infinite complex, which man is forever understanding in increasingly clearer light; it is a static whole, which must be seen and understood only from the perspective of the fundamentalist dynamic. In this setup, the truth ceases to have an objective or intrinsic or absolute validity; it has that meaning imparted to it by the requirements of survival. Supreme virtue reposes in its heroic acceptance, not in reality.

This has obvious dangers. It restricts and then distorts the growth of the personality. It creates an attitude of mind which confuses right and wrong and finds it hard to draw the essential distinction between political necessity and moral right. The result is a constriction of the personality that can only spell disaster for the Afrikaner people. A diaspora in these circumstances would lead to the destruction of the community itself and its culture. What point would there be in allowing Dutch Reformed Church mission stations in Nyasaland, Nigeria, or elsewhere in Africa if the Afrikaner missionaries were committed to the ideal that *die wit man moet baas bly?* Nigeria and Nyasaland might, in the not distant future, ask DRC missionaries to close down their schools and return to South Africa in protest against the immorality of apartheid. This would be a moral defeat for the Afrikaner Christian. If the Afrikaner had to face this moral challenge wherever he went and if he had nothing else to offer but the heroic approach, his future would be in jeopardy. History allows a people to survive only to the extent that it is prepared to grow in mind and in spirit.

Viewed objectively, the destruction of the Afrikaners would be a major tragedy not only for them but for humanity as well. Each time a human group fails to measure up to the requirements of living peacefully and fruitfully with its neighbors, humanity is the poorer for the defeat.

The emphasis is being put on the Afrikaner here because it is from his side that the most determined advocacy of the temper of the slave owner comes. The British support his racial policies up to a certain point. If the moment came for the whites to be driven out of South Africa, the British would go to other parts of the Commonwealth. The Afrikaner would literally have no-

where to go. This serves to underline the tragic nature of his position.

To return to the African's dilemma: His cultural borrowings have taken such deep root in his life and they go back for such a long time in history that for him the struggle to reach the moment of fulfillment is no longer basically racial. For him, it centers largely around irreconcilable values of life. The clash is no longer between black and white; it is between a philosophy of life that sets the greatest store by the group and another that attaches maximum importance to the individual. He has built up a whole tradition, a whole life, and, indeed, a political philosophy on this belief.

Most people on the continent find it hard to understand all this. When I was in Accra for the All-African People's Conference in 1958, West Africans often told me that I and other South Africans they knew were not Africans. They said we did not *think African*. When I visited Swaziland recently, I was informed by highly educated Swazis that the black South Africans in the protectorate conducted themselves as though they were black Europeans. There was no malice in all this. People who had been brought up in accordance with the ideals and beliefs of an environment they regarded as African could not understand how men of their own race could think differently or belong to a different cultural world.

They understand only too well why the Negro is a black Westerner. He was captured as a slave and forced to live in conditions in which he lost almost everything cultural he ever took with him from Africa. He had no choice. He had to become a black whiteman. They do not see how an African majority, which has fought for almost every inch of its land as we have done within the last three hundred years, can have attitudes that are different from those of the majority on the continent.

The answer, of course, is simple. The white man settled in our country in such large numbers and was so armed that after defeat we faced the prospect of being wiped off the face of our land if we did not adapt our life and thinking realistically to the demands of the changed situation. We could do this in one of

two ways. We could abandon everything in our own culture and set ourselves the ideal of becoming black Europeans. British policy at the Cape had begun to move in this direction by 1852, when a nonracial franchise was granted. Or we could, after fighting heroically to maintain our independence in the face of overwhelming odds, decide to create for ourselves a new pattern of life based on our experience in history. It would be inspired by borrowings from our culture and that of the conquering white man, to insure our survival. We decided on the latter course. The result was that we evolved a cultural pattern that was no longer tribal and that, at the same time, could not be European. It was unlike anything history had seen before. Go to any African capital and you will promptly notice that our music has a distinctiveness all its own. We do not say it is superior to anybody's; we merely say that it is uniquely our own, born of our peculiar experience of life—the unique creation of the human mind forced to survive in unique conditions.

We had to develop a somewhat eclectic outlook on life to enlarge our personality. We had to do this or face disaster. In the process, we learned the hard way that the things which really endure in human experience are the values of life that give content to existence for man. We realized that race and color had no inherent value in themselves. We may have been politically right in adopting this attitude; we may have been wrong. Our justification is that this attitude ensured our survival and has now placed us in such a position that we have, with these bare hands of ours, finally isolated apartheid from the family of civilized nations.

The sense of realism that was to develop from our new view of life naturally encouraged the emergence of new attitudes toward our relations among ourselves, toward our relations with the non-African minorities, and, for that matter, with the other peoples of our continent. As a result, substantial numbers of Africans in the republic draw a sharp distinction between the meaning freedom should have in South Africa and that which it has in West Africa, for example. In the latter area, it is said, the climate was of such a nature that the whites could not settle in

large numbers. They came for specific purposes and periods, and upon retirement they tended to return to cooler zones. The climatic factor discouraged the growth of substantial white minorities with deeply vested interests in these countries, and that militated against too wide an area of acculturation. Thus, when the spirit of revolt against white domination rose, the whites did not have as many reserves of power as they had in South Africa. Because of this, African nationalism could interpret freedom to mean the transfer of sovereignty from the white authority to the indigenous community. This we might call the Saharan Approach.

Quite a different set of circumstances existed in southern Africa. The temperate climate allowed permanent white settlement. Economic and other factors attracted large numbers of whites from Europe, most of whom cut off their links with their countries of origin. The Afrikaners even gave up the Dutch language; the Huguenots did not want to have much to do with France and French culture; and the British, when Dr. Verwoerd finally forced them to choose between their own people in the Commonwealth and South Africa, elected to become political beggars in Verwoerd's race-conscious republic.

These communities developed a sense of nationhood that differed in important essentials from the European conception. The differences were the result of their experiences in the African environment. They belonged to Africa and developed attitudes that, popular or not, were valid only in the African environment. They had deeply vested interests of all kinds; Afrikaans poetry, for example, has derived endless inspiration from the beauties of the veld. All these roots tied them almost permanently to the African soil. Very many of them would have nowhere to go if they were thrown out of Africa, for there are no communities with the same lingual or cultural ties. Hence, they occupy a position that, in important respects, is similar to that of the Negroes in the United States and South America. In addition to all this, they have developed reserves of power that necessitate a realistic approach. Apart from the moral and humanistic aspects, they can justify their sense of belonging to Africa. They

present a problem that does not allow of solution by the methods adopted in Ghana or Nigeria.

In West Africa, freedom could have only one meaning—the transfer of power from the foreign authority to the inhabitants. In South Africa, the problem is quite different. To develop the democratic tradition, many Africans maintain that freedom must mean the sharing of power, wealth, security, and opportunity on a basis that will give free scope to the will of the majority without threatening the survival of the minorities. In practice, this will mean the free sharing of power on a nonracial basis in a society where race and color are no longer factors of political, economic, or social significance. This approach we shall call Capricornian Realism.

Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika has faced the problems presented by a mixed community and arrived at the conclusion that where race antagonisms exist, the coordination of group initiatives in a nonracial society is in the best interests of all concerned. This is the line Seme and Dube laid down for the Union Africans in 1912.

To many Africans of the republic, the danger of seeing in the Saharan Approach the only solution for all African countries lies in the fact that it might produce a polarization of attitudes in the continent, which might divide the peoples of Africa into two camps—the advocates of the Saharan Approach with its southern connotations of expelling the white "foreign minorities" and the supporters of Capricornian Realism, who believe in the coordination of race initiatives. Such a division at this stage would play into the hands of the Verwoerds and the Welenskys and in that way retard progress toward real freedom. What the times call for in this field, it is said, is a flexible attitude that recognizes both the Saharan Approach and Capricornian Realism as legitimate expressions of Africa's desire for freedom and encourages both as African responses to the same challenge in different situations.

This flexibility is of vital importance to South Africa and, probably, to the rest of the continent. It opens the doors wide to all the peoples of Africa to work together for the liberation of

the continent and, after victory, for the pooling of their resources to raise their standards of living with the minimum of delay. In this gigantic task of reconstruction, there will be need for all the reserves of power owned by all the peoples who have made Africa their home. And how deep this feeling runs can quickly be made clear: If one stands up in an exclusively African meeting to say these things, one gets cheers, so strong are the reserves of power.

The last group of reserves is the military. The machine that the white man has established to secure his dominance can be divided into two sections—the police and the army. Both are unique in one respect, for they are organized, trained, and oriented to regard themselves as the first line of defense of one section against the other. This means, of course, that South Africa is a nation at war with itself: On the one side is the small white minority and, on the other, the overwhelming majority of the Africans. The coloreds are giving serious consideration to the idea of taking sides with the Africans, and some Indians are attracted to the prospect of making friends with the rulers of tomorrow. Between the two main opposing sides are the police and the army, to keep the peace.

In both forces, elaborate precautions are taken to ensure that in moments of crisis the initiative to influence events under no circumstances slips into African hands. In the police force, the African cannot rise to any position higher than that of a first-class sergeant. As in the army, where he is always a noncombatant, so in the police force he is forbidden to carry firearms—except in situations where such carrying, as in some of Johannesburg's locations, becomes the only means of ensuring the supremacy of the white man.

In the locations, the police behave like an army of occupation, since they are free to enter any house and search it without a warrant. They are the most heavily armed police force this side of the Iron Curtain and outside of the dictatorships. Their main task is not to protect the citizen and uphold the law, but to ensure that "proper relations" are maintained between black and white. The accumulated experience of operating tyrannical in-

stitutions down through the ages is at the disposal of the South African police, and they use it to perpetuate one of the most vicious tyrannies man has ever invented to limit his neighbor's freedom.

Although they readily involve themselves in private wars with the Africans—as in Witzieshoek, Zeerust, and Pondoland—knowing beforehand that Parliament will indemnify them, they are merely an instrument of policy. Ultimate power reposes not in them, not in the cabinet or Parliament, not even in the electorate or the Afrikaner people, but in a secret society, the Broederbond, which wields a sinister, cabalistic influence on the course of events in the republic.

The Broederbond is the true custodian of the Piet Retief tradition. It controls the government and, to some extent, the Dutch Reformed Church. Through these, it influences parliament, the universities, the army, the police, and every phase of South African life. If, tomorrow, the Broederbond decided that apartheid should be scrapped, it would not be long before it was erased from the Statute Book of the country. That, however, is unlikely, for the strength of the Broederbond lies not so much in the number of its members as in its inflexible determination to keep the Afrikaner master on his terms at any cost. But a warning should be sounded here: The Broederbond is not holding a peaceful and innocent Afrikaans people in thrall; it merely expresses, with the greatest degree of clarity and the fiercest determination possible, the motivating urges that stir deepest in the Afrikaner nationalist bosom.

It will be seen from all the foregoing that the reserves of power interact in the South African situation in a most peculiar way. No group can impose its will on the others indefinitely without being hurt. In spite of his dominance, the Afrikaner has not been able to solve the race problem on terms that suit him. In spite of his numbers, the African has not been able to destroy white supremacy.

13 • THE UNCOMMITTED AFRICAN

ONE visible effect of the reserves of power on the various nationalistic groups that came into being during the first fifty years of the Union was the acceleration of the process by which they were divided into two groups. One side favored a realistic approach to the race problem, while the other preferred the heroic. This arose largely from acceptance and nonacceptance of the values that gave content to life in the white man's world.

Although the African National Congress developed African initiatives to alter the balance of racial power reserves, its policy in practice was guided by a deep-seated respect for realities. The policy of buying time to build up reserves of power was an acknowledgment of both the weaknesses and the potentialities of the African. The ICU, like Bambada before it, was ready to take the offensive on any plane where there was the possibility of embarrassing the white authority. It believed, or acted as though it believed, that the masses would become militant in proportion to the number of challenges hurled at the race oppressor. As long as the two moods were differently motivated there was the certainty that nonviolence would remain a significant factor in the race crisis. The conflict between the realistic and heroic approaches would project peaceful solutions to the fore as the feasible bases of unity, and this would certainly remain the case also as long as the power reserves were balanced in the white man's favor.

During the course of the fifty years after Union, a number of factors combined to alter the balance of power in the African's favor. Apartheid's refusal to listen to peaceful appeals for change, and its inability to respond positively to constitutional demands or nonviolent agitations for reform, narrowed the gulf between the two moods of African nationalism. The Cold War raised the value of African good will, and the emergence of African states and the Accra Conference all combined to bring the reserves to parity.

One very important result of this was that when the white authority, as was its habit, shot the Africans at Sharpeville in 1960 to assert white initiatives, the gulf between the two moods was bridged. A new harmony in the voices raised from both sides of the gulf became noticeable. Criticism of peaceful methods was bolder, for increasing numbers of people argued that mass nonviolence was an incitement to state violence. There tended to be general agreement that the only answer was protracted majority violence. In short, a change was taking place in the thinking of the African: At last, the heroic and realistic sides had begun to see the race problem from reconcilable perspectives. When Luthuli called for a day of mourning for the death of Sobukwe's followers, the realists and the heroicals—to coin a word—could then think alike on strategy. For them, the moment had come to start speaking and acting firmly.

Their main problem was how to do this. The Consultative Conference of African leaders, which met at Orlando toward the end of 1960, was to some extent an attempt to find a solution acceptable to all sides. Most of the delegates who accepted invitations to it hoped that it would furnish them with the answer they were looking for. For the heroic side the answer was simple —assert group initiatives decisively in a major challenge to apartheid. The former members of the PAC stated that they were particularly interested in positive action against race oppression. The realistic side did not find it as easy to provide the answer. For a long time, they had been nurtured on traditions that rejected racial initiatives. From insistence on a principled struggle

and a program of action, they had gone on to preach that values of life with a similar validity on both sides of the color line were the only desirable and effective bonds of unity in a mixed nation. Unlike the heroic side, they doubted the wisdom of the African "going it alone." That, they feared, could very well degenerate into racial fundamentalism on the African side. Coordinated intergroup initiatives were what they would have liked to have been able to prove to be the answer.

But they faced serious internal difficulties. The multiracialists in the Congress movement and the nonracialist liberals, for example, were handicapped by the fact that the like-minded of all races did not all have similar economic interests. This fact aroused different responses to particular lines of action. The only logical weapon the realists could use effectively—because of their outlook and their composition—was mass nonviolence. To do this, though, they required time, money, and emotional effectiveness, especially if the heroic side was one of their rivals. Not having these in sufficient quantities made them largely impotent in the face of urgent challenges; for wherever it became possible to procure arms, the advocates of the heroic line would certainly capture the initiative to influence events.

Another cruel dilemma was emerging. It was becoming clear that the day was not far off when the choice before South Africa would be between the guerrilla with a grenade or gun in his hand and the saboteur with a box of matches in his pocket. The "extremist" would be the guerrilla; the "moderate," the saboteur, so violent and extreme were the contradictions in the race crisis.

The startlingly significant fact in all this was that apartheid's intransigency had pushed both the heroic school and the realists, the "extremists" and the "moderates," to the point where they both virtually accepted violence as the only potential means of making an impression on the white ruling minority and the government. The only real problem that remained was whether it was going to be violence to the person or to property.

After the collapse of the stay-at-home strike, which the Consultative Conference had been originally called to organize for

May 29–31, Nelson Mandela, who had suddenly emerged from obscurity to be "recognized" as national leader, announced that the days of nonviolence were over. He added ominously that the oppressed would consider other ways of struggle, and nobody in the ANC movement leadership repudiated him. He was merely making public a change in attitudes that had already taken place in the underground, and the acceptance by substantial sections of the African community of violence as the instrument without which change could not be brought about marks one of the critical turning-points in the history of South Africa. This could very well be true of Africa, since nobody knows for certain how Africa's millions would react to another bloody explosion in the republic. Finally, an important point to note about the change in attitudes is that it is precisely what the Communists had waited and hoped for during a period of nearly forty years.

It is at this point that the so-called uncommitted African enters the picture. In South Africa, the African was born into a situation of inescapable involvement. Seme, Dube, and their contemporaries were mainly the products of mission schools. The world they wanted for themselves was to be based on democratic values as understood in the West, for the spiritual and intellectual umbilical cord of their generation was in the West. Emotionally and physically, they lived in a world where the temper of the slave owner was the dominant influence. The consequent dichotomy in the life of the African was to constitute, to a large extent, the state of being uncommitted.

In large parts of Africa, neutrality entails no congenital involvement. Intellectually and physically, the people belong to Africa. But in South Africa, cultural integration has gone too far, for too long, for the black man to experience no conflict between his present environment and his intellectual or spiritual preferences. This makes involvement a far more serious matter in the republic than in any other part of Africa. When a large group that has spiritually chosen a life based on values that have meaning in the Western world is forcefully turned away from its path, in order to perpetuate a tradition that is foreign

to the free world, then there is bound to be conflict. When the African democrats say that apartheid is the best recruiting agent Communism has in the republic, this is what they mean.

In this situation, commitment has a variety of meanings. Apart from embracing the Communist doctrine, it entails agreeing to respond to particular situations in prescribed ways. It involves moving intellectually or emotionally from a previously occupied ideological position to its opposite. It is a form of political proselytization and not a conversion. In the category of responses, the preference for violence and involvement might be included, by implication at least. The latter is a form of adjustment dictated by the laws of the country, which make the profession of Communism a crime; consequently, commitment is not a dramatic happening like baptism or death—certainly not for groups. It tends to be a gradual, almost imperceptible process of change in habits of thought, in behavior, in attitudes, and, of course, in reacting to given situations.

If we use this definition for purposes of ascertaining the changes taking place in the mind of the African, it will become clear that the acceptance of violence implies the rejection of a cardinal principle of Western policy in Africa. Both Western Europe and America have gone to great pains to keep violence out of the South African crisis, certainly out of the African's mind. The fact that their efforts have failed does not necessarily mean that Communist values have been accepted; it does indicate that a valuable tactical position has been lost, that a security vacuum has been created, which waits to be filled. And it shows that a climate of opinion has been created which surrenders to the Communists the tactical initiative to influence events on a vital plane. They, in turn, will find it easier, from now on, to work in a community whose thinking is becoming oriented toward violence. Apartheid is responsible for this. Accordingly, the Communists are gearing themselves for effective action in the more propitious circumstances created for them by Dr. Verwoerd and his followers. How they are doing this will be demonstrated in the section on Communism.

The security vacuum is the most disturbing danger sign this side of the point of no return. A key people in sub-Saharan Africa have been exposed to conditions that might make their association with the free world increasingly difficult. The Communists themselves are not responsible for this; rather, the republic's government, which claims on all occasions to be a friend and ally of the West, is doing it. To the uncommitted African, the real danger in this setup is not the loss of tactical initiative: It is that a vacuum has been created, which threatens his freedom (if he has it) or destroys his chances of getting it (if he has not won it). It may limit his area of fulfillment and impose on him one more European-made destiny that will cramp the free development of his genius. It may rob freedom of content. Nkrumah and Nyerere are of one mind in their hostility to this threat.

This throws into bolder relief another view of the security vacuum. It need not be seen exclusively from the angle of disaster, for its existence is also a challenge that must be accepted. What may be lacking is an economic, cultural, spiritual, ideological, or political security. Where the gulf between poverty and wealth has followed racial lines for a long time and where political security has been denied on racial grounds, the safest precaution, for some time to come, is to start by filling the economic and political sides of the vacuum. A super-Marshall plan for Africa, administered preferably by the United Nations, is one idea that deserves consideration, since it could be useful in slowing down the processes accelerated by apartheid. On the political plane, democracy has to show that it produces quicker and better results than Communism in the fight to extend the area of liberty. If it merely saturates the air with admonitory unctuosities when apartheid frustrates life's purpose for millions of people right under its nose, then it is repeating Nero's blunder—with a vengeance.

The problem of commitment might be seen also from the angle of the continent and the perspectives from which the African views his destiny.

The two moods of African nationalism have their roots ultimately in man's experience on this planet. The most dominant factor in this experience is the individual's desire to make the best possible use of his life—the urge to live. When the anthropoids abandoned their homes in the trees of the primeval forest, they did so because an arboreal existence offered them only limited opportunities for making the best possible use of their lives. The dangers that man faced in his new abode, from animals, floods, disease, and his neighbors were such that in order to survive he gave up the individualism of arboreal life for life in the caves. Among the trees, life had centered around his own individuality; his personal quickness of mind, agility, and resourcefulness were his primary guarantees of safety. But survival in the caves called for the development of different qualities. Since the troglodytes might suddenly find a dozen bears snarling at the entrance, they had to recognize the need for collective action, for collective defense. The tribe and its disciplines emerged. For maximum efficiency, of course, the new unit had to be compact, disciplined; it had to accept leadership. The individual had to surrender much of his personal freedom in order to build up the solidarity and power of the group. These were more reliable guarantees of security and survival.

But when life in the caves became inadequate and unsatisfying —when, in other words, it no longer enabled man to improve himself—he went to the valleys where he could till the soil when game was scarce. He met others placed like him. His leaders increased their power over him, and in time they appointed themselves permanent heads of their tribes. Their positions and those of their allies, the priests, became hereditary. The chiefs had come into being. During the winters, when game was scarce, man could sit down, sharpen his tools, sew his clothes, exchange experiences with his neighbors, and, also, think. Thought has been the most potent weapon against dictators right through history.

In the meantime, the demands of survival were making the tribal states an institution that made growing inroads on the

liberty of the individual. The chief, his relatives, and his sup-
porters were becoming a group within the tribe, the distinguish-
ing feature of which was its possession of power. The ruling group
used this power to strengthen its position at the expense of the
individual. But as man began to think about his problems, he
challenged the priests, the chiefs, and the kings (who had emerged
from the more progressive states). He wanted to reduce their
power, since it narrowed his area of fulfillment. So the great
conflict between the individual and the group developed in full
force, and it was to affect the entire course of human history.
At every stage, the group insisted on narrowing down the in-
dividual's area of freedom in return for the protection it gave
him, but the enlargement of the individual personality that re-
sulted from this clash necessitated a change of strategy on the
part of the group. As soon as it felt called upon to vary its
techniques for controlling the individual, it developed classes
within the group, all of which specialized in the suppression of
the individual's liberty. They were in time to fight among them-
selves for dominance, but that is beside the point.

From the long conflict between the individual and the group,
there arose two traditions—the one that set the greatest store
by the individual and the other that attached maximum im-
portance to the group; the one which saw fulfillment for man
from the perspective of the individual and the other which
viewed it from the angle of the group. History is but one long
and unbroken record of the conflicts between the two traditions.
The side upholding the rights of the individual was to produce
the tradition we describe as democratic, and the totalitarian out-
look was to develop from the other.

When the white man came to South Africa, the individual Afri-
can was quick to see in those values of life that had the same mean-
ing on both sides of the color line a better guarantee of security
and a safer road to fulfillment. For him, the acceptance of these
values was the wise thing to do. So he became a Christian, broke
away from the tribe, and went to live in the community of be-
lievers on the mission station; and because he no longer had the

might of the group behind him, he developed the instinct for
respecting realities.

The tribe, on the other hand, was a defensive organism and
a machine for attack. Its job was to protect itself, to ensure its
survival. When the white man came with the Bible and the gun,
threatening to sow evangelical dissension in its ranks for the
purpose of shooting it into submission when it became weak, it re-
jected him and the divisive values of life he brought along. It
despised and hated the traitor who crossed over to the side of
the white man; when possible, it killed him. Seme's family
belonged to the refugee group that had fled from the Zulu
kingdom because the king no longer thought it good to have
converts among his subjects. These people fled until they settled
down in the Inanda mission station. And because the tribe or the
group had power on its side, it saw men and events from the
heroic perspective.

When the white man finally conquered, he treated all black
men alike, whether or not they had accepted his values of life.
The nonacceptors blamed the acceptors for the defeat and vice
versa. The one side thought its approach better and more ef-
fective than the other's and refused to abandon its own. The
differences became so acute that in later wars between the
African and the white man the acceptors took up arms on the
side of the latter against their own kith and kin. In short, spiritual
links were proving stronger than blood connections. When Cet-
shwayo fought the British, for example, African Christian com-
munities furnished the British with men. This was as long ago as
1879! And these were volunteers! From all this, there developed
the two moods of African nationalism in South Africa.

This element of dualism is one of the most remarkable
characteristics of African nationalism in Negro Africa. No-
where does it manifest itself as clearly as in the two interpre-
tations of freedom referred to in this study as the Saharan
Approach and Capricornian Realism. Geography does not have
much to do with the differences between the two; it is largely a
question of self-interest and temperament. In West Africa, just

next door to Ghana, Houphouet-Boigny has projected himself to the fore as an ardent Capricornian Realist, one who attaches importance to the individual and the values that give content and meaning to life. In South Africa, the PAC saw in the Saharan Approach the first and last revelation of the truth, for it lays the greatest stress on the group and its power.

Nkrumah has made most Africans believe that his ideal of a free Africa is the creation of a vast, monolithic state within which the African personality would be the dominant influence. This is not the idle dream of an idealist; it is an end that can be attained—given the leadership, the courage, and the determination. There is no valid reason why an inspired African cannot do for the continent what Karl Marx did for Communism. But to keep this vast empire together would present its own problems. Some Negro Africans might not find much scope for fulfillment in a world dominated by the African personality—just as some whites find a world dominated by the white personality crushing. History teaches that the racial personality can sometimes be viciously tyrannous, that it can damage the individual personality and stunt its growth. In a world torn in two on the issue of evaluating the human personality, stress on race or the power of the group could quite conceivably accustom millions to thinking of themselves only in terms of the group. If this happened, freedom and fulfillment would be seen from the collective perspective.

Here, again, the adoption of the group approach would imply the rejection of a cardinal democratic principle—that the individual has a sacredness that makes it imperative that he should be governed by consent. In itself, this would not imply an acceptance of the Communist ideology. But an Africa that saw things from the perspective of the group would be more amenable to another type of group approach—that of the Communists. It would all be a question of habits of thinking. The Pan-Africanist, for example, might regard himself as an ardent democrat. If, however, he encourages his followers to see themselves as a racial group, if he teaches them to see their future from the angle of

group fulfillment, there is always the danger that when the Communists start working up group pressures against him he will be poorly placed, tactically and morally, to steer events toward his goal of freedom. The African personality and the Communist personality are irreconcilable. His difficulties are not made easier by the fact that in the conflict between African nationalism and colonialism, the West hesitates to give immediate, effective, and decisive help to those who fight for the extension of the area of liberty.

The moral, therefore, is that if there had been no free Ghana or Nigeria, for example, the chances are that South Africa would have remained a distinguished member of the Commonwealth. She would probably still be given all the honor and acclaim accorded a perfectly respectable Western democratic nation.

But then, the failures of the West are no yardstick by which to measure our own moral stature. They are no beacons by which to direct our march into the future. They are no argument for paving the way for the Communists—unless, of course, the African personality is but an imitation of the European personality, with no vitality of its own. The uncommitted African has his own criteria—his capacity to achieve, his moral dimension, and the world he is creating for himself. He is a new type of individual, bringing with him a fresh outlook on life. He wants to play a new role in a new type of civilization. He wants the opportunity to prove his worth, to justify himself, to serve in nobody's ideological kitchens. For him the Communist and capitalist stereotypes are too rigid and inflexible to allow for that enlargement of the human personality that would take him to his moment of fulfillment. He is suspicious of any policy that might tie him hand and foot to one side of the ideological fence or the other.

On the other hand, Capricornian Realism—like the Saharan Approach—takes note of the common historical experience of the African Negro. It holds, however, that fulfillment for the black man, whose humanity was outraged and whose personality was damaged as a matter of policy for centuries, cannot be

achieved in an African version of the white personality. It can only be achieved in the ideal of emancipated man enjoying the liberty that is his birthright, and being free to make the best possible use of his life as an individual. He might be black, brown, or white—the color is not important. He must be free to draw for his development from the vast experience man has accumulated during his sojourn on this planet. What matters vitally, above everything else, is the human personality, because in the final analysis, the only personality that is real is the human.

The Capricornian mind would rather have federations of countries with contiguous borders and common problems. If need arose for greater aggregations a Commonwealth of African States would be preferable.

The two moods of African nationalism are realities in the twentieth century. They are the ingredients that keep African nationalism a motive power, and they synthesize into the march to freedom. In this process, Houphouet-Boigny is as real as Nkrumah, occupying as honorable and patriotic a position. If, for him, freedom can be understood from a different angle—say, in closer collaboration with France—the African statesman will not shout against this in tones to awaken the dead. He will see in it the expression of the varied genius of a great people preparing itself for the task of leading civilization in its next jump into the future. This is a cardinal principle of uncommitment.

Many fears have been expressed about Sekou Touré's alleged flirting with the Communists. There is no convincing evidence that he wants to narrow down the area of freedom by tying his people to the coattails of the Soviet Union. Like every African statesman, he is impatient to see the scourge of poverty removed from the life of his people. If Marxist formulas hold the key to success for him, we should ask ourselves if Western democracy demonstrated to him its proof of effectiveness, if, indeed, it still can. One of the most loved and respected sons of Africa, Leopold Senghor, has often warned that the distinction should be drawn between Marxism as understood by the socialist, on the one hand, and the Communist, on the other. The latter, he has often said, is not acceptable because it works for the restriction of freedom.

Capricornian Realism, like the African personality, is as African as anything can ever be. To denigrate it in efforts to throttle it, or to cast African thinking into a racial mold, would mark the moment of failure for African statesmanship. A new era of wars would have been opened. Freedom would have been won to be betrayed. For, African nationalism will always have its two moods. It is right and desirable that this should be the case. The alternative would be a collective racial mind. When this nationalism has served its purpose—we shall not have use for it forever—and when freedom and security are no longer in danger, the two moods will continue as the conservative and radical wings of African opinion.

What the times and the situation call for is an African Accord, a community of feeling, an organic relationship, which will remove race hatred and suspicion and rely for its success, not on dehumanizing compulsions or the odium of excommunications, but on its ability to give proof of its effectiveness. This, in the view of the uncommitted African, would extend rather than limit the area of African unity. This Accord would be neither a neutral force nor a compromise between Communism and capitalism. It would be a new phenomenon on the world stage, but it would have its roots in the African's common historical experience. Content would have been given to it by a variety of inspirations—some African, others Occidental and Oriental. Its motivating urge would be to see the individual reach the moment of highest fulfillment. It would be based on a political, economic, and cultural eclecticism that combined the best traditions in the human experience and from these produced a new amalgam. The composite whole would be the best expression of the African genius, on the one hand, and, on the other, would give content to that type of democracy that would best satisfy Africa's hunger for freedom and security.

This is the goal the uncommitted African has set himself. His friends will be those who help him move toward it with the minimum of delay, and not those who push him to one side of the ideological fence or the other. He has his own purpose in life.