

. . . it was time south Africa became less dependent on the West for raising capital. . . . South Africa could not go on ignoring the hostility of certain Western countries after all South Africa had done for the less fortunate people in South Africa. . . .

. . . the time had come to establish economic links with certain communist countries . . . so that South Africa could rid itself of its dependence on the West and the vulnerability that went with dependence.

Dr. Viljoen's threat is interesting, not because of its unrealism, but because it shows the depth and width of the vacuum which has developed in the Afrikaner's thinking on the future of South Africa. The November, 1973, Umtata Conference rejected the balkanisation of South Africa into racial states because, like the Bloemfontein Unity Conference, it regarded the racial, economic and other difficulties which face all the countries of Southern Africa as related, complementary and inseparable aspects of a larger Southern African Problem which called for a larger Southern African Solution.

The apartheid regime refuses to see the crisis in Southern Africa from this angle. The refusal landed South Africa in the Soweto Rebellion on the one hand and, on the other, drove big business to the Left of the government on a fundamental policy issue. In short, the refusal prepared ground for an alliance between the African majority which provides labour and big business which pays the taxes and manages the economy.

But the refusal must be seen for what it is. In the final analysis it is an oblique admission by the advocates of apartheid that they are incapable of giving constructive leadership in the crisis their racial policy has created. The wooing of communist countries is an important aspect of the admission when it is remembered that for many years now, the apartheid regime has claimed that it is a Western bulwark against communism.

Mention was made earlier of the element of impermanence in some of the positions the Afrikaner takes. The shifts in his positions and the way he makes these shifts is another point of weakness in the Afrikaner monolith which will influence his dealings with the opponents of apartheid, now that he stands alone in the world.

Most writers on apartheid believe that the Afrikaner will fight to the bitter end and will sooner choose the diaspora and the destruction of Afrikanerdom than share power with the African people. The government's own pronouncements and tactics make it clear that while Pretoria will do a little window-dressing here and a little juggling with "petty apartheid" there, the Afrikaner monolith is in no mood to share power with the majority. Inflexibility seems the state of mind the Afrikaner monolith is in.

This type of inflexibility is not unusual in situations of race or ethnic conflict. America's slave-owners eventually resorted to the arbitrament of arms to defend their right to own their fellowmen. The inflexibility turned out to be no guarantee of victory.

But, side by side with the inflexibility, is an inner logic in the Afrikaans experience which focuses attention on areas of congruence in African and Afrikaner thinking. The Afrikaner is often accused of leading South Africa with his head in the sand. More often than not, the accusations ignore the most important determinant of Afrikaner policies: The Afrikaner's *survival problem*.

At first viewing, the Afrikaner advocate of apartheid appears to be allergic to equality between Black and White. A closer view of his history or his *survival problem* shows that the allergy is a *variable which responds to the demands of survival*.

When the shortage of White women threatened the settlement which Jan van Riebeeck founded at the Cape on behalf of the Dutch East India Company in 1652, he encouraged his men to marry women of colour. The Dutch Reformed Church solemnised the marriages.

Eric Walker, the South African historian, tells us that:⁷

Van Riebeeck . . . recommended mixed marriages, and Jan Wouter had duly wedded Catherine, a freed woman, daughter of Antonie of Bengal. Then van Meerhof, the doughty explorer, married Eva, a Hottentot. He was the first European to marry a Hottentot and received promotion to the rank of surgeon as a wedding present from the Company.

In 1815 Frederick Bezuidenhout defied a British court's order to appear before it to answer charges levelled against him by his Khoikhoi servant. His refusal to do this started the Slachter's Nek Rebellion. His brother, acting on behalf of the rebels, made two unsuccessful appeals to Xhosa King Ngqika for an alliance against the British.

The search for allies was still very much in the mind of Afrikaner leaders after the end of World War I. In July, 1921, General J.B.M. Hertzog, who later became a South African prime minister, included the following in a letter he wrote to Clements Kadalie, the Black leader of the militant South African Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU):⁸

It is for us by our common endeavours to make this country, that we both love so much, great and good. In order to do that we must not only ourselves be good and great, but we must also see that there is established between the White and Black Afrikaner that faith in and sympathy with one another which is so essential for the prosperity of a nation. It is my sincere desire that that faith and sympathy shall exist and to that end I hope to exert all my influence.



Black Leaders at 1973 Umtata conference. (left to right: Matanzima of Transkei; Mangope of Bophuthatswana; Sebe of Ciskei; and at right Buthelezi of KwaZulu)



Capture of Cetshwayo (the Zulu King) by the British at Battle of Ulundi, August 31, 1879.

Dr. D. F. Malan has the reputation of being the father of modern apartheid. He led Afrikaner nationalism to power in 1948 on the slogan that *die witman moet baas bly* (the Whiteman must remain master). In 1921, he sent the following telegram of good wishes to an African political gathering in Queenstown:⁹

No race has shown greater love for South Africa than the Natives. Therein he, the Native, assuredly is a pattern of true patriotism and is entitled to take his place side by side with the (Afrikaner) Nationalists in the common political arena.

In the days when the White powers decided the destinies of the world, Pretoria accused the United Nations of interfering in the domestic affairs of a member-nation when the world organisation attacked apartheid. Apartheid, Pretoria argued, was something that had to be settled by South Africa only. The collapse of White power in large parts of the world and the emergence of African states forced the Afrikaner to change his tune. The imperatives of survival compelled him to recognise the goodwill of the Free Africans as one of his new guarantees of survival.

In the 1974 Security Council debate on the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, Pretoria's permanent representative in the world organisation addressed this open invitation to Free Africa in particular and all interested countries in general:¹⁰

... our participation in these proceedings, in so far as they relate to the internal affairs of South Africa . . . should be seen as flowing from our willingness to discuss our differences with other countries which are genuinely interested in a constructive solution to them and are prepared to talk with us openly and objectively. It is particularly to these countries that we address ourselves—and more especially to the states of Africa. For we are an African state. It is in Africa, where we live and where we belong, that our destiny lies. We have an important identity of interest with other states of Africa. It is with them that we must talk and we firmly believe that all of us in Africa can only gain by communication with one another. . . . My government stands ready to explore all avenues which may bring about an understanding amongst us.

The operative phrase is: *explore all avenues*. The realism is not a pose, as anybody familiar with the Afrikaner's history can affirm; it is a response to Afrikaner weaknesses in the context provided by given African actualities. The Afrikaner's political potential can remain the decisive determinant of policy only if African labour and English technology and financial know-how decide to remain docile and submit themselves to permanent Afrikaner hegemony.

The Africans transformed themselves into a monolith to challenge this hegemony and succeeded in isolating it on the international plane; in

smashing the satellite system in which policy sought to force the English monolith and the Coloured and Indian sub-monoliths to orbit around the Afrikaner monolith for the purpose of forcing these communities to gang up with the Afrikaner to help him solve his *survival problem*.

Sudic diplomacy created the situation where the Coloured and Asian sub-monoliths were confronted with crucial choices. The government offered a destiny imposed from above by the Whites. Buthelezi offered them a destiny in whose shaping they would have as full a say as the African majority. The two sub-monoliths chose to line up with the Africans.

This isolation of White domination on territory where it thought itself invincible exposed one more area of weakness in the Afrikaner monolith.

The shift in internal African, Coloured and Asian attitudes created a new set of relations between the non-White majority, which provides the labour that sustains South Africa's economy and the English monolith which is still the dominant factor in the economy. This relationship forced Big Business to move into opposition to the government's racial policy; into advocating the abolition of race discrimination.

The advocates of apartheid took away the African peoples' political rights in the effort to drive a wedge between the Africans and the English on the political plane and succeeded in creating a new area of congruity in African and English attitudes to race discrimination. This happened because the Afrikaner concerned himself so much with his *survival problem* he defined himself and the other South Africans in terms which extended the area of his isolation.

The Africans, Coloureds and to a lesser extent Asians concerned themselves as much with the fundamentals of conflict—of which the *survival problem* is one—as with the operational aspects of race oppression. As a result, they paid as much attention to the Evolving Revolt as to residential segregation, the Pass Laws, the Differential Wage, etc. They set as great store by the Collective Will of the Africans on one hand and, on the other, of the non-Whites as they did on the abolition of race discrimination. They might be said to have regarded the meaning freedom would have after the overthrow of White domination as being equally important with the means for winning it.

The Afrikaner strove to smash the Collective Will—which will be discussed in a later chapter—while the Africans struggled to crack the foundations of the united front of White monoliths. The Soweto Rebellion, the Coloureds' identification with the Africans in Cape Town during the Rebellion, and the formation of the South African Black Alliance showed that the non-Caucasian peoples were winning the war of minds; that the African definition of the race problem was filling the vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa which had been created by White definitions of the quarrel between Black and White.

Some Afrikaners took note of these defeats and realised that a united African-Coloured-Asian front would have the potential to push all the Whites into the sea, simply by withdrawing its labour, paralysing the economy and creating conditions in which it would be impossible for the Whites to live in the affluence to which they are accustomed.

The English, the Jews and other Caucasians can emigrate to other countries where they have kinsmen. The Afrikaner has no kinsmen in foreign lands; he belongs to South Africa. If he were thrown out of the Republic his community would be destroyed.

The Jews survived the diaspora because they contributed towards the hegemony of Graeco-Romano-Hebraic civilisation in the days when it had the power to impose the Caucasian will on, and prescribe destiny for, the Third World. The Afrikaner has nothing to give the White race. He can give it the minerals of South Africa or guarantee the Cape sea route or remain a gateway into Southern Africa for Western manufactures only with the co-operation of the African-Coloured-Asian majority.

Thoughtful Afrikaners have faced these weaknesses and a few of them have begun to think of alternatives to apartheid; of exploring avenues for discovering alternative guarantees of survival. These searches for alternatives to the status quo have not been given the attention they deserve by Free Africa, the OAU and the United Nations. America, Britain, France and West Germany are spending a lot of money on efforts to have a clear view of what is going on in South Africa. Free Africa, the OAU and the Frontline States continue to mouth slogans about armed struggle when not a single African country manufactures arms; when, in fact, they do not have an internal political base to lead the armed struggle inside the country; when they continue not to co-ordinate internal and external campaigns against apartheid.

But the Afrikaner's weaknesses must be seen against developments in the African community; against African reactions to conquest.

It will shed more light on this exciting period in our history if we let the leaders of the African after Sharpeville tell us in their own words how they saw the position of their people then.

After the Sharpeville shootings, as already said, the government banned the main political organisations in the Black community and hoped to fill the leadership vacuum thus created with co-operative chiefs. The African people's answer was to launch two offensives, one to block the election of co-operative chiefs in some homelands and the other to isolate the Whites in South Africa. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi spoke for the first group while the Black Consciousness Movement led the campaigns of isolation. In an interview with DRUM magazine (November, 1971), Buthelezi said:

We will always be part of a greater South Africa whether we like it or not. . . . What concerns me is that my people must get equal oppor-

tunities. How they get this I am not concerned about. If there will be some improvement for my people, even if it is not exactly the ideal in terms of my own principles and beliefs, I have no option but to take advantage. . . .

I always believe that the interests of my people whether they are Zulus, Venda, Sotho, Shangaan, etc., are so intertwined that it is impossible to separate them realistically. . . .

It seems that the role we are forced by circumstances to operate on (is) ethnic grouping, but I don't think people should be just paralysed from doing something for themselves merely because they are against ethnic grouping. . . . We should take advantage of this time to consolidate ourselves. As long as we know our goals it is not important to waste time bickering about whether ethnic grouping is bad or not. . . . We are aiming for nothing less than full human rights to which all our people are entitled. Nothing less can ever satisfy.

Buthelezi was feeling his way into the leadership suddenly thrust on him by events after the Sharpeville shootings. His mandate required him to rededicate the African people to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, transform the bantustan institution into a revolutionary weapon against apartheid, build effective political power bases, co-ordinate internal and external campaigns against apartheid and make majority rule the issue in the quarrel on apartheid. Building a political base was the most difficult of his tasks.

The government was determined to crush every political party which operated outside of the homelands administrations. It would do all in its power to remove all political opposition to apartheid. At the time, many people, particularly the younger Nationalists, rejected the idea of forming a political organisation that could function within the law; they argued that to create such an organisation was indistinguishable from collaboration in operating apartheid institutions.

Another group of Nationalists urged that realism should guide African thinking on the turn events were likely to take. The Evolving Revolt had developed beyond a struggle for the extension of the area of liberty for the African and had become a struggle for power. The government would exploit every weakness on the Black side to crush this challenge to White leadership.

This called for a strategy which would be aggressive wherever the African was strong and for realism where he was weak. The end in view was not to collaborate; it was to challenge apartheid on every plane, including its own ground. These Nationalists listed the following as Buthelezi's priorities in the conditions created by Sharpeville setbacks: the seizure of power in the Kwa Zulu homeland to prevent co-operative chiefs

from dominating the Zulu Territorial Authority; the rededication of all the African language-groups to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood which apartheid sought to destroy; the transformation of the Territorial Authority into a revolutionary weapon for use in the dual authority crisis to which apartheid was pushing Black and White; building a political power-base to fill the leadership vacuum which emerged after the bans on the ANC and the PAC in 1960; subjecting "self-government" to severe tests on every plane; creating a vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa; giving a unifying momentum to events in Southern Africa and confronting apartheid with a better and more satisfying alternative to the vassalage which Pretoria peddled as "independence" in unviable mini-states.

These priorities which are not in their order of importance, were designed to give the Africans a political weapon by which to fill the leadership vacuum created by the bans on the PAC and the ANC, to rally the people by showing that apartheid could be fought and defeated on its own territory, and to co-ordinate internal and external campaigns against apartheid for the purpose of moving all concerned to a political solution.

As one of those who actively influenced Buthelezi to stand for election, I can say what I had in mind. For ninety-one years after 1879, the Zulus had been a defeated, humiliated and fragmented people; for fifty-eight years after 1912, we had thrown our lot with the other African language-groups to form a new and stronger nation which would make it possible for all of us to free ourselves and all our people from continuing humiliation and restore to all our peoples that land and freedom which belonged to them.

Rising from defeat and humiliation was not a pleasant task; on the contrary, it was painful, unrewarding and often dangerous and ugly in the conditions which existed in South Africa. Nobody would lead us out of the situation of defeat and fragmentation; we and we alone had to do that. We would be misunderstood and called names; we would not be the first people to be so abused. To be thus called names was part of the challenge of freedom. We had to stand up and fight for that which belonged to us even when people burnt us on the stake or poured boiling oil over our bodies or murdered us in police cells.

Our commitment to freedom demanded that we should fight for that which belonged to us no matter what it cost us. Some of our people had been hanged in the bid to crush the commitment; some were serving life sentences on Robben Island while others were in exile. Our task as a people was to see to it that these temporary setbacks did not bring our struggle to a stop; we had to fight even inside the very institutions our oppressors set up to give permanence to our humiliation.

Buthelezi was not the type of man who would tremble at the thought, or be awed by the prospect, of fighting oppression on its own ground. He was the type of man who would lead the struggle from where it had been

temporarily stopped after Sharpeville. Our people wanted him to lead them; he never offered himself for election and did not canvass for support. All the committed spent their time, money and energy canvassing Zulu voters to support Buthelezi's election.

Those of us who urged him to stand knew that he was the type of man who had no time for political heroics. Like us, he saw no point in attacking apartheid in the absence of a well-organised political base. His first step in building this base was to go to the Umtata Conference in November, 1973, and argue the case for rededication to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood.

He followed his success in Umtata with the establishment of the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha), which evolved from a Zulu association into a national organisation.

From platforms provided him by the homelands institutions he rejected White definitions of the race problem and laid down the terms his people wanted. He rejected the concept of Black integration in a White-dominated society and stated in terms nobody could mistake that his and his people's goal was majority rule. Before long, Prime Minister Vorster himself was forced to address himself to and talk about majority rule—attacking it, of course.

Buthelezi gave a lot of thought and time to the re-ordering of monolithical alignments. His strategy on this plane succeeded when the United Party began to split. Buthelezi signed a pact with Harry Schwarz which accelerated the United Party's drift toward final collapse.

In September, 1971, he addressed Afrikaner students in Stellenbosch University. Stellenbosch was not only the most important centre of higher learning in the Afrikaner monolith; it was the main centre of cultural power in the Afrikaans community.

Buthelezi was still feeling his way. The Zulus had given him an awesome mandate. He had been asked to adhere strictly to the law of the Whites and at the same time to make the fullest possible use of the contradictions in this law to challenge apartheid in particular and White domination generally; he had to use the law to attack apartheid. The complete disarming of the African community made it impossible for these people to talk of an armed struggle at the time; they could think in terms of political weapons and political solutions; this mandate required that he move Black and White to a political solution.

NOMINALISM

Buthelezi's role in African politics must be seen against the background provided by the decline in the influence of Nominalism.

Led by Clements Kadalie, who was later joined by Allison Wessels George Champion, the ICU threatened, from 1919 onward, to paralyse the economy with a general strike in protest against race humiliation.

General Smuts rushed to parliament with the Native Affairs Act (1920) which established the Native Conferences, a get-together in which government officials sat and listened to the "grievances" of the African people, without being bound to do anything after hearing these grievances.

The Native Conferences were abolished by the Hertzog government in 1929. The Nominalists lost an instrument by which they had conducted a futile dialogue with the government.

The abolition of the Cape African Vote in 1935 was the fatal blow which sent political Nominalism to its grave. With political Nominalism there also died the tradition of collaboration with the Whites which the Nominalists had upheld.

The Nominalist was a man of two worlds. He had turned his back on enchorialism and believed that the traditionalists were heathens. To associate with them was to live in evil. If he lived among them, he disorganised their society; he despised them; they were a condemned people; they were the enemies of Christ just because a few White men said this.

The irony in his position was that that White Christian world to which he belonged spiritually rejected him because he was not White. That left him floating somewhere between enchorialism and Christianity.

The state of not belonging to the nomarchy and the community of Christians placed the Nominalist in a situation of spiritual isolation and insecurity. His Sudic evaluation of the person had been a reliable anchor for his personality; it had been developed and tested continuously for thousands of years. It made him feel secure and at home in the cosmic experience; it harmonised his personality and his society.

Because Christianity was given one meaning in the relations between White and White, and another between Black and White, he doubted if it could give him that security which his Buntu philosophy had guaranteed him. Thus, thrown out of his traditional world while he was unwanted in the White Christian, he remained an enchorialist in his dealings with his Black neighbours and in his assessment of himself while adopting the ritual of the Christians. It is in this sense that he became a Nominalist Christian.

Belonging to two worlds gave him a two-dimensional or Bicipitous Mind; he saw things simultaneously from the enchorial and Christian perspectives. The change was often painful for him; it introduced painful disharmonies in his personality and made him a misfit in his community. He was often thrown out of his traditional society because his loyalty to Christ and his two-dimensional mind disorganised and destabilised his society.

If he was not thrown out, there always was the danger that he might revert to enchorialism. The missionaries in time established mission stations where the converts could be segregated to live out "Christian" lives.

A new lifestyle developed in the mission stations, which were under the watchful eye of the White missionaries. This was a synthesis of Sudic and Christian value-systems. It combined with other forces and developed into what Seme was to call "a new and unique civilization."

The Zulu gave the name *isikholwa* (the culture of the believers) to the lifestyle of the mission stations.

A parallel change was afoot among the Africans in the urban locations. Proletarianisation did not commit the African to any moral values. At the same time it changed his lifestyle; it forced him to subject himself to disciplines designed to serve best the interests of the Whites. He created a synthesis of disciplines which blended what he had brought over from his nomarchy or culture with what he took over from the White side.

The Zulus called his culture *isidolobha*, the culture of the towns.

The schools established by the missionaries and the government initially drew no distinction between one language-group and another or between Christians and enchorialists; it blended the two cultures and produced a synthesis of syntheses; "the new and unique civilization."

Like its constituent cultures, the new civilisation produced the person with a mind which perceived simultaneously from two angles. Every educated African today is the product of the synthesis of syntheses. For anybody to say the African's heart is in the tribe clashes with known facts. The overwhelming majority of the Black people were born into the synthesis; they see life, reality, men and events from perspectives developed by the synthesis. In simple language, they do not even have the mind of the tribesman.

But let us return to the Nominalist. If the mission stations produced the Christian Nominalist, the urban area brought the Cultural Nominalist into being. This person had been torn away from his nomarchy by pressures he had no power to resist. He was thrown into the industrial maelstrom which the White man had set in motion in the towns. Like the convert, White society rejected him. He developed a culture which was shaped by proletarianisation.

The communists hoped that the African so conditioned was a ready customer for the type of ideological goods they peddled as a creed of economic salvation. This was where they misread the African experience. The "new and unique civilization" was a Sudic response to a fundamental challenge; the Collective Will forged in Bloemfontein in 1912 was a fundamental answer to this fundamental challenge.

The answer responded to the environment which the Africans were forced into by conquest. As long as conquest prescribed destiny for the Africans they would continue to see in the Collective Will a guarantee of survival, victory and a better life.

The creation of the synthesis of syntheses was an integral part of nation-building; it was by no means easy. It led to bitter and prolonged fights inside the African community. Seme had scathing things to say against the Nominalists when he was president of the ANC:

... the missionaries came into this country to look after the heathen and to love them, but by a strange contrast, every "native" who got educated by these missionaries immediately became disinterested in the heathen and, in fact, despised his heathen brothers. The result has been that the greatest bulk of our people who are still heathen have no educated men to lead them amongst their own tribes. The Chiefs and their uneducated people are despised and forsaken by their own educated tribesmen.

This attitude of despising your own people has created antipathies between the new leaders and the old population, which are most regrettable. There is no reason why the educated Africans should throw away their tribal connections and so much desire to be regarded as being detribalised natives. I fear that in this sense the so-called "detribalised natives" have not properly considered their positions and their duties towards their own people. . . .

—Vol. I, Document 481

This gives but one aspect of the many, complicated tasks of nation-building which the Whites did not know or understand. With the advantage of hindsight, we might be tempted to pass harsh judgment on the Nominalists. But in our difficult situation, out of which there have never been easy ways, it is wise to regard the performance of each generation as a response to the challenge as the times presented it. Seme's scathing remarks were provoked by the individualism of the converts who had been taught that they lived for themselves and Christ and not for themselves and their neighbours.

MEDIALISM

Unlike the Nominalist, the Medialist was outraged by a Christian morality which was given one meaning in the White and another in the African community. He blamed the divalency on the immaturity of the Whites. Since the Whites did not want him in their world as an equal, he did not want them to lead him; he walked out of the White-led church to establish his own denomination where he would give to Christian values the meaning that would be valid in the situation of his people.

He had moved out of the enchorial experience when he became a Christian; he set out to create his own world, between the enchorial and White worlds.

Vittorio Lanternari gives this description of the beginnings of religious Medialism in South Africa.¹²

The messianic cults rose and multiplied in South Africa long before they developed elsewhere on the African continent. The Ethiopian

Church founded in 1892 by Mangena M. Mokone set the first example of autonomy. . . . Several isolated attempts at secession from established mission churches, poorly organised and scarcely influential, had been made by such earlier leaders as Nehemiah Tile and Kgantlapane. Nehemiah Tile, who left the Methodist missions under attack for his interest in native Tembu nationalism, created a Tembu church as early as 1884. The objective of the Tembu was to oppose the religious control of the Europeans while also adapting the Christian message to native conditions; and since the Queen of England was the head of the Anglican Church, the Tembu maintained that their own Supreme Tribal Chief should be recognised as the bishop of their religious body.

Medialism was the third African response to conquest; it was a reaction of the ciliate human mind to a given challenge, just as Nominalism and Enchorialism were. The point to note is that these reactions were more or less contemporaneous. Tile worked among the Xhosa, about a thousand miles away from Mokone and Kgantlapane. Every major language group produced its crop of Enchorialists, Nominalists, Medialists and Monolithists.

The spontaneity and simultaneousness of these revolts in all the African communities show the dynamism of the Sudic mind in a situation of challenge; they show this mind responding to the challenge of its nature when confronted by the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic mind; they show how the Sudic Ideal performed when subjected to the harsh tests which came with conquest and the prescribed destiny. These responses were vindications of the person as an individualisation of *NU* or *NTU*.

Like the Enchorialist, the Medialist rejected the prescribed destiny on some planes and accepted it on others. He rejected the leadership of the White man in the church but accepted the Christian teaching, which he tried to interpret in his terms. That produced problems to which we shall soon come. Before we deal with these, let us see how political Medialism functioned.

On October 4, 1904, Reverends Samuel Jacobus Brander, a Northern Sotho-speaking African, and Joshua Mphothleng Mphela and Mr. Stephen Nguato gave evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission. The members of the Commission were all White. The answers Mr. Brander gave under cross-examination show the aspirations and dilemmas of the Medialists:

- 40,855. Do you think it would be a good thing for you Native races to run side by side with the white races in everything, just like the two rails of a railway line?—Not at present, but in the future I think so.
- 40,856. When?—In years to come; maybe after 50 years.

- 40,857. Do you not think it will be better for you to keep always separate like the two rails on a railway line, so that you will not come into conflict, and perhaps into ill-feeling with one another, and so get into trouble with each other in some way?—No; I think when we are educated we can be united and we can be one with the white all over, and I think we will have peace later on.
- 40,858. You think at the same time you should all have the same right to the franchise, the same political rights and the same social rights?—Yes, when our people are educated to such a standard.
- 40,859. And you would also like in time by constitutional methods, that is by lawful measures, to get yourselves into the control and management of public affairs in the Government as you have done in the church?—Yes, I should think so.
- 40,860. Mr. Thompson: And where would you end; would you like the races to amalgamate?—Yes.
- 40,861. Would you like the White man to marry the Native Woman?—I should think so.
- 40,862. And the Native man to marry the White woman?—I should think so.
- 40,863. Did you quite understand that question about getting ultimate political control into your hands; do you mean that you want to govern the White people of this country?—No, it is not so. While we live together. . . . While we live together it would not be for us to govern the white people, but to be with them. . . .

—Vol.I, Document 8c

Two additional dimensions of Medialist thinking emerge from Brander's testimony. He envisaged the emergence, some time in the future, when the Africans were better educated in the ways of the Whites, of an open society based on race equality.

The key sentence in the second dimension is: "While we live together." In the Sotho and Nguni languages of South Africa to "live together" means to live side by side on the basis of consensus. Lions, zebras and hyenas live together in Tanzania's Ngorongoro National Park without any consensus, whereas people live together in a village, city or country on the basis of consensus; on the basis of the same attitude to the person.

Brander realised that the basis for a viable Black-White consensus on living together was still a long way off; that the African would have to be "educated" first before he could develop a meaningful formula for co-existence. When the African was ready to participate in the formulation of the basis for co-existence, there would be no need for him to "govern the White people" just as there would be no need for the White people to govern the Africans. "To be with them" meant that Black and White belong together and those who belonged together did things together; they governed together. This was the gravamen of Brander's testimony.

At the time, Brander was not interested in race equality; he wanted the right to use "constitutional methods" and "lawful measures" to prepare his people for the time when they would get themselves "into the control and management of public affairs in the Government."

His quarrel with the British government was that it was denying him the right to develop institutions which would enable him to use "constitutional methods" and "lawful measures" to ensure respect for the wishes of his people. The denial frustrated life's purpose for the person brought up on the Sudic evaluation of the human being; it defined the fundamental cause of conflict between Black and White.

The Medialists were dedicated to the creation of a synthesis of value-systems which would give valid meaning to life in the conditions created by conquest. Isaiah Shembe started by creating a synthesis of enchorial and Christian values and proceeded from this to establish a community, at Ekuphakameni, a few kilometres below the hill on which Dube had established Ohlange College, about fifteen miles to the north-west of Durban.

Shembe regarded the Old Testament as his source of enlightenment. He composed psalms and hymns for his followers. At first, he addressed himself to the Zulu

Lalela Zulu
Lalela abantu bengiphethe,
Ngezwe lethu.

Siyazizwa izizwe zivungama
Zivungama ngawe
Njengezinyoni.

Sisho izinyoni sisho amahloko!

Acekezela insimu
Ka Dingana no Senzangakhona.

Ayiqedile mamoh!

Sizwa ngo Mnyayiza
Ka Ndabuko.

Listen, O Zulu!

Listen; here are people who pester me;
About our land they bother me.

We hear the nations conspiring;
Conspiring [against] you;
They make bird-like noises.

When we talk of birds, We talk of amahloko!
Which consume the harvest in the field;
The field of Dingana and Senzangakhona.

Lo! See how they have laid it to waste!

Mnyayiza tells us they have;
Mnyayiza the scion of Ndabuko.

Like Tile, Shembe's message was at first addressed to his language-group; he spoke to it in terms which emphasised the indivisibility of the Zulu soul. This soul was in harmony with itself and that harmony was a blend of bitter humiliation, continuing pain, faith in the person and confidence in final victory.

The names he mentions in the psalm stir the deepest passions in the Zulu consciousness; they call to mind the wounds inflicted on the Zulu personality in the past and the present. The evocation creates a synthesis of passions which gives the Zulu experience its peculiar symmetry.

It should always be remembered that the other language-groups were producing their prototypes of Shembe; their own responses to conquest. All these responses had their roots in the Sudic evaluation of the person.

In time, Shembe realised that the indivisible soul of the Zulu was, in fact, only a fragment of a whole: the indivisible soul of mankind. He addressed himself to the mankind that surrounded him in his country. In Psalm 120, he cried out:

Arise O South Africa
Set alight your firewood;
Let all nations gather around,
From your fire to derive warmth!

Arise O South Africa!
Ignite the wood for your fire;
The fire your God gave you.

No other support exists
For you, O Africa:
Jehova alone ———
He is your light.

I am adequate;
I live in hope.
Whether or not they like it,
The dawn of your day shall come.
When the sun rises then,
All nations shall bask in it.

The logic of Medialism demanded that the Medialist should at all times respond to an ever-evolving challenge. It required that Shembe and other Medialists discover a *universal dimension* which would make Christianity simultaneously valid in the lives of all human beings. Shembe and the religious Medialists of his time created a synthesis of Enchorial and Christian values and saw this as the *universal dimension* they were looking for because it defined the person in positive and optimistic terms and recognised the simultaneous legitimacy of his community's self-definition.

To people brought up on the Sudic view of the human being, the definition of the person as a creature created catastrophic disharmonies in the person, as already pointed out. First and foremost, it forced the person to apologise for being human, when he had been taught all his life that to be human meant striving perpetually to discover more satisfying dimensions of being a self-defining value.

The Christian mandate and the dogmas it prescribed frustrated life's purpose for this type of person: they distorted his personality and sent him back to what he regarded as the childhood days of the human race. His ancestors had outgrown these days. Down the ages, they had developed a most challenging attitude to the person and had evolved a complex but readily recognisable social system to ensure that the person realised the full promise of being human.

People like Shembe and other leaders of the time set out to develop a philosophy which would not create catastrophic disharmonies in the person and in society. The *universal dimension* they produced sought to discipline the person and society and to create social rhythms which would guarantee survival in the conditions created by defeat. Any truly scientific analysis of African society in the urban and rural areas which ignored these rhythms would defeat its own ends.

The Medialist's Bicipitous Mind opened out simultaneously to Black humanity and to the larger humanity outside of the Black experience. The response issued directly from Buntu's emphasis on the primacy of the person and Christian humanism as understood during the first half-century after conquest.

The Buntu assessment of the person taught that the individual extended himself into the family, the nome, the nation and humanity. Shembe's response to the challenge the concatenation called for was Hymn 180 which he composed in 1931:

Come, all you nations;
The fire has been lit in the hearth;
All nations warm themselves before it;
Come, you who are in need.

Come, you who are invited
Your heritage is ripe (for your taking).
Why do you moan,
When your heritage is in your hands?
It is enough;
Enjoy it.

Only to those who do not like it
Is the heritage denied.
Come, you who desire it.
For you the gates are open,
You who desire the heritage.

For you the heritage has been preserved;
It has been preserved
From before the heavens and this earth existed.

Medialism's concern with "all...nations" was translated into informative political action. In the South African setting, all nations included the Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites. The common factor among all these was that the person was a value regardless of who his parents were. The person was above race, colour and ethnicity. In addition, the various groups were bound together by the fact that South Africa was their home.

Political Medialism took form mainly in the Xhosa experience. A group of African intellectuals, led by Walter B. Rubusana, John Tengo Jabavu and others fought a long war of words against race discrimination. Like Shembe, these men took the position that the common humanity all races had should be the determinant of policies and not colour. In 1909 the Africans of the Cape Province joined hands with Coloured in-

tellectuals and decided to send a delegation to London. Apart from John Tengo Jabavu and other Africans, the delegation included Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman, a Cape Coloured leader and a White man, Mr. W. P. Schreiner. The plea of the delegates gets to the core of Medialism:

Your humble Petitioners respectfully submit that the only practical and efficient means whereby fair and just administration and legislation can be attained, peace, harmony and contentment secured, is by granting equal political rights to qualified men irrespective of race, colour or creed....

Your Petitioners apprehend that by the racial discrimination proposed in the aforesaid Bill as regards the qualification of members of the Union Parliament, the prejudice already existing in the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and Natal will be accentuated and increased; that the status of the Coloured people and natives will be lowered, and that an injustice will be done to those who are the majority.

—Vol. I, Document 17

Aided by the Communist Party of South Africa and the all-White Labour Party, Hertzog's Afrikaner nationalist party captured power in 1924 and became the dominant influence in South African politics. It pursued aggressively anti-African policies and whittled away some of the rights enjoyed by the Coloured community. That stimulated African and Coloured interest in a non-White united front against race oppression.

At the 1927 conference of non-White leaders, Mr. I. P. Joshua, of Kimberley, made this statement:

The Conference was called primarily to discuss and evolve methods of co-operation between non-Europeans.

—Vol. I, Document 44

At the Third Non-European Conference held in 1931, Dr. Abdurahman moved the following resolution:

That as the want of unity was the greatest stumbling block to the improvement of non-European conditions in the Union of South Africa, this Congress resolves:

(a) that the various non-European industrial and political organisations should unite and present demands for the improvement of non-European conditions in the Union on economic, social and political lines to Conferences of Employers and the Government....

—Vol. I, Document 46

In his address to the Conference, Dr. Abdurahman said that "unity was the first and primary essential to controlling power." He told the delegates, who represented the African, Coloured and Asian communities that the non-Europeans:

must first put their house in order before they could improve conditions. The time had arrived, in fact the rank and file were demanding that they should pool their brains and resources, unite the multifarious Non-European Organisations into one powerful body and direct and guide the enormous power that lay in the Non-European workers.

Vol. I, Document 46

The Hertzog government's decision to remove the Cape Africans from the Common Roll of Voters in the Cape Province brought into being the All-African Convention which, under the leadership of Professor Don Davidson Tengo Jabavu, the son of John Tengo, sought:

- (a) To act in unity in developing the political and economic power of the African people.
- (b) To serve as a medium of expression of the united voice of the African people on all matters affecting their welfare.
- (c) To formulate and give effect to a national programme for the advancement and protection of the interests of the African people.
- (d) To assist in rehabilitating dormant and moribund African organisations and bringing together unorganised Africans into societies, communities or bodies affiliated to the All African Convention.

Vol. II, Doc. 15

Like the ANC, the All-African Convention (AAC) was formed in Bloemfontein. D.D.T. Jabavu and Seme had together issued a call to the African to meet and agree on a joint reaction to the abolition of the Cape African's right to be on the Common Voters' Roll.

At this meeting, which was held in December, 1935, Dr. G.H. Gool, a Coloured delegate from Cape Town, urged the AAC to:

lay the foundations of a national liberation movement to fight against all the repressive laws of South Africa.

Vol. II, page 7

Moderate Medialism had brought the AAC into existence. Dr. Gool represented the radical Coloured intellectuals of the Cape who worked with radical Black intellectuals to transform the AAC into a militant

organisation. Tension was rising in the African community because of the Hertzog government's policies for the rehabilitation of the Poor Whites and the re-imposition of the poll tax in 1925. This tax had been the immediate cause of Bhambada's rebellion.

At the January, 1926, annual conference of the ANC, Clements Kadalie, a leader of radical Medialism in the trade union movement, had angrily denounced the Whites in a speech and had warned:

We are dealing with rascals — the Europeans are rascals.

Vol. I, Doc. 48d

Kadalie had spent his younger years in Cape Town where he was exposed to the radical African and Coloured influences which emanated from the city. The labelling of the Whites as "rascals" reflected the changing mood of Medialism; it complemented Dr. Gool's demand for a national resistance movement formed by all the non-White people.

This rising anger reached explosion point in 1943 when the Smuts government created the Coloured Affairs Department. In the view of the Coloured Community, this act extended the area of segregation for the Coloured people. The Coloureds, who had formed the Anti-CAD Movement to oppose the establishment of the Coloured Affairs Department joined the AAC, which was coming under the control of Black radicals.

Events were galloping to a climax. On December 17, 1943, AAC and Anti-CAD delegates met in conference and issued a *Draft Declaration Of Unity* and the well-known *Ten-Point Programme*. The conference elected a Continuation Committee and in doing this brought the Non-European Unity Movement into being.

One of the ingredients of the new African-Coloured united front was the rejection of the Whites. In a speech to the AAC conference on December 16, 1941, Mr. I.B. Tabata had attacked the performance of the African people's White representatives in parliament and had added:

I maintain that one has first to be in the skin of the oppressed and suffer as an African does, if he wants to represent him.

—Vol. II, Document 62

At first reading, this sounds like a negation of the non-racialism which had brought together the AAC and the Anti-CAD in the Non-European Unity Movement. In actual practice this was a translation into action of the radical Medialists' policy of non-collaboration. The inner logic of non-collaboration worked for the systematic isolation of the Whites on every conceivable scale.

In its final form, the Unity Resolution passed by the January, 1931, Non-European Conference had read:

That this third non-European Conference hereby approves of the urgent necessity of establishing a central body of the constituent

Associations of Bantu, Coloured and Indian Organisations of South Africa and resolves that the time is opportune to form such an Organisation....

Volume II, Document 46

The synthesis of experiences which the communion of African and Coloured radical minds produced was to a large extent a southern development. A related, though different experience was under way in the northern provinces of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal. We shall come to it in the next section of this chapter.

Medialism was the half-way house between the African and White worlds. Its political form moved the Africans, Coloureds and Asians to a non-White consensus on attitudes to the united front of White monoliths. While the Non-European Unity Movement stated in its Ten-Point Programme that it was not against Whites, the logic of the solidarity for which it stood moved events to the isolation of the Whites.

The Medialists argued that the Africans, Coloureds and Asians controlled the labour which sustained the White man's economy; that if these communities could pool their resources they could use strikes and boycotts to paralyse the economy and bring the White united front face to face with disaster.

The commitment to boycotts and non-collaboration was the essential step which would set people of all races on the non-White side moving toward the withdrawal of non-European labour.

Compromises became necessary in order to give viability to the non-European consensus on final goals and strategy. The AAC and the NEUM campaigned vigorously for organisational federalism, to enable each of the racial groups to maintain its identity in its organisations while pooling the resources and co-ordinating the activities of all when it came to action. Here, they were laying the foundations for one more form of weapon against White domination: African-Coloured-Asian Unity.

BLACK MONOLITHISM

In the main industrial cities of the Transvaal, Natal and the Orange Free State the Africans did not have as close contact with the Coloureds as in the Western Cape. Besides, race prejudice was stronger in the northern provinces, where the Africans did not have the vote. In the economy, the discrimination which existed was more benevolently disposed toward the Coloureds and the Asians, sometimes at the expense of the Africans. If this created the distance between the Africans on one hand and, on the other, the Coloureds and the Asians, it set the Africans moving toward the creation of a Black monolith as an answer to monolithism on the White side.

Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, about whom much was said on the evolution of the ideal of African unity in an earlier chapter, was the father of African Monolithism. The ideals he propounded were the main pillars of the philosophy he and his colleagues held out as the African people's creed of salvation.

Seme and his colleagues were based in Johannesburg, the political cauldron in which nearly all the main language-groups of Southern Africa were churned by segregatory laws into a new community. Since the philosophy of this community has already been dealt with, attention might be given to its strategy, the dilemmas it faced, the type of action it took and the results it produced.

Like all the moods of African Nationalism, Monolithism had two minds; it was aggressive where it was strong and conciliated when weak. Medialism had done this to a greater extent. The movement of the AAC from being a moderatist organisation to the laying of the foundations of militancy, which inspired the Coloureds to throw in their lot unreservedly with the Africans during the Soweto Rebellion, was a moment of glory for Medialism. But it took a whole generation to give viable focus to the revolt of the Africans, Coloureds and Asians as a group. It went through phases when it was conciliatory and moved step by step to militancy.

The Monolithists were not committed to racialism as their spokesmen were to repeat for more than half a century after 1912. They felt that the Whites attacked and punished them for being the children of their particular parents; that the punishment translated into action a given attitude to the person and that this attitude was antithetical to everything sacred in Suidic tradition.

The White attitude to the person did violence to the Black person in unique ways. This circumstance demanded that the Black man should react to the provocation in a unique way. Seme proposed the transformation of all the Black peoples of Southern Africa, many of whom were represented in the Witwatersrand, whose gold mines made this region the industrial hub of South Africa, into a co-operating economic and political community.

These communities came from different parts of the subcontinent and spoke different languages. All of them were committed to the Suidic evaluation of the person. Seme and his supporters argued that this commitment should be the bond of unity which would give character and form to the Black monolith.

Like the Medialists, the Monolithists regarded the African's labour as the most powerful weapon in Black hands. While they accepted the principle of co-operation across racial barriers if need arose, they did not feel as strongly about African-Coloured-Asian collaboration as the Medialists were to feel. They laid stress on African unity and argued that a strong and well-organised African community was the first prerequisite for an effective non-European united front.

Their priorities were: the building of the new nation; the development of the Evolving Revolt on the homefront, the systematic isolation of the united front of White monoliths on the international plane and the maximisation of Black power.

Building a nation under the conditions created by conquest was a complicated and trying task. Contradictions and conflicts arose within the new nation which called for complicated compromises and accommodations. The Nominalists and early Medialists were the most important leaders of the new nation during the first twenty-five years of its existence. Attacked by the White supremacists on one hand, the communists on another and living in constant fear of disruption of the nationhood they were developing, the founders of the new nation went to great extremes to avoid those conflicts with the Whites which could lead to the destruction of the Bloemfontein Unity Ideal. They dreaded violence and "extremism" as they did the plague and adored "constitutional methods."

The Bicipitous Mind was in action in all these developments. The aggressive side of this mind had brought the Africans to Bloemfontein in 1912, had enabled them to create the new nation and was responsible for the launching of the Evolving Revolt on the homefront and the campaign against White domination on the world plane.

The mood of conciliation found expression in the hostility to "extremism," futile dialogues with the government and the Dutch Reformed Church, and the failure of the AAC to launch a massive resistance movement against the abolition of the Cape Vote—although people like Dr. Gool and others had talked about a stand at the formation of the Convention.

Conflict with the Whites was passing through its second phase. There had first been the era of the wars which came to an end with Bhambada's rebellion in 1905—06 and the subsequent imposition of White rule. The years of disintegration had followed the collapse of Bhambada's rising. The Bloemfontein Unity Conference had seen the dawn of the age of fusion, which produced the Congress Youth League and the Non-European Unity Movement in 1943.

Anton Mziwakhe Lembede, Ashby Peter Mda and Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe were the principal spokesmen of the League. They made it clear that they were committed, not only to the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, but also to a united Africa. While Mda and Sobukwe sometimes expressed socialist sympathies, both were uncompromisingly opposed to communism. Lembede, Mda and Sobukwe wanted all with ears to hear to understand that they belonged neither to the West nor the East, but only to Africa.

The Youth League proclaimed its commitments with a vigour and determination which threatened to frustrate the ends of Soviet policy. The influence of the League over the ANC was so great, the League overthrew

the leadership of the Nominalists in Natal and from then onward, became the kingmaker in the ANC. Xuma was thrown out of the Presidency-General of the ANC by the League. In Natal, Mr. A.W.G. Champion was elected to the Natal presidency of the ANC and rejected, years later, by the League. Chief Albert John Lutuli was a Youth League protege.

The surrogates of Moscow took steps to curb the growing power of the League. An alliance of five organisations was formed, which included the ANC. It has already been said that this set-up gave the ANC, which represented the majority, the status of a minority in the alliance.

One of the tasks the Congress Alliance (as it was called) had was to issue a document redefining nationhood for all communities. The Freedom Charter was this document. It was designed to supersede the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood and commit the ANC to a nationhood which would serve best the ends of the Communist Party. Its acceptance by the ANC meant that the Soviet Union thought it was in sight of the mass organisation described by Eddie Roux in an earlier chapter.

This drift to the Left was reinforced by visits to Moscow and other Eastern European countries by members of the pro-Left leadership of the ANC. Walter Sisulu and Duma Nokwe were among those who visited Moscow during these years.

Opposition to the Charter was labelled *Black Racism* and was given the character of the unforgivable sin of South Africa's race politics. The Left spoke of South Africa as a "multi-racial" or "multi-national" country. Massabalala B. Yengwa, who was secretary of the Natal branch of the ANC for many years stated during the Treason Trial that he thought:

there will be a stage where I think the people of South Africa will realise that this inequality is wrong; they'll find a way, as a group—as a multi-racial nation—as a common nation they'll find a way of distributing this land.

—Vol. III, Document 53

In earlier years, Yengwa had been one of the founders of the League in Natal. When the communist offensive got into its stride, he shifted to the Left. In so far as I know, he never became a communist at any time. In his testimony under cross-examination during the Treason Trial again, he observed:

My lords, what I do know is that Russia for instance has always consistently supported the struggle of the people of this country; it has never failed at any time to support us; it has always expressed itself as supporting the struggle of the Colonial peoples. . . . And it was natural that as far as we were concerned Russia was committed to supporting our liberatory struggle in this particular country. But that did not in

any way mean that we supported the Russian. . . .

—Vol. III, Document 53

Yengwa's statements are important because he was Lutuli's principal adviser and right-hand man.

The drift to the Left combined with the acceptance of the Freedom Charter as a declaration of ANC policy to split the movement and brought into being the PAC.

This split is important; it resulted from a head-on collision between the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood, which Moscow rejected as *racist*, and the *multi-racialism* of the Freedom Charter. To an outsider, the quarrel might look complicated. In the South African setting, however, it was easy to understand. The African Nationalists rejected the prescription of destiny behind the imposition of the Charter on the Black people and argued that the Charter was an involved way of guaranteeing "national rights" (minority rights) over which Black and White were quarrelling. The African's struggle for freedom was a waste of time if its goal was to guarantee "national rights." What African Nationalism was prepared to guarantee were human rights, regardless of race, colour, ethnicity, sex or creed.

I was involved in this quarrel; I was against the Freedom Charter. Our side has never been given the hearing it was shown by subsequent events to deserve.

At the time I was not interested in the ideological aspects of Communism. What I objected to was the involvement of any foreign power in what I regarded as a Black man's struggle. I would have objected equally strenuously at the time if Britain or the United States had interfered in the way the Soviet Union was doing in our politics. At this time, my quarrel with the communists was over methods and not their ideology. I did not want us to be involved in Caucasian ideological quarrels because these had the effect of splitting us and of weakening us in our fight against the united front of White monoliths.

I regarded our struggle as a collision of minds which we would resolve by creating a mutually satisfying synthesis of values as African, Coloured, Asian and White South Africans. I did not want any of our people to impose their self-definitions on the other groups. But since the other groups thrived on our humiliation, we would have to develop enough power by ourselves to guarantee respect for our wishes. It was only when we were strong that the other communities would be prepared to recognise us as equals; when they would sit down with us and hammer out a formula for existence which all could accept with honour.

I saw the Evolving Revolt as a weapon in a war of minds. The balance of Black and White power was heavily against us. We were disarmed, desperately poor and largely illiterate. That meant that we had to work

very hard to build our power. I was prepared to take over power wherever the enemy yielded ground; to consolidate our position on this ground and to move from there to conquer new ground. Whatever victory we scored diminished the power of the enemy. I was prepared for the trials and disappointments all this entailed; that was what an Evolving Revolt involved.

Our position demanded that we should concentrate on power dispositions in our group and on the White side. My duty was to serve the ends of power-maximisation in order that we might one day speak as equals of the other groups. My concern with power dispositions and monolithical alignments made me a functionalist. I was prepared to work with Moses Kotane and Dan Tloome, who, I knew, were Communist Nominalists. Like the Christian Nominalists, the Communist Nominalists were converts whom the White community rejected as it rejected me. I wanted a united front of the rejected wherever this was possible. Thus, when Lembede demanded the expulsion of the communists from the ANC, I opposed him because that would upset our plans for the maximisation of Black power.

If men like Moses Kotane and Dan Tloome had been in charge of the Communist Party of South Africa; if Moscow had trusted the Africans and left them free to develop their synthesis of Sudic and Marxist values, I would have had no quarrel with the communists. But the Whites who controlled policy in the CPSA wanted no deviation to the right or the left; they were determined to prescribe destiny for us. As Malkenson had said at the 1930 annual conference of ANC, the communists would declare open war on African Nationalists if we did not line up behind the Soviet Union as Gumede had said we should.

The White Christians had divided us so badly the Black Roman Catholic priests did not associate with their Protestant brothers in Christ to discuss common problems when I grew up. The Whites were bringing their divisive ideologies into our struggle to weaken us further. In all this I saw only disaster for our side. Our problem was that wherever Whites came into our organisations, they prescribed destiny and split us. Soviet policies cracked the foundations of unity which we, in the League, had worked so hard to build.

The position might be put a little differently. The two dimensions of the African mind had developed two responses to challenges. These responses determined thought and action in the Black community.

Under the stimulus of race oppression the Southern Response, based mainly in Cape Town, shed its racial angularities and created an African-Coloured consensus on the overthrow of White domination. Under the same stimulus, the Northern Response, which developed in the Witwatersrand, abandoned narrowly ethnic loyalties and created an all-African consensus on crushing White domination.

Thinkers in the NEUM and the League looked forward to the emergence of a consensus based on the reconciliation of the determinative responses. At the December, 1958, conference of the AAC, Mr. W.M. Tsotsi described the Congress Youth League in these terms in his presidential address:

Those whose politics consist of stereotyped slogans and cliches will no doubt raise their eyebrows when I say it is our duty to guide and not to condemn categorically the emergent African Nationalism. We have to recognise that, in so far as it is genuinely anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, African nationalism is a progressive and political force. . . .

—Vol. III, Document 34

Years earlier, the AAC and the ANC had met in conferences to try to hammer out a formula for creating a synthesis of the determinative responses. At the 1948 joint gathering, A. P. Mda had sent signals to the leaders of the Southern Response indicating that the Youth League, the militant vehicle of the Northern Response, realised that there was merit in the Southern Response's insistence on non-collaboration. This is what he told the conference:

. . . there was much in what Convention said on Non-collaboration. There was also much weight in what Congress said. But we shall all be forced in time to accept Non-collaboration. The discussion should boil down to whether Congress was prepared to accept Boycott as long-term policy. In 1946 the African National Congress had resolved to boycott the N.R.C. and Advisory Boards. In 1947 there was a slight change in the attitude of Congress. They advocated the election of "Boycott candidates."

Mr. Mda . . . proposed the acceptance of the boycott weapon on principle.

—Vol. II, Document 69

When there was nobody around to prescribe destiny, the Africans tended to move gradually in the direction of a synthesis of determinative responses. At the 1949 joint conference of the AAC and the ANC, Mr. Moses Kotane, who typified a Communist Nominalist, argued that it was wrong for anybody to imagine that the ANC wanted to collaborate with the race oppressor:

Congress did not want to collaborate. The worker in production was operating the machinery of oppression, but he formed another instru-

ment whereby the same instrument could be overthrown through strikes and revolutions. Congress did not want to collaborate, but the people were not ready. We could not carry out "Non-collaboration." The AAC itself had not been able to carry out "Non-collaboration." In some cases non-collaboration might be possible, determined by the preparedness of the people at the particular time. Congress stood for Non-collaboration—when the people were ready. They went into the N.R.C. to abolish it from within. They could not accept an inflexible term.

—Vol.II, Document 69

Kotane's realism reflected the state of mind among those who were committed to the Northern Determinative Response. At the 1958 annual conference of the AAC, Tsotsi adopted a realistic attitude in his presidential address, to which reference has been made above:

To give the Ten-Point Programme a leftist interpretation, no matter how cock-eyed, is to bring the whole movement within the definition of statutory communism and to run the risk of it being declared an unlawful organisation within the meaning of the Suppression of Communism Act. It is difficult to resist the inference that this is a consummation which many of the revisionists would devoutly wish as offering an easy method of escape from the hazardous tasks which presently devolve on them as members of the liberatory movement.

Tsotsi spoke for those committed to the Southern Determinative Response. The realism in the two Responses issued from the logic of the Evolving Revolt; from the need to move the two minds of African Nationalism toward convergence and an alternative to apartheid which would be acceptable in the two wings of the Evolving Revolt.

Soviet policy dreaded this move toward convergence. Those communists with whom I was friendly told me that Kotane often warned the White surrogates of the Soviet Union that it would be disastrous for communists if they went too far to lay down the law for the African.

Apparently, the Marxists forgot about his warnings when he went into exile and conducted the struggle in ways which prescribed destiny for the Black people. Nobody gives a better view than Ben Turok of what happened thereafter.

The reader has noted by now that conquest forced the African people to make a fundamental re-assessment of themselves; that, as a result, their thinking evolves according to a clearly recognisable and self-defining pattern toward a clearly stated goal. This pattern is heroic or idealistic or militant on one plane and, on another, conciliatory, realistic or functionalist. In preceding chapters the reader has been given brief outlines of the ingredients which went into the emergence of each response.

In every African from South Africa, there is the Enchorialist, Nominalist, Medialist, Monolithist and Supermonolithist. The family into which he was born, the community in which he grew up and the rhythms which give uniqueness to his culture and harmony to his society are a synthesis of all these ingredients. The pattern is a total of all these elements.

As said above, every African is born into this pattern; he grows up, matures and fulfils himself in it and eventually dies in it. This pattern determines his habits of thinking; it creates harmonies and conflicts which hone his personality, give symmetry to his culture, balance his society, prescribe final goals and fix his priorities. In the Zulu language, this pattern is defined in the two principles of *ukuba ngumuntu* and *ukuma njalo*.

These principles have their equivalents in all the major African language-groups of South Africa; they give the African community of the Republic its peculiar perspective; they make it what it is; they give it its identity and this identity is neither Zulu, Xhosa nor Sotho; it is a synthesis consciously and deliberately built by all the language-groups; it is a self-guided process of moving from one form of existence to a more satisfying dimension of being human.

The reader has noted, also, that the logic of this pattern moves all the African people to a clearly stated goal; to the creation of "a new and unique civilization"; to a "civilization" in which nobody will ever again prescribe destiny for the African.

The Christian missionaries, like the communists, erred in one fundamental respect: they set out to force the African to define himself in terms which served White interests, at the expense of the Black people. The London Missionary Society would see no reason for the African to define himself in his own terms when Jesus Christ had already done this for him. The missionaries of Marxism, for whom Potekhin speaks, see no reason why Africans are "unwilling to accept the scientific theory of socialism, tested in practice, and instead engage in a search for some other kind of socialist society" when Karl Marx has prescribed destiny for them so clearly.

The Collective Will rejected these evaluations of the African and developed its own definitions. These new self-definitions bound the Africans into a new community both in Bloemfontein in 1912 and in the formation of the Congress Youth League and the Non-European Unity Movement in 1943. The communists did try to form a racially mixed organisation—the Non-European United Front. This Front, however, set out to prescribe destiny for the Africans and was manipulated by the Whites to serve the interests of the Soviet Union. This circumstance damaged the credibility of the Front.

Left-wing "interpreters" of the African experience write extensively in efforts to split and divide the African people as we move toward the moment of victory. During the first fifty years of the ANC, they fought its