

(ANC) or with the ICU. The best of all were rank and file Bantu members, often semi-literate, who received their education through the party and had never been in any other organisation.⁷

— pp. 214, 215

The uneducated were easy victims. In any nation, policy was not made by shepherds and street sweepers. The missionaries had taken advantage of the African peoples' ignorance of the White man's ways to prescribe destiny for the Black people all over South Africa. The communists were taking advantage of the ignorance of the uneducated to impose another destiny on the Africans. Roux continues:

The Communist Party by now numbered among its members many Africans whose political knowledge and understanding was small. It began to seem that the Party might be swamped by members who had little or no knowledge of Marxist principles and theory. The suggestion came from Moscow that the Party should remain a small and select body of trained revolutionaries working through a larger mass body. In this way, the communists would be enabled to preserve the purity of their doctrine while at the same time, through the larger organisation, giving a clear lead to the masses on all suggestions.

This was the beginning of a long and bitter conflict between African Nationalism and communism that eventually split the ANC on the homefront and, later, in exile. In 1924, Kadalie's ICU established a branch in Johannesburg, which developed into the headquarters of this workers' movement. The communists initially worked closely with the ICU, to win converts and not to reinforce this wing of African Nationalism. By 1926, Kadalie had had enough of their disruptive proselytism; he kicked them out of the ICU. The communists turned to the ANC. Let Roux continue from here:

It happened that this new suggestion from Moscow which was tantamount to an order came at a time when Bunting (another White communist) while in Tembuland (Transkei) had already tentatively founded an organisation called the League of Native Rights, a "designedly innocuous organisation," he called it, "with the preservation of the Native franchise and universal free education as the prime objectives," the Communist Party's interest in the scheme not being advertised but not necessarily concealed.

To the communists in Johannesburg the idea seemed good and they set about founding a new mass organisation to be called League of African Rights. It was inaugurated by a public meeting in Incheape Hall, Johannesburg. The League called upon all to join who were interested in the struggle of Black men for freedom in Africa. It drew up a "petition of rights" with demands for the abolition of the pass laws

and land laws, extension of the vote and free education for the Bantu....It took for its slogan "*Mayibuy i Afrika*" (Let Afrika Return), and for its flag a black, red and green emblem. The song of "*Mayibuye*" was sung to the tune of Clementine. It was immediately joined by J.T. Gumede, of the ANC, who was made president, and by Doyle Modiakgotla, of the Ballinger ICU, who became vice chairman. The secretaryship was held by the communists Albert Nzula and Edward Roux (the author). Charles Baker was Treasurer.

The new organisation seemed well and truly launched according to Moscow specifications and the needs of the situation. The Communist Party, while duly represented in the leadership, was not conspicuous there.

But it seemed that this was not at all what Moscow had desired. The new L.A.R. was a success from the start. Political fever among Africans was still running high....

In the midst of it all a telegram from Moscow ordered the immediate dissolution of the League. The communists were dumbfounded, for they had acted, as they thought, on instructions from Moscow. But, good Leninists, they obeyed orders....

This incident calls for an explanation because it draws in the sharpest possible outlines the Soviet Union's dilemma in South Africa. The surrogates of Moscow were mainly White. As pointed out, these saw the "race" problem through perspectives developed in the White environment in South Africa. These perspectives differed from those in the locations of Johannesburg; they were a poorly informed response to a crisis which was shaking the ANC to its foundations.

The oppressed peoples of the world met in conference in Brussels in 1927 to consider plans for the co-ordination of their struggles against colonialism and imperialism. The decision to convene the conference had been taken by the Colonial Presidium of the Comintern at the urging of representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union serving the Presidium. The Soviet Party regarded the convention of such a conference as a declaration of solidarity with the oppressed.

J.T. Gumede, the President of the ANC, represented his organisation at the Brussels conference. From there, he visited parts of the Soviet Union and returned to South Africa full of praise for the Soviet system. This plunged the ANC into a crisis; they saw in Gumede's championing of the communist cause a betrayal of the African people and an acceptance of the prescribed destiny. Explosion-point was reached when the nineteenth annual conference of the ANC met in Bloemfontein in 1930. The communist wing of the ANC was, this time, led by a White person, S.

Malkenson, who was given permission to attend the conference.

Umteteli waBantu (May 3, 1930) says that in his presidential address, Gumede started by giving his impressions of the Soviet Union:

Referring to Soviet Russia, Mr. Gumede said his sympathies were with the peasant workers of Russia, and he urged Congress to consider the matter of defending them against the onslaught of the enemies of the oppressed peoples of the world. Everywhere the oppressed peoples were being inspired by that ideal of emancipation which found expression in the Russian revolution.

Vol. I, Doc. 48i

Against the background given by the Communist Party's traditional hostility to African Nationalism, a hostility which had forced Kadalie to expel them from the ICU, Gumede's identification with a power which, acting through its White surrogates, prescribed destiny for the Africans, provoked negative reactions. Gumede proceeded:

We have now to rely on our own strength, on the strength of the revolutionary masses of White workers the world over with whom we must join forces. We have to demand our equal economic, social and political rights. That cannot be expressed more clearly than to demand a South African Native Republic, with equal rights for all, but free from all foreign and local domination.

Vol. I, Doc. 48i

The address raised a storm of protest and made it clear that Gumede's new position was not acceptable to the African Nationalists. To drive their point home, the delegates threw him out of office and elected Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme president of the ANC.

Malkenson, who requested that he should be allowed to speak during the storm, said he wanted to state the case of the communists. *Umteteli* reports that he said:

no longer would the fight be a secret within the Congress; it would become a struggle outside Congress; and the militant masses would decide the issue.

Dr. Seme on behalf of the new Executive welcomed this declaration of war....

To mend Gumede's shattered image as a leader, the communists formed the League for African Rights and elected him its first (and last) president. Apparently, the trick did not serve the ends of Soviet policy and Moscow promptly ordered the dissolution of the League.

Let us go back to Malkenson's speech, which drew the lines of conflict in ways nobody could mistake. Moscow's surrogates had reached the

point where they felt they should come out in the open to smash both the Collective Will and the Ideal of Nationhood which it translated into action.

But the communists had one fundamental handicap: they were White. They could not come out openly and fight African Nationalism; they had to have Black surrogates whom they could manipulate to shatter the Collective Will and destroy the Ideal of Nationhood.

As the crisis in South Africa deepened and the area of freedom widened in the Third World, Moscow's policy of working through White surrogates who operated through Black surrogates ran into trouble. The emergence of non-Caucasian states after World War II gave the Black people a choice of allies.

Freedom was coming to Africa. Independence on the continent would reinforce the Nationalists. Time ceased to be the ally of the Soviet Union. The surrogates formed the Congress Alliance which included the ANC (which had come under communist control), the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats (White), the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The Alliance immediately transformed the ANC, which represented the majority, into a minority in the policy making bodies of the Alliance.

Thus reinforced, the surrogates called a "conference" which turned out to be a mass rally in Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 26, 1955. This rally adopted the Freedom Charter as a declaration of policy for the peoples of the Alliance. The document has been discussed so extensively in the last two decades we shall not consider its clauses here. Of interest to us are African Nationalist reactions.

The Freedom Charter purported to be an ideal of nationhood, like the Black Republic Gumede advocated in his pro-Soviet speech. What was remarkable about it was not so much what it said as what it did not say. It did not say a single word about the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood. On the contrary, it spoke of "guarantees for national rights" when these rights were the issue on which Black and White were quarrelling.

The silence was a tactical rejection of the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood. The Nationalists had no choice; they had to walk out of the ANC, when Chief Albert John Luthuli accepted the Freedom Charter as a statement of ANC policy, and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress which wasted little time in establishing contact with Free Africa.

The PAC adhered to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood while the ANC upheld the Freedom Charter. The communists had split the ANC under Luthuli as they did under Gumede.

Final victory in Moscow's bid to have complete control of the ANC came in 1969 when the ANC met in exile in Morogoro, Tanzania, and decided to abandon its African identity and admit White and other

members. That created a crisis which led to the expulsion of an influential bloc of Black Congressmen in the 1970s.

On the homefront the use of Caucasian tactics in an environment where they had no relevance led from one defeat of communist strategy against apartheid to another until the communist underground cells were to a large extent wiped out.

This point deserves attention. The Freedom Charter confronted the Africans with a fundamental challenge which called for a fundamental answer. The communists predicted, rightly, that African Nationalism would sooner or later collide head-on with Afrikaner nationalism and that this would create a vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa. From this it proceeded to conclude, wrongly, that a concept of nationhood based on Graeco-Romano-Hebraic attitudes to the person as propounded by Karl Marx would fill the void.

The conclusion ignored the problems which Christianity had created for itself in the African community when it prescribed destiny for the Black people. Its rejection of the Sudic attitude to the person had split the Christian church and produced the Separatist Movement.

The nation born in Bloemfontein on January 8, 1912, had given itself an identity based, first, on the Sudic attitude to the person and, second, on the recognition of the simultaneous legitimacy of different cultural self-definitions and economic or political experiences. The destiny of this nation was to build "a new and unique civilization" in order to fill the vacuum.

The Separatist Movement and the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood were massive rejections of any type of prescribed destiny. Moscow and its surrogates made a wrong reading of the Sudic mind when they thought they could impose their brand of prescribed destiny. The African's answer to the error was to split the ANC and form the PAC.

The pattern of rejecting the prescribed destiny is too important a feature of African behaviour after conquest to be ignored. This pattern, however, is merely a vehicle, an operational aspect of a fundamental rejection—the rejection of the Caucasian attitude to the person and the destiny it prescribes for the African.

Wherever the African's rejection of the alien philosophy—alien because it produced a morality which has one meaning in the relations between White and White and an altogether different one in dealings between Black and White—took place, it created an ideological void which the African filled with a synthesis of Sudic and Caucasian outlooks.

Communism, like Christianity, rejects the African's right to develop this synthesis. As Potekhin puts it, there is no need for the synthesis when "scientific socialism" has been developed and tested to answer the African's problems.

The weakness in this approach is that communism was developed and tested in conditions which differ in important essentials from those which

exist in Africa. It is a product of Graeco-Romano-Hebraic and not Sudic civilisation. Marxism has yet to take note of this difference.

The problem we are dealing with here goes beyond class or race conflict; it is a collision between the psychology of creating "a new and unique civilization" and the psychology of prescribing destiny for the African. Marxism, capitalism, Christianity and apartheid are all habituated to prescribing destiny. The Freedom Charter expressed this habituation.

In the view of the Sudic African, the common commitment is rooted in what the Caucasian attitude to the person regards as conflict between the inadequacy of the known and the infinity of reality. What is known has limitations; the latter give the human race the character of a species born in weakness. Infinite reality is limitless; its boundlessness defines the person's weakness.

The Sudic Ideal rejects the theory of inherent weakness and regards the distance between what is known and the infinity of reality as a challenge. Perpetual evolution is the answer to this challenge. The destiny of the person is forever to march into the future. To do this, he must define himself in terms which enable him to respond to the challenge of his nature.

After the split on the Freedom Charter the leaders of the anti-apartheid homelands met in Umtata where they filled the vacuum created in African thinking by the split in the ANC, with the ideal of re-unifying the Africans in the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

Their silence on the Freedom Charter arose from the fact that this document reduced the Africans to the status of a people who accepted the prescribed destiny.

On one plane, the Umtata commitment to the ideal of re-unifying those whom apartheid divided was a rejection of the prescribed destiny. On the other, it was a movement of the Sudic mind to its Ideal of Nationhood; it was the assertion of Sudic leadership initiatives to fill the vacuum created by the Freedom Charter.

This gives perspective to developments in the African community inside South Africa at the moment. This perspective is one of the vehicles by which some of the tragedies now being enacted in Rhodesia could be avoided.

A little more light on this perspective will help. In the developments listed above we see the translation into experience of the psychology of creating "a new and unique civilization." This psychology is the product of the synthesis, of the *common controlling idea* as tested by conquest and challenged by proletarianisation.

The synthesis is an eclectic inspiration; it has had to make graftings from the West and the East. In spite of this, it remains a uniquely African creation; it remains the product of the African experience in the rural reserves and the urban locations. Above all, it is a determinant of African policy.

In the conditions created by apartheid the White man has no way of dealing with the African as an equal and, therefore, of understanding the psychology under discussion. He created for himself a prison of the mind when he committed himself to segregation. The price he is paying today is that he and the African are moving in opposite directions.

One result of this is that virtually every book written by Whites in South Africa or in the West or in the Soviet Bloc on the "race" question tends to say the same thing in different words. All focus on the operational aspects of apartheid because the authors have not done their homework on the fundamentals of conflict. Largely as a result, the international community concentrates on the operational aspects of White rule and, by doing this, allows itself to run in endless circles while the crisis drifts relentlessly towards predictable disaster.

Paying too much attention to how apartheid functions is an integral part of the "race" problem. This does not mean that the African must build his own prison of the mind and shut himself inside it. On the contrary, the eclectic nature of the synthesis and the Sudic evaluation of the person demand that he must open up to the major components of his environment—to Africa, the West, the Soviet Bloc and the rest of the world. He must inform himself on the Afrikaner's *survival problem*, develop a relevant philosophy for acquiring and controlling the technology of the West and have a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Bloc on the basic materialism of Sudic teachings on the consubstantiality of all things. He must, in short, have a continuing intercivilisational dialogue on the systematisation of the methods by which to present the Sudic Ideal's positive and universally valid attitude to the person. Finally, he must realise that if he must talk to the West and the Marxist World, he must also develop a way for talking to the Afrikaner monolith. The logic of the Sudic attitude to the person demands that he should do this even when the other side is arming itself against him. He must talk, among other things, to make his war aims known.

This logic does not say he must talk and move events to a political solution only; it says he must use political weapons where these place him in a strong position and not hesitate to use military arguments where these stand better chances of producing desired results. This logic combines with both the element of variability in the Afrikaner's hostility to race equality and the imperatives of monolithical survival to suggest that emphasis on the fundamentals of conflict might be the only shortcut to an African-Afrikaner consensus on final goals in a quarrel complicated by monolithical rivalries.

We have digressed from the sweep of apartheid's offensives against African Nationalism in order to set the spotlight on dimensions of the vacuum which deserve more attention than they receive. We must now return to our main theme. We stopped before discussing the fate of the militant wing of African Nationalism. This section was wiped out. But

African Nationalism's bicipitous mind promptly filled the vacuum thus formed with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's National Cultural Liberation Movement. By the middle of 1978, this Movement had 150,000 paid-up members in no less than 956 branches. In any language, this was power.

This called for a fundamental recasting of attitudes to the dispositions of power inside South Africa. Ben Turok, a former member of the White Congress of Democrats and a leading theoretician of the South African Left in exile, weighed the results of communist strategy from the late 1940s and came to conclusions some of which are listed below. Turok's testimony is important because he spent nearly all his adult life, if not all of it, in South Africa building Marxist power and because he was on the inside of things in the Marxist movement. In 1974 he analysed the performance of the communist movement since the 1940s and published his thoughts in Canada under the title: *Strategic Problems in South Africa's Liberation Struggle: A Critical Analysis*.⁸ His conclusions included:

At the turn of the '60s Black Africa was rapidly gaining independence from direct colonial rule but their freedom was won without violence.

—p. 43

This statement was, at first reading, not a correct representation of the historical position. On November 17, 1952, Superintendent K.R.T. Goodale, an acting superintendent of the Kenya Criminal Investigation Department, Special Branch, had "applied for warrants to arrest Jomo Kenyatta and five others on charges of membership and management of Mau Mau."⁹ The Mau Mau had been a nationalistic revolt; it had used violence to prepare ground for the independence of Kenya and had succeeded in its objective.

But then the communist movement did not recognise the legitimacy of nationalist struggles. In spite of this, one hesitates to think that Turok might not have been aware of what had happened in Kenya, particularly because, like the war the Ethiopians fought against Mussolini, Mau Mau was given muffled cheers by the Black South African Nationalists; muffled because open declarations of solidarity would have given the South African police cause for action when the Africans were busy with preparations for the resistance movement.

In South Africa, it is a crime even to cheer the victories of African struggles for freedom. A group of young people met in Durban to congratulate Frelimo publicly for having won freedom for Mozambique. Some of their leaders are in jail today.

Turok continues:

It can be seen that the sweep of sabotage was considerable. It was used in town and country and by all the liberation movements. Yet it failed to ignite the prairie fire as many had hoped.

—p. 45

Having talked of fascism for a decade and more, the movements were nevertheless caught by surprise when the police behaved like fascists. Under torture, many victims found to their regret that they knew too much and that the police knew what they knew.

—p. 45

Looked at as a single phase of the struggle it must be said that the sabotage campaign was abortive.

—p. 45

Perhaps the over-sophisticated methods used in sabotage were themselves the consequence of the political outlook of the movement.

—p. 46

The last paragraph above gets to the heart of the communist dilemma. The prescription of destiny demanded that “over-sophisticated methods” should be used in a community which had no knowledge of these methods and which had not been prepared for their use.

Toward the end of the 1950s, underground cells had to face the choice between sophisticated and unsophisticated methods. Sophisticated methods were largely irrelevant. A militant asked how one could burn vast sugarcane fields along the coast without getting caught. He went to an American, because I did not know how to do this. He took a matchbox, lit a cigarette, shoved the unlit end of the cigarette between the phosphorised heads of the matchsticks and the inner box and placed the whole on the cement floor. After ten to fifteen minutes the whole exploded into a burst of flame. The ten to fifteen minutes would give the arsonist enough time to escape.

Militants would take a late night train to the north or south coast with about a dozen match-boxes and cigarettes and would light the latter and throw them into the sugarcane fields at convenient intervals. To the best of my knowledge, not one was ever caught. But sugarcane fields were set on fire in the north and south coasts of Natal.

The point I am stressing here is that the White man’s policy of segregation was so thorough in keeping vital information from the Africans—we were not allowed access to public libraries—that they did not know how to burn a sugarcane field; they had to go to a White man even for this.

In the situation which Turok is discussing, the communists had all the opportunity to develop arson and sabotage techniques to teach to the Black community. They did not because they always feared to arm African Nationalism lest it captured power on its own steam and gave to freedom its own meaning. Moscow did not want this to happen; it did not happen where White policy set out to manipulate the African’s struggle through a relay of surrogates.

Turok proceeds:

In retrospect, it seems that if sabotage had not been able to establish itself as a continuing form of struggle because the method was too advanced and the organisation inadequate, then Operation Mayibuye (the Sabotage Campaign) was an even more dubious proposition. In a short time it led to the decimation of the movement. . . . once the main leadership was arrested at Rivonia in 1963, the Plan collapsed.

—pp. 48, 49

Many leaders and hundreds of the best cadres had been sent out of the country for training, and this seriously weakened the organisation at home. Those who remained were either jailed or immobilised. A serious miscalculation was the effectiveness of torture in extracting information leading to the uncovering of a sector of activists. As a result of arrests and the disclosures during prolonged interrogation, the underground was wiped out, and even the heroic effort of top cadres like Wilton Mkwayi, who returned after training abroad, were insufficient to renew the struggle. There is an important lesson here. There can be no move towards the attack until a line of defense and retreat has been prepared.

—p. 49

Certainly in the South African case, the problem of returning trained guerrillas from abroad and then keeping the action going is a formidable one. How Operation Mayibuye meant to overcome this is not known, but the fact that for some ten years a significant number of guerrillas have not been able to return is an indication that the proposal was unrealistic from the start.

—p. 50

The answer lies in the development of a correct political line to which the mass of the people can respond readily and in the elaboration of a strategy and tactics to match. Progress in this area has been rather slow in coming over the past decade.

—p. 51

The most recent pronouncements of the external movement, however, indicate that the emphasis is once again moving away from immediate armed struggle and there is greater stress on rebuilding political structures at home. The urgent need seems to be for political organizers who can return home and take root among the masses rather in the way this was done in the early days by Cabral in Guinea.

—p. 53

The complexity of the structure of the African people, together with the particular forms that oppression and exploitation take on in South

Africa, makes an outright socialist program unrealistic at this stage. No section of the movement has urged this in the past and while some groups in exile like PAC and the Communist Party have periodically turned to Marxist phraseology, all have agreed that the primary goal at present is the achievement of national liberation. . . .

—p. 56

Given the favourable circumstances there is good reason to predict that a Black liberation struggle will produce a progressive government.... But no matter how auspicious may be the future of socialism, the national aspect of the liberation struggle remains primary, with the African people its determining component. If African demands are to be in the forefront for political reasons, this is no less important strategically.

—p. 57

In the Bantustan areas the potential of African power is obvious. While the official leaders spar with government over the degree of autonomy they have, real resistance will grow among the mass of impoverished Africans which will either force the official leaders into greater militancy or bring them under popular attack.

—p. 57

We have come a long way from the years when the communists dragged in mud the names of African leaders; when Malkenson could stand up in a Nationalist conference and declare open war on African Nationalism in the name of communism; when the communists could produce the Freedom Charter to tell the Africans what sort of a nation they should be; when vicious attacks were made on Chief Gatsha Buthelezi for building a political base in the conditions demanded by the peculiar situation of the Africans. Now some theoreticians of the Marxist movement — which is a larger entity than the South African Communist Party — can acknowledge publicly that the “potential of African power is obvious” in the Bantustan areas. It was precisely this obviousness which forced men like Buthelezi and others committed to the eventual formation of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa to “collaborate” in operating the segregated homelands institutions.

It might be premature to speak of a dialogue between the Soviet Union and African Nationalism in South Africa on a solution which will produce the desired results in the peculiar situation of the Africans in this country. Turok’s critique serves the useful purpose of defining areas where the leaders of African Nationalism inside South Africa and the Soviet Union might explore the possibilities of a consensus on a political settlement. Clarity on the internal dispositions of Black and White power suggest that the chances of moving faster to majority rule are greater if all involved think in terms of a political settlement rather than of a military solution.

For what is at stake in South Africa is, as Turok rightly points out, power — who holds it and to what purposes he uses it. If the Soviet Union continues its war against African Nationalism and encourages attacks on the functionalist leaders, it would create conditions that would guarantee the expulsion of the Whites from South Africa. Apartheid has already given the Africans a very good reason for the expulsion of the Whites.

No African can stop the Whites if they are determined to create conditions that guarantee their expulsion. The wisest of them are already leaving the country in droves. The Brisbane correspondent of the Johannesburg *Star* (international edition, July 22, 1978) made this report on emigrants to Australia:

White South Africans and Rhodesians are arriving in Australia for permanent settlement at the rate of 4,000 a year. Most of them are said to have changed countries because of racial tension.

For three hundred years and more, the Whites have made systematic efforts to impose their will on the African people. Reverend Z. R. Mahabane always warned that the day would come when the Africans would draw the line and say: “Thus far, Whiteman, and no farther!” That day came on June 16, 1978, when the students took a stand from which no guns would move them for nearly two years. Their stand established the relativity of White power, just as the defeats Turok describes with so much authority show that there are limitations to communist power in fixing final goals for the Africans.

The problem in the conflict between Black and White centres on conflicting attitudes to the person. Until it is seen in this light, before the Soviet Union and the West realise that accommodation with the African is possible only on the basis of reconciled attitudes to the person, the Africans will remain committed to the Evolving Revolt, which rises stronger from each defeat. Because it concerns itself with the person first, where the West and the Soviet Union concern themselves with material possessions first and the person afterwards, the African philosophy will in the end crush Western and Soviet materialism.

That it has the potential to do this has been demonstrated by the development of the Evolving Revolt in the sixty-six years since 1912 and by the policy of isolating the Whites which the new nation launched when it sent a delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.

If the Soviet Union continues to disorganise the African monolith’s march to its freely chosen goal, it will create conditions which will make it impossible for the Soviet Caucasians to set foot in South Africa, just as apartheid’s blunders almost guarantee the expulsion of the White South Africans.

The expulsion of the latter is no problem. As the Kenyan experience shows, when the dust settles down after the overthrow of apartheid,

droves of Whites from other countries will flock to South Africa with their skills and capital. They will be welcome because they will have entered South Africa on terms laid down by the African people.

COMMON ERRORS

From what has been written above, it will be seen that both apartheid and the Soviet Union seek to prescribe destiny for the Africans; both adopt rigidly ideological positions; both have declared war on the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood and the Collective Will and, in the final analysis, both move events toward the establishment of minority rule.

It would be a misreading of the nature of the forces which determine apartheid's racial policy and the goals of Soviet foreign policy to say that race explains the identical attitudes to the Bloemfontein Ideal and the Collective Will. The root and fount of the similarity of the positions taken by Pretoria and Moscow is the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic attitude to the person.

This attitude ignores what the Africans regard as the fundamentals of the conflict — the minds at war, the depth of the commitment to united nationhood and federalism to accommodate different cultural self-definitions, and the Collective Will — and attaches maximum importance to residential segregation, the pass laws, the differential wage, influx control, etc., which, while they are real evils, are only vehicles in a collision which involves important fundamentals.

Both refuse to face the problems posed by conflicting attitudes to the person in a racially mixed society; both prescribe destiny. Pretoria offers the Africans vassalage and toy independence, toy flags, toy parliaments and toy governments in unviable mini-states.

Moscow prescribes destiny by defining the quarrel between Black and White as a class struggle when each monolith is a hermetically sealed system which has within itself all its classes, when the Afrikaner worker is the bitterest foe of the African worker. Moscow also lays down the law by financing and manipulating Black Communist Nominalists to undermine the Bloemfontein Ideal, boost the Freedom Charter, shatter the Collective Will and raise the spectre of Black racism.

Black racism certainly does exist in South Africa, where it is as evil a phenomenon as it has been everywhere. But the way to combat it is not to split the African people; it is not to prescribe destiny for them; it is to let them "do their thing" and give them support on the basis that they remain free to develop their own solutions to the "race" quarrel.

While there are striking similarities in the involvement of the apartheid regime and Moscow in the African's struggle, there also are fundamental differences. Apartheid and Soviet policy serve the ends of conflicting power-structures. Pretoria offers political bread crumbs in the rural areas

which are not as easy to control as the urban locations where every person is under constant police vigilance. The South African version of indirect rule in the rural areas was originally designed to enable co-operative chiefs to keep their people in tow.

In the South African setting, however, there had to be heavy bribes for the chiefs to remain loyal as a group. And even then, co-operation was more forth-coming from illiterate chiefs. But the complex laws imposed by apartheid could not be understood or administered by illiterate chiefs. The White power-structure established an exclusive school for the sons of chiefs where policy taught them how best to serve the ends of White policy.

But, in the South African setting again, to educate a person is to make him a potential revolutionary. The educated chief became a political Nominalist and evolved from this toward becoming an African Nationalist. This does not happen to every chief, as the case of Chief Charles Hlengwa of Southern Natal shows. At the same time it develops a nationalistic mood which the interested reader need go no farther than the minutes of the Zulu "Legislative" Assembly to detect.

That some of the homelands administrations have become political bases for African Nationalism could very well result in South Africa's revolution being led, at least initially, from the rural areas. The White liberal establishment in the West, as in South Africa, has not as yet faced the implications of this prospect. Free Africa, too, has not faced it.

Moscow had its eye on the extensive proletarianisation going on in the urban locations. Here was ready-made material for the Soviet type of revolution. Every text book defined the location people as a working class. True, they were not as advanced as their opposites in Europe. But they were workers. The books said conflict was the destiny of the workers and bourgeoisie in the location.

This approach, however, was irrelevant in the location for two reasons: Strictly speaking the African community does not have a bourgeois or capitalist class in the European sense. While individuals here and there might have enough money to live above the bulk of their people, as a rule they do not own land; they cannot, as a rule again, buy stock in White companies and, generally, cannot own land in the locations, to say nothing of the White areas.

What money does for these people is to enable them to live a little more comfortably in the locations, where the pass laws and race humiliation apply to the millionaire and grave-digger with equal force. Both are punished for being Africans; the logic of the punishment forces them to see in the monolith their only guarantee of freedom.

To preach class conflict in this setting is to create chaos inside the monolith; it is to create the conditions which apartheid establishes through its policy of Ethnic Grouping.

Soviet policy concentrates on the urban areas where the surrogates operate in the main—yes, under extremely difficult conditions—in the

locations in the expectation that the revolution will come from the urban areas. The Black urban worker is most certainly in a stronger position than his prototype in Rhodesia; South Africa is incomparably more highly industrialised than its neighbour across the Limpopo. This gives the urban locations a real potential to paralyse the South African economy with a general strike.

But this potential can be translated into political realities not by emphasising class conflict, but by reinforcing the Collective Will in the locations. In the view of the vast majority of urban and rural Africans race discrimination is the first evil that must be crushed.

The African population will have its mind on the race issue as long as there is race discrimination in South Africa. In this setting, the majority of the Africans will think in terms of a war of minds and not a war of classes.

The fundamental message which the African people are sending to the White world is that Caucasian civilisation rejects them by dispossessing them (as apartheid does), by exploiting them (as Western investors do), and by prescribing destiny for them and stabbing them in the back in their struggle for freedom (as the surrogates of the Soviet Union are doing).

The next chapter describes how the Africans see their struggle; it shows the difference between the African perspective and the White perspective and sheds light on why apartheid and Marxist initiatives generally evoke negative responses from the mass of the Black people in the urban and rural areas. The point which has to be faced in South Africa is that misreading the African experience, as the Afrikaner monolith clearly does, and prescribing destiny, as the Soviet Union has been trying to do since 1921, distort the African personality and create catastrophic disharmonies in our society on one plane and, on the other, in the relations between the Black and White races in the world.

The racial policies based on misreading the African experience led to the Soweto Rebellion and the establishment of the relativity of Afrikaner power. Prescribing destiny for the African by ignoring his attitude to the person and to the Collective Will reduce communist campaigns against apartheid to abortive adventures as Turok said and as events proved.

The problem which has to be faced here is that solutions which, in Caucasian views, are guaranteed to produce desired results in White environments more often than not turn out to be simplistic tangentialities in the conditions created by White domination in South Africa.

Take the clamours for armed struggle. A fairly highly placed American in the CIA told me that there was no answer to the bullet, when the war in South Vietnam made it clear that the disciplined will of a people cannot be crushed even by the most sophisticated military equipment. It was not Soviet or Chinese fire-power which brought about the humiliation of American arms in Southeast Asia; it was the disciplined will of the barefooted Vietnamese.

Whether or not armed struggle comes to South Africa, it will not be the decisive factor in the quarrel between Black and White; what will decide the course events finally take will be the Collective Will of the African peoples which they brought into being on January 8, 1912.

Political refugees who continue to see developments in South Africa from perspectives valid in the 1960s talk freely of armed struggle. They can afford to say this, protected as they are by foreign flags. Lest I be misunderstood, most of them fled the country precisely because they felt that the time had come to call for an armed struggle. To the extent that this is the case, they are quite right to call for armed struggle. But they are quite wrong when they claim a monopoly on virtue or political wisdom; when they sit comfortably under the protection foreign flags afford them and start attacking those leaders on the homefront who continue the struggle under conditions of unprecedented adversity.

Those who feel they want to talk about the armed struggle from safe positions provided by foreign powers are free to do this. But they should realise that if they want to have the masses of the people on the frontline, they should consider present realities in South Africa; they should realise that people who negotiate in the turn the crisis has taken are neither cowards nor traitors; that realism is awareness of the odds a people face.

The agminative logic of the Sudic attitude to the person demands that human groups should define themselves in terms dictated by or valid in their environment. If this environment leads some to armed struggle and others to negotiation, we should not paralyse the struggle by fighting each other over tactics; we should regard the people committed to different tactics as complements which together constitute the African's one Bicipient Mind and his one Collective Will. The Bicipient Mind and the Collective Will lead to one goal: freedom.

This unifying approach is based on the nature of the Evolving Revolt which demonstrates that negotiation in the conditions created by White domination can be a revolutionary weapon. When the government in Pretoria banned Inkatha's magazine, *Inkatha*, the NCLM defied the government's order and continued to publish it. In taking this stand, the NCLM created a situation of dual authority conflict which forced Pretoria to retreat. This happened because Buthelezi and the NCLM had negotiated a situation which enabled them to use legal institutions to commit illegalities like defying government bans. The extension of the area of situations of dual authority conflict leads eventually to a negotiated solution if people are disciplined on the basis of an ideal which evokes identical and co-ordinable responses in them.

The Sudic attitude to the person assumes relevance at this point. The ordinary African in the urban and rural areas does not understand the complex ideological influences which apartheid, the pass laws, influx control and the differential wage translate into action. For him, the race quarrel is a straightforward clash between Black and White; between the

African personality and the Caucasian personality.

If you tell the African in simple Zulu, Xhosa or Sotho that *abelungu bedelela ubuntu bethu* (the Whites have contempt for our personhood or humanity) he will understand clearly what race oppression is all about. The secret of Buthelezi's rise to political eminence lies in the fact that he interprets the struggle, not in incomprehensible alien terms, but in terms which have vital meaning in the day-to-day experience of the African.

The government's policy of forcing Africans to *develop along their own lines* gave Buthelezi and his NCLM their opportunity to consolidate their power and attack apartheid from legal positions, to use conflict rationalisation (*ukuqhatha*) to create and not to solve problems for the conqueror.

The point to note in the reference to *ukuqhatha* is that Buthelezi and the NCLM define the struggle in Suidic terms, analyse it in these terms and describe its goals in these terms. Apartheid's laws say they must develop along their own lines. If these lines clash with apartheid's intentions, the misreadings under discussion are to blame.

Most informed Africans realise that apartheid is merely the tip of an ideological iceberg; that in the final reckoning apartheid translates into action a global Caucasian attitude to every person of African descent. This person is presumed to be the inferior of his opposite on the White side simply because he or she is the child of particular parents. This calls for a co-ordinated answer from the Suidic World as a whole.

The humiliation of this world by slavery, colonialism, racism, apartheid and other forms of punishment for the African charges all peoples of Suidic descent everywhere with the responsibility of purging the dominant civilisation in Africa, Europe, the Suidic World and the Western hemisphere of the defects in it which distort the human personality and create catastrophic disharmonies in society; it charges all Suidic peoples with the duty to give contemporary Caucasian civilisation a mature attitude to the person, that is, an evaluation of the person which will discipline the individual and society and enable both to realise that the person is adequate for the tasks of discovering more satisfying dimensions of being human, of realising the promise of being a person, and of attaining the glory of being a self-evolving and self-defining value.

The "universal dimension" to whose discovery the All-Africa Church Conference has dedicated itself will always be a futile search and a costly waste of thought, energy, time and resources if it ignores the fact that the fundamental weakness in Christianity is its pessimistic and devaluative view of the person. This is the challenge which African Christianity must face honestly if it wants to influence events constructively in the changing dispositions of power on the continent.

For, it must always be remembered that communities which have been subjected to continuing abuse and humiliation by given racial or cultural groups eventually cultivate a revolutionary interest in the ideals which

determine thought, motivate policies and influence behaviour and action among their oppressors.

This interest led the Jews to the position where they became an exclusivistic community which regarded itself as preceptors to the human race. They succeeded in creating a world culture which was committed to values which enabled them—as Max I. Dimont points out in his books, *The Indestructible Jew* and *Jews, God and History*—to "teach" mankind through Jesus Christ and Karl Marx.

The Suidic members of the human race have been punished harshly for being children of their particular parents. The punishment has awakened in them the realisation that the first prerequisite for them to establish a satisfying position in the community of peoples is to create a moral order in the world in which it will never again be a crime for an African or a person of African descent to be the child of his or her particular parents.

In this world order, it will never again be a crime for a White woman to be the particular child of her parents.

The task of Suidic scholars and universities in this setting is not to be carbon copies of White universities; it is to address themselves to the vital problems of the Suidic World, to identify the philosophy by which Suidic Africa gives meaning to reality and life, and by which it seeks to lead the human race along safer routes to a better future by giving the person a feeling of adequacy and by creating harmony in his personality. The harmony and adequacy will, as the ancient Egyptian experience indicates, enable the family of Man to "build for eternity."

The values which give meaning to the above attitude to the person are readily available for interpretation (in Southern Africa) in, among other things, the interpretations of the *Law* which are drilled into the mind of the boy and girl on reaching puberty, and in each family's *izithakazelo*, the patronymic legend in which each such family defines itself.

These values are crucial for the resolution of conflict in the war of minds inside South Africa and, one might add, on the international plane. After forty years of frontline involvement in the fight against apartheid, I still find that most White people in South Africa, the United States and Western Europe do not have the faintest idea of what is going on in the communities of Southern Africa in general and, in particular, of the Black South Africans.

Where the main issue being decided in the war of minds is whether prescribing destiny for the African or recognition of the simultaneous legitimacy of different cultural self-definitions will determine the future of all the peoples who have made Southern Africa their home; armed struggle and negotiating are not incompatibles in a community like ours, on which divisive pressures are exerted from every section in the White community.

The exertion calls for an informed dialogue of civilisations—between the Suidic world on one hand and, on the other, the West and the Soviet

Bloc—on the reconciliation of conflicting perspectives and on finding a *via media* that will stop the drift toward World War III and toward the reduction of South Africa to ashes.

The most important factor to consider in moving events to a political solution is the Bicpitous Mind which will be discussed in the next chapter.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Shuter and Shooter, Picktermaritzburg, 1903.
2. Verbatim Report, First Kwa Zulu Legislative Assembly, 3-17 May, 1974; Vol. 4, Pp 133-34.
3. Ibid., Pp 136, 141.
4. George Padmore: *Pan Africanism or Communism*; Doubleday and Co., New York, 1972, Pp 268-69.
5. H.J. and R.E. Simons: *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950*; Penguin Books, Maryland, 1969, Pp 134-135.
6. *Chronicles Of Black Protest*; ed., Bradford Chambers; The New American Library, New York, 1969; P 225.
7. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1972, Pp 214, 215, 226-227.
8. *Strategic Problems in South Africa's Liberation Struggle: A Critical Analysis*; LSM Press; Richmond, B.C., Canada, 1974, Pp 43-57. (missing pages excepted).
9. Montagu Slater: *The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1955, P 29.

IV. African Political Attitudes: An Inside View

A BLACK COLLECTIVE RESPONSE EMERGES

In his perceptive analysis of the crisis in South Africa, Ben Turok comes to conclusions which shed valuable light on present clamours for armed struggle in South Africa. He shows that the Marxists do not have a political power-base in the African community worth talking about and that sabotage campaigns and guerrilla infiltrations went haywire.

To the African who is involved directly in his people's struggle the reason for the failures to which Turok refers lies in policies based on the will to prescribe destiny. These concentrate on the operational aspects of apartheid and ignore the fundamentals of conflict when these fundamentals motivate thought and action and fix priorities in the African community; when they prescribe final goals and evoke identical and co-ordinable responses to similar provocations.

To define the quarrel between Black and White in terms of class conflict is to use a yardstick which has limited relevance in South Africa's war of minds. What we need to understand in Southern Africa are the attitudes to the person which give rise to mutually exclusive ideals of nationhood.

In the present chapter we trace African responses to White translations of the Caucasian evaluation of the person into actions. The intention is to discover the relationship between these responses and Black World reactions to conquest for the purpose of exploring the possibilities for a Black World strategy against race humiliation. The crisis in South Africa is of moment to the world and has taken a turn which calls for a fundamental recasting of attitudes. In the Soweto Rebellion the Africans showed that White power in general and Afrikaner power in particular is now relative. The armed might of South Africa could neither force the students to accept Afrikaans as an additional medium of instruction nor suppress the rebellion which went on for about eighteen months. One consequence of establishing the relativity of White power is that Whites now emigrate from South Africa and Rhodesia at the rate of about 4,000 a year.

What this means is that a substantial number of Whites have come to the conclusion that apartheid is no longer able to protect White domination or guarantee White security.

The political consciousness of the African people is such that the prospects of a general strike are today not as remote as they were five years ago.

The virtually complete isolation of South Africa on the international plane has paved the way for the co-ordination of internal and external campaigns against apartheid.

If these factors combine to make it possible for the African to see the light at the end of the tunnel, they also argue the case for a second look at the strategies adopted against White domination; they argue the case for a strategy that will hit the apartheid regime where it is weakest. The first precondition for such a strategy is that it must be developed by the Africans on the front line. The second is that people in foreign lands who want to give assistance should have a clear idea of what is going on in the mind of the African community.

The five moods of African Nationalism listed above give an idea of what is going on in the mind of the victims of apartheid.

The aspects of each mood to which attention will be given are: the circumstances in which each developed; each mood's definition of the "race" problem; the solution it proposed; the dilemmas it faced; the strategy it adopted and its achievements.

Enchorialism set out to defend the independence and land of the African people; to secure their right to determine their destiny and to protect their freedom. Defeated on the battlefield, they did the only honourable thing open to them: they refused to accept defeat. Bhambada kaMancinza Zondi rebelled when the British in Natal imposed the poll tax in 1905-06. The Zulu lost about 4,000 men in that clash. They laid down their arms—to fight on another day, as the freedom songs of the time tell us. One summons the past to inspire the present:

Mathambo alele eNcome, vukani!
Arise, O ye bones
Which lie buried on Blood River's banks!

The one I heard people sing often when I grew up in Northern Natal ran:

Impi kaBhambada sayibamba,
Kwashisa phansi,
Kwabanda phezulu!
Siyeza mlungu!
Siyeza mlungu!
Mhla safika,
Kuyocish' ilanga!

In Bhambada's army we fought.
The clash of arms heated the earth
And chilled the heavens!
Beware, White man!
We are coming!
We are coming!
The day we arrive,
(We shall raise so much dust)
The sun shall not be seen!

History was against the enchorialists; they fought on ground where the enemy was strongest, and lost. Bhambada was defeated and paid with his life for challenging the armed might of the British. He set a precedent for the children who faced the White man's guns in Soweto: he showed that no matter how well armed the Whites were, their power was relative. The British withdrew the poll tax against which Bhambada had protested. It was re-introduced by Hertzog's Afrikaner government, in 1925.

The enchorialists were neither Christians nor educated; they fought to defend the Older Order.

Like Bhambada, the Nominalists were born and grew up in the shadow of defeat. The logic of defeat required that they should co-operate with the White man; that they should surrender themselves to his God and accept deculturation. They launched a great crusade to convert their "heathen" brothers, built schools of all sorts and established newspapers for their people. John Langalakhe Dube established Ohlange College; the Reverend E.A. Mahamba-Sithole built a settlement for Black orphans in Natal while the Reverend Abraham Z. Twala built a similar refuge near Elliotdale in the Transkei.

In 1892, Dube issued a call to Christendom:

I appeal to all Christians who may chance to read these pages, to aid in some way in this great work. "Truly the harvest is great, but the reapers are few." Millions of those for whom Christ died, are sitting in the darkness of sin and superstition, and almost crushed beneath the iron heel of heathen oppression. They are longing for something to satisfy the hunger of their famishing souls, but fail to find satisfaction in idols. No one points them to the only living and true God. . . .

Every true Christian must sympathize with the cause of missions, and with the conversion of the heathen. . . .

Oh! how I long for that day, when the darkness shall have passed away, because the "son of Righteousness has risen with healing in His hand." This shall be the dawning of a brighter day for the people of Africa. Christianity will usher in a new civilization, and the "Dark Continent" will be transformed into a land of commerce and Christian instruction. Then shall Africa take her place as a nation among nations; then shall her sons and daughters sing aloud: "Let us arise and shine, for our light has come. The glory of the Lord has risen upon us."

Vol. I, Doc. 19

My grandmother had grown up toward the end of the Zulu empire. She had enlisted in the army and belonged to the Ingugce regiment. Her way of expressing the trauma into which the Zulus were thrown by the defeat was to say that one could smell gunpowder on every mountain and in every valley in the land of the Zulu. For her, the world had come to an

end when Cetshwayo's Ulundi capital went up in flames on January 4—5, 1879. Grandmother, like many people of her generation near White settlements, became a Christian. Those whose world had been destroyed believed that Jesus Christ the Saviour would restore to them that which they had lost. They identified themselves with the White man on his terms. That landed them in two dilemmas. They sooner or later discovered that the Zulu Definition of the Person was diametrically opposed to the Christian. They did not doubt in their minds that the Zulu assessment was incomparably more highly developed than the individualism of Christianity; that it worked for the continuous enlargement of the personality and that it recognised the person and his neighbour as mutually fulfilling complements.

At the same time, Christianity was a proselytising religion which had behind it the military, economic and cultural power of the conqueror. The demands of survival required that people should embrace it.

In addition, Christianity's teaching on the brotherhood of men was an extremely attractive doctrine to a conquered people. If they embraced Christ, they concluded, they could be friendly neighbours with the Whites.

They were first shocked and then wounded very deeply when they found that the Christian missionaries who preached the brotherhood of men did not practice their teaching in their dealings with the Black Christians; that the White Christians rejected them and that those White Christians dispossessed them of their lands, denied them their human rights and made laws which made it a crime for a person to be an African.

The Africans had hoped that Christianity would be a bridge between Black and White and were horrified when they discovered that it was a prison of the mind in which the mind of the Black man was manipulated to serve White interests.

In spite of these humiliations, the Nominalists clung to Jesus Christ and were loud in proclaiming their dependence on the White missionaries. In 1903, the executive committee of the South African Native Congress issued a statement in which, among other things, it said:

The black races are too conscious of their dependence upon the White missionaries, and of their obligations toward the British race, and the benefits to be derived by their presence in the general control and guidance of the civil and religious affairs of the country to harbour foolish notions of political ascendancy. . . .

Just as we believe that the Unity of the Natives for the purpose of attempting to overturn the established authority of the white man is the "chimera" of ill-informed minds, and an idea which is belied by traditional tribal disunity, so also do we believe that the conception of uniting the white races in a league against the Native as a class is bound to failure.

—Vol. I, Document 7

The Nominalists had an irrepressible passion for prostrating themselves before British authorities. Their style comes out in the following quotation from a petition the Ockraal Location people sent to Queen Victoria in 1887:

The Humble Petition of the Native Inhabitants of the Location of Ockraal in the District of Queenstown Colony of the Cape of Good Hope
To

Her Most Excellent Majesty Victoria by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen Defender of the Faith Empress of India—

We your Majesty's most loyal and dutiful subjects the Fingos of the Location of Ockraal desire humbly to approach your most gracious Majesty. We consider it the highest honour to be under your Majesty's benign sway and the subjects of a Government distinguished for justice mercy and all temporal and spiritual privileges. . . .

—Vol. I, Document 4

As fate would have it, it was the Whites (before whom they prostrated themselves) who slowly strangled and finally destroyed the leadership of the Nominalists in the African community.

In 1919 Medialism had brought the ICU into being. This omnibus type of workers' organisation set out to mobilise the collective power of Black workers to improve working conditions.

Clements Kadalie was convinced that a dialogue not backed by organised power would be a waste of time. The Whites swore by Christ on Sunday and, for the rest of the week, worshipped effective power. He organised the workers into the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in Cape Town in 1919 and used the African's labour as a political weapon.

The emergence of the ICU, after agreement on the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, was the most important step in the evolution of the new nation. The Bloemfontein Unity Conference had brought into being the African National Congress (ANC) which was intended to act as custodian of the 1912 Ideal of Nationhood and had committed itself to aggressiveness at the level of strategy and conciliation when it came to tactics. Kadalie, who had originally come from Malawi, saw little or no point in a Black-White dialogue in which the Black side did not have organised power.

Smuts, the new prime minister after Botha's death in 1918, read correctly the implications for White domination of Kadalie's approach. His cabinet piloted through parliament the Native Affairs Act of 1920 which set out to drive a wedge between the moderate nation-builders who had gone to Bloemfontein in 1912 and the ICU militants.

The act established the so-called Native Conferences in which "respon-

end when Cetshwayo's Ulundi capital went up in flames on January 4—5, 1879. Grandmother, like many people of her generation near White settlements, became a Christian. Those whose world had been destroyed believed that Jesus Christ the Saviour would restore to them that which they had lost. They identified themselves with the White man on his terms. That landed them in two dilemmas. They sooner or later discovered that the Zulu Definition of the Person was diametrically opposed to the Christian. They did not doubt in their minds that the Zulu assessment was incomparably more highly developed than the individualism of Christianity; that it worked for the continuous enlargement of the personality and that it recognised the person and his neighbour as mutually fulfilling complements.

At the same time, Christianity was a proselytising religion which had behind it the military, economic and cultural power of the conqueror. The demands of survival required that people should embrace it.

In addition, Christianity's teaching on the brotherhood of men was an extremely attractive doctrine to a conquered people. If they embraced Christ, they concluded, they could be friendly neighbours with the Whites.

They were first shocked and then wounded very deeply when they found that the Christian missionaries who preached the brotherhood of men did not practice their teaching in their dealings with the Black Christians; that the White Christians rejected them and that those White Christians dispossessed them of their lands, denied them their human rights and made laws which made it a crime for a person to be an African.

The Africans had hoped that Christianity would be a bridge between Black and White and were horrified when they discovered that it was a prison of the mind in which the mind of the Black man was manipulated to serve White interests.

In spite of these humiliations, the Nominalists clung to Jesus Christ and were loud in proclaiming their dependence on the White missionaries. In 1903, the executive committee of the South African Native Congress issued a statement in which, among other things, it said:

The black races are too conscious of their dependence upon the White missionaries, and of their obligations toward the British race, and the benefits to be derived by their presence in the general control and guidance of the civil and religious affairs of the country to harbour foolish notions of political ascendancy. . . .

Just as we believe that the Unity of the Natives for the purpose of attempting to overturn the established authority of the white man is the "chimera" of ill-informed minds, and an idea which is belied by traditional tribal disunity, so also do we believe that the conception of uniting the white races in a league against the Native as a class is bound to failure.

—Vol. I, Document 7

The Nominalists had an irrepressible passion for prostrating themselves before British authorities. Their style comes out in the following quotation from a petition the Ockraal Location people sent to Queen Victoria in 1887:

The Humble Petition of the Native Inhabitants of the Location of Ockraal in the District of Queenstown Colony of the Cape of Good Hope
To

Her Most Excellent Majesty Victoria by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen Defender of the Faith Empress of India—

We your Majesty's most loyal and dutiful subjects the Fingos of the Location of Ockraal desire humbly to approach your most gracious Majesty. We consider it the highest honour to be under your Majesty's benign sway and the subjects of a Government distinguished for justice mercy and all temporal and spiritual privileges. . . .

—Vol. I, Document 4

As fate would have it, it was the Whites (before whom they prostrated themselves) who slowly strangled and finally destroyed the leadership of the Nominalists in the African community.

In 1919 Medialism had brought the ICU into being. This omnibus type of workers' organisation set out to mobilise the collective power of Black workers to improve working conditions.

Clements Kadalie was convinced that a dialogue not backed by organised power would be a waste of time. The Whites swore by Christ on Sunday and, for the rest of the week, worshipped effective power. He organised the workers into the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in Cape Town in 1919 and used the African's labour as a political weapon.

The emergence of the ICU, after agreement on the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, was the most important step in the evolution of the new nation. The Bloemfontein Unity Conference had brought into being the African National Congress (ANC) which was intended to act as custodian of the 1912 Ideal of Nationhood and had committed itself to aggressiveness at the level of strategy and conciliation when it came to tactics. Kadalie, who had originally come from Malawi, saw little or no point in a Black-White dialogue in which the Black side did not have organised power.

Smuts, the new prime minister after Botha's death in 1918, read correctly the implications for White domination of Kadalie's approach. His cabinet piloted through parliament the Native Affairs Act of 1920 which set out to drive a wedge between the moderate nation-builders who had gone to Bloemfontein in 1912 and the ICU militants.

The act established the so-called Native Conferences in which "respon-

The annual conference of the South African Federation of the Chambers of Industry was reported by the international edition of *The Star* (October 9, 1976) to have passed a resolution which included the following:

it was in South Africa's interest for the Government to phase out statutory job reservation in an orderly manner. The draft resolution which called for this to be done gradually was amended by the removal of the word "gradually".

In the same issue of *The Star*, the president of the National Development and Management Foundation was reported to have opened a "business outlook" conference. In his speech, the president made the following demands:⁴

- all races should be permitted to practise professionally or do business in any area
- all races should be permitted to live and own property and houses where their earning abilities allowed them to do so
- businesses should be allowed to decide for themselves whom they wished to employ and promote, irrespective of race or colour, and whether they wished to have separate facilities for the use of separate races
- hotels and restaurants themselves should decide whether they wished to place any reservations on the sex, dress and colour of their customers.

The leaders of Commerce, Industry, and Management were largely of one mind on the need to abandon apartheid in spite of the government's insistence on adhering to it. Sections of big business were, however, not satisfied with merely passing anti-apartheid resolutions. On the 3rd and the 4th of December, 1976, they convened a conference on The Political Aspects of Discrimination and on Dismantling Political Discrimination and invited Buthelezi to address them and convey African reactions to their stand against apartheid. The conference met in the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn, near Johannesburg.

The approach adopted by the sections of big business which invited Buthelezi differed from the government's in one important essential: Where the apartheid regime imposed "solutions" on the African, the businessmen prepared ground for solutions agreed upon by people on both sides of the colour line.

Buthelezi made these points in his speech:

What must be done is clear. We need radical political change. We need political power sharing. Above all, we need a combined effort to bring about radical change....

The United Party and the Progressive Reform Party (Prog-refs) are involved in opposition politics at the national, provincial and local levels....

There appears to me no reason why we cannot form a shadow multiracial body which would be a foretaste of things to come.

Inkatha, the Progressive-Reform Party and the United Party have to face political alternatives for the future.... When we severally consider the future, we need to bring our different thoughts into a pool of thinking....

The body I am thinking about could enable Inkatha members, Progressive-Reform and UP members to meet for interchanges of ideas so that the endorsement or modification of party blueprints can become informed.

I am talking about talking to each other — not about mergers.... If I am the hand that my people offer in friendship, I am also the hand they will withdraw in their anger.

The response of sections of the White press and leadership showed which way the wind had begun to blow in some White groups. In an editorial, *The Star* commented:

There are two different routes to change available to South Africa today.... The first involves bringing South Africa's peoples closer together, the principle behind Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's suggestion that Blacks and Whites need to form what he described as an opposition "shadow cabinet," committed to change and justice.

This is the peaceful road. It recognises that stability in South Africa ultimately rests in joint action by Black and White. It is no longer possible to impose White solutions on Blacks. The great irony is that Chief Buthelezi's proposition is virtually illegal — the government has legislated Black-White political entente out of existence. It is a policy we may all live bitterly to regret.⁵

This cautious endorsement of Buthelezi's proposals for a political alliance with the parties which oppose apartheid on the White side was only a climacteric in a development that has become a marked feature of South African politics. On March 14, 1976, Buthelezi had stood up in Soweto and had demanded the establishment of majority rule as an alternative to apartheid. He had been one of the guiding spirits behind the Umtata Conference's commitment to the ideal of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa. In less than two weeks after the Soweto demand, Senator W. Sutton, the Natal Whip of the conservative White United Party made these statements in an interview with *The Star*:⁶

I believe the Black-White issue is very far along the way to an accommodation. I am convinced that it will be a federal arrangement. . . . If

our society . . . is going to survive, then we must involve the Black man totally in the free enterprise society for his personal advantage and the advantage of the group as a whole. This will provide the strongest support of the Western system. . . . If we can involve the Black man in that kind of system, then the future is absolutely assured for us.

We started by saying that at Union, the Africans, Afrikaners and the English were transformed into self-centred monoliths and that each became a system with its own social and economic stratifications. Each monolith had its own ideal of nationhood and each occupied a position in national life which was determined by the reserves of power it controlled. While the Africans had the labour and the numbers, they were too poorly organised at the time to force the Whites to respect their wishes. The Afrikaners were the largest community on the White side. In a closed or racial caste-society, numerical preponderance gave them a political potential which enabled them to have absolute control of the government, the army and the police and to dominate parliament. The English were the dominant factor in the economy.

In this setting, the Afrikaners presided over a power structure based, in the main, on the labour of the African monolith and the technological-financial know-how of the English. Apartheid was adopted partly to preserve the cohesion of the closed society and partly to keep the Afrikaner in political control. It is in this sense that the majority of Afrikaners regard apartheid as a guarantee of their survival.

The fundamental weakness in the Afrikaner approach was that Afrikaner hegemony was based on reserves of power controlled or likely one day to be controlled by antagonistic monoliths. The Afrikaner assumed that race could be transformed into a permanent bond of unity on the White side and used apartheid to create an unbridgeable chasm between Black and White and, in that way, isolate the English and maximise their dependence on Afrikaner political goodwill.

African Nationalism developed a dialectic of displacement and organised the Evolving Revolt largely in response to the fundamental weakness on the Afrikaner side. The Youth League's confrontation strategy was designed, among other things, to exploit this weakness and create a vacuum in the Afrikaner's thinking on the future of South Africa and to subject apartheid to internal tests which would expose its futility and absurdity; to entangle it in the contradictions within contradictions which it produced to enable the Afrikaner to occupy a position in the government which the Africans and the English could make increasingly untenable.

In Natal, the dialectic began to take shape about a hundred years ago, when King Cetshwayo tried to form a Black military alliance which would regard Southern Africa as a collective security area. Some proceeded from where Cetshwayo had been stopped. Instead of relying on military power,

which the disarmed Africans could not have, Some transformed the race quarrel into a war of minds; into the clash between the "common fundamental sentiment" and what he called "the sins of civilization." This change placed the African in the position where he could fight on ground chosen by him, using weapons developed by him and move to his freely chosen goal at a pace set by him.

The dialectic was one of the weapons developed to deal with the peculiar and complicated relations which had emerged in South Africa's situation of conflicting monoliths. While it rejected race as a determinant of policy, the dialectic focused on power dispositions within each monolith. These, the Bloemfontein Unity Conference believed, changed in response to how economic and political forces were aligned. The task of the Africans in this setting was to develop techniques for creating the situations which could broaden the area of polarisation between the Afrikaner and English monoliths.

On the homefront, the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, the Umtata Conference's Geopolitical Alternative to apartheid, the Evolving Revolt, the dialectic and the Soweto Rebellion exposed the major points of weakness in Afrikaner thinking on nationhood while apartheid worked continuously for the extension of the area of conflict and instability. These weaknesses were given new dimension by the way apartheid closed Free African markets to goods of South African manufacture.

The apartheid regime found itself in the awkward position of having to ask foreign investors to sink their money in a country where the Differential Wage limited the internal market for goods produced by foreign investments mainly to the White fifth of the population while South Africa's racial policies shut Free African markets to most products made in the Republic.

Caught in the contradictions within contradictions and dilemmas into which apartheid had thrown South Africa, some supporters of the government on the homefront and some of its agents in Western Europe started a campaign of threats to seek investment capital in communist countries; to form a gold and uranium cartel with the Soviet Union, to control world marketing of the two minerals, and to have trading partners in the Eastern Bloc.

The seriousness of these threats emerged in some of the statements made in the South African parliament in 1977 by supporters of the apartheid regime. The international edition of the Johannesburg *Star* of April 16, 1977 reported that during his speech in the resumed debate on the budget, Dr. P. van B. Viljoen, the apartheid member for the Newcastle industrial city had:

warned the West that it could no longer take South Africa for granted, and if it came to a matter of survival the Republic would turn to communist and socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc to raise capital. . . .