

To these men, the Christian evaluation of the human personality was acceptable because it stated that man had been created in the image of God. Because of this, life's highest purpose was to strive to be perfect like God, to make the best possible use of his life; but to do this to the best of his ability, man needed to be free in body, mind, and spirit. Whatever limited this freedom frustrated life's purpose, it became a criticism of the divine intention. Hence, the Boers' race attitude repulsed them because it represented this criticism. Finally, the most outstanding of these men, like Drs. Seme, Dube, and Rubusana, had received part of their education overseas. These three had all attended American schools. Their own tradition of liberty combined with their understanding of the Christian evaluation of the human personality and the idealism of the American Revolution to produce an ideological ferment, which set itself goals that were the exact opposite of those of the Boers. Where Seme, Dube, and Rubusana had diverted the dominant currents in the main stream of European culture into the life of their peoples to give it richer meaning, the Boers had stuck to their position of isolation.

The main classes from which African leadership had come during that period were professional men, churchmen, businessmen, chiefs, and retired civil servants. This circumstance, coupled with their backgrounds, was to determine the methods they were to use to insure respect for their wishes. They employed the so-called constitutional methods—calling public meetings, making protests, organizing demonstrations, passing resolutions, and sending deputations to white men in positions of authority. Since Dr. Philip had used most of these methods and produced excellent results, his black pupils saw no reason why they should not try them. But there was another side to this story. The leaders of African nationalism at this stage did not believe that the issue of self-determination could become a matter of practical politics in their own lives. They wanted to buy time to nurse the unity they had created until it became an effective striking force. While moving toward this goal, they were willing to do all they could to agitate for reforms without provoking a head-on collision with white authority.

Although the Cape African still had the vote, these men rarely, if ever, thought in terms of initiating action to force parliament to adopt a particular course. The strategy was to wait for the white authority to take the initiative in introducing a law. If it was deemed oppressive, the African National Congress would protest against it in tones to awaken the dead. Demands for its repeal would be made throughout the country. Occasionally—as in the incident involving the introduction of passes for women in the Ficksburg-Winburg area of the Free State in 1913—the ANC would organize resistance. In that particular case, the demonstration proved successful.

From this tradition of struggle, there evolved the politics of resistance that produced two very significant results. The negative attitude of the leadership confirmed the impression in the Afrikaner nationalist mind that African agitations for reform were inspired by the desire to frustrate movement toward national fulfillment for the Afrikaner. On the African side, it surrendered the initiative to influence events to the white minority and failed to project before the masses of the African people a clearly defined goal toward which to march. This indecision made the African National Congress the ready host of all political adventurers who wanted to use the African people to advance their own ideological ends.

The most remarkable achievement of the tradition of struggle based on the politics of resistance was the defiance campaign of 1951-52—a massive demonstration which did not, however, change the attitude of the government. But the failure of the politics of resistance can be traced to a number of factors on both sides of the color line. Although the Africans had the superiority in numbers, they were unorganized; and the white authority had a well trained and highly disciplined army and police force ready to strike anywhere at any time against any challenge. Even on the economic plane, society was organized in ways that made it easier for the whites to club together and exert pressures which could crush African resistance to governmental authority. Finally, the white-led churches were themselves heavily committed to race discrimination. The key posts in very

many of them were held exclusively by white men, many of whom used them to shield the authority of the government and to discourage the growth of any attitudes of militancy.

On the African side, the generation that went to Bloemfontein in 1912 had occupied itself too much with considerations of unity and did not believe that planning for victory could ever be a matter of practical politics. As a result, the leaders did not prescribe a clearly defined goal as an alternative to segregation or apartheid. Because of this, the struggle tended to lack direction, and more often than not it came to be weakened by personality clashes. The use of constitutional methods was based on the quite mistaken assumption that constitutional, political action could be effective in a situation where the African did not have political power. The leaders also had an inadequate appreciation of the power of the call of blood in the white community. By accepting the Union on conditions, most of which were laid down by the Boers, the white community had acted on the principle that blood was thicker than water. Hence, to the whites, the Union symbolized blood unity.

The generation under discussion attached an unrealistic importance to the value of coordinated black-white reserves of power in a situation where the area for this was limited by two factors—the disequilibrium in the reserves of power and the fact that the African professional and business classes were in the embryonic stage. That reduced contact between black and white to minimal proportions.

The Afrikaner nationalist's hunger for security and the serious complications to which it gave rise were never accepted as a problem to which African statesmanship had to give a clear and positive answer. This was partly the result of the habit of hesitating to take the initiative in moving events toward goals desired by the Africans and partly due to the fact that the leaders were too heavily committed to building unity and buying time to accumulate power reserves.

Finally, the church tended to use its position of tremendous influence in the African community to slow down progress to-

ward freedom. It frowned very heavily on "extremism" from the African side. The general strategy was not to take a clear stand in favor of race oppression. As a matter of fact, substantial numbers of white church leaders tended to condemn race discrimination in public while encouraging it within their churches. Some of these men stood on public platforms to attack it, but they insisted that their African colleagues enter their houses through the back door.

The popular strategy was to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the church and what was called politics. African clergymen were discouraged systematically from participating in the political life of their people. They were warned to confine their activities to spiritual matters. The man who concerned himself too much with the lives of his congregants outside the church was often in danger of losing his job.

As a result of these pressures, most African clergymen came to regard politics and sin as virtually synonymous. They encouraged their people to develop a passive attitude toward injustice. It was not the duty of the Christian to raise his hand against injustice. Even when he was denied the right to strive to be like God, all he could do was to fall on his knees and pray.

The general belief among most people is that only the Dutch Reformed Church is guilty of the sin of race arrogance. But all the Christian communities played large parts in slowing down the march to freedom one way or the other, either directly or indirectly. This is in no way a defense of the Dutch Reformed Church; it is merely an attempt to balance the picture.

The practice of race discrimination continues to this day. As a rule, African clergymen are treated as the inferiors of the whites. They are often paid lower stipends. The general argument is that their congregations are not rich. The acid test of consistency, however, is not the wealth of the congregations; it is whether or not the very devout white Anglicans of Johannesburg or the pious white Catholics of Pretoria would accept cultured and outstanding Christians like Bishops Zulu or Mabathoana as their spiritual leaders. It would surprise most South

Africans on both sides of the color line if there was one white congregation willing to accept spiritual leadership from an African priest.

One result of missionary pressure was that the mission stations refused to give effective support to the fight to extend the area of liberty. A complicated contradiction emerged. The mission stations were, in terms of education, the most advanced section of the African people at the time. The missionaries had done magnificent work as school teachers, and the mission stations had produced some of the most militant and effective rebels against white domination. In terms of the thinking of their generation, Dube was an extremist and Seme a dangerous man. Dube suffered, however, for his political beliefs. He was once brought before a court of law, where he maintained that Christ's teaching should have valid meaning in every phase of a Christian's life. Thereupon, the white missionary at Inanda refused him the right to preach in the local church; he actually locked the doors and refused to open them when Dube, a qualified clergyman, was due to preach a sermon. Dube's people, the community that had produced him, sided with the missionary to reject him and his extremism. Dube, Seme, and many of the builders of the African people had started life proud to regard themselves as Christians; they died bitterly disappointed with the way in which the Christian church aided the cause of white domination.

The real weakness of the African National Congress was that its leaders were tied too closely to the church; so closely, in fact, that the church could affect their political effectiveness. It was hardly surprising that when a new leadership emerged to challenge the conciliatory policies the ANC pursued, it did not confine itself to political militancy, but went out of its way to make savage attacks on the Christian church as the agent of the race oppressor. And this leadership was in no way Communistic.

9 • THE BATTLE FOR INITIATIVES

THE Union Government wasted no time in confronting the African front with the first of a series of grave challenges. In 1913, Parliament passed the Land Act, making residential segregation in the rural areas compulsory.

This created a first-class crisis in the African community. Large numbers of Africans had for a long time settled on white farms, often on the basis of sharing crops. This system had enabled a fair proportion of white farmers to move into the towns and live on the proceeds from the farms worked by the Africans. As a result, it was not unusual for the industrious Africans to end up owning the farms. But to the Afrikaner nationalist, this was a sword of Damocles over his head. If the African was allowed to push the Afrikaner off the farms and into the towns, he would take the land back from the white man. Moreover, if the African could support himself by working the land on his own, he would never again allow himself to be a servant. This would make worthless all the sacrifices made to bring him under white control, and it would make South Africa unsafe for the Afrikaner. Therefore, the Land Act was introduced to push the African out of the rural areas so that he should be more amenable to the type of economic discipline the whites were planning for him.

The African National Congress accepted the challenge. It mobilized African opinion and made strong representations to the government against the law. These made absolutely no impres-

sion on the rulers, and it soon became clear that the intention of the government was to reduce the Africans to the position of helots.

The only answer to this situation was resistance. The ANC, however, was not ready for this sort of thing: It feared that a frontal challenge at such an early stage might be catastrophic for the African side. Sol. T. Plaatje, secretary-general of the ANC and one of the brightest men in it, had a bright idea, so the story goes: Since the new law violated human rights, as he said, a delegation should be sent to Great Britain to expose white South Africa's real intentions for the black man. This would have a twofold advantage—it would start the process whereby white South Africa would be isolated from the civilized community of nations and, on the home front, preserve the solidarity of the Africans by showing that something definite was being done to oppose the Land Act.

The delegation reached England shortly before the outbreak of World War I. But the British were preoccupied and in no mood to offend the South African Government, whose help they might need in the coming war. Dr. Dube, who led the delegation, returned empty-handed. After the war, another delegation was sent, in 1919, this time to Versailles, to plead against race oppression in South Africa. This, too, produced no results. By then, however, the failure of the ANC policy of conciliation had created new tensions in the African community. Dube and his colleagues were criticized for being ineffective in the face of aggression from the white side; for wasting too much energy trying to buy time when the increasing burdens on the Africans called for a definite stand against white domination. The end of World War I intensified these pressures, for the economic dislocations that followed hit the African hardest and confronted the ANC with challenges it could not meet. Everywhere people clamored for a new type of leadership to confront the race oppressor with the reality of disaster as a condition of success.

Clements Kadalie stepped forth to accept the challenge of the times. He had originally come from Nyasaland and worked in Cape Town. He thought in terms of seizing the initiative to in-

fluence events from the white side, and he was determined to use industrial action to do it. This was a clean break with the politics of resistance, as well as with the practice of using political action, as the ANC had done. The Philip tradition, which had been dominant among Christian Africans for nearly a century, was beginning to prove ineffective.

In January, 1919, Kadalie and his friends, after being encouraged and advised by a white friend—Kadalie never at any time concealed his indebtedness to this man—launched the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). This organization was started as some sort of omnibus trade union, which was to concern itself with the interests of African workers in the urban and rural areas. It set itself no ideological goals, evolved no theory of struggle, and accepted no philosophical basis for the society it sought to build. It merely wanted fair play, but even this was not defined in the clearest terms possible. It differed from the ANC in one other important respect: Its leaders were not drawn from the "respectable" classes. They had come straight from the ranks of the workers themselves, and they had a ruggedness and militancy that men accustomed to making obeisances before authority found outrageous. They stated that moderate speeches and pious resolutions would never make any impression on a government determined to ensure that the white man remain master, regardless of merit. The only condition of success, they argued, was to confront the temper of the slave owner with the reality of disaster.

To do this, they started by attempting to cast the thinking of their people in a new mold. They set themselves the goal of destroying the sense of inferiority which the government was systematically infusing into the minds of the masses. For example, one of the myths the Africans were being made to believe was that the white man was invincible; but by dragging before the courts of law any white person who cheated his African servant of his rights, the ICU blew this to pieces. More often than not, the ICU won. The effect of showing that white supremacy could be challenged and knocked out in its own courts of law impressed African opinion. From the days of Frederick

Bezuidenhout, of Slachter's Nek, it had been a risky thing in many parts of the country to lodge a complaint against a white person; when the ICU showed it could be done without any trouble, the masses rallied.

The ICU broke new ground in still another field: It did not hesitate to use the strike as an instrument of pressure against employers. Along the Cape coast, where it organized some of the most successful strikes, the effects were electrical. Those whom white domination had crushed and left in despair saw their hopes revived when they beheld the effectiveness of the ICU line. As the mood of the people changed, they demanded a frontal attack on the structure of race oppression itself. It was not enough to deal successfully with trade union matters, they said; efforts had to be made to rid the country of the temper of the slave owner.

This pushed the ICU onto the political plane, where it found itself forced to play a role for which it had never prepared itself. One of the most significant indications was the way in which the ICU proved Seme's dictum that African unity would destroy white solidarity. Increasing numbers of white people from all walks of life began to interest themselves in the ICU and its activities. Hertzog and Malan are said to have sent donations; the Bishop of Bloemfontein pleaded for a more realistic attitude toward the ICU. Then, soon after the ICU had clearly demonstrated the power of the African proletariat, all the disparate groups with socialistic inclinations, which had begun to emerge on the white side about 1915 and then split apart, united to form themselves into the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921. This represented the first ideological crack in the façade of white unity.

This was to be followed by a more dramatic event—the toppling of a government. The ICU made representations to Mr. Walter Madeley on behalf of some of its members and asked for an interview. Prime Minister Hertzog insisted that it would be most improper for a cabinet minister to agree to meet an African deputation. Madeley, who was a Labor man in the coalition government, ignored the Prime Minister's injunction and met

the ICU leaders. When Hertzog tendered his resignation, the Governor-General asked him to form another government, which he did—without including Madeley in the cabinet. It was, therefore, becoming clear to the government that if not checked the ICU would grow in strength until it cracked white unity and overthrew the white government. Hertzog began to prepare a showdown.

The time to attack came when the ICU organized a boycott of the municipal beer halls. The outcome was a series of bloody clashes with the police in 1929, which led to the banishment of the ICU leaders and the virtual destruction of the organization itself. The reasons for the collapse of the ICU were varied. Although it had started as a trade union with no social goal or philosophy of struggle, it had soon realized that, insofar as the African was concerned, there really was no line of demarcation between what was strictly political and what was industrial. Events forced it to function as a movement of political protest, a role for which it was not at all prepared. Moreover, the inexperience of the leaders, their personal jealousies, and whatever remained of tribal suspicions further complicated the task of the ICU. Another important factor that worked for division was the Communist Party, for its intrigues played no small part in intensifying the confusion that finally destroyed the ICU. Above all, however, there was the power of the state against the ICU: When the government finally clamped down on the movement and banished its leaders, its members scattered because there was no unifying doctrine around which people could regroup.

The collapse of the ICU enabled Afrikaner nationalism to devote its attention to one problem that had always remained a sore spot from the day the Union was formed. In the Cape's African vote, the white nationalists saw another sword of Damocles. Hertzog and his followers feared that the African voters would one day use the ballot box to widen fissions in the white community and transform Parliament from a bastion of white supremacy into the instrument with which to destroy the white man's position of privilege. So he launched his campaign to remove the Cape Africans from the common roll of voters. He

wanted to substitute for the Cape African vote a form of representation that would give the Cape Africans (who numbered a little less than 3 million) three representatives in the all-white House of Assembly and provide for the representation of the entire African community by four whites in the Senate. A mixed council with representatives from all the provinces would be set up to advise the government on the grievances of the African people. The greatest volume of opposition to Hertzog's bills came, naturally, from the Cape. The other provinces rallied, though, as was to be seen later, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The areas where the African did not have the vote resisted with very great difficulty the temptation to jump for the idea of having a token foothold in Parliament in exchange for the Cape vote.

Professor D. D. T. Jabavu—the son of John Tengo—traveled extensively up and down the country, campaigning against the Hertzog bills. His idea was to mobilize all sections of the African people into one camp for the purpose of massing and concentrating opposition against the bills. The ANC had been too weak to rally African opinion, and some of its leaders were even reported to be secretly looking forward to the day when they would sit on the representative council. The ICU had been thrown out of commission. So Jabavu found himself placed in a position where he had to create an entirely new organization to lead the opposition against Hertzog. This organization was the All-African Convention, founded in 1935.

Like the leaders of the ANC, Jabavu was a moderate. He had no plans for confronting apartheid with the reality of disaster. His idea was to bring into being an omnibus resistance group, which was to encompass many viewpoints, united only by their desire to oppose race oppression. But almost from the start, the Convention found itself in serious difficulties. It had allowed individuals and organizations to affiliate themselves with it regardless of their political convictions. The Trotskyites and the Communists had moved in; so had some ANC members. The first two were so allergic to the ideological preferences of the

latter that before long a split was inevitable. The Trotskyites led the wing that wanted a complete boycott of the type of institutions Hertzog offered the African people. The Communists, together with most ANC members, found it practically impossible to resist the temptation to use the Hertzog institutions as platforms for their own propaganda. These differences became so acute that soon the ANC members and the Communists were forced to quit the Convention.

Thus purified, the Convention began to straighten out its own thinking. It noted that the ICU's collapse had contained a number of lessons for the Africans. It had not been enough merely to seize the initiative to influence events or to seek to confront segregation with disaster; it had not been enough even to rely on political or industrial action to effect reforms. The most effective way of destroying white domination was for the African to refuse to collaborate in working the segregated institutions and to be ready to pay the price. Noncollaboration, in itself, was only a weapon; for the struggle to have direction, it had to be principled, to move step by step toward clearly defined goals. The Convention later produced a program by which it sought to transform South African society. It contained such matters as noncollaboration, universal suffrage, the right to collective bargaining, and non-European unity.

The Convention was one of the most intelligently-led African political organizations. Its doctrine of noncollaboration and its insistence on a principled struggle were to make a deep impression on African opinion. Unfortunately, however, it involved itself so much in the polemics of nihilistic perfection that it gradually lost touch with the realities of the race crisis and degenerated into a highly articulate debating society. Its influence was not destroyed by the intervention of the state; it merely "withered" away from the front line.

It did not fade out of the limelight, however, before it had done one other thing—popularize the idea of non-European unity. Both the ANC and the ICU had been purely African organizations. Although they were not antiwhite or anti-Indian, they

concentrated on building up African power reserves. The Convention found this a source of weakness in two ways: It divided the oppressed and kept them weak, and it laid the foundations for the African's version of the temper of the slave owner. The oppressed, it said, had to stand together against race oppression. The ten-point program was held out as the rallying point for all nonwhite democrats.

The most significant feature of African political organizations up to this point was obviously the refusal to evolve a mystique by way of an answer to Afrikaner nationalism's oppressive temper. The ANC fought shy of this, the militant ICU kept clear of it, and so did the Convention. There were two reasons for this. First, in order to evolve a mystique that would appeal effectively to large masses of the African people, it would have to be as deeply rooted in race as was the Afrikaner nationalist's. The African community had first rejected the call of the blood when it asked Dr. Philip to press the government for the demarcation of mission reserves, where the converted would be free to lead a Christian life away from their pagan kinsmen. In the years that followed, generations of Africans grew up that were no longer responsive to the call of the blood, of race, or of the tribe. The ablest leaders of the community had come from their ranks. They had set their minds against racialism and were in no mood to emulate the Afrikaner. They could not be moved—emotionally or intellectually—into seeing virtue in a mystique based on race.

Second, the series of compromises on which African unity had been based militated against anything that proclaimed race as a possible unifying influence. Most Africans believed that race consciousness could develop that group thinking which would, in turn, lead to tribal conflicts that were likely to wreck the achievements of half a century and condemn the African to that position of perpetual weakness that Afrikaner nationalism sought to maintain. A unity based on acceptable ideals had the advantage that it could appeal to progressively larger numbers of people on both sides of the color line.

10 • THE REVOLT OF THE PAC

BY THE time the Convention came into being, the government of the Union had made it unmistakably clear that its one and only answer to the assertion of African initiatives or agitations for reform was to shoot.

Mgijimi's religious followers had been mown down by gunfire for demonstrating on the common outside Queenstown in 1920. About two years later, the Bondelswarts of Southwest-Africa suffered a similar fate for daring to oppose the will of the white man. There had been deaths from police gunfire when the Africans in Durban demonstrated against the pass laws in 1929. The ICU demonstrations against the beer halls that same year produced bloodshed freely.

The use of force was designed to underline the fact that the white man was determined to keep his initiatives the dominant influence in South African life. Any agitation for reform was viewed and treated as either a rebellion in the making or as a rising against the white community. This had the advantage of emphasizing the race factor, of keeping the white front solid, of shocking the nonwhites into accepting permanent inferiority, of impressing them with the invincibility of the white man, and, finally, of forcing them always to fight on ground chosen by the whites.

The Convention realized that in the face of a government that was unresponsive to constitutional agitations for reform,

the systematic build-up of African power reserves could one day become a lapse into racial fundamentalism, leading to increasingly bloody encounters between the state and the Africans. This would sharpen racial antagonisms and force the non-whites to fight on ground where they would always be sure to lose. The only effective answer to this was to wage a principled struggle, to work out a program by which to guide action from time to time. This, in turn, would have another advantage, for insistence on a program would deracialize the struggle and broaden it to bring in the Indians and the coloreds. A principled struggle was a different thing from a national struggle: The former could attract all people who subscribed to the program regardless of race, whereas the latter embraced the "nationals" who constituted a particular racial group.

This was an important step forward in the evolution of thought on the race question. Both the ANC and the ICU had fought for the extension of the area of liberty. They had systematically striven to crack the color bar, and they had relied heavily on African unity to do this. The Convention argued that it was not enough to imply, as the Congress had done, that freedom would be the birthright of all South Africans after victory. All the oppressed races that had made South Africa their home had to fight together and win together so that they could build together a social order within which they could all feel secure. The Convention, however, in fairness to itself, was not the originator of this idea. Dr. John Philip had tried it in his mission stations, and the older Jabavu had been moved by it when he elected to stand aside from the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912.

What the Convention did, then, was to respond, in an organized manner, to growing clamors for nonwhite unity. The Convention's heroic fight to save the Cape vote had made a deep impression on colored and Indian opinion. These communities felt that the loss of the Cape African vote threatened directly the voting rights of the Cape coloreds and the economic interests of the Indian community in all the provinces. They realized

that by themselves they would not be strong enough to push back the tide of white reaction. Just as the ICU's show of strength effected the first ideological split in the white community, so did the Convention introduce fissions in the colored and Indian communities. When it called for non-European unity, it was providing a political home for the discontented among these groups.

As early as 1927, Dr. Abdurahman, the colored leader from Cape Town, had advised the Kimberley Conference of the African People's Organization (APO)—a colored political group—that thought should be given to the idea of uniting the non-Europeans in the fight against race oppression. This line had not made any visible impression on the then powerful ICU, nor had it been taken very seriously by the ANC, then battling against the ICU for survival. But the emergence of an African group in favor of nonwhite unity stimulated activity among the Indians and the coloreds in new directions. The main centers of this activity were Durban and Cape Town; the Indians were concentrated in the former and the coloreds in the latter. The most enthusiastic supporters in Durban were mainly the Communists, and the Trotskyites were in the forefront in Cape Town. But the intrusion of the African into Indian politics caused a first-class crisis. The moderates took the line that it was in the interests of the Indian community to avoid antagonizing the whites by associating with the powerless Africans. The protracted clashes—on a variety of issues that boiled down to non-European collaboration—between the "progressives" and the moderates split the Natal Indian Congress in two and, in the end, put the "progressives" in the ascendancy.

The Convention was never very influential outside the Cape province. Doctrinal squabbles went on inside it until in the end it became largely a name, and the main preserver of the doctrine became the Non-European Unity Movement, whose increasingly Trotskyite leanings reduced its potential for becoming a mass movement. In fact, the five years before World War II were characterized by debates on the form non-European unity

would take. The Communists favored multiracial groupings as the most desirable and workable basis; the Trotskyites saw in this a variant of apartheid. If unity was to be effective, the latter argued, it had to be between individuals and not groups. As a result, the Unity Movement increasingly became a nonracial organization.

The multiracialist and nonracialist viewpoints were being canvassed heatedly among the nonwhites when World War II broke out. The Natives Representative Council (NRC), which had been established by the Hertzog bills, promptly made it known that it would not embarrass the Smuts government by pressing the claims of the African people too far for the duration. In India, however, Gandhi was being jailed for insisting on a clear definition of British war aims for his country. Here were representatives of an oppressed people deciding to give a new lease on life to race injustice in a war fought precisely against race humiliation.

The shocked African community reacted to this in two ways. Paul Mosaka, a Johannesburg trader, joined hands with Hyman Basner, a Jewish lawyer, to form the African Democratic Party (ADP) in opposition to the ANC, which was at the time dominated by some of the men who had supported the NRC resolution. The ADP had no color bar; it opened its doors to all South Africans and stood for a mildly socialist program. Inside the ANC, the old guard faced mutiny. Also, a group of young men, led by Anton Lembede and Ashby Mda, formed the Congress Youth League to get the ANC to commit itself to anti-Communism and to militant action against race oppression.

The League set itself a twofold goal. In its program, it wanted to start by what Mda called "politicizing the African masses." This meant instilling in the Africans confidence in their ability to break white domination, the so-called reconstruction part of the program. After that, the League wanted to use positive action against race oppression. But on the vital question of racial attitudes, the League rejected both the Communist multiracialist and Trotskyite nonracialist lines as unrealistic. The African was the

poorest, largest, most backward, and most oppressed member of the community. These factors made it necessary for him to put his own house in order before attempting to collaborate with the better-placed members. If he rushed to work with them before he had prepared himself for this task, he would never deal with them on the basis of real equality. The League concentrated, therefore, on working only among the Africans. In addition, it worked on building up its power; on destroying the influence of the conservatives, who were led by Dr. A. B. Xuma and Mr. A. W. G. Champion, formerly of the ICU; and on giving to ANC policies a distinctly nationalist and militant slant. The idea was to seize from the whites the initiative to influence events, to give the Congress militant leadership, and, finally, to confront race oppression with the reality of disaster as the only condition of success.

The League regarded African unity as the key to liberty, and it considered every other problem from this perspective. It was not antiwhite, anti-Indian, or anticolored. It was intensely pro-African. In its approach to men and events, it combined the heroic and realistic viewpoints—the heroic to give emotional appeal, the realistic to guide policy. The hero was Anton Lembede, and Ashby Mda provided the brains behind the entire movement.

Like the Convention, the League believed in a principled struggle. To this, it added the necessity for phasing the struggle; since it believed in pushing African initiatives to the fore, it argued that these could never be effective where they were employed to serve conflicting group interests. The Indian had the right to own land and trade in the towns, but the African carried the pass and was subject to the curfew laws. He was not accepted as a real equal by either the whites, or the Indians, or the coloreds.

The African, the argument continued, could not set the pace of progress toward his goals if he collaborated with racial groups whose interests were not similar to his at the time. Experience had shown that this type of cooperation always placed him in the position of pulling the nuts out of the fire for the more

advanced or better-placed groups. If the other groups genuinely wanted to see the African free, they should support him on terms that did not hurt his self-respect and did not give them unfair advantage over him. After victory, the Africans would be free to identify themselves with anybody whose interests were similar to theirs. Race would cease to be a factor of political, economic, or social significance. There could even be African Communists and capitalists, who would collaborate with the like-minded in the other groups, regardless of race. This plan of action, Anton Lembede, the ablest exponent, called Africanism.

Quite early in its history, the League had committed itself to the policy of going on the offensive in its bid to alter the pace of movement toward freedom. In pursuing this line, it had administered a fatal blow to the NRC when it forced Professor Matthews and Dr. Moroka to resign from the Council. It broke Champion's grip on the ANC in Natal and threw Dr. Xuma out of office by paving the way for Albert Luthuli, whom the Natal Leaguers were steadily pushing to the fore as expressing the new mood of the ANC. And when the League felt it had cleaned the Congress house sufficiently, it turned to direct action against race oppression. The result was the launching of the resistance movement in 1951.

This campaign was designed to achieve several ends. It was intended to widen ideological fissions on the white side by creating a situation in which the white democrat could cross the color line to join hands with the nonwhite opponent of apartheid in the fight to extend the area of liberty. It was a dramatized warning to the world that a point of crisis had been reached in the relations between black and white, and that this would one day endanger the peace on the continent. Third, it was an assurance to Asia that the African, on his own initiative, was taking positive steps to avoid clashes between himself and the Indians, as had happened in 1949.

The campaign did not succeed in its declared aim of getting the government to repeal the six laws mentioned by its leaders. Elsewhere, however, it produced satisfactory results. It effected

the second ideological split in the white community: Anti-apartheid groups got together and formed the Liberal Party of South Africa, which took a progressively uncompromising non-racial stand. From the beginning, Alan Paton, the author and great humanist, gave it his enthusiastic support. Apartheid became a talking-point all over the world. The like-minded of all races thought more and more of coordinated action against apartheid as having the highest potential to destroy race oppression.

After the resistance movement, the government of India started its more effective campaign of dragging South Africa before the United Nations to answer for its treatment of peoples of Indian descent. The Africans welcomed this line; although at the time it did not have much prospect of producing spectacular and immediate results, it intensified the process of isolating the white authority, and thus accelerated and reinforced the trend the Congress had started in 1913. The morale of the African community improved, and more Indians and coloreds were attracted to the idea of closer collaboration with the Africans.

These successes, however, introduced many unforeseen problems. The Communists made more determined bids to capture the leadership of the Congress. When it became clear that the League had the African community behind it in the resistance movement, the Communists made the following decisions: The Congress should be purged of its nationalist influences; it should be made a people's organization; emphasis should be on the interests of workers; and it should become an integral part of a bigger alliance, the Congress Movement, where it could be more effectively controlled by the Communists. The Freedom Charter was to be the new policy line.

Organized bids were made to sow suspicion and confusion among Leaguers in particular and ANC members in general. Walter Sisulu, then Secretary-General of the ANC, was sent on a secret mission to Bucharest, Moscow, and Peking without Luthuli's knowledge. Duma Nokwe went with a youth group to attend the World Festival of Youth in Bucharest. These tactics

shook the Congress from top to bottom. There were resignations from senior posts, and some of Luthuli's followers turned against him for what they described as his yielding of vital ground to the Communists. The League's program of action was shelved in favor of the Freedom Charter; critics of the Communists were elbowed out of the Congress, and the new line increasingly tended to see virtue in the people's republics and vice in the Western democracies. But some of the more militant members of the Youth League pointed out that collaboration with the other racial groups was leading the Congress to disaster; that it had handed over the movement to Communist control. Where there had been unity, there was now only distrust and quarreling, and a weakened organization was being reduced to the status of a mere branch of the Congress Movement.

The point of bitterest attack was the doctrine of multiracialism. The new alliance, called the Congress Movement, was made up of five organizations: the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats (COD, white), the Colored People's Organization (SACPO, colored), and the Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The coordinating body of the Congress Movement was the National Consultative Committee, which made policy. On this body, the ANC, as the largest organization in the movement and the one representing the biggest section of the nation, had as many votes as the COD, which was supported by no more than 500 people in the white community. In the colored elections for the Assembly, SACPO had been unable to muster enough support in the Cape to save its candidate. This organization had as many votes as Luthuli's ANC, which had a paid membership of thousands and which, having called for 10,000 volunteers to go to jail in the resistance movement, had got not less than 8,000.

Although the African National Congress spoke for the majority in the nation, it had been demoted to the status of a minority organization inside the Congress Movement. The Youth League critics who had feared that collaboration with the other groups would lead to the humiliation of the African, pointed out that their fears had been vindicated. Multiracialism in practice

meant that the minority groups could gang up in the policy-making body against the majority and place themselves in a position to dictate policy.

Groups started to form in some of the major urban areas to find ways and means of breaking the multiracialist grip on the African Congress. The two most famous and most determined of these were in Johannesburg. One met in the house of Josias Madzunya, a former Youth Leaguer and a powerful political figure in Alexandra Township, who concerned himself with fighting the Communists on the field of action. The other met in the house of Potlako Leballo, at Orlando, another ex-Youth Leaguer. The Leballo Group concerned itself directly with evolving a theory of nationalism that it could use to neutralize the Communist influence in the ANC. It soon grew in influence and attracted a number of very devoted young men: Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, a lecturer in African Studies at the Witwatersrand University, and Jacob Nyaose, a leading anti-Communist trade unionist, are but two examples. As soon as it was strong enough, it established liaison with Madzunya and made an open bid to oust the Communists from the leadership of ANC. But it was beaten decisively. Leballo and his followers left the ANC and proclaimed the establishment of a new organization to uphold the ideals of the original Bloemfontein Conference.

Some time later, in 1959, the rebels in various parts of the Union met for a conference in Orlando, where they founded the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) with Mangaliso Sobukwe as president and Potlako Leballo secretary. From the beginning, Potlako Leballo was the most interesting character in the PAC. His determined opposition to the Communists and his shepherd-ing of his group to the point where it became the PAC marked him out as Communism's principal bogeyman. Communist journalists projected an image of him in which he was represented as a hard, insensitive, dull-witted race-hater, an uncompromising dictator, and a mob-rousing mountebank. The rest of the white press took up the cue: Leballo became South Africa's bogeyman Number One.

The individual behind the bogeyman, however, was a fierce

hater of race oppression. He had felt its reality in his own life. When World War II broke out, he had suffered so much from it that he left school, volunteered for service, and fought courageously by the side of white men to destroy Nazi racialism. The man who had inspired Potlako to risk his life in this fight was a white man, none other than Jan Hofmeyr, a Cabinet Minister in the Smuts government. Hofmeyr had gone on a recruiting tour to Lovedale College to explain to the African students the issues at stake in the war. After Leballo had signed up he devoted his life to oppose race oppression.

The All-African Peoples Conference that had met in Accra in 1958, had inspired the oppressed in many parts of the continent with new visions of freedom. The PAC made it clear that it wanted to align itself with the liberating forces that were changing the course of events in Africa. But the really new factor in the thinking of the PAC was the determination to make the issue of direct participation in government a matter of practical politics. Up to that time, African political organizations had not taken a clear stand on immediate participation. They had contented themselves merely with demanding equal rights for all. The PAC did not stop at demanding participation, but enunciated an ideal of the society it wanted to build. In this, the PAC went further than any other political group, for it was out to build an Africanist, socialist, and nonracial nation.

Their critics admitted that Africanism was a criticism of Europeanism as it was known in South Africa. They pointed out, however, that a racial reaction had certain dangers. Since there was intrinsic virtue only in being a member of the human race, Africanism might find that in order to destroy Europeanism it would have to use the latter's techniques. In doing that, it would limit freedom and damage the human personality precisely in the way totalitarian regimes had done during the last twenty-five years. Therefore, any emphasis on being African emphasized the racial factor, and a people who had won its victory by using race as a weapon would find it hard to persuade themselves, once they were free, that racialism was immoral.

11 • NEW ROAD TO VIOLENCE

THE ANC had spent considerable energy buying time to build up power reserves. Since it had used only constitutional methods to convince its followers that it was coming to grips with the race question, this had given rise to a tradition that was to culminate in a complete rejection of violence as a weapon in the racial fight. The ICU, during its short life, had not been very particular about the methods it used; necessity had been the determining factor. The PAC, on the other hand, took no position that committed it one way or the other; its attitude was that, for its part, it would prefer to use nonviolent methods. It hastened to point out, however, that things being what they are in this country, it was not in the power of the African to say whether or not his struggle would remain non-violent. History had shown that peaceful demonstrations by Africans had provoked violence from the government.

Having thus defined its ground, the PAC prepared to seize the initiative from the white man to set the pace of movement toward its goal. The plan was, first, to launch what was called the status campaign. This would not be directed at any particular political target, although there might be boycotts of stores with the color bar. The end in view was to accustom the Africans to the idea of acting collectively to force the pace of progress toward freedom. Meanwhile, every effort would be made to build up a trade-union movement free from Communist influ-