Publications of the Society for Psychological Anthropology

Editors
Robert A. Paul, Graduate Institute of the Liberal Arts, Emory University, Atlanta
Richard A. Shweder, Committee on Human Development, The University of Chicago

Publications of the Society for Psychological Anthropology is a joint initiative of Cambridge University Press and the Society for Psychological Anthropology, a unit of the American Anthropological Association. The series has been established to publish books in psychological anthropology and related fields of cognitive anthropology, ethnopsychology, and cultural psychology. It will include works of original theory, empirical research, and edited collections that address current issues. The creation of this series reflects a renewed interest among culture theorists in ideas about the self, mind–body interaction, social cognition, mental models, processes of cultural acquisition, motivation and agency, gender, and emotion.

The books will appeal to an international readership of scholars, students, and professionals in the social sciences.

Human motives and cultural models

Edited by
Roy G. D’Andrade
University of California, San Diego

Claudia Strauss
Duke University

Cambridge University Press
Contents

List of illustrations  ix
Preface  xi
List of contributors  xiii

1 Models and motives  1
   Claudia Strauss

Part I Cultural models as motives  21
2 Schemas and motivation  23
   Roy G. D'Andrade
3 Ghost busters in anthropology  45
   Richard A. Shweder

Part II How do cultural models become motives?  59
4 How cultural systems become desire: a case study of American romance  61
   Dorothy C. Holland
5 The motivational force of self-understanding: evidence from wives' inner conflicts  90
   Naomi Quinn
6 The directive force of morality tales in a Mexican community  127
   Holly F. Mathews
7 Learning to be an American parent: how cultural models gain directive force  163
   Sara Harkness, Charles M. Super, and Constance H. Keefer

Part III Cultural models as motives reconsidered  179
8 Motivated models  181
   Catherine Lutz
9 What makes Tony run?
Schemas as motives reconsidered

Claudia Strauss

It is obvious that people's wants are shaped, to a large extent, by their culture. There are probably few goals shared by !Kung hunter-gatherers, United States businesspeople, and Hindu renouncers. But how, exactly, does culture shape motivation?

Following some recent work by Roy D'Andrade (1984, 1990, this volume), I assume that insight into this problem can be provided by looking at the cognitive representation of cultural knowledge. Unlike D'Andrade, however, I argue that cognitive representations can differ in the kind of motivational force they provide. This paper focuses on five Rhode Island male blue-collar workers' talk about "getting ahead." I also know about some significant choices they have made in their work lives. What I found is that their choices have been directed by three types of knowledge. These three types of knowledge differ not just in content, but also in form of cognitive representation, manner of verbal expression, and type of motivational effect.

Schemas and directive force

D'Andrade's central thesis is that culturally formed cognitive schemas not only determine our interpretation of the world but also direct our actions in it, often serving as goals. To appreciate this claim it is necessary to understand what a cognitive schema is.

Casson (1983) provides a helpful review of the cognitive science literature on schemas. Although this notion has received different treatments by different theorists, and has even been presented under different names (e.g., "scripts," "frames," and "scenarios"), the core concept is that schemata are conceptual abstractions that mediate between stimuli received by the sense organs and behavioral responses ... not all stimuli are stored in memory; rather, schemata are employed to provide "a general impression of the whole" and to construct (or reconstruct) "probable details." (1983:430)
Rumelhart provides a similar explanation:

According to schema theories, all knowledge is packaged into units. These units are the schemata. Embedded in these packets of knowledge is, in addition to the knowledge itself, information about how this knowledge is to be used.

A schema, then, is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. *(1980:34; emphasis mine)*

One famous example of a schema is our knowledge of the typical sequence of events when we eat at a restaurant. This schema organizes our perceptions of ongoing restaurant experiences and our memories of earlier ones. It is also the basis for interpreting others' discourses, because speakers in this society can leave most of this background knowledge unsaid when talking about particular dining-out experiences *(Schank and Abelson 1977)*. Finally, this schema clearly has directive force for us: if we are eating in a restaurant, we generally feel motivated to follow the restaurant "script" (i.e., pick choices from a menu, tell them to a waiter or waitress, eat, wait for a check, pay it, leave a tip, and go out). To put it as D'Andrade does, the restaurant schema has goals "embedded" in it.

Gerber *(1985)* provides another good example of a schema with directive force. The Samoan term *alofa*, loosely equivalent to our "love," is linked to the following scenario:

an old person, often portrayed as a stranger, is seen walking along the road, carrying a heavy burden. It is hot, and perhaps the elder seems ill or tired. The appropriate response in this instance is a feeling of *alofa*, which implies helpful or giving actions such as taking over the burden or providing a cool drink and a place to rest. *(Gerber 1985:145)*.

In other words Samoans have an *alofa* schema, which links this term to the above scenario. The Samoan *alofa* schema, like our restaurant schema, has embedded in it certain goals for action: if one sees an old person who is hot, tired, and overburdened, one should offer refreshment or help. Thus, the Samoan *alofa* schema is a good example of a cultural model with directive force.

The goal-embedded schema model of motivation has many advantages over previous approaches. D'Andrade notes that earlier motivational research searched for a small, cross-culturally applicable set of measurable motives that worked like the drives of hunger and sex. If goals are seen as embedded in schemata, on the other hand, there is room for cross-cultural variation and no need to specify a single, fixed list of human motives. The fact that the goals embedded in any schema are not always activated – as D'Andrade points out, we know chairs are for sitting in, but we do not feel motivated to sit just because we see a chair – can be explained by seeing at what level a schema contributes to the interpretation of a situation. Thus,

What makes 'Tony run?'

One recognizes some chair as part of the "finding a seat" schema, which is part of the "attending a lecture" schema,which is part of the "finding out what's going on" schema, which may be for some people part of the "doing anthropology" schema . . . (this volume: 30).

D'Andrade proposes that the schemas at higher levels of interpretation (e.g., doing anthropology or getting ahead) will trigger their embedded goals more than those at lower levels of interpretation: "a person's most general interpretations of what is going on will function as important goals for that person" *(this volume: 30)*.

I agree with D'Andrade that a goal-embedded schema theory of motivation has the advantages he cites over earlier motivational research.

My own study of five working men's success discourse has led me, however, to the conclusion that high-level cultural schemas do not necessarily serve as important goals. The motivational effect of cultural knowledge depends on other features of its cognitive representation. My interviewees' discourse about getting ahead, and the career choices they have made, reflect three different types of cognitive representation, each of which has qualitatively different motivational effects.

Consider first the widely shared, easily verbalized values that underpin the "American Dream": with hard work anyone in America can get ahead, and everyone should strive to do so. Although my interviewees voiced this success model, they appear to hold it in a bounded way. By "bounded" I mean these ideas are only weakly linked to the rest of the belief-holder's knowledge structure. Furthermore, my interviewees were able to see these values as values. Their discourse shows not only an acceptance of success values, but also an awareness that these values are dominant ones in our society. Success values are a good example of what D'Andrade calls "a person's most general interpretations," which are supposed to act as motivators. Yet success values did not greatly influence the career choices most of my interviewees made. This surprising finding is discussed in the next section.

In the following section I turn to a more class- and gender-specific schema held by my interviewees. Much of their discourse about being breadwinner suggests that they are not aware of these values as values, seeing them instead as inescapable reality. Breadwinner values, unlike success values, did direct my interviewees' routine behavior.

Although my interviewees share many beliefs about work and success, each also has a unique outlook stored not in the bounded way of the success model, but as an unbounded network linking key symbols, emotionally salient experiences, and ideas about himself. These personal semantic networks, the third form of belief discussed below, have had a still different sort of directive force, guiding each man toward idiosyn-
critic self-defining goals and general styles of behavior. This is illustrated, in the penultimate section, with the discourse of one interviewee, Tony D’Abrosca. Tony’s accomplishments as a runner fit into a personal semantic network linking athletic achievement to childhood memories, feelings of distance from others, and current political values.

The final section speculates that these different forms of cognition are the products of different sorts of cultural messages and briefly considers the implications of these findings for a theory of culture.

American success values

D’Andrade (1984) has used American beliefs about success as an example of a cultural model with strong directive force. He notes that from some interview data he has collected:

It seems to be the case that Americans think that if one has ability, and if, because of competition or one’s own strong drive, one works hard at achieving high goals, one will reach an outstanding level of accomplishment. And when one reaches this level, one will be recognized as a success, which brings prestige and self-satisfaction. (1984:98)

He adds about the American emphasis on success:

There are external sanctions involving money and employment, there are conformity pressures of many kinds, and there are the direct personal rewards and value satisfactions already mentioned. Perhaps what is surprising is that anyone can resist the directive force of such a system – that there are incorrigibles. (1984:98)

I found that in certain contexts, several of my interviewees voiced the same ideas about success as D’Andrade’s interviewees. The main difference is that D’Andrade’s interviewees seem to have had a model that transcended purely economic criteria, whereas most of my informants, like the white-collar managers and professionals interviewed by Robert Bellah and his colleagues (1985) associate high goals and hard work with upward mobility.

In 1985 I conducted a series of semistructured interviews with four neighbors (two male, two female) and six union and management employees (all male) of a batch-processing chemical plant in Cranston, Rhode Island. This plant, owned by Ciba-Geigy Ltd., a multinational pharmaceutical and chemical company, had been a source of local controversy, first for its noxious discharges, later for its decision to close and leave the state. Over the course of six to seven lengthy interview sessions we talked about the Ciba-Geigy controversy, the role of business in American society, current events, general political and economic questions, and their own work experiences and life histories. The first five interview sessions with each person were very loosely structured around a common set of topics that got covered sooner or later with each interviewee. In the sixth interview session I asked a series of open-ended but standardized questions about our social system. The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed.

This analysis focuses on the responses of the five working-class men in the interview group. Four were employees and one was a neighbor of the Cranston Ciba-Geigy plant. The men are all native Rhode Islanders in their forties or fifties, are married and have children, had between nine and twelve years of schooling, and have (or had — some are now retired) skilled or semiskilled blue-collar occupations. All are white and their ethnic backgrounds cover the four most common Rhode Island ethnic groups: Italian-American, FrenchCanadian, Irish, and Yankee.

The questions that most reliably elicited shared American success values came from the standardized series used in the last interview. At one point I asked (one at a time): “What things keep people from getting ahead in the world?” “Who or what is to blame for this?” “What things help people to get ahead?” and “Is the system fair? Does everyone pretty much have the same chance to get ahead?” Later in the same interview I asked each man if he agreed strongly, agreed somewhat, disagreed somewhat, or disagreed strongly with the statement, “Anybody can get ahead if they just work hard enough.” Here are the answers four of the men gave to one of those questions. (Underline indicates my emphasis; italics the speaker’s.)

1. CS: If people can’t get ahead in the world, who is to blame for that?
   Jim Lovett: I don’t know that you could blame any one. You, you are the one to blame. It’s you. Because … you can achieve anything your mind can conceive. If you can think—the, if you have an idea. [del] And if you think about it hard enough. And you want it bad enough. Then you can achieve it. There’s nothing on this, in this country or on earth that if you were willing enough to work at it, that you cannot achieve it. So we all have the potential of being a millionaire, if that is your goal. You’ve got to have a goal. And if you’re willing to work at it, hard enough, then you can achieve it. So, it goes right back down to you. [del] If it’s your own personal drive if you will or your goals. Everyone should have a goal. (6:17–18)

2. George Gauvin [responding to “Anybody can get ahead if they just work hard enough”]: I would say that’s true. You’ve got to work, you’ve got to really try to better yourself. Even if you’re not — you don’t have to be on top, but improve your job, improve your class. You start off as a helper, you become good, you become a journeyman — have to work hard at it. (6:24)

3. Daniel Collins [responding to “Anybody can get ahead if they just work hard
enough”); I strongly agree with that… I believe if you put an effort into anything, you can get ahead. Just [like] myself, where I have to put the effort into learning, again. You know. If I want to succeed, I’ll succeed. It has to be, come from within here. Nobody else is going to make you succeed but yourself… And, if anybody disagrees with that, there’s something wrong with them. (6:27–8).

4. CS: “What things keep people from getting ahead in the world?”
Anthony Gallucci: Brains and… not having any initiative or… money. Some people don’t want to get ahead. Too much responsibility, I guess, you know, in some [cases]… It could be laziness. [In answer to later questions, he adds:] I would think if you were trying to bring your kids up properly and… show them, I mean, try to show them what the advantages of having a good job – or disadvantages of digging a ditch. [del] It all depends how bad you want something. Your kids going to school now, pump gas and work at hamburger places and everything else, trying to save a few bucks, help pay their way to college, anyway. I think if you want it bad enough, there’s ways. (6:12–13).

Each of these men claims that anyone can get ahead and either states or implies that one should want to.

Only one man, Tony D’Arosca, seriously disputed in response to these questions the premise that anyone can get ahead and the value of doing so:

5. CS: “Does everyone pretty much have the same chance to get ahead?”
D’Arosca: [del] That’s the old saw, you know. “Anybody can get ahead.” “Lot of opportunities.” Nah. There is for some… There is for some. They get the opportunity to skin the small guys. That’s how I look at it. (6:32)

One thing that is distinctive about the way these ideas were held by my interviewees, compared to many of their other beliefs, is that they could see them as values. This is obvious from D’Arosca’s statement (“That’s the old saw, you know” [5]), but the values embedded in this model were not accessible only to someone who disputed it. Every man but one spoke at some point as if he were aware that he might be judged by the criteria of the success model and found wanting.

Some particularly clear examples of this awareness come from Jim Lovett’s speech:

6. I’m happily married. And I’ve got three terrific kids and wonderful grandchildren. I feel so, that with my education, which was only to the ninth grade, I’ve been fairly successful, um, raising my family. (1:2)

7. So I was always able to provide a decent living for my family. We never had a lot of – my own, my own family – a lot of elaborate things perhaps. We always were the last one in the, in my group that I grew up with or went to school with, to have a new car. But. We – our children never went without clothing. They never went hungry. And Irene and I would probably not get to go to the movies or go out to dinner as often as the others did, but our children never went without. So we were in a sense good parents or providers or whatever. And we look back on it now with the others that did afford, could afford themselves night clubs and, and restaurants and new cars. That their children, because of it, have to be left with a babysitter a lot more than my children because we did stay with them. We were involved with them and they weren’t. So… their children have grown up and gotten married and divorced where – and fallen away a little bit because maybe they weren’t attended to by their family, or, or afforded their parents as they grew up as much as my children were. (5:18)

What is the meaning of the pause in 6. after Lovett says he was “fairly successful”? The construction of “I feel so, that with my education, which was only to the ninth grade, I’ve been fairly successful,” which implicitly contrasts his “success” with his education, suggests that Lovett was starting to say something about his success in monetary terms. Probably he was starting to say that even though he dropped out after the ninth grade, he still made a fairly good living. But then he stopped, perhaps realizing that most people would not say that he has made a good living, would not judge him to have been successful in those terms. (When I interviewed Lovett, he had been out of work for seven years with a crippling occupational disability. His workers’ compensation payments, frozen at a rate determined by his wages when he left work, put him just over the poverty line.) So in 6. Lovett pauses, then completes the thought by saying that he was successful at raising his family. Passage 7. shows the same realization that others (perhaps the friends who can afford the new cars and movies and night clubs) might judge him to have been a failure by the goals of the success model.

A similar awareness is apparent in the following remarks by Anthony Gallucci:

8. CS: Is there anything about your life that you would do over, if you could?
Gallucci: [del] I had a good time at Ciba-Geigy. I mean, I wouldn’t, if I could find something better, naturally, I would do something better, but if I – for a poor working man, I had a good time there, over the years, for the most part. (5:20)

9. [Gallucci mentioned that some workers at Ciba-Geigy can get enough overtime and holiday pay to make a salary of $40,000. He added] Which isn’t the same for you, know, nobodies. (5:32)

Gallucci, more than anyone else I interviewed, used terms like the ones highlighted above to put himself and fellow workers down. It may be that he actually is embarrassed to be a working man or it might be something more complicated – that he anticipates that I will look down on him and
so talks about himself and his fellow workers from what he imagines is my point of view, which is not one he shares necessarily. In any case, Gallucci shows an awareness that the dominant social judgment is that one should strive to be more than a "poor working man."

Even D'Abrosca anticipated and reacted to the social judgment that he had not made enough money:

10. CS: "What things keep people from getting ahead in the world?"

D'Abrosca: [del] like me, I'm not cut out for business. I couldn't charge a guy ten bucks for something I paid five for. You know. And . . . There's a certain makeup there you [?] have to be, to be a businessman. I did the best I could with my education and knowledge and skills. I'm not rich, I'm not poor. I'm happy with what I have. I've got a home and the kids have grown up pretty good. (6:15)

Daniel Collins spoke with greater pride and less defensiveness than some of the others about a key decision that kept him from getting ahead. Twice he was offered promotions into management at Ciba-Geigy, and both times he turned the offers down. The second refusal came when Collins held an elected position in his union's local. He felt he could not betray the men who had elected him by becoming a foreman. At one point Collins recollected a conversation with the plant manager who had offered him that promotion:

11. He said, "You stupe," he said, "You could have been a boss there." I said, "Well, I chose to do what I'm doing." I said, "Maybe in later life," I said, "It might haunt me." [laughs] [del] I look back and I'm not mad at myself. I'm happy that I, you know, didn't take that type of job instead of what I had to contribute to my fellow workers and the union and international. [del] I don't kick myself in the funny as some people would say for not taking it. (2:12)

Collins had spoken earlier of how much more money he could have made as a foreman than as a worker, especially in severance benefits from the plant closing. So this statement, too, is a reply to the judgment that he did not make the smartest moves he could have to get ahead.

Collins's decision to remain in the union may seem surprising, given his explicit assertion of success values. (Later he said that he agreed with the statement, "I usually admire successful businessmen," adding, "I do, anybody who succeeds, I admire him")[6:32]. In fact, of the four men who endorsed success values in response to my questions about getting ahead, only one made career choices consistent with those values.

The one man whose behavior was strongly directed by the goals of the success model was George Gauvin. Gauvin presented his life history as a success story, stressing how he overcame a physical handicap, learned a trade, and was able to support his family fairly well through a strategic series of job moves when he was young. He said that when he was young, his friends never knew where he was working, because if he learned he could make a few more dollars somewhere else, he would be there. Even after he had settled in at Ciba-Geigy, he persistently applied for the position of lead man in his department in an effort to get ahead.

Jim Lovett, like George Gauvin, learned a trade so that he could make more money than an unskilled worker would. Unlike Gauvin, however, Lovett stayed at a job that did not pay especially well and did not pursue promotions. He considered but decided against moving to another state where his skills would have brought a higher income, because he and his wife felt they should remain near their aging parents.

Gallucci, like Collins, turned down an opportunity to take a foreman's position at Ciba-Geigy. Collins had been interested, however, in advancing in the ranks of his union's international. Gallucci, on the other hand, consistently placed working conditions and personal relationships above economic advancement. He left a better-paying job with the railroads to begin working at the chemical plant because the hours of his first job did not leave him enough time to date the woman he later married. At Ciba-Geigy he turned down at least one opportunity for a promotion into management and then moved to a position in the company that promised to pay less well, but had better hours and less supervision. After moving to this department he avoided overtime assignments and promotion into a higher rank with better pay, but more unpleasant work duties. Since Ciba-Geigy's closing, although Gallucci is only fifty-six, he has retired.

Tony D'Abrosca, the only man who thoroughly rejected the success model (elsewhere he said, "Small things make me happy. Not money") [3:5], in fact worked harder than anyone else in this group to earn a good living. This is not as inconsistent as it sounds, because D'Abrosca also had a larger family to support than any of the other men did. Still, in 1985 D'Abrosca reported an income significantly higher than that of my other blue-collar interviewees. Unlike Gallucci, D'Abrosca worked two jobs much of his life and chose a career path at Ciba-Geigy that gave him many overtime opportunities, which he took. Also unlike Gallucci, who retired when Ciba-Geigy closed, D'Abrosca, at sixty-one, went back to work.

In sum, explicit belief or disbelief in American success values is only weakly correlated with the actual behaviors of these five working men. Why is this?

My explanation turns on the way success values were internalized as cognitive schemas by my interviewees. For most of them success values seem to be held as a relatively isolated, compact package of ideas that is only weakly linked to a larger picture of reality or sense of self. Connections of the latter sort may be necessary to motivate action.
Some evidence for the supposition that my interviewees hold the success model in a bounded way comes from the fact that their beliefs could be stated compactly, in the space of a few sentences. This suggests a correspondingly compact form of storage. Further evidence for the bounded way in which these beliefs were held comes from two men who stated the same ideas earlier in the course of the interviews. The earlier expressions of the model are given in the first column, the later expressions (from above) are given in the second column. Notice how similar they are.

12. [Jim Lovett is talking about the Amway sales organization, which he and his wife have been part of for many years] There’s a, we used to have a little saying that if your mind can conceive it, then you can achieve it. It’s like, you know, whatever your mind can conceive, you can achieve. But you only get out of anything what you’re willing to put into it. And if you’re going to lazy around, then you’re going to lazy. That’s what you’re going to earn, is lazying around. But if you’re going to work, you’re going to earn something.

13. [Collins is talking about his plans to go to college for training in a new field] I see on TV where people sixty-five, sixty-eight years old, graduating from college, so that kind of inspires me to say, Yea, I can do it. If they can do it, I can do it... You know, it's just a matter of applying yourself. And wanting to succeed.

The largely unchanged way Collins and Lovett repeated their views is further evidence for a bounded form of storage. An illuminating description of bounded storage was once given by Robert Abelson. He proposed the following:

Let us postulate the existence of self-contained cognitive units called opinion molecules... [which] give you something to say and think when the topic comes up... These sorts of opinions are often quite impervious to other levels of argumentation because of their complete, closed, molecular character. It is as if the opinion-holder were saying, "what else could there possibly be to add?" (1968a:27)

The bounded, packaged quality of this kind of knowledge was earlier described by Mikhail Bakhtin as a feature of "authoritative discourse": "It remains sharply demarcated, compact and inert... It enters our verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, or totally reject it." (1981:343).

Abelson's "opinion molecules" and Bakhtin's "authoritative discourse" are examples of knowledge that is held in an isolated, encapsulated, bounded way. Both theorists also describe knowledge that is less bounded. Similarly, Rumelhart, quoted above from a 1980 publication as asserting the building blocks of cognition to be "packets of knowledge," is one of the propounders of a new theory of cognition, connectionism, which proposes the building blocks of cognition to be not large packets of knowledge but smaller units modeled after neurons (Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP Research Group 1986). Units can be joined in many different configurations, from bounded packages to unbounded networks. I argue below that beliefs represented in the latter way - especially when they include links to key childhood memories and self-understandings - do embed strongly motivating goals.

Before turning to unbounded beliefs, however, we should consider some beliefs that contrast with my interviewees' success values in a different way. As discussed above, their talk about getting ahead indicated a meta-awareness that these values are dominant social values. This contrasts with much of their discourse about their duties as the breadwinner in the family. The latter talk suggests that breadwinner values typically come to consciousness not as values, but as an inescapable reality.

**Working men's breadwinner assumptions**

These ideas were expressed in statements like the following:

14. [Collins is discussing the workers' fight against Ciba-Geigy's proposal mandating Sunday work] But when that changed and it was negotiated through a contract that you would work, so you had to change or keep losing that eight hours pay. With three children, I couldn't afford it. So I had to go with the flow and work the Sundays. (1:7)

15. [D’Abrosca is talking about why he worked at Ciba-Geigy] Lot of people getting cancer there. So - over the years. And... it's a risk. We know it. And - but the money's good. This state doesn't have too many good-paying jobs. So, we're sort of trapped. So, I wouldn't want my kid going there. If he had a choice. (1:5)
16. [Lovett is explaining why more workers don’t report hazards at the workplace] And if you’re making good money, you’re not going to make no waves. Even if your buddy next to you is dying with whatever that caused it, that you know. You’re still not going to make waves. I mean, if a guy’s making a living, you now, he’s just not going to do that, unless he’s ready to make a move. (1:15)

17. [Gauvin is sixty-two and would like to stop working, but Ciba-Geigy has made it difficult for him to retire] They keep me there, they keep me there, and I want to leave, and now they want me to stay. (6:5)

Unlike the individualistic success model expressed in 1.4., passages 14–17. assume that the interests of the family come ahead of the interests of any individual, including the father/husband/breadwinner. Bellah et al. (1985) found that some of their white-collar informants carried their individualism to the extreme of not being sure they had any responsibility for their families. The individualistic focus on my interviewee’s success model was also clear. Thus, Lovett said, “you can achieve anything your mind can conceive” (1.). Gauvin urged, “you’ve got to really try to better yourself” (2.). and Collins stated, “if you put an effort into anything, you can get ahead” (3.). By contrast, see 14. in this section, and 7. and 10. in the last, where Collins, Lovett, and D’Abrasca state explicitly their responsibility for their families, especially their children. The same assumption is implicit in 15.–17. above. Gauvin, for example, went on to say that he has to have Blue Cross coverage because his wife is sick.

Furthermore, this is not, as in the success model, a matter of putting upward mobility ahead of all else. The men were not talking about the possibility of upward mobility so much as the pitfalls of downward mobility. Each man was considering a situation in which he or someone like him held a job that paid well – and the question was whether or not to keep it. If the alternative is another manufacturing job, this could easily mean, at least for the Ciba-Geigy workers, a much lower income. In 1985 most of the Ciba-Geigy workers I interviewed had incomes between $20,000 and $25,000. In Rhode Island as a whole, the average manufacturing wage in 1985 was only $15,860.12 So it is not a question of striving for wealth above all, but of avoiding near-poverty.

These working men’s breadwinner values have in common with middle-class gender-role expectations the idea that an adult male’s income should be his family’s primary source of support. My interviewees’ norms differ from white-collar versions of these gender-role expectations, however, in three ways. First, it is not necessary for the breadwinner to advance his family’s fortunes; it is sufficient if he has a steady paycheck that covers the bills. Furthermore, unlike the middle-class man’s version, which is closely linked to the success model, the focus in the working man’s model is not on the individual, but on the family. In the working man’s model, the interests of the family come ahead of the interests of any one individual in the family.13 It follows that getting and keeping a job that pays well enough (in wages and benefits) to ensure that his family is secure is more important than the breadwinner’s self-fulfillment or personal needs. Also part of this model is the knowledge – for Rhode Islanders with a high-school education or less – that there are not many jobs in the state for men of their skills that pay a decent wage.

Thus far I have discussed only the content of this model. In comparing the way my interviewees talked about success in 1.4. with passages 14.–17. above, I was also struck by the use of constructions in the former passages that indicated a sense of choice between values, as compared with constructions in the latter passages that indicated a sense of constraints imposed by inescapable realities.

Thus, in answering my questions about getting ahead, Lovett said, “if you’re willing to work at it . . .” and “Everyone should have a goal” (1.). Collins said, “If I want to succeed, I’ll succeed.” Gauvin said, “Some people don’t want to get ahead” (4.). Finally, Gauvin exhorted a generalized “you” to “improve your job” (2.).

By contrast, in talking about the sorts of situations they or others have faced as breadwinners, Collins said, “I had to go with the flow” (14.). D’Abrasca said, “We’re sort of trapped.” Lovett asserted flatly that unless a worker is ready to leave the job, “You’re not going to make no waves” (16.). And Gauvin said that the company “keeps me there” (17.).

Of course, these men are not literally trapped, without any choice, in jobs that are tiring, dangerous, and interfere with family life. They could report hazards on the job. But to do so would probably mean a drastic loss of income. The metaphors of necessity these men use hide the implicit value premise that downward mobility is bad, highlighting instead the day-to-day realities of their work lives.

This does not mean that these men are unable to see that they have a choice. On another occasion Collins was talking about how his life had become very routine:

18. No, boredom did set in, I believe, after twelve or fourteen years, I was kind of getting edgy and said, Wish I would go somewhere else or go look for something. But I never did, the one factor was that the money was too good to, you know, to say, “I’m going to go somewhere else for $3 [an hour] less. So, I guess you get married to the job after a while . . . And I guess, that’s kind of why you like to stay in that field because the money, the money is there. You know, you get to say, Well, I like putting a few dollars in the bank account and doing what I like to do. But if you go down and do some different type of work, especially in this state, the money isn’t there. (6:5)
The first part of this statement shows a sense of constraint, similar to that exhibited in 14–17. above ("you get married to the job after a while"). Then, however, Collins pauses and indicates that he could have left the job; it is just that he liked the wage scale there, which gave him the money for "doing what I like to do."

Similarly, a few minutes after Gauvin said that the company "keeps me there" (17.), he spoke in a different vein about making choices rather than being held against his will:

19. And they want to keep me there? I'll stay. Okay. Otherwise, if I go, I lose my severance pay and my Blue Cross. (6:6)

So it is not quite the case that my interviewees cannot see that they have a choice. What is at stake is how they tend to think. Their tendency, as shown by the way they usually talked, is not to see the value of avoiding downward mobility as a value. This is quite different from the way they talked about success, which they consistently treated as a value.

There is also a clear difference between success and breadwinner values in their directive force. Knowing that the success model represents widely shared values led several men to respond verbally—defensively in some cases, with pride in others—to the imagined judgment that they had not been very successful. It may be that awareness of their failure to live up to these values has affected their self-esteem. However, this model was less effective than the breadwinner model at motivating action: only one of the blue-collar interviewees who endorsed the model acted on it consistently in his work life. Every man who spoke of breadwinner role expectations as an inescapable reality, on the other hand, assumed primary responsibility for supporting his family, subordinating his own interests to the need to keep a steady paycheck coming. For these four men at least, the values they felt constrained by were usually seen not as values, but as simple reality.14

Only Gallucci—the one man for whom I did not find a quote comparable to 14–17. above—seems to have seen and acted on the belief that downward mobility is a real choice. In one sense Gallucci did subordinate his interests by going to work in a dangerous environment as a chemical plant. (Although the long-term health effects of these chemicals were not publicized until recently, the risks of fire, toxic leaks, and explosion were obvious all along.) On the other hand, even though Gallucci had a family to support, he moved to a position in the plant that paid less well but allowed him to escape the close contact with chemicals, rotating shifts, and strict supervision he had faced as a chemical operator. This is consistent with his initial decision to work at the chemical plant,

What makes Tony run?

where he made less money initially than he had in his previous job but had more time to court the woman he married.

personal semantic networks

My understanding of "semantic networks" relies on the significant insight of symbolic anthropologists that symbols draw their force from their links with concepts from diverse realms of experience (Good 1977).15 The webs of significance that can stretch from house layouts to kinship structures and cosmology are good examples of outlooks represented in an unbounded way rather than as bounded "packets of knowledge." (Unbounded networks can be composed of smaller, bounded sets of beliefs; although the constituents may be bounded, the whole is not.)

Personal semantic networks are the idiosyncratic webs of meaning carried by each person, linking individually salient verbal symbols to memories of significant life experiences and conscious self-understandings (Quinn, this volume). Everyone I interviewed had a different cognitive network of this sort. Each man's personal semantic network has directed him toward an idiosyncratic pattern of self-defining goals and styles of behavior.

How are cognitive links expressed in discourse? The following aspects of discourse may be indicative of strong associations in cognition:

Contiguity. In the absence of any interruptions that change the topic of the conversation, if idea B follows idea A in a person's discourse, then B and A are linked for them.

Significant terms. If a person talks about A and B using the same significant terms, then A and B are linked for them.

Shared "voice." If a person talks about A and B using the same "voice" (Bakhtin 1981), i.e., with the same outlook and mode of expression, then A and B are linked for them. (In this paper lexical rather than paralinguistic features are used as the primary indicator of "voice.").

These clues can help us construct part of Tony D'Abrosca's personal semantic network.

Tony D'Abrosca was fifty-nine when I interviewed him, married, with children and grandchildren. He had been working at Ciba-Geigy for twenty-five years, first as a chemical operator, then as a maintenance mechanic. His discourse revealed a personal semantic network that links up the following ideas: memories of growing up poor, concerns about social injustice in America, the conviction that his views about social injustice are very different from most people's, the idea that his values and beliefs are different from his siblings' and parents', the sense that his
childhood asthma helped make him different, and the realization that his childhood asthma makes him now want to compete in marathons.

D’Abrosca, the oldest in a family of eleven children, grew up poor. His parents, immigrants from Italy, both worked in Rhode Island’s textile mills, where D’Abrosca, too, worked for many years before taking a job at Ciba-Geigy. Although D’Abrosca has worked hard and had the highest income of the working men I talked to, he still identifies with the “poor.”

20. [CS asks for TD’s overall attitudes about business.]
TD: Well, businessmen I think would sell us for a buck. [del] And . . . well all my sisters and brothers are all in business. Most of them are and I shouldn’t feel that way, but . . . [del] That’s my attitude on businessmen. Businessmen are to me, are a shady bunch. That, that’s my feeling. So, and . . . I can’t see soaking a poor guy. Because I was poor, I was one of eleven kids. The oldest. And we were all poor. (1:4)

21. CS: What do you think of the free enterprise system?
TD: Well here I go. Free enterprise. I think . . . too many guys have too much greed in them. And . . . they want all they can get for . . . at the expense of others. You know? The businessman is out for one thing — money. (3:13–14)

D’Abrosca connects his criticism of businesspeople to a more general critique of American society. He is not hesitant to voice these opinions — whether in discussions at work or in his frequent, caustic letters to the editor of the Providence paper. The following letter, written after Ronald Reagan’s re-election, is representative in both content and tone:

22. The results of the recent elections indicate to me that either there are 52 million rich Americans or else we have become a nation of insensitive, uncaring dits with no social or moral conscience. Since this majority is so concerned with only number one and so infatuated with greed, superficiality, and timeliness, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the following changes made soon:
1. Move the US Capitol to America’s mecca, Disneyland.
2. Redesign the American flag to a facsimile of the dollar bill and pledge allegiance to same.
3. Change the National Anthem to that inspiring tune, “Hooray for Hollywood” complete with chorus line and soft-shoe dance.

The use of the word “greed” and the references to money in this letter connect these ideas to D’Abrosca’s criticism of businesspeople like his siblings (20., 21.). It is evident from 22. that D’Abrosca sees himself as different not only from his siblings, but also from most Americans. This theme, the consciousness of being different, was repeated often in the context of talking about his politics:

23. [CS asked who would agree with the statement, “People on top in society don’t really care about the little guy.” TD agreed, then CS asked who else would agree with that.]
TD: I don’t know. I’m unique I think, in a lot of these thoughts. I mean . . . Who would agree with me? [del] The working man is so busy working that he doesn’t think about these things. Seems to me. (laughs) I don’t know what it is. They’ve got no opinions — there’s a vacuum in their head. The working guys . . . Like I told you, they voted Reagan in. That’s — they don’t think it out. (6:31–2)

24. [CS mentioned that TD has taken “different stands on certain issues.”]
TD: Yes, I’m different.
CS: Yea.
TD: I’m one of a kind maybe. I don’t know. (6:6)

As 23. indicates, D’Abrosca has particular scorn for his fellow working men: “there’s a vacuum in their head.” This theme, how uninformed his work-mates and other working men are, was also repeated often:

25. I’m not a Communist. I’m just a socialist. I’m not Communist. I like . . . I want the people to have a fair deal, so — fair break. I’m against what these people are doing here for the rich, you know. The rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Like the old saying goes, and it’s true. And . . . I’m called Communist. At work. By a few guys. That’s their scape word, you know. Cop out. Try to talk to these guys and forget it. I may as well [just] talk Red Sox to them. (2:33)

D’Abrosca sees himself as being different from others (e.g., more bookish) since his childhood. He explains this as being the result, in part, of his severe childhood asthma:

26. [CS asked if TD “went with the crowd” more as a child.]
TD: I never did. I had my own way of thinking. If they want to jump off a bridge somewhere, I wouldn’t do it. Unless I’d want to do it. When I was a kid I had asthma. Real bad. And when I was about nine I couldn’t even walk. (6:10)

27. [CS asked if it was tough being a young boy and not being athletic.]
TD: I could never play. You know, with the other kids. So I took to books. (6:12)

D’Abrosca also connects his childhood asthma to his desire to compete in marathons now:

28. TD: It’s different. Test yourself. I had asthma as a boy. I still have it and I wanted to see what I could do. Wanted to prove to myself I could do something because as a young boy I’d dream about Boston Marathon. Impossible dream then, you know? Cause of the asthma. Now I’ve done it three times. (2:12)

Finally, D’Abrosca links up his interest in running marathons to his
critique of his family's concerns with money, closing the circle to the ideas with which we began:

29. CS: Do you think you pretty much lived up to your parent's expectations for you? What would you've hoped for you?
TD: I don't know. The boy - the other kids did. Went in business. They're all proud of them and bragging about them. Which is normal I guess. I'm not sure if they ever bragged about me or not. They never did in front of me. One time I was so proud, I ran in that 50-mile race, I won the New England championship. I called up, I was all excited you know? "Are you crazy? You're an old man. You should be in a rocking chair." That shot me down. But . . . that's my mother. My father was dead. He died back in '68 I think. And . . . that was the end of that. That was one thing I was really proud about, but . . . no one else was I guess. Well my wife and kids were. It's a sense of values I guess. I guess if I told them I made a million dollars they'd be out of their minds but, it was only a race, so it didn't count. It counted to me. I was happy with it. So, I was happy when my kid ran his first marathon. You know. Small things make me happy. Not money. (5:5)

Fig. 9.1 summarizes the connections I have discussed above. Some of these connections were indicated by contiguity of topics within a passage (e.g., marathon running and making money in 29, or attitudes toward businessmen and attitudes toward his siblings in 20). Cognitive links were also indicated by shared significant verbal symbols in different passages (e.g., "money" in 21 and 29, or "greed" in 21 and 22). Finally, there is a shared "voice" - the same embattled, sarcastic tone - expressed in many of these passages (e.g., 22, 23, and 25). These aspects of discourse, especially when they occur in combination, strongly suggest cognitive links.

Note how different this whole network of ideas is from the bounded success model each interviewee was able to express compactly in response to my standardized interview questions about getting ahead. There was no time in the interviews when D'Abrosca compactly described this whole set of ideas, indeed, he may never at any one time be aware of the whole set. The extensiveness of the ideas encompassed (and I could have described further linkages with, for example, his ideas about war or about family roles) probably makes it impossible to capture the whole within awareness. What we have here is not a bounded opinion, but an unbounded network (containing within it, to be sure, many bounded opinions).

Two elements of this unbounded network have acted as strong motives for D'Abrosca. He has published his political views in frequent letters to the editor - so many, that for the last two years he has been invited to attend the Providence Journal's annual dinner for frequent contributors of letters to the editor. He has continued writing letters like the one quoted in

22. despite threatening phone calls, vandalism to his home, and hostile reactions from his workmates.

D'Abrosca has also continued with his marathon running. His extraordinary accomplishments as a runner show just how powerful that goal has been for him. When D'Abrosca was a child he was so severely asthmatic that he could not walk more than a few yards without collapsing. His asthma improved as he grew older, but because he worked two jobs on rotating shifts most of his adult life, he did not have much time left for physical fitness programs. He did not begin running until he was fifty and his work was mostly on the day shift. Within two years he was running marathons, then ultramarathons, that is, races 50 miles or longer. Recently he won the New England Championship for his age group in a 50-mile race. In 1986 he was one of only six Americans to compete in a 40-mile race through the Swiss Alps.

Idiosyncratic networks are not important just for people who, like D'Abrosca, consider themselves to be unique. Everyone I interviewed had a personal semantic network that contained strong goals.

George Gauvin, like Tony D'Abrosca, had physical problems as a child. Unlike D'Abrosca, however, the memory of his disability is linked for Gauvin to pride in the skills that have enabled him to earn a steady living despite his problems, and to the belief that people should just do
their best and not complain. He was quite contemptuous of the "radicals" at Ciba-Geigy who badmouthed the company. I mentioned above that Gauvin is the only working man I interviewed for whom (at least when he was young) making more money was a consistent, strong goal. In his case, the bounded, shared American success model seems to have been reinforced by the unbounded personal network of ideas just described.

Jim Lovett has a personal semantic network that links the key terms "responsibility" and "caring" to family concerns and unhappy memories of the absence of his father's companionship as a child. This family-centered model is in turn linked to Lovett's politics: many of his views about business and society can be paraphrased by saying that people should always treat each other as they would inside a family. The motivational force of these ideas can be seen in the energy he has devoted to his family and to caring for others. When Lovett was working he learned first aid and assumed responsibility for treating fellow workers' injuries. Now, although Lovett is out of work with an occupational disability, he has very little free time left in days devoted to providing assistance to his parents, in-laws, and children.

Anthony Gallucci's networks are very different. His views cannot be summed up easily, but one theme he expressed quite explicitly:

30. [Thinking about who influenced him when he was growing up.] I really hated any kind of authority. (5:4).

This general dislike of authorities continued into adulthood, and is linked to specific views about his bosses at work and governmental authority in society. The directive force of these views can be seen in pranks that undermined authorities in the workplace. These ideas also influenced his decision to switch to a position at Ciba-Geigy where he earned less money than he had made as a chemical operator but was freer of supervision.

Daniel Collins, by contrast, believes in the need for strong leadership. His network links this idea to his concerns about working people's welfare, opposition to "selfishness" and "complacency," and remembrance of his mother's admonition to "speak your piece." These ideas have had strong motivational force for him. Until Ciba-Geigy announced its closing, Collins devoted much of his free time to the union local at the plant. He has also put aside concerns about his safety and welfare to "speak his piece" whenever he thought it necessary, whether to fellow workers, bosses, state bureaucrats, military commanders, or neighborhood toughs.

In sum, each man's personal semantic networks contain strongly motivating goals. The directive force of these goals is not just stronger than the force of the goals attached to other sorts of beliefs, however.

What makes Tony run?

Each of the three types of belief I have described has had a different sort of directive force for my interviewees. The bounded success schema, which they were aware of as a widely shared value, may have had potent effects as an internalized social judgment affecting each man's self-esteem. Success values were much less potent, however, in determining career choices for most of them. Their breadwinner assumptions were likewise internalized social judgments, failure to satisfy which would also have affected their self-esteem. However, because these values were generally seen not as a matter of choice but rather as an inescapable fact of life, they were much more effective than the success schema in shaping the men's routine behavior. Finally, the goals contained in personal semantic networks, which are linked to emotionally salient individual experiences, have pushed each man to out-of-the-ordinary, self-defining efforts.

Conclusions

The main argument of this paper is that cultural models differ in not only the extent but also the kind of directive force they provide. American success values, though endorsed by four of the working men I talked to, motivated the actions of only one of the men who stated them. This is not to say that this ideology had no effect on the rest. The one man who thoroughly rejected success values may have been influenced in a less conscious way by them. The others might be moved by political rhetoric that appeals to this model. Finally, the fact that success values can be seen as shared values meant that my interviewees all judged themselves by that standard. These recognized social values, however, did not determine their practice.

Working men's breadwinner values were apprehended differently by most of my interviewees. In talking about choices faced by breadwinners, they tended to speak not of what people should do, but of what they have no choice but to do. This is the form of belief that Clifford Geertz has called "the native's point of view":

People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, unselfconsciously ... they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any "concepts" involved at all. That is what experience-near means -- that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together. What else could you call a hippopotamus? Of course the gods are powerful, why else would we fear them? (1984:125)

Shweder (this volume) has developed this argument, pointing out that when experience is seen in this way, directive force naturally follows out of commonsensical adherence to the reality principle. Indeed, for the four
men who saw the constraints of the breadwinner model as the constraints of reality, these ideas were a powerful predictor of their actions.

Geertz and Shweder overlook, however, the fact that “the native’s point of view” is not at all uniform. Some cultural constructs are indeed used in the “unselfconscious” way Geertz talks about. Others, however, such as the shared success model, are apprehended with a greater meta-awareness of the status of the constructs as cultural values.

Parts of the personal semantic networks I traced were, like the success model and unlike the breadwinner model, seen as values. The unbounded cognitive storage of these networks, however, means that they are difficult to apprehend in their entirety. These networks embed self-defining goals consciously chosen and acted on by my interviewees (cf. Quinn, this volume) as well as less conscious personal styles of action.

Each of these three kinds of beliefs was expressed differently in discourse. The bounded, cognitively accessible success model was expressed fairly explicitly, as compact generalizations. This made my interviewees’ statements of the ideology very similar to analysts’ statements of the ideology. When repeated by two men, major elements of this model were preserved largely intact. The breadwinner model, on the other hand, was present more often in an implicit form. Its premises were just assumed in what Bourdieu has called a “discourse of familiarity, [which] leaves unsaid all that goes without saying” (1977:18). It is true that most of the statements of the success model quoted above were elicited by questions that asked for compact generalizations, while no questions of the sort that would have elicited a compact, explicit statement of the breadwinner model were asked. Yet, two informants also volunteered explicit statements of the success model (12. and 13.) before being asked the questions about getting ahead. Furthermore, as a member of this culture, I would have felt foolish asking something like, “What are the obligations of an adult man?” The mere fact that it would not have occurred to me to ask such a question, whereas it seemed reasonable to my interviewees and me to ask, “What things keep people from getting ahead in the world?” is itself some indication that success values and breadwinner role expectations are different types of culturally shaped beliefs.

Some elements in personal semantic networks were expressed in a similarly explicit, compact form in my interviewees’ discourse. Explicit self-descriptions (e.g., “I’m unique I think, in a lot of these thoughts” [23.] or “I really hated any kind of authority” [30.]) are examples of this. The cognitive connections between these elements, however, can be seen only by tracing the order of topics in a speaker’s discourse and the links between ideas expressed with the same significant terms or in the same “voice.”

Some further points can be made about these three forms of belief. First, they were probably acquired by my interviewees in different ways. While they may have observed many people who tried to get ahead and even some who succeeded at it, their explicit verbal formulation of shared success values suggests acquisition from an explicit verbal source. Such sources are readily available in U.S. society in the mass media, advice books, fictional accounts, and popular discussion. Lovett mentioned another source: the slogans he learned at Amway sales meetings (12.). As evidence for the supposition that the success model is learned largely from verbal formulations, notice that when D’Andrade summarized his informants’ ideas about success, he used several key terms (“drive,” “works hard,” and “goals”) that also turned up in one or more of my interviewees’ statements. The importance of these terms as explicit verbal symbols can also be seen in the way my interviewees emphasized them through repetition within a statement, verbal stress, or use as a one-word sentence (e.g., “Goals. Everyone should have a goal” [1.]).

These working men’s breadwinner assumptions, on the other hand, were likely to have been acquired more through observation than explicit statements. Some aspects of this model are common enough in popular discussion (e.g., that men should be the main income earners in a family), but others (e.g., the need to sacrifice one’s interests to keep a steady paycheck coming) were probably learned simply by observing other working men staying at boring or dangerous jobs.

Personal semantic networks contain elements learned both in the explicit verbal manner of success values and the implicit, observational manner of breadwinner assumptions. Particularly important here, however, are the ideas and experiences that each man came to take as self-defining ones – often because they contrasted with the values of others with whom he interacted.

Each of these models represents different forms of knowledge and awareness – different ways of believing. These ways of believing are not reducible to differences in content, but involve different forms of cognitive representation and conscious apprehension. Thus, for most of my interviewees, success values are stored as the packets of knowledge postulated in traditional schema theory, while their wide-ranging personal semantic networks are stored in a less packaged way. The success model comes to their consciousness as a set of values, while the breadwinner model (though it contains values as well) often comes to their consciousness in a different way, as knowledge of reality.

It was also interesting that these three models are shared by increasingly narrow segments of American society – from the widely shared success model, to the more class- and gender-specific working man’s breadwinner
model, to personal semantic networks, which contain many culturally
given elements, but include unique life events and, in any case, represent
idiosyncratic combinations of shared elements. This is not surprising. The
success model is acquired from ideological sources that are widely
available in our society; the working man’s breadwinner model is learned
from observation of other working men; and personal semantic networks
are shaped by the particular combination of experiences and ideas to
which each individual is exposed, which are never exactly the same for any
two people.

A few warnings are in order about the extent to which my findings could
be generalized beyond my interviewees and the particular sets of ideas I
described.

First, the separate effects of these different kinds of beliefs were
probably easier to see with my blue-collar informants than they would
have been with white-collar informants. In a white-collar working
environment behaviors probably conform to the success model more than
they do on the factory floor. Thus, observation learning would reinforce
explicit ideological learning, making their separate effects harder to
distinguish. In general, it is doubtless the case that differences between
distinct kinds of cultural models will be easier to observe in the discourse
and behaviors of non-dominant than of dominant social groups. (Further-
more, this paper has downplayed interactions, which did exist, between
these different levels of belief. One example of this is the way the success
model was reinforced for George Gauvin by the particular configuration
of experiences and linked explanatory concepts in his personal semantic
network.)

It is also possible that the distinct effects of these different models were
enhanced by two peculiarities of industrialized western cultures. In the
liberal western tradition there is a distinction between values, adherence to
which is a matter of choice, and “hard” reality. Other cultures would not
make the same distinction. Perhaps peculiar to western cultures is our
metaphysical and moral construct of the self. I claimed that elements of
personal semantic networks are strongly motivating. I do not know if this
is because they are stored in an extensive, unbounded cognitive network
(which would be the case in any culture) or because these ideas are
attached to a distinct, valued self construct more limited to the West.
(Probably both explanations are partly correct.)

Finally, although the focus of my argument has been on ways of
believing, it has a bearing on what we assume culture to be. If we conceive
of culture monistically – everything is symbols or discourses, which differ
only in meaning and position in the ordering of experience – then it is
difficult to talk about different kinds of cultural values and motivational

force. As D’Andrade has noted (n.d.), we will not make progress in
anthropological theory without a more differentiated model of culture.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 85th Annual Meeting
Models.” I am grateful to Roy D’Andrade and Naomi Quinn for
organizing this session. The two discussants in this session, Robert Weller
and Edwin Hutchins, had comments that were helpful in rewriting my
material. This paper has also benefited from comments by Ellen Basu,
Bradley Levinson, Naomi Quinn, Robert Strauss, and Kathryn Woolard.
My biggest debt is to the five men quoted here.

NOTES

1 D’Andrade does not take credit for the insight that schema theory can
subsume motivation theory, citing Schank and Abelson (1977), Mandler
(1984), and Gallistel (1985), among others, as sources for this idea.
2 Tony D’Abrasca asked that I use his real name. All other interviewee names
here are pseudonyms.
3 Most of these questions came from Kornhauser (1965).
4 Every interviewee but one chose a pseudonym consistent with his ethnicity.
5 My other transcript conventions are the following:
   [?] = unintelligible
   [word?] = uncertain transcription
   ... = long pause
   [del] = deletion
   { } = paraphrase
   " " = my reading of a standardized interview question
   (X:Y) = utterance citation from my transcripts, where X is the interview
   number and Y the page number
   (X) = utterance citation from previous use in this paper

   Punctuation reflects the speaker’s intonation rather than rules of grammar,
   and transcripts were regularized for stammers, stutters, and verbal pauses.
6 Elsewhere, D’Abrasca stated that he and his siblings had all “turned out fairly
good. Moneywise or otherwise.” He added, “I hope my kids do well” (5:3.4).
   Conversely, the other four men, who endorsed the success model in response
to my standardized questions, expressed doubts about the moral worth of
riches and discussed inequality of opportunity in other discourse contexts.
So their beliefs are more complicated than it would appear here (Strauss 1988,
1990).
7 I did not usually transcribe verbal pauses. This one seemed especially signifi-
cant, however.
8 There were several examples of this speech in another’s “voice” in Gallucci’s
discourse.
This is not to say that success values are rarely linked to action for working men in general. Beyond the obvious difficulty of generalizing from a sample of five people, there is the less obvious factor that some of these men fell into the working-class part of my interview group precisely because they had not been motivated by the success model. Two of the white-collar workers I interviewed started out life in circumstances much like these five, but then sought education and promotions that put them into management positions.

Gauvin's belief structure is the only exception here. His references to starting as a helper, then becoming a journeyman (2.) show that the general statements quoted are intimately linked to a broader set of ideas he has about his own career.

See Bakhtin on "internally persuasive discourse" (1981:345–6) and Abelson's cognitive consistency theories (1968b).

Based on $305 average weekly earnings in Rhode Island manufacturing industries (1987 Journal-Bulletin Rhode Island Almanac.)

This model is based primarily on my research. However, it fits with other accounts of American working-class culture, e.g., Halle (1984), Komarovsky (1987), and Miller and Riessman (1961).

However, in some contexts (see 7. and 10.) some of the men talked as if they were being judged by the breadwinner model. This was especially true when, as in the above two cases, the breadwinner model overlaps with the success model.

Good's "semantic network analysis" (Good 1977) captures the cultural level what my "personal semantic networks" try to capture at the individual level.

In finding these symbols I used the methods outlined by Agar (1979).

For a more detailed discussion of all three criteria, see Strauss (1988).

In D'Abrosca's case the example provided by his hard-working immigrant parents may have been more significant than the success model as an explicit ideology.

Geertz's own view is not uniform either. Earlier works of his suggest a much more sophisticated understanding of different forms of belief.

These different forms of awareness are usually referred to as the difference between "overt" and "covert" or "explicit" and "implicit" culture (LeVine 1984). (See also Bourdieu's [1977] doxa/dogma distinction.) These terms do not capture all of the degrees of opacity and transparency that exist, however (see Strauss 1988.)

The process here is much as Bourdieu (1977) describes for the formation of the habitus.

REFERENCES

Abelson, Robert P.

What makes Tony run?

Agar, Michael
Bakhtin, Mikhail M.

Bourdieu, Pierre

Casson, Ronald W.

D'Andrade, Roy G.


Gallistel, Charles R.

Geertz, Clifford

Gerber, Eleanor R.

Good, Byron J.

Halle, David
10 Afterword

Roy G. D’Andrade

The preceding chapters have tried to explore the usefulness of the idea that cultural models can have motivational force. What now can be concluded about this idea? What issues have arisen from this work?

Practicalities of psychological assessment

At this point, several things stand out which were previously unseen or obscure. First, at the beginning, it was not known whether it would be difficult or easy to assess the motivational force of particular cultural models. It is one thing to argue that, on various theoretical grounds, some schemas, and therefore some cultural models, should have motivational properties, and that these properties should be assessable. It is another thing to identify, in a real ethnographic study, the motivational properties of a specific cultural model.

Overall, assessment of the motivational force of cultural models appears to be a feasible task. The authors had no special difficulty in determining the degree to which the models they were investigating functioned as active goals for specific individuals. These models ranged across a variety of domains: romance, marriage, gender, the self, emotion, childhood “stages,” witches, gods, and water glasses. Based on the results of all the chapters, it seems fair to conclude that the assessment of the motivational force of a cultural model is well within the capacity of a competent ethnographer.

Why should this be? The usual account is that motives are hard to identify and even harder to measure. In the traditional approach one has to determine to what degree a person strives for – or would strive for if they could – a particular state of affairs, such as self-actualization, which has been defined by some theorist, and which may correspond to no schema, idiosyncratic or cultural, of the person being assessed. This task is further complicated by the frequent failure to distinguish between the ultimate energy sources which may activate many goals and the specific goals toward which the person strives. The difference between standard