

African Black Alliance, the shift in Big Business thinking on race discrimination and the Viljoen-de Klerk initiative have all prepared ground for movement toward the consensus.

This movement calls for the assertion of statesmanlike leadership initiatives to lead Black, Coloured, Asian and White opinion toward agreement on final goals. As things stand at the moment only Buthelezi and the National Cultural Liberation Movement can give this type of leadership. As the Freiberg Report and other researches show, Buthelezi has enough organised power to be a representative of the majority of the South African people at the moment.

These advantages give Buthelezi the freedom to call out his followers in a national stay-at-home strike to paralyse the economy and to back this with a crisis of dual-authority conflict, or to secede from the Republic to form the nucleus of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

This union might be formed in one of two ways: either with or without the co-operation of the Whites. The crisis in South Africa has reached the point where the conquering minority has lost the power to impose its will but still has enough authority to delay the march to majority rule. The increase in the numbers of Whites who flee the country shows that cracks have developed in the foundations of White power. These cracks give Buthelezi his chance.

He could unify Kwa Zulu and "White" Natal and secede from the Republic specifically to form, with the Ciskei, Transkei, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique, which have contiguous borders with Natal, the nucleus of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

The psychological effects of such a nucleus need no emphasis. The goal of a Black-ruled federation which every Black man in South Africa could regard as his own would introduce a new dimension in the relations between Black and White. And this dimension would, in turn, prepare ground for a Black-White defence policy which would make it impossible for any combination of powers to plunge Southern Africa into war.

The nucleus can be seen from another angle. The international community has rightly taken the position that it will not recognise the vassal states which have accepted the "independence" offered by the apartheid regime. But this negative reaction cannot be the policy of the international community forever. At some time in the future, the world must realise that the treatment of Transkei and Bophuthatswana as international pariahs creates problems for mankind.

While there is need for reinforcing rejections of the vassalage which apartheid offers as independence, the Free World should

develop a policy for recognising the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa as the geopolitical structure that would re-unite the peoples apartheid divides.

The nucleus of the Federal Union would make it possible for some Africans to secede from apartheid's satellite system and regroup to form a nucleus of their own design.

In India Mahatma Gandhi and Mohamed Ali Jinnah reached the point where the differences dividing their communities forced them to accept partition. As already shown, there are Africans who do not want to belong to the same state as the Whites. Some of these are prepared to accept "independence" itself if it takes them out of the racial dictatorship imposed by the Afrikaner monolith.

There are many ways of moving toward the Federal Union; establishing the nucleus, which would evolve into a larger regrouping of Southern African peoples, is one of them.

The PAC popularised the slogan: *Izwe lethu!* (It is our country!) Before it, the ANC had demanded: *Mayibuye i Afrika* (Let Africa be restored to her glory). In the view of the man or woman whom White rule crushes every day, these slogans have little or no meaning; they do not define goals which have vital meaning in his or her life. In the conditions created by apartheid, goals with a specific geopolitical focus are likely to evoke a positive mass response.

One of the weaknesses on the side fighting White rule has always been the absence of a clearly stated alternative to the national identity prescribed by apartheid. Black and White have never been confronted with a real choice of worlds—with an alternative to the racial dictatorship which would have relevance in the lives of ordinary people.

The Bloemfontein Unity Conference gave us an Ideal of Nationhood while the Umtata Conference of 1973 gave geopolitical content to the Ideal. Since then, nobody has stated in precise terms what shape the geopolitical form should take.

The ordinary person who is crushed by race humiliation and oppression does not have the time or equipment to familiarise himself with abstract principles; he is concerned with concrete situations because these affect his life visibly.

The nucleus would give Lesotho and Swaziland direct access to the sea.

The re-unification of Natal and the formation of the nucleus would attract investments and would lay the foundations for the transformation of the Federal Union into the industrial heart of Africa. The establishment of the nucleus would go beyond opening the markets of the continent to goods from the nucleus; it would create an altogether new type of relationship between Free Africa and the peoples of the nucleus.

Above all, the nucleus would have a greater potential for developing a more prosperous economy than the "White" state. Apart from crushing the satellite system which Pretoria dreams of it would have two major ports facing the Indian Ocean and St. Lucia Bay, which is almost surrounded by national game parks, and has the potential to be one of the finest holiday resorts on the Indian Ocean. The nucleus would have coal, iron, wood pulp, sugar, maize, livestock and other resources which would make it the industrial gateway into Africa.

The nucleus, in which the majority of Africans live, could be extended to include the homelands of the North if and when they are ready to confront the Afrikaner monolith with the inevitable implication of Ethnic Grouping.

- xiii. *A common defence policy for all the peoples of South Africa initially and all the communities of Southern Africa later.*

The most important developments on the homefront in the clash between Black and White during the first, nine months of 1978 were, first, the decision, by Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, chairman of Die Broederbond, Dr. Willem de Klerk, editor of *Die Transvaler* and other leaders of the Afrikaner monolith, to exchange ideas with African leaders and, second, Premier Vorster's resignation from the leadership of the apartheid regime.

The resignation took place in curious circumstances. Chief Buthelezi, in common with some Coloured, Asian and White leaders, had for years called upon Vorster to convene a constitutional conference to hammer out a formula for co-existence which would be acceptable to all races. Vorster had opposed this. Then, early in the second half of 1978, the chairman of Die Broederbond and *Die Transvaler's* editor and other Afrikaner leaders met Drs. Nthato Motlana and Maurice Nyembezi, leaders respectively of Soweto's Committee of Ten and Inkatha branch.

Some of the points made by Afrikaner leaders were: that the Afrikaner monolith would have to change its commitment to excessive Afrikaner protectiveness; that it would have to adopt riskier positions to maintain its culture; that all "unnecessary" colour bars would have to be rejected; that Africans should move away from their commitment to the unitary state and the Westminster concept of "winner take all" if victorious in general elections; that the government was becoming aware that South Africa had entered a new political era in which "the essential factor is maximum consensus"; that if Black nationalism and the Afrikaner had to make

sacrifices to secure their common future, in the new thinking of the Afrikaner, provision had to be made for "the political fulfillment of the urban black"; that the Afrikaner was thinking of some sort of confederal structure for South Africa and believed this could reconcile conflict.

- xiv. *The return to their original homes or ancestral lands of all African communities and others removed from these homes and lands by the White man's laws and the payment, to all people thus deprived, of reparations and such other forms of compensation as the majority government will authorise.*

We should under no circumstances believe that just because some Afrikaner leaders now talk of policies based on "maximum consensus" they have changed their basic attitudes to us. We should develop our own yardsticks for determining basic changes in their thinking. One of these is the return to our people of all lands which belonged to us before conquest. These are African lands; they have always been African lands and will forever be African lands.



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The Afrikaners, if the points they made are any guide, came to set in motion a political process; their name for it was *maximum consensus*. They met the Africans in the effort to sound African reactions to Afrikaner alternatives to the status quo. These alternatives had two fundamental weaknesses: they were conceived within the concept of separate freedom on one hand and, on the other, they were based on demonstrable Afrikaner ignorance of developments in the African's Evolving Revolt in the last sixty-six years.

The doctrine of separate development is unacceptable because it is based on what the Afrikaners regard as the White man's right to prescribe destiny for the African. The prescription might be seen in Afrikanerdom's hostility to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood and the dishonest offer of vassalage in unviable mini-states.

The ignorance of African history emerged in Afrikaner insistence on the abandonment of the commitment to a unitary state. The Africans rejected the concept on January 8, 1912, when they formed themselves into a new nation whose destiny was not to be integrated in a unitary state, nor in a racial dictatorship of the type established by apartheid, but to establish "a new and unique civilization."

The African rejected the Westminster concept of nationhood when he chose this destiny.

The Africans had said, over a hundred years ago, that the philosophy by which they gave meaning to freedom defined the person in terms which emphasised his primacy regardless of who his parents were and recognised the simultaneous legitimacy of different cultural self-definitions.

The facts which gave significance to the exchanges were, first, that the chairman of Die Broederbond and the editor of *Die Transvaler* had virtually gone over the head of the Vorster government to meet the leaders of the African people in an exchange of views which, though not formal, had some of the makings of a first step toward negotiating a political settlement.

The second fact was that at about the time the Africans met the Afrikaners, rumours started circulating to the effect that Vorster was planning to resign, which he did.

His resignation drew into sharper outlines the conflict between the advocates of the narrower ideal of nationhood based on the principle that *die wit man moet baas bly* and that section of Afrikaners who are moving toward a larger concept of nationhood which would include the Africans, the Coloureds, the Asians and the Whites on the basis of "separate freedoms."

The two developments throw into bolder relief the vacuum which has developed in Afrikaner thinking on the future of South Africa. The void demands that the Africans, particularly in Free Africa, should be ready to fill it with a political alternative; that is, with a clearly stated final goal

while readying themselves for armed struggle should the apartheid regime play them dirty tricks.

The people on the homefront have already indicated their determination to negotiate with the Afrikaner if he wants a real alternative to apartheid. Realism demands that Free Africa should adapt to the demands of this situation on the homefront instead of shouting ineffective slogans about armed struggle.

The alternative is simple: The Africans on the homefront will proceed to settle their quarrel with the Whites in their own way, regardless of what the advocates of the armed struggle say or do.

In the meantime it does not do the African harm to move the argument with the Afrikaner away from separate lavatories for Black and White to a Black-White defence policy for South Africa. This would be an assertion of leadership initiatives in a situation of challenge.

This is not written to threaten Free Africa. On the contrary it is a plea to those Black countries which have made colossal sacrifices in support of our cause—sacrifices which we honestly and deeply appreciate—to take note of the changing dispositions of power on the homefront and develop strategies for adapting to these changes.

One consequence of not adapting before armed conflict is the unnecessary bloodshed we saw in Rhodesia. The other was the humiliating position where the Free Africans who clamoured for armed struggle did nothing effective to stop the massacre of our children during the Soweto Rebellion, other than to saturate the air with angry verbiage. They did the same when Smith killed Mozambicans on their own territory.

Other points from the above Programme of Principles call for comment. These will be discussed in their order of importance rather than as listed in the Programme.

Proportional partition is the most important of these. To begin with, proportional partition is not a new development in African history. As we have shown, Seme, Jabavu and Selope-Thema gave thought to the idea; so did H. Selby Msimang and Paul Mosaka.

It has been argued throughout this discussion that Black and White attitudes to the person produce mutually exclusive ideals of nationhood. The resulting conflicts make a poor foundation for a unitary state of the type imposed by the English in 1910. And, in any case, we Africans were not a party to the formation of the unitary state. In 1912, however, we united ourselves into a single nation. This nation needs to consolidate its territory first. This means that it must start by forming the nucleus of a federal union of the states which face the Indian Ocean, which would grow gradually to include all the states of the sub-continent in the end.

While opposing White domination in all its forms in every possible way, we Africans should also take note of the specifically geopolitical problems apartheid creates for us and should develop our Federal Union idea in such a way that it eventually solves these problems.

Proportional partition on the bases of simultaneous legitimacy and validity, proportional redistribution of the land, resources and other forms of wealth and eventual unification into a federal community of Black and White states of Southern Africa seems the type of state structure which conditions in the subcontinent call for.

Instead of wasting time, energy and money exchanging polemical insults with Pretoria, the international community generally and Free Africa in particular need to move away from concentrating on the functional aspects of apartheid, toward confronting the Whites in South Africa with a geopolitical alternative to the status quo.

The above might be stated in different terms. If the evolution, forms and functioning of racism and race discrimination in South Africa, the United States and in the relations between the Black and White nations together constitute a process which translates into action a given attitude to the person, the answer to the crisis in South Africa is a counter-process which would move the Africans and the Whites to a face-to-face confrontation on a clearly stated geopolitical alternative to the status quo; it is the launching of a political initiative which would set the counter-process in motion and lead Black and White to a Southern African Treaty Conference in which all the racial, language and other groups which have made Southern Africa their home would together hammer out a formula for co-existence that would transform the subcontinent into a cooperating economic and political community which would develop by stages into a federal union of the autonomous states of Southern Africa.

South Africa would be partitioned into two states, one Black and the other White as shown in the accompanying map. The Black state would have to control enough land and resources to withdraw Black communities in the White state if necessary.

Like the Black state, the White state would have the right to accede to the Federal Union. If it wanted to, it could remain out of it and throw in its lot with the West. The expectation is that self-interest would enable it to join the Federal Union.

Two main points need to be noted about the above formula for co-existence. The formula proposes a treaty between Black and White to settle the race quarrel for all time. This is the only way to build for peace, mutuality, co-operation and stability where two races, controlling given reserves of power, are committed to two different attitudes to the person.

The three elements of the formula for co-existence proposed above are: the dismantling of the unitary state-structure as a first precondition for the demonolithisation of South African society; adequate guarantees of political independence, economic security and survival not for the Whites only, but for all the peoples of Southern Africa, and the unification of all these peoples into a co-operating economic and political community.

On one hand these elements provide moulds in which diametrically opposed evaluations of the person could co-exist in an environment which

recognised the simultaneous legitimacy, validity and importance of different cultural self-definitions. On the other, they would create a collective sovereignty whose first task would be to protect the national-group sovereignties and preserve a satisfactory relationship between the whole and its constituent parts; that is, between the collective sovereignty and the national-group sovereignties.

The collective and constituent sovereignties would be bound together by a consensus on final goals; that is, by the recognition of all the nations of the subcontinent as a community with a common economic and political destiny. For this consensus to produce the desired effects, it has to be developed now, before armed conflict breaks out in South Africa. Urgency is given to its establishment by the circumstance that it is an important insurance against civil wars in the African community.

The apartheid regime is incapable of giving leadership in the directions outlined by the formula for co-existence; only the Security Council can do this. The government in Pretoria is deliberately creating the conditions which make war inevitable. The Soviet Union, acting through the Cubans, would not be human if it ignored Pretoria's role as its best ally in Africa. Partly as a result, the Soviets and Cuba are pouring large amounts of military materiel into Africa, first, to impress on the Africans the fact that the Soviet Union is an effective ally because it supplies arms when they are needed and, second, to be within striking range of Pretoria when war comes to South Africa.

The second point to be noted about the treaty conference is that it is designed to ensure that no foreign power or group of powers imposes solutions to Southern Africa's race problem. The peoples of the subcontinent themselves must produce a solution and they would do this, not in an appointment on the battlefield, but by sitting together in a treaty conference to agree on how they propose to live together.


In order to move events in this direction, machinery needs to be established for the co-ordination of the internal (South African) and external campaigns against apartheid. Such machinery would ensure that if and when the African majority came out in a general strike to paralyse the apartheid economy, the international community would be ready to act decisively to bring race oppression crashing to the ground.

The co-ordination would confront the Afrikaner with equitable partition as a guarantee of security for, and a possible solution to, his *survival problem*. The global fight against racism in South Africa continues to be handicapped by the fact that nobody in the international community has seriously confronted the Afrikaner with such an alternative.

When the Afrikaners have a state of their own, in which to nurture their culture, preserve their identity and segregate themselves to their hearts' desire, they would no longer have a *survival problem*; they would cease to make a nuisance of themselves in the subcontinent; they would stop making a mess of the lives of Africans, people of mixed blood,

English and Asians inside South Africa. Instead of living in uncertainty about the future, all races would be guaranteed security in the African sun.

No foreign power can give the peoples of the subcontinent this guarantee. Only they can give it to themselves in a treaty conference. The international community can help move events in this direction by exerting pressure on the Security Council to do the work it was established to do: to build for peace by calling the Southern African Treaty Conference with a minimum of delay.



Map of the proposed Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa, showing South Africa partitioned into the Black state, the Republic of Sudia, and the White Homeland.

The fashion in South Africa, as in the outside world, is to define the quarrel between Black and White only in racial terms. This simplistic approach ignores the facts that the Afrikaners and the English, though White, have problems between themselves which are as intractable as some of those which characterise Black-White relations; that their histories, cultures and positions in the state give them conflicting attitudes to many of the country's problems.

The Afrikaner has a *survival problem* which the English do not have. Where the Afrikaner sees the retribalisation and fragmentation of the African majority as one of his guarantees of survival, the English, when they ruled South Africa, did not regard African unity as the threat to the Whites which the Afrikaners think it is.

In the schools and churches they established for the Africans, the English welcomed Black people from all language-groups. They are not averse to the African community's ambition to transform Southern Africa into the Ruhr of Africa.

Thus, to define the Black-White quarrel only in racial terms has the effect of adding to the complexity of an already complicated problem; it forces all concerned to speak in terms of absolutes and unnegotiable positions.

What the crisis in South Africa calls for is the realisation that while race features prominently in the quarrel between Black and White, it is only a vehicle used in a conflict which involves fundamentals like different attitudes to the person, the mutually exclusive ideals of nationhood to which these attitudes have given rise, and the irreconcilable strategies adopted for marching to final goals.

Defined in these terms, the problem will cease to be racial only; it will be seen to have aspects which call for a political solution; it will even project majority rule arrived at as a result of negotiation involving all the peoples of Southern Africa as the Afrikaner's only real guarantee of survival. Defining the race problem in terms of monolithic power dispositions will emphasise the need to create a Black-White consensus on final goals; the need to develop a formula for co-existence which will demolitise South African society and provide new guarantees of survival for those who need them; and the need to accelerate movement to the transformation of Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community.

The treaty conference would produce the formula for co-existence on which to develop a consensus on final goals. Proportional partition, which would be the second stage, would give each group adequate guarantees of security. For those Afrikaners and English who detest race equality and majority rule, a separate state would be provided. In this state, they would practice apartheid to their hearts' desire and would not have a single Black person to annoy them.

Up to now, the race problem has been treated as though all White people were against the Black race. This is not the case. While it is true that the majority is for White supremacy—during the November 1977 elections the liberal Progressive Reform Party bought large amounts of newspaper advertising space to let the White electorate know that it opposed universal adult suffrage—there also are Whites who would feel comfortable in a Black state or in one ruled by a Black majority.

It is important that the Whites should be encouraged to choose freely between living in an all-White apartheid state and living in one based on race equality and majority rule. The separatists would be a free and sovereign independent community in their own homeland if they wanted things that way.

The treaty conference, the Consensus on Final Goals and Proportional Partition would be no more and no less than related stages in the march toward the final goal: the establishment of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

Proportional Partition would enable the White segregationists to be separated from those they do not want as neighbours and would leave the anti-racists free to co-operate with the Black majority in transforming Southern Africa into the Ruhr of Africa. We Africans need to reject those who reject us and embrace those who embrace us; we want to stand shoulder to shoulder with the latter in our march to the Federal Union.

The Coloureds, Asians and Whites who would remain in the Black Republic of Sudia would be denied no right that the Africans want for themselves; they would become Africa's children by identifying themselves with Africa's first-borns and would choose to do the thing which the Africans do in Africa: to reject the idea of punishing the person for being the child of his particular parents.

Movement to the treaty conference, Proportional Partition and the transformation of Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community would of necessity be a process which would involve all Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites who regard all the communities of Southern Africa as peoples with a common economic and political destiny.

One of the weakest points in internal and external campaigns against apartheid is that they lack positive focus. Up to the end of the era of the wars, between 1870 and 1880, African opposition to White domination defended the Black peoples' right to call their lands their own. Conquest, defeat, deculturation and proletarianisation created dangerous problems for our people. All sorts of Caucasian theological and ideological groups came in to divide us and create confusion in our ranks.

Partly as a result, we began to define ourselves in the incongruous terms prescribed by the conquerors. That held out the prospect that we might one day take up arms against each other in the defence of the borrowed self-definitions.

We sent our children to White-oriented schools in South Africa and the West where they were taught the techniques of self-definition, not in their own terms, but in Graeco-Romano-Hebraic terms which avoided the fundamentals of conflict and focused on the operational aspects of apartheid—on segregated residential areas, the pass laws, the differential wage, influx control, etc.

At every conference on South Africa I attended in the ten years I was in America, African scholars read "learned" papers in which they played around with statistics collected by the White power-structure to show where tactical retreats and adjustments could be made to ensure that White domination functioned with the minimum of friction.

Our scholars did not, as a rule, address themselves fully to the need to think in terms of solutions; to the need to confront White domination with well-reasoned and clearly stated alternatives to the status quo in South Africa.

If this helped to surrender the initiative to influence events to Pretoria, it did not give our people the clearest possible view of their alternative to apartheid.

It was not enough merely to say: "Abolish Apartheid! Establish Majority Rule!" The mass of the African people ask: "How do you abolish apartheid? What is Majority Rule? How do you go about establishing it?" Our scholars, particularly those in exile and who are, for this reason, freer to think and write independently, are shy of addressing themselves to this aspect of our struggle.

But our scholars are not the only people who allow the advocates of apartheid to do most of the thinking on the type of South Africa for which so many have sacrificed so much in the years since 1910.

While the NCLM and the Black Consciousness Movement have done magnificent work in politicising our people, they continue not to give positive focus to the struggle they lead. They demand Majority Rule and, in the next breath, do not tell their readers precisely what Majority Rule means and the steps to take to move toward it.

It is true that there are all sorts of legal obstacles to the free discussion of moves to establish Majority Rule. But it is difficult to see why legal institutions like homelands assemblies, which are to a certain extent privileged platforms, are not used fully as platforms from which to educate the masses of our people on what Majority Rule is and on how the Africans can reach it via a political solution.

The proposal for proportional partition is one way of moving toward Majority Rule. Other people might think of other measures. All these need to be aired as freely and as extensively as possible. The Whites are doing this on every conceivable plane. We, who stand to lose or gain most, do not make the best possible use of the channels we have to give positive focus to our struggle or to confront the Whites with clear alternatives.

Proportional partition sets aside the largest portion of South Africa for the Black people because, first, they are in the majority and, second, because those Whites, Coloureds and Asians who would elect to live in Sudia would have to be provided for.

The boundaries of the White state would stretch in a straight line from Knysna to Prieska, through Calvinia to Koekenaap on the South Atlantic. This part of the country has the areas where the Whites first settled.

Those Whites who hate the idea of being ruled by Africans would be free to live in the White homeland and would be free not to join the Federal Union. In like manner, the Union would be free to refuse to accept the White state as a member if the latter pursued policies which would not be acceptable to Africans.

The proportional reapportionment of the land, its resources and other forms of wealth is unnegotiable. No African in his senses accepts the position that Whites own 87 per cent of the land and the Blacks the remainder. The resources of South Africa must be distributed according to population needs on both sides of the colour line.

Speaking for myself, I might add that it would not harm the majority if the van Plettenberg formula, which laid down the Kei River as the eastern boundary of White territory, were modified in such a way as to create what can be called the Prieska Polygon. Prieska's position, near the Orange River, would place the waters of this river at the disposal of the White state. For this reason, Prieska is a pivotal point in the geographic and economic forms of the Polygon.

The rest of South Africa would belong to the Africans. People of mixed blood and Asians would be free to live where they chose.

It is possible that mine might be a minority view. Apartheid's excesses against the majority are driving increasing numbers of Africans to the view that the expulsion of the Whites from all South Africa is the Black man's only guarantee of a satisfying life in his land.

I am a serious exponent of the Sudic evaluation of the person and would regard the right of the White man to live in Africa, if he faced the challenge of belonging to Africa, as an unnegotiable absolute.

Negotiable matters, like population transfers and the distribution of water, would be issues in which Black and White interests could be reconciled.

Areas of congruity would include those issues where there are fundamental affinities in Black and White interests. I would regard the right of the Whites to a place in the African sun as an area of congruity, just as I would the nationalisation by successive Afrikaner governments of basic resources like water, etc.

One of the criticisms levelled against the Geopolitical Alternative is that it leaves the bulk of South Africa's industries in what would be Black territory. This point deserves attention.

The Whites were able to develop industry and commerce with the enforced co-operation of the African. Forced African labour (Isibhalo) was used in the construction of sections of the Durban-Johannesburg railway line. The Differential Wage paid to the African, the exploitation on White farms, and the humiliations of segregation made it possible for the Whites to be one of the most affluent groups in the world.

The African's share of his land's wealth and what he was paid for his labour were a scandal when compared with the way the Whites rewarded themselves. These injustices clamour for redress; they require that the Whites should pay reparations for their crimes against African humanity.

These reparations can be paid by giving the industrialised section of South Africa to the dispossessed majority.

While saying this, note should be taken of the fact that many resources of the section proposed as Black territory have to a large extent been exploited by the Whites. Take the gold mines of the Transvaal for example. Many of them are not very far from depletion-point while the mineral resources of the Cape Western district, which would be on White territory, have barely been touched.

The logic of a political solution demands that the right of the Whites to a place in the African sun should be recognised. The African has the right to claim South Africa as the Black man's land; he can argue that he is entitled to every inch of it; he can even lay down his life for it, as he has done so often in South Africa. If he did that, history would be on his side; but that approach will never lead to a political solution to the race problem to which I, for one, am committed.

What I propose in the Geopolitical Alternative is not a magic formula which will transform South Africa into a paradise for everybody in a day; what I offer is a formula, first, for a Black-White consensus of final goals and, second, for co-ordinated, phase-by-phase movement to these goals; a formula for giving the Africans and the Whites feelings of certainty about their future, whereas apartheid moves all concerned to a future that is "too ghastly to contemplate," as Vorster once said.

The Soweto Rebellion on the homefront, the virtually complete isolation of the apartheid regime on the international plane and the acceptance of Majority Rule by the world combine to mark the end of one phase in our struggle and to signal the beginning of another. In the new era, as in the old, our first guarantee of victory against policies based on pessimistic attitudes to the person is the ability to give effective leadership; to be ready with alternatives to fill the vacua which Sudic initiatives create in White thinking on a satisfying relationship between Black and White.

The creation of a world consensus on proportional partition would enable like-minded Blacks and Whites to start planning for a new society, in Sudia, in which the person would be equipped, enabled and seen to make the best possible use of his or her life regardless of race, colour,

sex, ethnicity or creed; they would establish machinery for creating an altogether different set of relations with Free Africa and the rest of the international community; they could set out to transform Southern Africa into the Ruhr of Africa and ask the industrial nations to be involved in a mutually satisfying manner in the transformation of the peoples of the subcontinent into a co-operating economic and political community.

The advocates of apartheid are incapable of leading us or the Whites to the above goals; their attitude forces them to lead all concerned, including the Afrikaner monolith, to ultimate destruction. The political initiative proposed in this discussion will stop this crusade of insanity.

MAJORITY RULE

Majority Rule is controversial in so far as the White communities are concerned. Space does not allow a full discussion of this all-important goal but enough will be said to give at least a working idea of how some Africans understand it.

Majority Rule means the use of political and economic power by the many to raise the living standards of all citizens in a balanced, person-centered society.

Translated into action in South Africa, Majority Rule means:

- i. The redrawing of borders for the purpose of creating autonomous states in South Africa in which different communities would have enough living-space to guarantee their survival in ways best suited to their genius;
- ii. The language and culture of each majority group in an autonomous state would be the dominant factor in that state;
- iii. People whose attachment to their language and culture makes them feel uncomfortable when they have to live with other communities would be free to confine themselves to their state;
- iv. Policy would aim at the free movement of populations, the mutualisation and broadening of contacts and the exchange of cultural contributions; the Afrikaner, to give one example, would be encouraged to place at the disposal of the Zulus, for example, those contributions which would help enlarge the Zulu personality and vice versa;
- v. Municipalities like Verulam or Stanger in Natal, where racial minority groups constitute the majority would automatically belong to the autonomous state;

- vi. Larger urban areas, in particular the industrial areas, would become open, non-racial non-ethnic states in which no cultural pattern would dominate;
- vii. Each state would control all its internal affairs with the exception of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Economic Development;
- viii. In its own interest and in the interest of the larger whole, each state would surrender some of its sovereignty to create a head of state who would be a rotating, executive president;
- ix. The president, who would hold office for four years, would be elected by the Federal Parliament from a list submitted by a different state every four years; the rotating right to nominate candidates within each state would moderate excessive preoccupation with narrowly ethnic and other concerns;
- x. When the turn of the next state came to propose candidates, it would nominate its own citizens;
- xi. Each citizen in an autonomous state would have the vote on reaching the age of eighteen (18) regardless of race, colour or creed;
- xii. The executive president's cabinet would have at least one member from each autonomous state plus as many members as the federal union might decide to have; the president would choose his cabinet on the basis of merit, regardless of whether or not they were members of the legislature;
- xiii. The minorities would have the right to veto legislation which affected adversely their cultural rights pending an appeal to a Human Rights Court which would be a branch of the Appellate Division established to ensure that no cultural group was denied the right to make the best possible use of its life as long as such life did not limit similar rights of other communities.

Many of the points listed above call for comment or explanation. The principle of autonomy requires that the distinction should be drawn between the proposals I made for a federal union about fifteen years ago and what Pretoria is offering. When I referred to the Swiss system and its cantons, I had in mind an arrangement which would be hammered out by all the communities of South Africa and not the frauds foisted on my

country as "independence" for the Africans or "participation" in the government offered the people of mixed blood and the Asians.

There are fundamental differences between the type of autonomy I proposed and what the government offers today. Agreement on final goals was the first precondition for movement to the Federal Union of Autonomous States. Each of the main language-groups would submit its proposals for the redelimitation of borders for the autonomous states. Natal, with its Zulu majority, would be an open nonracial state in which Zulu and English would be the official languages.

In so far as the other Black communities are concerned there would have to be extensive restorations to them of the lands taken away from them by the White conquerors. Each such deprived community would present its claims in writing and these would be discussed in open debate by all the groups represented in the official body considering boundaries. Lesotho, for example, cannot survive without the lost lands on the Orange River. The Swazi have extensive claims to land in the Piet-Retief-Barberton-Nelspruit sections of the Transvaal; so do the Pedi, Tswana, Shangane and Venda people in the North. There is need for boundary adjustments in the neighbourhood of the Transkei and the Ciskei.

Unlike the English, the people of mixed blood—why can't we call them the Sudians? I find it humiliating constantly to be calling them Coloureds or people of mixed blood; humiliating to me because these labels insult them; they define them as people who do not belong anywhere when they are the children of Africa—and the Asians, the Afrikaners have a *survival problem* which works for the creation and continuous extension of areas of conflict in Southern Africa. I am committed to the Sudic evaluation of the person and this commitment binds me to recognise the Afrikaner's right to a place in the African sun if he is prepared to face the challenge of belonging to Africa.

I would want to see an autonomous state set aside for the Afrikaner in which he would take care of his *survival problem*, develop the habits of living which make a people the children of Africa, and contribute constructively to the enrichment of the freedom experiment which the Africans launched at the Bloemfontein Unity Conference. The Afrikaner is a human being; he has the potential to do better things than make himself a nuisance to his neighbours. I would want to do all I could to see the potential translated into reality.

In each state, the language of the majority would be the official language, in common with one European language or another. There would also be the option of a third language—say, Portuguese—to facilitate communication among the peoples of the Federal Union.

There would be two types of states in Sudia: those based on cultural autonomy and those in which the language-groups were so mixed that people had no identity problems. In Sudia the Witwatersrand area, for ex-

ample, would be an open state in which no language-group would be dominant.

Each open state would make adequate provisions for all the cultural groups within it. These provisions, like guarantees of individual rights, would be spelt out in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Sudia.

The basic point always to bear in mind is that in South Africa, as in other parts of the continent, we are dealing with conflicting processes—with power dispositions which create these conflicts. The only way to evolve effective solutions is to realign the power groupings and set in motion an altogether different process which will move men and events to goals agreed upon by all races. Apartheid's proposals for change are doomed to fail because they are designed to serve the ends of predation and are not based on any consensus.

A united front of militants and moderates was established to fill the vacuum created by the mass resignations from the government-sponsored Urban Bantu Council. The new unity cut across language and territorial barriers. To demonstrate the growing solidarity of the African community the predominantly urban supporters of the united front met in conference in Hammanskraal, near Pretoria, where the delegates resolved to wage a co-ordinated fight against vassalage in unviable mini-states which the government peddles as independence.

Whether or not by design, South Africa's then predominantly rural National Cultural and Liberation Movement (Inkatha) met in annual conference in Natal almost at the same time that the Hammanskraal assembly was in session.

These events prepared ground for a larger type of unity; for the co-ordination of urban and rural opposition to apartheid. A united front of the urban and rural Africans could call for a general strike which would paralyse the economy. Those OAU countries which export labour to South Africa could use it to paralyse the mines, in support of the general strike. The co-ordination of internal and external pressures against apartheid would force the economy to grind to a halt.

The radical redistribution of wealth enters the picture at this point. A united African community could either paralyse the economy or wreck it by using arson as a political weapon. The intransigence which would try to wreck the unity would create a political vacuum which would march South Africa straight to armed conflict and arson.

What this calls for is not the nationalisation of industry; it calls for a bold sharing of political and economic power on the basis respectively of majority rule and mutualization. The acceptance of the principle of effective co-ownership could be part of the evidence those Whites who claim to work for a political solution would have to give to establish their seriousness.

In *An African Explains Apartheid*, I made the following comments and proposals on federation:

The Afrikaner's fear of being swamped by the Africans in a non-racial society constitutes a challenge that any statesman-like approach to South Africa's race crisis must take into account.

The federal constitution . . . would ensure that the Afrikaans minority had areas in the country it could regard as its "homelands." Within these, it would be free to develop its culture and language and, at the same time, make its distinctive contribution to the progress and prosperity of the whole.

In each ethnic province, the language and culture of the dominant group would become the main influences, and non-racial areas would, of course, be free to adopt cultural patterns of their choice. This arrangement gives each culture not only the soil, as it were, in which to nurture itself, but the room for adapting itself to changing circumstances, and it places a premium on collaboration, more or less in the way the different Swiss cultural groups have one loyalty but different homelands.

What I had in mind was an evolving ideal of nationhood; a concept all communities could grow into because all would have contributed to its formulation. Working together could teach all of us the habits of cooperating to create the open society in which we could all feel wanted. The Afrikaner had no right to saturate the air with his screams about his threatened survival when he thrived on the ruin of other peoples. If he wanted to belong to South Africa, he had to face South African realities and adapt to the fact that we were a very mixed nation. If he could not do that, it would be wise of him to clear out of South Africa and leave us to solve our problems with those Whites who would want to work with us in building the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa. We would attract as many of them as we would need. They would come from Western Europe, the Americas and other parts of the world. In spite of the Mau Mau Revolt, Kenya was beginning to have more Whites after independence than she had under British rule.

The specifics of my proposals for a federal state based on cultural autonomy included:

The real friends of South Africa should insure that the legal and political structure of the nonracial society to replace apartheid is a federal constitution, which makes provision for four types of federating provinces—those in which Afrikaner initiatives are the dominant influence, those in which the African has the biggest say, those in which the British are the key factor, and the nonracial provinces.

The division of the country into a number of culturally autonomous provinces.

The union of these provinces into a federal republic.

Voluntary union with the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and the mandated territory of Southwest Africa.

Universal adult suffrage for all on a common voters' roll.

Entrenched guarantees of personal liberty and individual rights.

The restoration of the Commonwealth connection.

Friendly alliances with the states of Africa.

Provision for territories and peoples who would like later to join the federal republic.

The immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the bans, and the return of all political exiles to their homes.

The procurement of active United Nations assistance in establishing the federal republic as an additional protection to the minorities and a precaution against the dislocation of the country's economy. . . .

Some Afrikaner nationalists might argue in all sincerity that the homelands in a federal republic would be no guarantee of survival for Afrikanerdom. The homelands idea, of course, is borrowed from their side; but if they think it is good for the African, surely it must be good for them too. If, however, what they mean is that their domination of the African is the only guarantee of survival they will accept, then we might as well face the fact frankly that salvation for the African would lie in preparing for war as the only solution to the race problem.

If they want to have the lion's share of the land of Africa and shunt the African majority to the eroded and crowded reserves, the Black man will not have much of a choice other than to teach himself and his children to know no rest until they drive the last Afrikaner out of South Africa, back to Europe. These realities must be faced because people are thinking and talking about them. If the Afrikaner is determined to keep by force of arms what he holds, he should realize that the African will one day seize by force that which was taken away from him. The emergence of African states will have been in vain if it does

not enable them to supply arms to the Africans in the republic to redress a historical injustice. Force provokes force. It might not be today; it must come sooner or later.

I wrote these words in 1962, before going into exile. The government's answer was to impose a five-year ban on me. One of the laws under which I was banned was the Suppression of Communism Act! Neither the bans nor the long years I have been in exile have changed the views expressed above—except that where, in 1962, I was prepared to demarcate a part of Natal as English territory, the Soweto Rebellion and the apartheid regime's determination to force the African majority out of South Africa made it clear to me that the majority of the Whites did not want a negotiated solution. If they pushed us to war, I told myself, all the African communities should insist on reversion to their ancestral boundaries. This would be one of our war aims.

In 1974 Buthelezi went to Cape Town to deliver that year's Hoernle Memorial Lecture organised by the South African Institute of Race Relations. He went to great pains to explain how the federation of autonomous states we had in mind would be formed, and laid great stress on parallels with the cantonal system of the Swiss.

I could not believe my eyes, two years later, when *Newsweek* published the gist of an interview which Mr. de Borchgrave, one of the weekly's senior correspondents, had with General van den Bergh, South Africa's security police chief and head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). De Borchgrave reported, among other things, that at the headquarters of BOSS in Pretoria he had been made to understand that BOSS chiefs favoured the establishment of a Swiss type of federation! BOSS promptly denied that it had given the information Mr. de Borchgrave passed on to *Newsweek*.

Subsequently, the cabinet appointed a committee, chaired by Defence Minister P. W. Botha (now the Prime Minister) to examine the constitution of South Africa with a view to effecting changes in it which were acceptable to the government.

The international edition of the *Johannesburg Star* (May 28, 1977), reported Chairman Botha as having made the following statements before a student audience in Pretoria University:

I have said before that a possible road to the future is a canton system for our extraordinary situation. It will guarantee the maintenance of identities for each group and consultation between them. Unique arrangements need to be made for our situation.

Two days before the Botha statement, another cabinet minister, Dr. Koornhof, had flown another kite to test reactions to a Swiss-type of cultural confederation. Premier Vorster neither associated himself with

the kite-flying nor rejected it. His neutrality created the type of confusion which, some commentators argued, could give him the image of a unifying influence in the ranks of Afrikanerdom.

Significance was given to this view by the fact that early in 1977 the government announced its plans for granting "full autonomy" to those homelands which did not accept "independence." Buthelezi's Kwa Zulu was uncompromising in its rejection of the vassalage which Pretoria offered as independence. The change in policy suggested that Pretoria had reached the point where its "independence" policy could not work. Kwa Zulu was a mass of islands which could not be consolidated into a single state without hurting White interests. Apartheid set out to protect White interests. In addition, the English in Natal made it clear that they were not averse to the idea of forming an alliance with Buthelezi's Zulus. Pretoria promptly dropped its offer of "independence" in order to prevent the formation of a united front of the Zulu and English monoliths which could demand independence and secede from the Republic.

The appointment of the Botha committee was a government admission that the South African constitution was due for change.

OPEN SOCIETY

The evolving programme outlined above would be designed to achieve two objectives: to enable all the groups to learn the habits of living, working and planning together for their corporate good, and to ready themselves in the process, for movement to citizenship in a larger state where race and ethnicity will be of no political significance; where merit alone will determine the position of the person in the life of the Federal Republic of South Africa.

In an open, person-centred society, each community would have enough land and resources to maintain its viability; it would, in other words, have enough living-space to define itself freely. The entrenchment of this fundamental freedom would be the first pillar on which the Federal Republic would be established.

The executive president would be the second source of strength. His office would be vested with a great deal of power to ensure that each community which felt deprived or unjustly treated would redress the wrongs against it when the time came for it to nominate its candidate for the federal presidency. No community would have the right to nominate a candidate before everyone had exercised their right to nominate. At this level, collective sovereignty would be a moderating influence in a society where citizens' personalities would have been moulded and honed by different evaluations of the human being.

After, say, thirty years, the constitution would come up for review. The points of strength and weakness noted in the life of a whole generation would provide insights into necessary changes and adjustments.

The definition of Majority Rule given here gives those Africans and Whites who want a negotiated solution the opportunity to assert informed leadership initiatives toward the convention of the Southern African Treaty Conference to pre-empt war.

The Stabilisation Fund and the Southern African Development Authority call for a few remarks. In the situations created by White domination in Southern Africa, Majority Rule or the granting of political "freedom" without social justice would be a fraud, an invitation to disaster, and a perpetuation of tyranny in a new guise. Those sections of the nation which White domination placed in positions of economic and cultural advantage would dominate the new society and continue to give to freedom a meaning that would humiliate the African and force him to use the political power he would have to crush the economic power of the advantaged groups. That would move us full circle back to where the Soweto Rebellion found us.

A community of have-nots owes no loyalty to those institutions it regards as the means for exploiting or oppressing it. Its responses sooner or later become influenced by what we might call the temper of the dispossessed—the mood which seeks to destroy that which cannot be changed, if it is unjust.

But White domination has encouraged the development of the temper of the dispossessed over such a wide area in Southern Africa that it would be folly to separate the economic problems of Southern Africa from the political or to deal with each country in isolation. What is needed is a sub-continental programme for the development of a sound, integrated economy within an integrated political structure. The Stabilisation Fund and the Development Authority would complement political freedom with social and economic justice.

Finally, reference has been made to the Africans and the Afrikaners as key communities. While the relations between the two are characterised mainly by conflict, fundamental congruities exist which the Africans and the outside world have not up to now given the attention they deserve. Both have always lacked enthusiasm for the unitary state because it facilitated the imposition of the will of one group on the others. Granting "independence" to the Transkei is the Afrikaner's way of dismantling the unitary structure. Matanzima's acceptance of "independence" might, in a sense, be said to be a rejection of the unitary state.

The Africans and the Afrikaners are deprived majorities on different planes. While the Afrikaners control the government, their share of the actual wealth of the country is not worth writing home about. Their position in the government projects them as the main exploiters of the African when the English-speaking sections collect the bulk of the profits from the oppression of the African. On this plane, the Afrikaner gets all the knocks and the blows from the outside world for defending a racial policy

which gives him relatively marginal profits when it comes to the possession of actual wealth.

The Black majority is kicked and knocked in different ways—to protect those who benefit most from their exploitation. Left-wing albificationists have suddenly discovered that there is no uglier political and moral evil than Black racism. Taking their cue from these, a number of Western liberals and intellectuals have started beating drums against Black racism. If an African defines himself and his people's struggle in non-Caucasian terms, he is branded a racist. The intention is to make it difficult for African Nationalism to free the African on his terms; to tie him to leadership by the albificationists so that when freedom comes, he will not be in the position to use the political power he will then have to dispossess the White supremacists.

Congruities exist, also, when it comes to African and Afrikaner attitudes to state ownership of resources like water, electricity, shipping, harbours, railways, airways, etc. The nationalisation of these resources is part of what some Africans call the redistribution of wealth. By vesting control of important sources of wealth in the state the Afrikaners laid foundations on which the Africans would build to raise the living standards of all the peoples of their country.

These congruities call for an informed dialogue on alternatives over the heads of the apartheid regime if necessary, between the Africans and Afrikaners who genuinely seek to resolve conflict and are ready to make the adjustments called for. These Afrikaners realise that provoking the African beyond a certain point will commit him irrevocably to armed conflict. They take note of the fact that when South Africa entered the Angolan war, the West regarded that as a kiss of death for UNITA, and preferred to see Angola taken over by the Marxists than appear to be anywhere near South Africa. That Western world which would not give aid to the side supported by South Africa in Angola wasted little time in finding ways to send some form of help to Zaire to suppress the Katangese revolt. The writing on the wall was clear. The West would rather see South Africa taken over by Black Marxists than come to the assistance of the advocates of White supremacy.

In order for us Africans to conduct a meaningful dialogue with the Afrikaner we need to say more clearly what we mean when we talk of the redistribution of wealth. No Black political party inside the country has stated its goals on this plane in the clearest terms possible. The open debate on economic alternatives to apartheid still goes on.

Without the redistribution of wealth and social justice, political autonomy for the African people would be one more trick designed to perpetuate White domination in a new guise. There would be no point in us accepting a political federation in which the wealth of our land continued to be controlled by the minority groups. We oppose apartheid

because we want to control the wealth of our country; we want political power because it will enable us to develop this wealth and use it in ways which will give to freedom a meaning that will be seen to be valid in the lives of all the peoples of South Africa. If we cannot have this meaning, our alternative would be to expel the Whites from our country. Speaking for myself, this would do more harm to all concerned than the apartheid evil we oppose.

The principles on which the redistribution of wealth is based have their origins in the mutualism of the Sudic Ideal. These principles include:

- stress on the primacy of the person regardless of race, colour, sex or creed;
- the right of the person to make the best possible use of his life in the light of his abilities and choices;
- the function of society is to create the conditions in which the person will make the best possible use of his life; it is to ensure that the person is equipped, enabled and seen to realise the promise and the glory of being human regardless of who his particular parents were;
- state ownership of primary resources like land, water, roads, harbours, airways, minerals, etc.;
- the radical redistribution of wealth with the minimum of unavoidable dislocations of the economy;
- the development of an evolving synthesis of economic experiences which will keep control of primary resources in the hands of the federal government and mutualise the ownership and control of the means of production and distribution;
- minimise the interest of the dispossessed in the use of arson and sabotage as political weapons and make them feel and see that they are effective co-owners of all the wealth of their country;
- the recognition of labour unions for all races in order, among other things, to create a well-educated, disciplined and thrifty labour force which would establish responsible labour-management relations and provide an expanding internal market for goods of South African manufacture;
- the introduction of radical land reforms to open the ownership of land to all South Africans;

- the maximum utilisation of all human resources in the modernisation of equipment, increasing production and the generation of capital from savings;
- increasing the personal savings ratio to reduce the dependence on foreign investments;
- the modernisation of industrial structures to obtain maximum advantage from resources by eliminating the weakness of exporting raw materials instead of converting them into manufactured goods inside South Africa;
- relating modernisation and technology to the needs of large, medium and small concerns so that progress in one field might stimulate progress in other sectors of industry;
- giving constructive purpose to the tensions and conflicts produced by the deracialisation of the economy;
- the co-ordination of policies by the government, industry and labour for solving the problems created by deracialisation;
- the recognition of an expanding economy as a precondition for peace, stability and growth in South Africa;
- the removal of all impediments to growth in education, land utilisation, labour mobility, energy production, raw materials procurement and the expansion of markets;
- the establishment of machinery to study the problems political decentralisation might produce in the economy and propose solutions to these.

The type of mutualisation described in these principles would seek to create internal cohesion and stability and extend the area of co-operation with the outside world. Movement toward these goals would be in three stages. There first would have to be agreement on the need radically to redistribute wealth. The first reaction of most people in Africa and the West is that redistribution means nationalisation of the type seen in Marxist states. This method is not suitable to South Africa, with its legacy of race discrimination. It would transfer power from one racial group to another and give the Africans a vested interest in using their numbers and the political power in their hands to dispossess the Whites who oppressed and humiliated them. The Whites would retaliate in different ways. The end result would be violent revolts which would not do anybody any good.

A CHANGED ROLE FOR NIGERIA

The redefinition of the "race" problem made in the present discussion, the stress on the primacy of the person, and the Ideal of Nationhood developed by the Black South Africans combine with the Evolving Revolt, the Bicipient Mind, the Collective Will and the policy for isolating the advocates of apartheid to set the spotlight on the role Africa could play in the turn the crisis has taken in South Africa.

If Free Africa, in particular, did all her homework on power dispositions in the Black and White communities, she would realise that she, like the OAU and the Black people in South Africa, are strongest, not on the military plane, but at political and diplomatic levels, and would develop a strategy for asserting informed leadership initiatives also in these areas.

These initiatives would include the re-evaluation of the strategies against White domination which Free Africa has been using in the last ten years. Free Africa would be badly equipped for the liberation of South Africa if she did not re-examine her attitudes for the specific purpose of fighting where she is strongest and hitting apartheid where it is most vulnerable.

An error which clamours for correction by the OAU is the exclusion of Lesotho and Swaziland on one hand and, on the other, Nigeria, from the Frontline States. The first two are important windows on what is going on inside South Africa and would give the Frontline States valuable insights on Pretoria's thinking on race conflict; they should have seats in the Frontline States.

Nigeria has a special role to play in the crisis in South Africa. The apartheid problem has been before the United Nations almost from the foundation of this body. In spite of this, the international community continues to be unable to build an effective consensus on how best to fight apartheid. One of the reasons for this is that the world organisation defines the crisis mainly from Caucasian perspectives. After the collapse of White rule in Rhodesia, the international community is likely to stand face to face with the White supremacists in Pretoria in a life-and-death-struggle that has the gravest implications for the future of the world.

This calls not only for clarity on the forces involved in the crisis into which apartheid has thrown the Republic; it calls, in particular, for the correction of some of the blunders which today continue to surrender to the apartheid regime the initiative to influence events.

The first of these errors is the failure to appreciate Nigeria's potential for becoming the decisive factor in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa. This failure is all the more amazing because of Nigeria's known commitment to liberation in the South. Not only have her leaders spoken in clear and unmistakable terms in support of liberation, Nigeria has backed her words with deeds befitting her size, commitment and position of leadership in Africa.

In spite of all this, Nigeria is not a member of the Frontline States; this means that if she continues to be excluded, she would not be a negotiator before collapse. For Free Africa to allow this state of affairs to continue is not only to give apartheid a new lease on life; it is unwittingly to sacrifice our children, who are showing that we are prepared to pay the supreme sacrifice rather than be slaves to apartheid.

As one of the larger producers of oil, Nigeria occupies a strategic position among the oil-producing nations whose importance in the fight against apartheid should never be underestimated. Nigeria is in the position to put persuasive pressures on the African members of OPEC to enable them to make a decision on whether or not to use African oil as a weapon against those who make it a crime for the children of Africa to exist in their own continent.

Africa's oil-producers are members of the OAU; they can be persuaded to use oil as a political weapon if the OAU addressed itself to the actualities of power disposition inside South Africa today. Nigeria, with her tremendous sense of responsibility is in the position to lead an African stand in the world oil producers organisation in favour of the use of oil as a weapon against apartheid. I was in Nigeria in 1958 and saw their performance in the Accra Conference of that year; I returned to my country with a tremendous amount of respect for their wisdom, ability to lead, and grasp of the complexities of the Black struggle.

OPEC, in turn, has the potential to approach some of South Africa's main suppliers, which sell oil to the Republic—with the request to suspend their exports as long as apartheid remains official policy in South Africa.

Nigeria, acting alone or in concert with Africa's producers, is in the position to approach the United States and ask it, first to stop exporting oil to South Africa and, second, to approach others with the request for co-operation in suspending oil supplies to South Africa to prevent a war that could set Africa and the Indian Ocean on fire. They could be told that by selling oil to South Africa they subsidize movement to a war that could some of their own enemies.

Lastly in the list of fundamental weaknesses is the power the homelands administrations now have to create a dual-authority crisis if they want to. The homelands administrations provide a privileged platform from which apartheid can be attacked. All the homelands have a land problem which the pegging of African land at 13 percent complicates every year. The reserves or homelands are not able to carry their present populations. This has created a problem in the rural areas which is moving toward being explosive.

Sooner or later, the homelands administrations will have to stand together and join the militants in calling all their people out in a general strike in demand for majority rule. The homelands administrations are

better-placed to lead on this plane and confront White authority with legal Black authority to bring apartheid face to face with the absurdity of its assumptions.

Let us conclude this discussion with brief references to the main issues raised in what has been written up to now.

Attempts by Western and Socialist countries (China excluded) to create a class of ideological menials who will function either as the political managers of an economic estate owned by the West or as the Black surrogates of Moscow after victory will land South Africa in the disasters we see in South Vietnam, Iran and Taiwan on one hand and, on another, in quarrels which produced the Sino-Soviet split, Tito's revolt and the suppressions of popular uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The emergence of Eurocommunism shows that Socialism is no cure for the ills which afflict mankind, just as capitalism is not. If it was, the Soviet Union would not be buying American wheat to feed the Soviet people.

It is an invitation to disaster for us Africans to throw in our lot with the West or with the Soviet Bloc. What our situation calls for is a realignment of internal forces for the purpose of moving Black and White toward the transformation of all the peoples of Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community.

The first step in this direction is a meaningful dialogue between the Africans and the Afrikaners for the purpose of building a Black-White consensus on the above goal. The second would be proportional partition. Mutualism, which would recognise the compatibility of private ownership of property on given planes, community ownership on others and state ownership elsewhere, would be the third. The fourth would be the unification of the autonomous, proportionally partitioned states into the Federal Union of South Africa which would negotiate with Angola, Botswana, Bophuthatswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Transkei, Zambia and Zimbabwe for the creation of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

Where the Whites in South Africa continue to waste time talking about separate lavatories when the issue before them is whether or not the Africans, Coloureds, Asians, Afrikaners and English shall have the sense speedily to develop and agree on a formula which will enable them to stand together to prevent their country from being reduced to ashes by internal insurrection or external intervention or both; where the Whites are proving that they are incapable of leading a racially mixed country, it becomes the duty of the Africans to assert vigorous leadership initiatives to give their country the character they want for it.

The obvious priority here is a policy *yokubophana amanxeba* (of binding each other's wounds) which will create a consensus of the like-minded on the homefront and abroad to extend the area for the co-ordination of internal and external campaigns against White domination. Such a policy would seek to re-unite those whom White domination

It would enable the people on the homefront and the exiles to speak with one voice against Western talk of capitalistic "interests" and guarantees for minority rights when these "rights" are the issue on which Black and White are quarrelling. The West might be making itself irrelevant when it places its "interests" and so-called "minority rights" before the people of Southern Africa.

What it should be thinking about is the creation of a controlled credits crisis to accelerate movement to the establishment of majority rule with the minimum of violence in South Africa.

But as experience in Iran and Taiwan shows, the West will shout itself hoarse about the need to secure its "interests." When the time comes for it to protect these, it will do nothing effective. That shows an important dimension of the vacuum in Western thinking on the crisis in relations between the West and the Third World.

The Soviet Bloc is moving toward a parallel position of irrelevance. It supports the clamour for armed struggle in the hope that this will prepare ground for another European ideology, after the failure of Christianity, Colonialism, Slavery and Capitalism. Soviet imperialism is committed to the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic attitude to the person which Africa rejects.

What conditions demand of the Soviet Union in Africa is not to prescribe destiny for the Black people as many other Whites tried to do in the past, but to launch an informed and constructive conversation with Black Africa on the basic materialism of the Buntu or Sudio Ideal.

The Soviet Union needs to conduct an informed conversation of minds with African Nationalism on this brand of materialism instead of calling African Nationalists names.

This takes us back to the proposal, by some Afrikaners, that Black and White should exchange ideas on alternatives to the status quo on the basis of what they called "maximum consensus." If, by this, they mean a consensus based on "separate freedoms" or any other apartheid-oriented philosophy, they are wasting their time, as Sharpeville and Soweto should have warned them by now.

If, as some hope, they plan to establish a satellite system which they hope to operate indefinitely with the co-operation of "difficult" African leaders like Buthelezi, they must be told in clear terms that they are also wasting their time.

No African in his senses will rush to see in the words "maximum consensus" a statement of surrender terms. At the same time it would be an error to disregard the fact that the Afrikaner is under intense pressure on all sides to get out of the laager and belong to the twentieth century. In a situation where he presides over a power-structure where labour and

technology are controlled respectively by the Africans and the English, he does not have much of a choice; he has to start moving into the twentieth century. We, Africans, need to develop a quality of diplomacy which will deal with this change in his thinking—if only to determine if it is a real change. Armed struggle will not determine this; it will mend the cracks in the united front of White monoliths and create new problems for us.

Our business is to create helpful polarisations on the side of all racists and not to unify them.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. Eds: Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport, Connecticut, 1976, Pp 105-06.