

ences. Jacob Nyaose had brought into being the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA) as a rival to SACTU, which was suspected of strong World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) sympathies. He applied for membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The third phase of this program would come when the PAC was strong enough to make demands it could back up with "decisive action." After that, the African society would be established.

This plan of action made a deep impression among friends and neutrals on both sides of the color line. As part of the campaign of preparing the ground for action, the PAC sent letters to friendly countries in Africa explaining the nature of the fight planned and its targets. One of their fears was that the Western press might too easily take its cue from the white press in South Africa and give a wholly distorted picture of the situation. This could be disastrous if the intended demonstration came up for discussion in the United Nations. So there had to be a bloc of well-informed, friendly nations in a position to place the real facts before the world. In addition, friends of the PAC throughout the rest of Africa were asked to give moral support to the campaign and provide relief for the dependents of those who might be given long terms in jail. And, finally, Ghana had just called the Accra Conference. She was interested in the idea that the South Africans were at last making a determined stand to remove from their national life apartheid's standing insult to all men of African descent.

Everything seemed to proceed according to plan. But suddenly there was a switch in PAC policy: The status boycott was shelved. The PAC was no longer to establish itself as a recognized political organization in the African mind, but instead it would launch a campaign against the passes. It would make simple demands. It would ask for a living wage, for the repeal of the pass laws, and for nonvictimization for participation in the campaign. That would gain it the recognition it needed. But since it was expected that the government would reject these demands,

an answer in the negative would be followed by a major campaign to force the government to start negotiating.

Nearly all the members of the PAC executive committee fell for this line—barring the president himself. They believed that there would be a massive response to the call to surrender the passes at charge offices; but if the government acted against them, there would be such chaos in the locations that the government would be forced to release them. After that, the campaign would gallop to a victorious climax. The naïveté expressed in all this was new to PAC thinking, and people who had been sympathetic to the PAC found it most distressing. The enthusiasm of the executives for its new plan knew no bounds. To the end, however, Sobukwe doubted the wisdom of the new line—but then his own loyalty to his executive committee forced him to accept the majority decision.

On March 21, 1960, after two postponements, the campaign was launched. Except at Sharpeville and Cape Town, the response of the community was far from spectacular, but of course the government saw in the demonstrations a definite threat to the supremacy of the white man. The police opened fire at Sharpeville and Cape Town, and subsequently there were shootings in Durban and Clermont Township. Although the leaders of the PAC had not all obeyed Sobukwe's order to lead demonstrators to police stations, the police rounded up those they could catch as the rest went underground.

Subsequently, very heavy sentences were passed on those leaders who had surrendered themselves for arrest. There was considerable damage done to property in the southern locations of Johannesburg, but in time the police regained control of the situation and forced the PAC underground. The ban made it extremely difficult to operate efficiently.

According to reports attributed to him, which circulated freely in the country after Ghana had sent to Basutoland a certain Mr. Barden—said to have succeeded the late George Padmore in the Office for African Affairs—Accra had sent a considerable sum of money to Basutoland for relief work among the

dependents of the jailed or of those who had been killed in the PAC demonstrations. Nobody knew precisely how the South Africans had used the money passed on to them from Basutoland; some of it had reached a few dependents, but nobody knew precisely the purpose to which it had all been put. A lot of friction developed among some of the underground PAC leaders on the use to which this money should be put. In the mudslinging that followed, the reason slowly emerged for the unexpected switch in PAC attitudes toward the status campaign.

Ghana had always been most encouraging in her understanding of the PAC position. She had been ready to provide money for relief work, it was said, but when she learned of the status campaign she criticized it as an absolute waste of time. She was for a frontal attack on apartheid and expected the local whites to panic, as the Belgians had done, and yield ground. Ghana was in a very advantageous position at this time, for her prestige among all political organizations of the African people was very high. She had just called the successful, morale-boosting Accra Conference, and most oppressed Africans were sincerely grateful for this declaration of solidarity. Besides, Ghana was willing to give moral support to the PAC and provide money for relief work among their dependents.

It would be unfair to Ghana to say she used her tremendous influence to force unwilling PAC leaders to change their minds on the status boycott. Most members of the PAC executive committee suddenly cultivated an inexplicably naïve belief that a determined show of African strength would shake the government so badly that in six months Verwoerd would be forced to negotiate. So confident were they of success that they committed themselves to the No Bail, No Fine, No Defense slogan; but after the heavy sentences, it was most mortifying to their friends and sympathizers when PAC leaders sent urgent appeals from jail, asking that they be defended and that their cases be sent on appeal. But at least one man in Vereeniging (where the Sharpeville shootings had taken place) refused resolutely to be bailed or defended. That man was Thomas More.

One of the most important lessons of the PAC campaign was

that any determined demand for reform would continue to be regarded by the government as an act of treason, to be answered with shootings. Whether a peaceful demonstration of unarmed men, women, and children or an attack on property, the government would give only one answer—the bullet. This confronted African political organizations with a problem. In the face of determination to use force to curb any demands for the sharing of political power, how did the unarmed man go about ensuring justice for himself?

Two traditions had emerged during the first fifty years of the Union. One school of thought had continued to regard the assertion of African initiatives as the factor that would extend the area of freedom. Mgijimi, the ICU, and the PAC had belonged to this category, and they had suffered the greatest violence from the state without showing any gains. The other regarded values that transcended race as the essential unifying factors; their approach was basically realistic and evolutionary. To a large extent, the ANC had belonged to this category, as well as Tengo Jabavu and, later, the Convention. This school had suffered less violence from the state, but it had not won any concessions either.

On balance, most African political organizations had not set out to use violence. Since they did not have access to arms, it would have been suicidal to choose to fight on ground where the government was strongest. And after Union, the emphasis had progressively been on nonviolence. The laws that made their way into the statute books made it clear, however, that a government that was not responsive to moral and other peaceful pressures would regard any insistence on nonviolence as a sign of weakness, as an encouragement to pursue more oppressive policies. To insist on nonviolence was to be ineffective, in short. At the same time, evidence was piling up everywhere in Africa that only after violence of some type had occurred did the British, whose system of government and whose maintenance of the color bar had something in common with South Africa's, begin to yield ground.

The issue of yielding to apartheid was out of the question. The

Africans had fought for their land for centuries. When they were defeated on the battlefield, they had simply decided to carry on the fight in other ways. Even after Union, they had stopped at no sacrifice to obtain justice; for asserting their determination to be treated like human beings, they had been shot freely in almost every part of the country. They had been jailed and exiled; men and women had been torn from their loved ones and sent to remote corners of the country to break their spirits. How could people who had fought with such determination yield?

Three ways out of this dilemma offered themselves. The Africans could resort to overwhelming demonstrations of non-violent power; they could consider rebelling; or they could undertake violence to property as a compromise between the other two.

For nonviolence to be effective in South Africa, however, there has got to be a measure of freedom to assemble or to travel, a large army of disciplined volunteers, and a measure of responsiveness to peaceful or moral pressures on the part of the government. None of these conditions exists any longer. This applies with particular force to the African, for the pass laws have been tightened in such a way that the police can trace the movements of a person virtually from day to day. So fine is the net that in a city like Durban plainclothes police search people in broad daylight on the streets, and there is hardly a corner in central Johannesburg where Africans are not stopped to have their passes checked. The government keeps an hour-to-hour watch for any challenge to its authority. The growing volume of refugees leaving the country and the large number of banned or exiled people, as well as the number of political prisoners and of political cases before the courts of law, all indicate that the state is so much on the lookout for trouble that the organization of massive, nonviolent demonstrations would be an invitation to defeat. Smaller shows of strength could be easily suppressed by shootings.

Sharpeville showed so clearly that mass nonviolence leads to

shootings that there is no longer any enthusiasm among the Africans for fighting on ground where they always lose. There would not be the morale to keep people together in demonstrations that produce disaster every time they are staged. Even a stay-at-home has its disadvantages; in Cape Town, for example, after the PAC antipass campaign, the police went from house to house beating up men and women in efforts to break the strike. The feeling grows in the African community that nonviolence might already have had its day. Luthuli still thinks that it can be used effectively, but he no longer has the majority on his side on this specific issue.

As things now stand, rebellion would have a very powerful emotional appeal. The humiliations over the years, the race hatred and oppression, the deep sense of grievance, and the drama of a determined bid for freedom all create emotional responses that favor a rebellion. But for it to be anything but an invitation to butchery, the Africans would have to possess arms, and they would have to be trained in their use. Pondoland recently showed that it takes time to train men in the use of arms, and both the guns and training in their use are out of the question in South Africa today. But rebellion would have to be ruled out for another, very important reason: It would deteriorate rapidly into a racial blood bath, in which the African would surely suffer the heaviest losses and costliest defeats.

In between these two extremes, there is violence to property. A growing number of Africans view property control as an expression of the power of the race oppressor, since it is used to perpetuate injustice. Its destruction would reduce the state's potential for using force as an answer to agitations for reform. It is the Achilles' heel of the ruling group; by striking at it, the country's economy would be shaken. This, in turn, would ensure, as nothing else could, the equitable distribution of suffering, for it would force attention on the urgent need to give positive answers to demands for reform. Apart from minimizing violence to the person, it would be the only effective way of fighting a de-racialized war with any hope of success.

One of the most important arguments used in favor of violence to property is that fewer numbers of people would be engaged in it. They could be trained singly or in small groups without attracting too much attention, and the training would be reasonably simple and take a relatively short time. If the need arose, every African could become a saboteur using the lit match against anything inflammable that belonged to the white side. Finally, it is said, there is infinite scope for reprisals and an almost unlimited choice of targets.

Since rebellion can be ruled out as impracticable, the real choice remains between massive nonviolence and violence to property. As will be shown in the chapter on the uncommitted African, large sections of the African community have already made their choices underground. That is where some of the most decisive battles against race oppression are now being decided.

12 • RESERVES OF POWER

THE pattern of race oppression in South Africa is such that hardly a decade has gone by during the last hundred years without a bloody clash between one section or another of the white authority and one African group or another. The legislative programs of successive governments since Union have been increasingly oppressive. All this has led to a degree of anti-whiteism among the Africans that should by now have made South Africa a veritable inferno. That this is not the case is, to most people on the white side, one of the most baffling features of the race crisis. The African who crosses the color line to make friends with the whites is not murdered—nor is his house burned down. These friendships, as well as nonracial organizations, flourish now more vigorously than at any other time in South African history.

It is true, of course, there there is a lot of hatred for the government. The armed risings that have occurred in the reserves since 1948, when the present regime obtained power, and the frequent murders of police—in some of the larger locations policemen patrol the streets only in heavily protected cars—show how strong the feeling is against the group that upholds the temper of the slave owner. In some locations, it is unsafe for white people to be on the streets after sunset. On the other hand, Alexandra Township, the most politically advanced and the most militant African township in the country, allows white people to move in

and out practically at every hour of the night. I once drove into the township in the company of a friend, Dr. Alan Friedmann of Johannesburg, who is now in Britain; at almost every corner, a voice would shout, "Hullo, doctor!"

When everything has been taken into account, it can be said that the area of mutual understanding and good will between black and white is almost as wide as that of hatred. The explanation for this lies in the peculiar reserves of power possessed by each one of South Africa's racial groups and the rather unique way in which these have interacted in the relations between black and white within the last three hundred years. For the purposes of this chapter, these reserves might be divided into three categories—those which influence thought and action on both sides of the color line, African reserves, and white reserves.

Cultural homogeneity is the most important single influence upon conduct on both sides of the color line. By going to John Philip's reserves, the African converts announced that they had rejected the ways of the tribe and had elected the culture of the white man and its norms. Race discrimination limited their chances for a full life in the white man's world; because it attacked the individuality of the black man, however, it awakened in him a keen appreciation of individuality and developed a strongly humanistic bias. As a result of these early Christian efforts and subsequent economic developments, a large and strong class of Africans has grown that has more in common cultural ties with the whites than with the tribesmen. Therefore, the African community is divided into two major groups—the Westernized and the tribal.

This cultural polarization within the community generates fierce tensions. The tribal mind sees the white man from the perspective of race—as a foreigner, an oppressor, who is inscrutable, lives in a world that cannot be understood, and can only be feared and hated. The Westernized African is not a stranger to the white man's world; he has a working understanding of the motivating urges that stir deepest in the white bosom, an intelligent appreciation of the values that give meaning to life in

the white man's world. To him, the white man is an ordinary person, like every other individual in the African community; he can be loved or hated as an individual.

These conflicting attitudes tend to have a moderating effect on each other. While the tribesman would want to drive all whites into the sea, he is never certain what the Westernized sections would do. Deep in his heart, he does not really trust them. Since he is aware of his weaknesses, he feels himself at their mercy, for they understand the ways of the white man, they can deal with him best. The Westernized African, on the other hand, does not trust the tribesmen: They are always the first to betray him to the white man; their values are not his. Because both face a common enemy, the angularities in their outlooks have an inhibiting effect on their behavior.

On the white side, the divisions are on the racial issue itself. The racist reserves his worst venom for the nonracist, the *kafferboetic*, who crosses the sacrosanct color line to rub noses with the "niggers." If he had his way, he would erect special jails where all white liberals would be subjected to medieval torture until they realized that earth does not have anything dirtier than association with Africans.

The nonracist does not take this lying down. While driving in Johannesburg with a white friend, I saw a white girl sitting in an ancient Ford Anglia driven by a young African sporting a beard. She held a bottle of gin in front of her, almost at the level of her eyes for all passers-by to see. She was defying convention very aggressively and putting the law in an impotently bad temper. First of all, it is not correct for a decent white girl to go out with an African boy; second, it was then a crime for an African be found in possession of liquor. She was deliberately holding the bottle very high in an African's car for those who might care to speculate precisely on what her mission was.

This was, of course, an extreme case. But the nonracists defy both convention and the law as a matter of policy in ways that throw the racists into perpetual convulsions in every stratum of white society. For the racist distrusts and fears the non-

racialist. He believes the nonracialist is the traitor who will sell out to the "niggers." The consequent tensions make it impossible for the whites to stand together as a group, united and determined to protect their superior position.

Thus, on both sides of the color line there are the aggressive racialists and the determined nonracialists. Many of them worship the same cultural gods, their race notwithstanding, and the only real difference is that the African nonracialists are in a very powerful position in their group, whereas their white counterparts are very much weaker. The result is that no racial side has absolute solidarity. To escape from the tensions that continually rock the group, the individual often leaves it to seek communion with the like-minded on the other side of the color line. This often involves a defiance of racialism on both sides. The girl who buys the gin for the boy is matched by the boy who drives her into the location in broad daylight, defying every municipal regulation and offending his group's racialists by bringing an "enemy" into their camp.

These excursions have hazards that many people find at least emotionally satisfying. The violation of the legal code to respect a moral law has its own compensations in a society whose racial laws are devoid of moral content. A form of solidarity develops, which derives its appeal from the novelty of the experience, its force from the upholding of moral law, and its permanence from an enhanced feeling of security. The people who have gone through this experience work zealously and continuously for the breakdown of the color bar and for the neutralization of race prejudice. Having escaped from the tensions which constrict the growth of the personality and tasted the new life in which it is enlarged, they find themselves at an advantage over their opponents. The fact that moral law is on their side enables them to keep their enemies on the defensive. But one very obstinate fact of African life which springs from the factors just outlined is that any attempt at developing a collective racial attitude will split the community in two. It is a fact every intelligent political or religious leader or social welfare worker knows only too

well, and African opinion draws the distinction between white enemies and friends.

Another influence at work on both sides is the common humanity black and white have. More often than not, the relationship between the domestic servant and her employer's family is deeper than that which the contract prescribes or the law permits. It has been developed to the point where both sides see each other from the perspective of human beings, bound together by a common interest, and sometimes it reaches the plane of mutual attachment. A classic illustration of this reserve of power is provided by the African employee of an Indian family who threw himself into the flames to save his employer's two children in a burning house during the 1949 Afro-Indian riots. He saved the little girls but died in the process. At the time, the relations between the Africans and the Indians were strained beyond the breaking point, and African group solidarity in Durban was at its height. The house had been set on fire by Africans.

On quite another plane, this reserve produces rather unexpected results. The Afrikaner policeman who enforces the Immorality Act, the DRC clergyman who preaches against the sin of miscegenation, and the highly placed officer of the Nationalist Party responsible for the Act often find themselves almost crushed by the tensions which are continually worked up to preserve Afrikaner solidarity. To escape them, at least for a time, some risk their good names by crossing the color line to feel that common humanity that only the clandestine embrace of an African woman in the backyard of a white home can give them. The experience opens up an entirely new world for the prisoner of racial tensions. Having tasted the consequent enlargement of his personality, he wants to have it again and again. The court records of South Africa show how widespread the demand for this experience is among the highest members of the Afrikaans community itself.

The third influence working on black and white alike, one that is never given the importance it deserves, is the support of the politically valuable colored and Indian minorities. Since the

1930's, when the Convention first spoke of non-European unity, African nationalism and its Afrikaner counterpart have been involved in a fierce struggle to win over the coloreds for different but equally powerful reasons. The Indians were courted at a much later period, and the courting then was less dramatic.

Since the whites comprise a numerical minority, they have long wanted to win over the coloreds to their side, for together they would be too substantial a minority to be pushed into the sea. But it was not until the 1949 riots that the role the Indian could play as a buffer between the white man and the African became clear. When the African racialists got out of control, they directed the impact of their fury against the Indian, when, basically, it was the white man they were angry with.

Finally, however, Afrikaner nationalism has come to realize that African nationalism is going to lead the country through a long period of economic crises and industrial disturbances. If colored and Indian good will can be gained, these communities will at least keep the essential services going to enable the army to deal effectively with the African revolt.

The African does not need the coloreds or the Indians for he has his numerical strength. But he needs their loyalty; for if the race-conscious whites could be isolated from every section of the nation, they would be appreciably weakened. The coloreds, who have blood links also with the African, could even be a source of additional strength, and the Indians would remain a valuable lever with which to stir up outside opinion against Afrikaner nationalism. An Indian community forever shouting loud protests against Afrikaner nationalism could be a very good advertisement for African nationalism among the millions of Asia, especially since both the colored and the Indians are incredibly allergic to any form of racialism.

We now turn to the African's power reserves. In terms of numbers, the Africans constitute the largest population group. Roughly, there are about four to every European, eleven to every colored, and twenty-two to every Indian. They are concentrated mainly in the urban areas and in the rural reserves,

the rest being scattered among the farms. The point of heaviest concentration is the Witwatersrand industrial area.

Numerical preponderance gives the African, first of all, the advantage of remaining the country's economic backbone. All sectors of the economy need his labor in ever increasing numbers. Apart from a greater purchasing potential, this key advantage places him in the position to use strikes and boycotts very effectively in the fight to extend the area of liberty. Second, the security of numbers has protected the African from the fear of extinction. Although survival is not his problem, it has tended to retard the growth of a virile group consciousness. Yet, the black man is in a more advantageous position to view the problems of the country without being affected by racial fears.

The disparity in black and white numbers ensures that the majority could inflict the maximum amount of damage on the economy with the minimum of sacrifice. Any African carrying a box of matches could be a menace to the supremacy of the white man, for the police would not be able to round up every African responsible for sabotage. By the simple technique of forcing the white man to deploy, over the widest area possible, his military and economic power, the African could seriously weaken his reserves. A major strike conducted simultaneously in every town of the Union would pin down the army and police and leave the rural reserves practically free to do what they liked. Finally, in the event of war, the government's participation would be rendered fairly useless. If four-fifths of the population were actively disloyal, the government would be powerless to make decisive contributions.

The second power reserve is that moral law is on the side of the African. By opposing race oppression and upholding the dignity of the person, the rule of law, the right to free expression and assembly, and the equality of men, the African has given moral content to his struggle. Therefore, the white community can no longer hold the Bible in one hand and the gun in the other and continue to march into the future as a united group. The more so since the African has already shown—in the

ideological splits effected within the white community, the third of which affected the United Party after the internal and external economic boycotts and the fourth, the Nationalist Party after the revolt of the Bassonites—that he will not allow this to happen.

In response to moral pressure, a group of Dutch Reformed Church theologians wrote a book entitled *Delayed Action*, in which they tore apartheid to bits on Christian and scriptural grounds. This was not just a retreat to a safer position of political power; it was a serious attempt to face the moral challenge posed, among other things, by the African's insistence on giving to Christian values the same meaning on both sides of the color line. How serious the step of the theologians was emerges clearly against the background provided by the history of Afrikaner nationalism and its insistence on dual meanings in the church and the state.

This reserve of power enables the African to take up a more convincing and therefore more powerful position on the issue of the Cold War. His antipathy to totalitarianism springs from his long experience with it in his own country and from his protracted fight for freedom. The moral values he has consistently upheld in this situation are the exact opposite of those accepted by the Communists. Dr. Verwoerd's regime, on the other hand, is as totalitarian as the Communists' in its handling of the non-whites. For it to claim to be a natural ally of the West is almost meaningless, if not embarrassing, to the free world. It makes the side which apartheid supports suspect.

One of the results of World War II was that humanity emerged from it with a sharpened sensitivity to injustice. For a long time, the world had believed Hitler when he said the Jewish problem was a domestic German matter. By so believing, the world connived at the basest abuses of the human personality that the mind of man has ever conceived, and the result was a war which brought untold suffering and grief to millions of innocent people. The lesson learned was that injustice to the individual anywhere was a threat to peace everywhere, and the United Nations was established as the specific expression of this

awakened moral sense. The concern with South Africa's race problem is in no way whatsoever a reflection of world hatred for the white citizens of the republic. On the contrary, the world is merely being sensitive to a situation which has in it the seeds of an ugly racial war and is therefore directly concerned about the maintenance of peace. Indeed, the African's consistently humanistic line has made things very much easier for the world. The black man's refusal to be provoked into a racial reaction has been proof of his political maturity, which has created a deep impression among all decent men and women.

The last category of reserves available to the African is the strategic, for South Africa is the economic gateway into sub-Saharan Africa. Whoever ultimately controls it, as the tide of liberation rolling from the north has made only too clear, has the ideological initiative to influence the course of events in this vast and potentially wealthy part of the continent. The Africans who have won their liberty state that their freedom is neither full nor secure while apartheid remains the dominant influence in the republic. Real fulfillment for them rests in working for the liberation of the Africans of the Union. Again, this is not because the Africans hate the whites of the Union; it is because apartheid constitutes a standing insult to every man of African descent and a direct threat to his security. White supremacy is incompatible with African sovereignty.

The emergence of African states has been a tremendous morale-booster in the African community for two reasons. The black states are expected to be emotionally involved in the fight against apartheid in a way few, if any, white countries can be expected to be. From them, it is said, ultimately will come the decisive assistance no white country could really give. Since the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and the rest of Europe are all white, they cannot be expected to fight against their kinsmen in Africa with the same determination that the Africans would display. This help could take one of many forms or combine them all—diplomatic pressure, economic boycott, moral and material support, or, above all, the provision of arms and training.

The large number of young men who leave the country illegally are not all of them adventurers eager to make better use of their lives in free countries; some are patriotic Africans who hope to get military training for the day when they might settle accounts with the Verwoerd regime.

Second, the African states are expected to use their independence to exert direct pressures to break apartheid's back. In a world where Africa remains the only place with the largest bloc of uncommitted humanity, it is natural that the Iron Curtain countries and the Western democracies go to great extremes to win African support. This gives to African good will the character of a precious commodity whose price is still rising in the world. Dr. Verwoerd is in no position to give this commodity to anybody, and surely not to his followers. Only the Africans can give it to whomsoever they choose, and their price is the immediate destruction of apartheid. And this, in turn, raises the African's potential to influence events—while that of the white community diminishes.

The extent to which these power reserves have been built up is shown very graphically in two recent developments. Externally, African diplomacy has, since 1913, set itself the goal of isolating white South Africa. The Union Africans now feel powerful enough to have showdowns with the Union Government on given planes. There has, for example, been the long and fierce battle in the United Nations in which the white authority has had one humiliating defeat after another. Then there was the major showdown during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. The Union's Prime Minister obviously went to London under the impression that his white skin and his boast that he is a genuine enemy of Communism would shield him from African attacks. He found that inside the Conference apartheid was viewed with repugnance by people on both sides of the color line, and this repugnance was so strong that Dr. Verwoerd was compelled to withdraw his application for membership in the Commonwealth. It was a major defeat on a major battlefield. It demonstrated, as clearly as could be done in the circum-

stances, that the African now controls strategic reserves of power, which, when deployed in given situations, can confront apartheid with the reality of disaster. This is real power in the hands of the African.

On the other hand, the process of isolating the supporters of white supremacy has led to the organization of international boycotts that have lost South Africa valuable markets and good will. These took a lot of time, energy, and money to procure and build, but capital is now being frightened off from South Africa.

The policy of buying time to build up power reserves has often and rightly been criticized as costly and slow to produce results. But today there is no doubt that it has begun to pay dividends, for it has placed the African in the very unique position in which he can start giving serious consideration to the possibility of choosing the ground on which to force a showdown with apartheid. The initiative to choose is at last in his hands. The fact that African initiatives could push South Africa out of the Commonwealth without bringing the Verwoerd Government crashing to the ground shows the very peculiar way in which the power reserves balance the relations between black and white. On the day mankind understands the laws according to which they work, the solution to the problem of race adjustment everywhere will be in sight.

This brings us to the white man's set of reserves. These can be categorized as economic, cultural, and military. Caledon's Hottentot Proclamation of 1809 forced the integration of the African into the white man's way of life by destroying the pastoral-agricultural economy of the tribe. Since then, industrial growth has transformed the African into a proletarian living largely on the cash wage earned in the urban areas. He is no longer a unit in a balanced society, since he has to leave the tribal area and venture into the towns where life is affected by influences that have very little in common with those in the tribal community. He has to acquire the habits of regular application, of working for a fixed period, and of obeying orders for the purpose of achieving a certain end; he has to realize that maximum productivity means

a better wage and a greater capacity to earn his living. These new experiences remold his attitudes, and they give a new meaning to life. Even the laws of hygiene he has to observe make him see men and events from a totally different perspective. Therefore, when he returns to the tribe, he is already a stranger to it. His heightened sense of individuality makes him a misfit, like hundreds of thousands of men and women on the tribal reserves today. The result is that tensions have developed in the mind of the tribesmen, which find ready expression in armed resistance to governmental authority in the reserves. It is not an accident that the use of arms in opposition to government policy—that is, on anything like an organized scale—has come almost exclusively from the reserves. But the point at issue is that the white man's economic requirements have so shattered the tribal system from within that the African's *own lines* are no longer there. Fulfillment for the black man can no longer be in the form of life led by his ancestors, and yet the advocates of apartheid insist that tribal life has scope for a better existence for the African. It just makes no sense whatsoever.

About one third of the African people lives in the rural reserves, one third on white farms, and the remainder in the urban areas. Yet the continuous and increasing demand for labor on the farms and in industry has denuded the reserves of large numbers of able-bodied men and left them in the hands of women, aged men, and children, whose ability to work the soil productively is limited. As a result, the reserves are so poor that they cannot support their own third of the African population. Even if millions of rand could be sunk into rehabilitating them, there would still remain the poverty of the remaining two-thirds of the African population to deal with. The strained relations between the government and the tribesmen, which are virtually endemic in the reserves, are but protests against the grinding poverty in these areas.

This poverty is a lever used to force the tribesman into the white man's towns and farms. When he is there, his poverty compels him to accept whatever wage he is offered. He is not

in a position to do much about his fate in this setup, since influx-control regulations are such that if he makes a nuisance of himself he can be thrown out of the towns and forbidden to enter any urban area at all. The pass laws regulate his movements twenty-four hours of every day of his life in the white man's towns, and the police have the right to enter his room at any time of the day or night to check on his behavior.

This system of checking is airtight. In the reserves, the Bantu Authorities are being introduced. These keep a sharp watch on the people. The men who serve on them are carefully screened and approved by the government, and the chiefs have been given wide powers over the men and women they must keep tractable. The result of all these elaborate precautions is that the white man remains assured of his cheap labor while his superiority is not immediately threatened; the "proper relations between master and servant" are maintained.

The people on the farms are the poorest and the most backward in the African community. They give the impression that some spark has gone out of their lives, that their spirit of resistance has been broken. The great risings against the authority of the white man and the massive demonstrations designed to weaken apartheid both in the rural and the urban areas have come almost exclusively from the tribal reserves and the urban areas. The reason for this is that these people have been torn away even from the crumbling tribal life, are rejected by the white man's world, and yet are forced to use their blood and sweat to bolster his economy. They are so much at the mercy of the farmers and the police that whatever security they have is that granted them strictly by the farmers.

The urban proletariat is the most progressive section of the African people. It has made the most consistent attacks on white domination and organized the most protracted campaigns. It has evolved its own, clearly recognizable philosophy of struggle and political traditions. Unlike the people in the reserves and on the farms, this section is almost exclusively dependent on the good will of the white location superintendent not only for its

being in the urban area but also for its having a place to sleep by night. The control is so perfect in South Africa that the white ruler has arrogated to himself the right to say where the African must sleep.

A new factor becomes observable in the locations—the systematic crushing of individuality. The locations are not designed as residential areas for human beings with different temperaments and preferences; they are meant to be reservoirs of labor in which the enlargement of the personality will be kept to a minimum. The houses are built according to one monotonous pattern, with straight streets to facilitate troop movements; and the hut in which the university lecturer lives is like that of his neighbor, the gravedigger; there is usually a high steel fence surrounding the location. Entry is by means of a pass, for movement into and out of the location is controlled. Outside the location, the police check to ascertain whether or not any African has the authority to be in the white man's town; if he cannot produce a pass to show that he should be there, he is presumed to be a criminal and arrested.

In the Transvaal, the government has started destroying the propertied communities in the urban townships—as distinct from the locations. In places like Sophiatown, Alexandra, and Lady Selborne, the Africans are being forced by law to sell their properties, leave the towns, and establish themselves in the locations where they are issued not the title deeds they had in the townships but certificates of occupation to make them more amenable to the discipline of the location superintendents. They are allowed to build houses according to their own plans.

The urban wage itself is designed to "preserve the proper relations." With very few exceptions—and these are being wiped out steadily by job reservation—it is not enough to enable a man to bring up a family, buy the necessaries of life, and provide good educations for his children and security for himself in old age. It is intended to provide him with the minimum requirements for physical existence. He earns a special wage because he is an African, not because of his skill. The Indians and the coloreds

earn on a slightly higher scale because they are neither African nor white. The highest pay is always reserved for people with a white skin. Finally, the African is debarred by law from developing his skill beyond a certain point. No matter how able, he cannot be an engine driver on the railways, and in the gold mines he is barred from certain jobs because of his race.

All these factors combine to give large sections of the African population feelings of insecurity and dependence; to give reality to the fear of being starved or thrown out of the location to the streets and from there sent on to the dreaded potato farms.

On the cultural plane, policy aims at allowing the African access to some of the material forms of the white man's civilization. In short, he must observe its conventions: He must go to school, where he learns to read and write; he must go to church; and he must learn the habit of consistent application by working to earn his living. He must wear Western-style clothes, use a water latrine, and travel by train. These are necessary to keep him a good servant. However, those things that give real meaning and content to the white man's way of life—respect for individuality, the right to liberty and self-expression, the right to develop his personality to the best of his ability—must not be given him.

The distinction here is a very important one. The republic's government always complains bitterly that its critics ignore the tremendous contributions it has made toward African progress: Magnificent hospitals, schools, and university colleges. These contributions are not to be denied, but they are significant precisely because they are designed to make the African a good servant and not a well-developed human being who is the intellectual equal of his white countryman. They are the visible expressions of an immoral attitude toward life; but when the attitude itself is criticized on moral grounds, it is a waste of time to take them into consideration. The Ngoye university college for Zulus in Natal may have first-class buildings; it may have the most highly qualified and experienced academic men on its staff. But this is not the point at issue; what matters is the policy these

men have to carry out, the type of citizen, the personality, they must produce. As long as policy aims at preserving "the proper relations," Ngoye is a cynical waste of public funds. As long as the African wage is an instrument of racial policy, the huge hospitals (which are complemented inevitably by the large cemeteries in the locations) are the visible symptoms of the inner spiritual rotteness that is the essence of the temper of the slave owner. Poor people need money to buy themselves better food. It is poor consolation to them to show them magnificent hospitals.

Just as the economic system of the tribe has been destroyed, so the cultural pattern has changed. There has emerged in the place of the old an amalgam compounded of traditions from the African, Oriental, and Western ways of life. My family, for example, speaks Zulu; we eat curry and rice; and one of our most enjoyable experiences is listening to the music of Beethoven and Mozart. The culture of a people is a living reality, through which is expressed the desire to make life worth while and better. It lives because it breathes the spirit, the life-force, of a living people. Unlike economic systems, it cannot be destroyed unless it be with the consent of the people who uphold it.

For generations, the African has been subjected to systematic pressure to adapt himself to the demands of surviving in an environment in which the temper of the slave owner was the dominant influence in national life. In order to do this, he evolved a cultural pattern whose inspirational sources were rooted deeply in the African and European experiences of life. This is not a compromise between the West and Africa. It is a new way of life, with its own pulse and dynamism. It will make its own impact on human history and civilization. Like that other reality in South Africa, the colored, the African's cultural pattern is a direct product of contact between Africa and the West. The colored is physically like neither of his parents. In the same manner, our pattern is neither Western nor tribal. It is a new entity, giving new content, form, and direction to life. Just as the colored cannot change the fact of having descended from black and white, so our culture cannot divorce itself from the sources of its inspiration without the destruction of the African people.

What some Africans regard as a cruel dilemma emerges from this. In his bid to eliminate white supremacy, the African has to be careful to ensure that he does not destroy the white person and, ultimately, those sources of his inspiration that are distinctly white. For spiritual sustenance he has always had to look as much to his sources as to those from the white side. If he destroys the white community, he might crush its sources of inspiration and therefore thwart or warp the development of his own personality. He might surrender the influence to mold his life to those who impose ethnic grouping on him to destroy his history and his finest achievements. He might repudiate the symbols that stand out as monuments to his industry and wisdom. In the final reckoning, he might destroy the African people and ultimately prove that apartheid is right. In short, he has to justify himself on terrain that is not of his choosing, and his is a cruel dilemma in a situation that treats no community with pity.

The Afrikaner has his own dilemma. He has evolved apartheid to guarantee himself a place in the African sun; but in so doing he has exorcised forces that make an Afrikaans diaspora inevitable unless there is a sudden change of attitude. It might be heroic for the granite mind of the Afrikaner nationalist to contemplate a scattered existence among the nations of the world in order to justify apartheid. For the average Afrikaner man or woman, however, it might mean an exile and a degree of suffering to which humanity could not afford to be indifferent.

The Jews could scatter to the four corners of the earth because there was moral content in their cause. In the final analysis, their Jehovah was the God of Mercy. Man had been created in His image so that he should strive to be like Him. The struggles of the Jews constituted one unfolding process of evolving toward God-like perfection, wherever they were. This motivating urge was a liberating influence. It worked for the continuous enlargement of the Jewish personality and it enabled the Jews to make their fair contribution to every field of human endeavor and in that way insured their survival. The Jews survived because they gave.

The doctrine that *die wit man moet baas bly* is restrictive. It narrows perception of the truth. In this doctrine, reality is not an