are either old widowers or divorced middle-aged men. That is, they are men without access to a woman’s voice. Kulick 1993 is a much more detailed analysis of gender and korses.

REFERENCES

Arizona Tewa Kiva Speech as a Manifestation of a Dominant Language Ideology

PAUL V. KROSKRITY

"What have you learned about the ceremonies?" Back in the summer of 1973, when I first began research on Arizona Tewa, I was often asked this and similar questions by a variety of villagers. I found this strange, even disconcerting, since the questions persisted after I explained my research interest as residing in the language itself, or in "just the language, not the culture." But my response was very much a managed production. For though my originally formulated object of study was the Arizona Tewa language, even early on in what was to become long-term field research I had become very interested in the tangled relationship of Arizona Tewa language, culture, and society. But despite this interest, I had been coached by my academic advisers and informed by a scholarly tradition of research on Pueblo Indians to recognize the cultural sensitivity of research on religion and the suspicion directed at those who would nevertheless attempt to study it, even in its more esoteric forms. My professional training thus encouraged me to attribute these periodic inquiries to a combination of secrecy and suspicion regarding such culturally sensitive topics as ceremonial language. Yet despite my careful attempts to disclaim any research interest in kiva speech (te'ë:hi) and to carefully distinguish between it and the more mundane speech of everyday Arizona Tewa life, I still experienced these occasional interrogations. Did these questions betray a native confusion of the language of the kiva with that of the home and plaza? Was there a connection between these domains of discourse that was apparent to most Tewa