

PART

III

COMMUNISM—A COMPLICATING FACTOR

WITH the exception of South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet had a serious Communist problem. The main reason for this is that contact between black and white has not been of long or permanent duration. Consequently, most countries in this region were not developed industrially with the degree of enthusiasm the whites have shown in the south. If this has been advantageous—by not developing a complicated race problem—for these in some ways, it has also retarded the growth of an urbanized proletariat. The high degree of industrialization in South Africa has, over the generations, produced a large working class—probably the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. This, in turn, has attracted Communism in ways the rest of the African people find difficult to understand.

In the pages that follow, an attempt will be made to show how Communism has affected the struggle of the African people against race oppression. In a sense, this is a unique story because it dispels many popular illusions, both inside the country and beyond its borders. This is the primary reason why a section on Communism has been included in this study.

The second reason is that the government of South Africa regards all its opponents as Communists. To throw the net as widely as possible, Parliament has already, in the Suppression of Communism Act, stated that it recognizes Marxist Communism and Statutory Communism. According to this definition, any-

body, even a Roman Catholic archbishop, who says apartheid is wicked is a Communist. If, however, the archbishop attacks apartheid strictly on moral grounds, then he is merely an agent of the Communists.

This technique of smearing people is useful in two ways. First, it enables the government to persecute all its opponents without raising too many storms in the outside world. America, for example, does not utter a word when a Communist is locked in jail. He might be a right-wing reactionary of the worst type possible; but if he is branded a Communist, America is through with him. This helps to keep the free world in that position of relative neutrality that makes shootings like the ones at Sharpeville and in Pondoland possible. Second, the government needs a whipping boy for the purpose of continually stirring up the tensions without which Afrikaner solidarity would crack. It has to show from day to day that the Afrikaner people are threatened by a sinister, revolutionary movement directed from Moscow.

In passing, it is not without significance that a few devoted Communists have made it impossible for the government to neutralize them or to silence them. In the Soviet Union, recalcitrant groups are easily disposed of; but in South Africa, the elimination of the Communist threat through the law courts would deprive Afrikaner nationalism of its most valuable political whipping boy. So, the Communists must be allowed to lurk somewhere on the outer periphery while the government deals effectively with the real enemy: African nationalism.

The third reason for including Communism in this study is that it is a force working according to its own pattern to influence events in a particular direction. No study of African politics in South Africa would be balanced that ignored its important role in the race crisis, for Communism functions very curiously in South Africa. In one mood, it is the sworn enemy of African nationalism; in another, it is the self-proclaimed friend of liberation. Since 1921, when it formally entered the political arena, it has followed a policy of sharp and costly zig-

zags, which has made it the firm ally of Afrikaner nationalism at one time and of African nationalism at another, and has finally transformed it into the enemy of both.

The events through which this pattern unfolded were influenced by two important considerations—South Africa's phenomenal industrial growth and the strategic position she holds as the halfway port between Asia and the West on the main sea route linking them. These factors combine to make the republic the main gateway into sub-Saharan Africa. Whoever controls South Africa has tactical mastery of this part of the continent. The second consideration is the race factor. Nowhere on the continent is the policy of race oppression pursued with a greater degree of determination than in South Africa. Although oppression provides Communism with the opportunity to project itself to the fore as a liberating influence, the emphasis on race creates awkward challenges. The white working class is the avowed enemy of the African proletariat, and apartheid derives its most determined support from the white proletariat. Since the Nostradamian prophecies of Karl Marx often tend to fall to pieces in a situation like this, recourse has to be made to expediency and policies of drift. The history of Communism brings out this fact more clearly than any analysis.

By 1915, splits had begun to develop in the socialist movement in this country. The socialists were at the time a white movement; if there were any Africans involved, very few people knew it. The formation of the ICU in 1919 made it clear that there already existed a politically conscious proletariat for whom Communism could be the immediate doctrine of salvation. The socialists resolved their differences and, in 1921, formed themselves into the Communist Party of South Africa, to spearhead the working-class revolt against capitalist domination.

The Party started with a rigid color bar. It admitted to membership only people with a white skin. But this betrayal of Marx was, strictly speaking, a tactical move to avoid hurting the sensibilities of the race-conscious white proletariat. The underlying belief—which de Mist had held as well—was that the processes

which the Party would set in motion would tend to liberalize opinion and destroy race prejudice more effectively if the Party shut its doors to the African. One circumstance which reinforced this approach was the fact that social intercourse between Africans and the Europeans was limited. The African middle class had not been out of its embryonic stage for long, and literacy was still the privilege of the relatively few.

The adoption of the color bar did not mean, however, that the Communists were indifferent to the plight of the workers on the African side. When trouble developed, they came along with help; when strikes or lockouts occurred, they organized soup kitchens, distributed food, and encouraged the Africans. On the other hand, the white worker had been conditioned in such a way that he distrusted any political party that did not say specifically that it was determined to uphold the "proper relations between master and servant," which Piet Retief had sworn to preserve. This circumstance was to force the Communist Party to follow a policy of zigzags with disastrous effects on the unity of the African people.

The first major move was made in 1922. That year, the white workers of Johannesburg were involved in a serious dispute with the mine owners. Strikes and disturbances spread over large parts of the city. Smuts, then Prime Minister, called in the army. Martial law was proclaimed, and it was not until blood had flowed that the white workers' rising was suppressed. In the elections that followed, the Communists joined hands with the Afrikaner nationalists and the mainly English-speaking Labor Party to throw Smuts out of power. In their view, Smuts was the agent of the capitalists. To vote against him was to strike a blow for the Marxist revolution, even if it meant returning to power a coalition the senior partner in which was committed heavily to the Retief tradition and the temper of the slave owner.

The Nationalist-Labor coalition took over the reins of government under Hertzog. Because it had never concealed its dislike for the African, it initiated legislation at once to narrow the area of freedom for the blacks. But with Afrikaner nationalism

in the seats of power and bent on imposing a racial dictatorship, while the ICU's influence continued to spread like wildfire, the Communists found themselves facing another awkward challenge. They had either to remain a small and ineffective white party or perch upon the crest of the wave of African nationalism. The Johannesburg conference of the party, which met in 1924, decided to abandon the color bar.¹

This change of position was significant. The Communists had helped Afrikaner nationalism to power during the elections. Afterward, they turned to the African and started working up pressures from below in the belief that Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism were the ingredients which, if encouraged skillfully and effectively enough, would one day collide with such violence that the consequent chaos would pave the way for the revolution.

But the attempt to collaborate with Afrikaner nationalism had convinced the Communists that the former was being driven by historical, emotional, cultural, and economic forces that threatened everything Marx had proclaimed to be precious. Afrikaner nationalism saw the truth, men, and events from the perspective of the group. Highest fulfillment for the individual lay not in his making the best possible use of his life, but in serving the ends of the group, the *volk*. The supreme arbiter between right and wrong was not the individual conscience but the *volk*, and the final goal was a closed racial state, membership in which would be determined by a prescribed yardstick—race, instead of merit. In essentials, the principle underlying this way of life was that the Communists stood for. They viewed reality from the angle of the group, or class, and the highest fulfillment lay in doing the will of the class. The individual had no real value of his own; he was important only insofar as he was a component unit of a collective whole, the masses. The real judge between right and wrong was "the people"—a mysterious entity

¹ Much of the factual material used in this chapter has been taken from *Time Longer Than Rope*, by Eddie Roux, an authoritative study of the Communist movement in South Africa up to the early 1930's.

symbolized in the presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communism set out to establish a closed state, citizenship in which would be determined by one's economic status.

Collaboration with Afrikaner nationalism had been designed to achieve two other ends as well. Not only was it the implacable foe of British imperialism, but it seemed destined to quarrel bitterly with industrial capital because its own roots were in the rural countryside. Communism has always had a strong bias for seeing virtue in its enemies if they can be used to serve its ends. Therefore, Afrikaner nationalism's divisive role in the white community held out good prospects of creating perpetually unsettled relations in the ruling group, and this could be used to advantage at the right time.

The Communists also reckoned that Afrikaner nationalism's hatred for the African was a guarantee that it would awaken the sleeping black proletarian giant. It would then sting him into seeking to be free from the tyranny of race, finally force him to organize himself effectively, and forge his unity into a powerful force that would drive headlong to a collision with Afrikaner nationalism. The new darlings of the Communist Party were largely illiterate, however, so energies were devoted to organizing night schools. Since the law did not require this to be done under license at the time, the African workers were taught not only the three R's, but the ABC's of Communism as propounded by Bukharin.

The most important achievement of the Communist Party during this period, and the one which stands out today as the most positive, was to stress the importance of training skilled trade-union organizers. The ICU had started brilliantly as a trade-union organization, but because it did not have skilled workers, its affairs were not handled properly. When the inevitable crisis came, it was blown to pieces. The pioneering work it did would have almost come to an end, for a period at least, if the Communists had not stepped in to improve the foundations laid by the ICU. Since this involved them directly in African politics,

they were able to establish links with African political organizations during the formative stage. And this, in turn, gave them an experience of African political life which no other mixed group has.

Largely because the ICU was a working-class movement, and possibly because it was powerful, the Communists tried by infiltration to influence its choice of directions. A fair proportion of them succeeded, but when it became clear that they wanted to carry out instructions issued from Moscow, Kadalie gave them the boot. This was in 1926. In the meantime, the Communists were showering vilification on the ANC, accusing it of being led by stooges of the capitalists, bourgeois intellectuals, and a host of other undesirables. To counteract them in Cape Town, Professor Thaele fought a long, bitter rear-guard action. In Natal, however, where they produced their one (and probably only) martyr, Johannes Nkosi, they did not take firm root; although they were not spectacularly strong in Johannesburg, they established a powerful, closely knit organization.

Kadalie's action, however, forced them to concentrate upon the ANC, the only other organization they could turn to. Progress to the top of this movement was more difficult than in the ICU, for the African middle class, which was well educated, was suspicious of Communist intentions. And the men it had promoted to the top as leaders were mostly people of independent means. Therefore, a new technique was used to accelerate infiltration—a special type of political bribe. Selected young men were sent to Russia for advanced training in the leadership of revolutionary movements. Then, J. T. Gumede, of Maritzburg in Natal, was invited in his capacity as President-General of the ANC to attend the Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism in 1927; from there he proceeded to Russia, where he was taken on a tour of Soviet Asia. He not only returned to South Africa bursting with enthusiasm for the Soviet way of life, but he traveled up and down the country reporting on his visits. Wherever he went, he told the Africans that virtue lay only on the Soviet side. One of the most successful propagandists that

Moscow has ever had in South Africa, he paved the way for the Communists to infiltrate the ANC more openly.

The bulk of the African people, however, still remembered the antics of the Communist Party before 1924 and, in particular, its support of Afrikaner nationalism. They revolted openly against the line laid down by Gumede, and in the 1928 elections he was thrown out of office as President-General of the ANC. The Communists were furious. They had spent money on Gumede, taken him overseas to give him status, and now there he was, a lone figure in the political wilderness. After they had decided to teach the ANC a good lesson, they managed to split it in two by bringing into being a liberation league with Gumede as its first and last president. But when, as was their habit, they reported this to Moscow, Eddie Roux says, they were told to disband it at once. They complied in a hurry.

The ICU continued to grow in strength. Men and women from all walks of life flocked to it to buy the famous red ticket, and prominent citizens on the white side, including the Bishop of Bloemfontein, urged a more realistic policy toward it. The movement was receiving attention in Germany, where the Nazis viewed it as a threat to white supremacy. People in Great Britain were interested in it. The Communists did not like it: African nationalism was becoming too powerful, attempting to influence events by itself, without their guiding hand. This they would not allow.

The 1929 general elections in the white community were approaching. By that time, the Comintern had given instructions that the Communist Party of South Africa should remain a small group of the elite providing the leadership to sway the black millions of the Union toward Moscow. The Depression was showing on the horizon, and things were not going well in the white community. The Communists then produced their famous Black Republic Manifesto, in which they announced as their goal the establishment of an all-African republic in South Africa.

On the face of it, this was an attempt to outbid the ICU; at close range, however, it seems to have been the line dictated by

Moscow. In the colonial world, word had gone around that support should be given to the national aspirations of the oppressed. In the United States, the Communists were demanding the establishment of a Negro state in the south. Naturally, Hertzog promptly denounced the manifesto as an African attempt to drive the white people into the sea, as part of a world conspiracy by the Communists to destroy white South Africa. As was to have been expected, white opinion was electrified, and African nationalism got a terrific boost. In the elections, the Nationalist Party galloped to power with an absolute majority. The Communist manifesto had done its job: The ICU and the ANC had been punished.

Up to this time, not one recognized leader of the African community had ever wanted a racial state. Even the ICU, which had angular preferences on the race question, did not want a separate racial state or Bantustan. In any case, the Communists knew beforehand that they would stand no chance whatsoever of getting a hearing if they asked for a black racial state. All they could succeed in doing would be to unify white opinion behind Hertzog and give a new lease of life to Afrikaner nationalism in power. The people who would suffer most in this situation would be the Africans, for that, of course, would sting them into rebelling against the authority of the Afrikaner nationalist. So it was grist for the party mill.

As soon as he had achieved power, Hertzog gave the ICU a crushing blow. Since that produced catastrophic effects on the morale of the African people, the field was then left open for the Communists, who made a desperate bid to capture the support of the Africans by organizing the antipass demonstration in which Johannes Nkosi lost his life. In the meantime, Hertzog was completing his plans for the removal of the Cape Africans from the voters' roll. That forced Professor Jabavu to launch a nationwide campaign to save the vote and brought the All-African Convention into being. The Communists were instrumental in splitting it; at least, they had their fair share in the sad business.

When the elections came to the institutions set up by the Hertzog laws, the Communists put forward their own candidates. The underlying theory was that apartheid should be helped to drift with all possible speed to its absurd doom. At the same time, capitalistic platforms would be exploited for the propagation of Communist propaganda and the projection of Communist leaders as the real representatives of the Africans. A small party of the elite could exist, therefore, only to provide the brains or "bosses" of the African people's revolt against race oppression. Curiously, the Communist bosses were often men and women from the racial groups which did not carry the pass. Many of them were wealthy professional persons; some owned large farms, country estates, or large business establishments; and from their expensively furnished drawing rooms, they worked out strategy for the African to follow.

In the fifteen years following the abandonment of the color bar, the Communists had successfully laid a fatal trap for the ICU, shaken ANC solidarity, and split the All-African Convention in two. By 1939, there was no well-organized movement to mold opinion among Africans in any definite or effective way.

Although the Communists had also suffered in the disturbances of 1929—some of their leaders were banned or driven out of the country—the political paralysis that followed did not affect them as disastrously as it did the African organizations. They had one advantage: They were able to finance a press, which constantly kept Communist leaders and policies before the African people. This has been their strongest point in South Africa since then; week in and week out they have dished out news slanted their way with no effective replies from their opponents. Their papers were brilliantly edited, the news-gathering machinery was good, and the lay-out was often attractive. Not only did they give a fair picture of how apartheid really affected its victims, but they were smart enough to know how to circumvent the law and survive when every other paper in their class would have gone under.

At first sight, it appears ironic that Communism in South

Africa should have functioned in ways that sabotaged the African's march to freedom. Afrikaner nationalism had already evolved a number of techniques to achieve this end, for its legislative program is designed to keep the African in a state of permanent weakness in order to preserve Afrikaner supremacy. Communism complements this process by sowing suspicion and dissension in the ranks of African nationalism, by preventing the emergence of a strong, nationalistic leadership, which would lead the community to freedom on its terms.

It is not until we remember that apartheid and Communism are both totalitarian that the touch of irony is removed. The one wants the Africans to remain a colonial people to serve its ends; the other wants to dominate the thinking of the Africans so that they will commit themselves to its side of the ideological line.

15 • AFRICAN NATIONALISM SABOTAGED

AGAINST the background of war clouds on the horizon, the All-African Convention split in half. Communist propaganda took the line that the war would be a collision between two rival imperialisms, and as Hitler brought more European countries under his heel, the Communist press increasingly warned against participation. One of the reasons for such an interest in participation was that large numbers of nonwhites were joining the war to ensure that Nazism and its race consciousness was defeated. Even when Smuts refused to recognize them as active combatants, they still persisted in regarding enlistment as an effective form of protest against Nazi racialism.

But when Russia entered the war, the Communist line changed sharply: Then the war became the people's struggle against fascism. African opinion was shaken badly by this about-face. People wanted to know where the real loyalties of the Communists were; had they been good South Africans, they would have stuck to the line that was best for their people; yet on the entry of a foreign country into the war, the local Communist line had changed almost overnight.

By this time, the group of young men who were later to form themselves into the Youth League had emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Communist line. One of its cardinal objectives was to build up a stable leadership which would command the respect of the African's enemies and enjoy the com-

munity's confidence by its proof of effectiveness. The names of Luthuli and Matthews frequently came up for discussion in Youth League circles as they searched for the men who would be the symbol of the new spirit of resistance. The moment Luthuli won the backing of the Natal League, it became obvious that his way to the leadership of the ANC was clear.

* As soon as the war was over, the League intensified its pressure for a definite stand against race oppression. Although the resistance movement of 1951 was launched in time, the long debates which preceded this demonstration are perhaps more interesting. For the Youth Leaguers regarded the campaign primarily as a tactical move to train the African masses in the use of peaceful collective action. Some of them selected this weapon for reasons of principle, but others said that expediency had decided the issue for them. At first, the Communists dismissed the idea of a nonviolent demonstration; but when it became clear that African opinion supported the resistance campaign, the line changed. They were heart and soul for a Gandhian campaign. In the meantime, they had worked hard behind the scenes to create a coordinating committee representing all the organizations behind the campaign. The acceptance of equal representation on it by the Johannesburg Youth Leaguers, who were coming increasingly under the influence of the Communist leader, Dr. Yussuf Dadoo, imposed severe strains inside the League. After the campaign, however, Communist pressure on Youth League unity was intensified. Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, and other Youth Leaguers visited Iron Curtain countries—with disastrous effects on Youth League unity. The consequent tensions led finally to the capture of the League by the Communists. And that was its end.

After the resistance movement, Communist policy stressed the need for action against race oppression rather than subversion of state authority. The idea was to stage dramatic stunts designed to administer continuous and indecisive shocks to the economy of the land in order to keep it in a state of chronic malaise. Anti-pass campaigns, boycotts, and mass demonstrations ensued. One

of the most famous and best organized of the latter was the secret trip of 20,000 women to Pretoria, without the knowledge of the police, to protest against race oppression. They demanded an interview with the Prime Minister, J. G. Strijdom, who found it convenient to remain securely behind barred and guarded doors. In all such protests, the idea was not to shock the government into making concessions—no Communist would be so naïve—but to impair the health of the country's economy.

These demonstrations were all said to have been organized by the Congress Movement. People who sat in the inner councils of this alliance stated privately that the ANC tended to accept instructions rather than to participate decisively in the formulation of policies. Dr. Wilson Conco, who was for a long time Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown gathering, in 1955, which produced the Freedom Charter; but on his return, he said he had seen the document for the first time at the conference. And Luthuli himself had not known who had drafted the charter. The coordinating committee of the alliance was, as a matter of fact, not the real originator of policy. The bosses of the underground Communist Party did the planning and made policy decisions. They approached men like Luthuli and other non-Communist leaders merely, in actual practice, to acquaint them with what had already been decided. One example will illustrate this point. Just before he went to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, Moses Kotane—the former Secretary-General of the Communist Party—traveled from Johannesburg to Groutville to inform Luthuli that he too was attending the conference. The latter, a key member of the ANC, was in no position to approve or disapprove; Kotane had come merely to inform him.

This remote control of the ANC was facilitated by the bans on Luthuli. The government had forbidden him to move outside the boundaries of his magisterial district. His head office was in distant Johannesburg. The Communists had successfully resisted pressure to transfer the head office to Durban, which was only about forty-eight miles from where Luthuli lived. Johannesburg

did not keep him as well informed on developments as they should have done. One case will illustrate this contention. When the government threatened to eject the Africans from Sophiatown, near Johannesburg, the ANC promised to lead the resistance. Luthuli, assured that the will to oppose government plans was irresistible, committed himself to the public statement, as a result of the advice he had received, that Sophiatown would be a Waterloo either for the ANC or the government. By this, he meant that the ANC would accept the Sophiatown challenge and resist removals because the people were behind it. When the day of removals came, the subtenants and the tenants dumped their goods and jumped into police and army lorries, singing. Manilal Gandhi often used to say that he did not see any sign of ANC resistance when the police showed up; in 1955, he had traveled especially to Johannesburg to see Luthuli's followers disgrace apartheid.

This was not just a piece of bungling. The withholding of vital information from Luthuli was part of the plan to destroy, whenever necessary, any African leader who was not completely under the control of the Communists. And there was an important complement to this plan of subtle destruction. The South African Congress of Trade Unions was one of the members of the Congress Movement. Unlike the other four allies, it was mixed racially, although the Africans were, of course, in the majority. African members of SACTU were encouraged to join the ANC and vice versa; Moses Mabhida was the Communist-sponsored chief of SACTU, and Luthuli led the ANC. Under this arrangement, the African member was deliberately given a dual loyalty and leadership as a precaution against Luthuli's defecting one day. If he were to do that, Mabhida would assert himself as SACTU leader against Luthuli. Since Mabhida was always with the workers, he stood a better chance of pulling a very substantial section of them in any showdown with Luthuli. And in any crisis not involving Luthuli, he could easily be upheld as the leader of the Africans.

It was all part of a complicated plan to reduce Luthuli to the

position of an impotent prisoner of the Communists. Locked up as he virtually was in Groutville, he was not free to make any impact on outside opinion. In the meantime, the Communist press was taking advantage of every conceivable opportunity to boost Mabhida. Hence, the type of leadership the Youth League had tried to establish was being subtly undermined and African nationalism sabotaged.

The treason trial started shortly after Sisulu had returned from Moscow and Peking. The trips to Bucharest, Moscow, and Peking by prominent ANC leaders had been clever moves to commit the organization by implication. Luthuli might argue that he and his movement were not Communist; but if his right-hand man could go to Iron Curtain capitals without his knowledge, the world would ask Luthuli who was the real boss of the ANC. If he said, as he did, that he did not know who had paid for these costly trips—his treasurer was saying publicly that the ANC was in the red financially—then it would be clear he was no longer boss. In the event of a showdown, he would not have enough world support to embarrass the Communists.

The government felt it was time to strike at the leadership of the Congress Movement. With characteristic maladroitness, it locked up the Communist and non-Communist leaders of the Movement, together with a few anti-Communists outside of the congresses. In evidence during the trial, it became increasingly clear that Luthuli did not have a real hand in formulating policy for the Congress Movement; therefore, the charge against him and some of his more immediate supporters was dropped. After nearly five years, the government case collapsed, and the accused were free men again. In short, the trips to Iron Curtain capitals had forced the government to show its hand, for it was going to act ruthlessly against all who challenged or opposed apartheid, regardless of whether or not they were Communists. And the same rule applied to the bannings.

The story that went around Durban after the return of each Congress leader from Peking was that China had been most insistent on building up rural pressures. True or not, there was a significant change noticeable in Congress Movement strategy

after the visits to Iron Curtain countries. Although efforts were made to organize urban workers, the greatest stress was laid on the need to attract the people in the rural reserves. Money flowed into the republic, and paid organizers were employed in some of the most sensitive areas of the country. The idea was to start tension piling up in the reserves to complement the pressure in the towns. There was a twofold advantage in this strategy: If the towns went on strike there would be no scab labor from the reserves; second, if there was trouble in both urban and rural areas, the police and the army would exercise little control over the whole situation because of the distances between them and the disparity in population ratios.

In the meantime, the nationalist revolt against Communism's tightening grip on the ANC was gaining momentum. In the Transvaal ANC members, and in Natal, to a lesser extent, anti-Communists, were being purged systematically. In Cape Town, Tom Ngwenya held out against Communist pressure and led a long and bitter fight almost precisely in the way Professor Thaele had, and at the same place, during the 1920's. But when the nationalists realized that it was impossible for them to change the leadership of the ANC, they left it to form the PAC. This was the most spectacular split the Communists had brought about in African opinion, and it left the Congress Movement without real opposition to Communist policy. It became increasingly dangerous for the moderates who stayed behind to want to deviate; numerically, the PAC walkout had weakened them.

The volume of support the PAC got for its campaign, both internally and externally, gave the Communists a nasty jolt. Some members of the Congress Movement had for a long time agitated for another dramatic stand against apartheid, but the leadership, still involved in the treason trial, had not been keen on a mere stunt. The PAC took advantage of this clamor, which was, in fact, popular, to stage its antipass campaign and write Sharpeville into the history of African nationalism. Luthuli at first refused to collaborate with the PAC in the antipass campaign; but after the massacre of scores of men, women, and children in various parts of the country, he called for a day of mourning. This

was supported widely by all sections of the nation and sent the government into a rage. It banned the PAC and the ANC for a year, declared a state of emergency, and forced some of the ablest Communist leaders to flee the country. Two PAC executive members had been instructed to leave before the campaign to present the PAC case overseas.

Politically, the PAC and the ANC were not on speaking terms. But when both sides got to London, it became necessary for them to speak with one voice as South Africans. They formed the United Front. The balance of forces was against the PAC from the very beginning, and opinion in South Africa was divided sharply on the wisdom of forming a United Front in which the pro-Communists and their supporters constituted the biggest element. In any case, the United Front had no mandate to speak on behalf of all the nonwhites, since whatever authority it possessed derived only from the organizations represented in it. It soon became necessary for it to have a mandate and attain status in the republic—particularly since press reports were circulating to the effect that the Front was being pressed to constitute itself a government in exile. Inside the Congress Movement, discussion had started on who would be the first prime minister; the pro-Communist wing wanted Dr. Dadoo, but most of the younger Africans felt insulted by this. The head of the government, they felt, had to come from that section that had borne the brunt of oppression: They wanted Luthuli.

While all these things were happening, it became obvious that the political vacuum caused by the bans on the African resistance organizations had to be filled. Leaders of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation (IDAMF) stated that an attempt to regroup on a different plane should be made and that a new basis for African unity should be found. IDAMF held a position of unique importance in the African community, for it represented the clergy and could therefore speak with authority on African problems. It had the following and was nonsectional. Since it had, in 1956, also called a conference of leaders in Bloemfontein, where apartheid was formally rejected, it came under

increasing pressure to call another to agree on a formula of unity. But in this case it could not move very fast because it was engaged in delicate negotiations with the government on purely church matters.

Then, almost without warning, the Communists began to interest themselves in the idea of a new regrouping and in private conversations exerted pressure for the immediate calling of a national conference. The idea was being canvassed almost everywhere, and Alan Paton, speaking for the liberals, had even suggested a third force between apartheid and African racialists. In response to these pressures, Luthuli and Matthews, among others, sent out invitations to a consultative conference of African leaders, which met in Orlando, Johannesburg, toward the end of 1960. The idea was to consolidate African unity.

It emerged quite early in the deliberations of the conference that a group of the delegates had come with a ready-made plan of action which they wanted the others to endorse. Real unity was not what they sought; they merely wanted the mandate to carry out their own plan. Feeling in the conference was so strongly in favor of real unity, however, that a committee was subsequently appointed to work out plans for the calling of a national conference of all intellectual leaders in the African community. These, in turn, would ask the government to call a national convention to draft a new constitution. Little time was wasted: The continuation committee elected by the conference, in its first session, presented a fairly detailed plan, according to which it was to move events to a particular climax. After the steps described in the conference, attempts would then be made for a showdown with apartheid.

But during the functioning of the machinery which the continuation committee set up to carry out its mandate, it soon became clear that the committee was intended merely to be a rubber stamp to endorse the actions of an invisible hand that moved events toward its own goal. This hand wanted its plan adhered to rigidly, no matter what happened, and expected it to be carried out in a hurry. As long as the requisite speed and con-

formity were maintained, money was available for this purpose in incredibly large quantities. At social parties organized in the locations for members of the continuation committee, expensive dinners were given, at which whisky, brandy, and gin were served in quart bottles. Members of the committee from Durban, for example, flew to Johannesburg, and cost was no deterrent in the printing and dissemination of literature. Never in the history of African nationalism had so much money been available.

There was, however, something very peculiar about this money. First, it did not come through the hands of the treasurer elected by the committee. Second, no proper statements of accounts were given. When the committee pressed for these, shoddy, unprofessional documents that meant absolutely nothing were handed in. Third, no receipts were requested in return for the money paid out to delegates. Finally, the real source of this money was not revealed; it was said that it had been donated by certain individuals, whose names were never given. Naturally, the mystery surrounding the funds started tensions in the continuation committee.

At the same time, the committee was being committed to lines of action that some members felt were not in the mandate given to it by the conference. After the walkout by the former PAC member on the committee, the invisible hand pushed events in the direction of isolating the heroic wing of African nationalism. Since no genuine effort was made to meet the objections of the delegate to some of the committee's emphases, the feeling grew among some of those who remained that the invisible hand was not interested in genuine African unity, that it was using the committee merely to advance its own ideological ends. These became more apparent in the kind of literature sent out on the "all-in" conference of African leaders that was to meet in Maritzburg, Natal, for the emphasis was on the interests of the workers. Stormy debates took place in the committee on the perspectives from which the pamphlets approached the race crisis, and some members felt that they were being committed by implication to Communist approaches, which they could not sup-

port. Telegrams were sent to pro-Soviet leaders outside the republic, and, of course, to others, without the authorization of the committee. When the members met, they often found themselves faced with accomplished facts. When they protested, they received assurances that the "mistakes" would not be repeated, but no sooner had they left than the invisible hand proceeded with its plans as though nothing had happened.

In the meantime, reports from Basutoland reached Johannesburg through people close to the Communist underground that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was one of the influences behind the financing of the continuation committee. Couriers were said to be carrying money between the protectorate and South Africa. When these matters came up before the continuation committee, they were denied—although the couriers were well-known personalities. But the persistent circulation of these reports and the denials merely added to the strains and suspicions that were threatening to break up the continuation committee. The last straw came when one section of the committee pressed for the postponement of the Maritzburg Conference in order to heal the breach caused by the walkout of the former PAC member. The invisible hand would not hear a word of this. Then the section that pressed for negotiations argued that the walkout altered the basis on which the continuation committee had been set up and that the United Front could no longer be expressive of the will of the Orlando meeting if the basis was changed. The invisible hand was no longer interested in African unity. The important thing was the Maritzburg Conference. There was to be no modification of the timetable, even if it meant splitting the continuation committee. Events galloped toward a crisis, and when the dissenting section resigned from the continuation committee, that brought an end to the United Front.

As the day of the Maritzburg Conference neared, its nature emerged in clearer light. It was no longer to be a conference of intellectual leaders from all walks of life, for press statements from the organizers or their supporters indicated that delegates