

## XVIII. The Death-Wish

*Akumbethe wamela ilanga.*

*(The rainbow has pretty colours, but the sun shines forever.)*

The debate on the Passes For Women Bill is running into snags in the Senate. It encountered some rough weather in the House of Assembly, where the younger Afrikaner militants dominate. The opposition to it, toward the last stages of the second reading, slowed its movement through the Lower House. If this could happen in the Lower House, where Afrikanerdom's frontline fire-eaters are concentrated, worse might be expected in the Senate where the old stalwarts of the Dutch Reformed Church are a power to reckon with.

The Dutch Reformed Church is committed uncompromisingly to race segregation, but as the custodian of the damaged Afrikaner conscience and the guardian of its morality, the Church finds it difficult to support policies which violate morality in ways everybody can see. Not that the Church can come out with a public criticism of the government; that is unthinkable in Afrikanerdom's present mood. What some churchmen are doing, however, is discreetly to exert pressure on the older and religiously committed senators for the purpose of slowing down the debate.

This, however, is not the prime minister's only headache. The responsibilities of office have awakened some of his interest in international attitudes to his policies. If there is anything he does not want to happen, it is to drag on the debates until the world is awakened sufficiently to the evil of the Bill to make its passage an international issue. He does not think world opinion is so strong against CNP policies as to translate its objections into effective action against Pretoria. He has no doubt in his mind that there still are people in positions of power in Western Europe and the Americas who believe in the inherent superiority of the white man in the world and who will not rush to encourage campaigns to crush CNP rule.

One of these days, he might need military support from the white countries against the black hordes from the free African states; alliances with some of these countries might be Afrikanerdom's only guarantee of survival in Africa. He still rejects van Warmelo's policy of dismantling the republic of South Africa and reverting more or less to

the position before Union. Like Churchill, he is not in the mood to preside over the carving up of his own empire.

The prime minister knows that most people in the world find it difficult, almost impossible, to understand the Afrikaner's position. How do the Afrikaners hope to reverse the march of events or to stop the momentum of history? People ask how the Afrikaner can be in his senses when he gives the entire Black World a vested interest in his destruction. How can he survive if he is finally thrown out of Africa, when he has nothing to give? The Jews survived because they had something to give.

The Afrikaners are only a speck of humanity in the world; their language has significance only between Cape Town and the Limpopo; they are producing no great art and are committed to ideals of fulfilment which humiliate the African and degrade Afrikanerdom and disgrace white civilisation in the process. Yes, the Afrikaners have political control over the richest, largest and most powerful country in Africa. But in the final analysis this power is founded on African labour. What will the Afrikaner do when the African withdraws his labour? The questions go on and on and on. In the end the outsiders' minds are wearied by what they regard as the suicidal intransigence of the Afrikaners. Some of them conclude that the Afrikaners are driven by the terrible death-wish which carried the Nazis to catastrophe. The prime minister frowns and gets up from his desk. He glances at his dead predecessor's portrait.

Thus fortified, the prime minister feels consoled by the fact that the world also finds it difficult, almost impossible, to understand how, in view of the cruel humiliations the whites inflict on the Africans, men like Magagu Geja kaBulube can still be friends with any white person at all, let alone dream of a non-racial society. How can a normal human being, spat upon at birth, spat upon through life and spat upon even in death see fulfilment for himself in anything but killing the white people and driving them into the sea? Is it because the African is insensitive to humiliation that he does not murder the whites? So many white people have said that there is a real, if intangible, defect in the African's make-up; perhaps they are right, the outsiders say.

Questions are raised even in Free Africa. Educated black men, leaders, journalists and thinkers are disgusted with the inexplicably stupid patience of their brothers in South Africa. Why do they not rise against oppression; why do they not organise a Mau Mau movement, for example, to kill the whites, burn their factories and farms and homes? For goodness sake, why do they not do something about their humiliation instead of pinning their backsides to the ground? De Haas looks at his wife's silver-framed, tinted photo on his desk.

The prime minister is delighted when black people attack the "stupid" patience of the blacks in South Africa; they confirm some of

his pet theories. In arguments he starts by saying that the Afrikaners are a God-fearing people; that while they are a severely disciplined people, they treat the black man with the justice he understands. His acquiescence to white domination is proof. The Africans, he continues, are a child race; it is a crime against them to force them to see fulfilment for themselves in terms of white criteria. If they are segregated from the white men who put wrong ideas into their heads and are allowed to have as many wives as they desire and all the beer they need, these children of nature feel fulfilled. This is what contentment means to them.

In the best of worlds, the ideal would be to leave them alone and to let them enjoy the primitive simplicity of their life. But witchcraft is no answer to disease and disease knows no colour. To save them from their ignorance, the white man has to provide health services; he has to establish schools, where they can learn the habits of hygiene. To provide these is the burden of the white man; to save the African from ignorance is his mission in South Africa. But why should the white man pay for the services he gives, while the black male runs around with women and wastes his time drinking?

The Pass Laws are designed to control African movement in ways that will produce the best results for the bearers of civilisation on the one hand and their wards, on the other. Here he grunts. Segregation is designed to protect the blacks against the greed and avarice of irresponsible whites who introduce the evils of white civilisation into the black community to advance their own selfish ends and would not mind if the black race was wiped off the face of the earth.

The Americans virtually exterminated the Red Indians with their "kindness." The Afrikaner's way is not only a guarantee of African survival; it has enabled the black people to breed at such a rapid rate they to-day stand in the ratio of 4 to 1 to the white man. The outsiders see no reason why, in these conditions, four million Africans cannot sacrifice their lives to kill four million whites; there could still be twelve million Africans left who would still constitute a black nation which would be larger than the populations of some African countries. The questions go on and on. In the end men conclude that the Africans in South Africa have either been so crushed they have lost their feeling for freedom or become insensitive to oppression.

De Haas attaches the greatest importance to the mood reflected in the questions. If the international community is still asking questions, it is still trying to define the problem. His belief is that a problem understood is a problem solved. If the outside world is still struggling to understand, it is not yet ready to act against the humiliation of the black man.

But time, de Haas insists, is not on the side of the Afrikaner; history too is against him. The Afrikaner must consolidate his position now while the world still struggles to understand; he must act boldly

and swiftly now while Free Africa is still weak and while the black people in South Africa are still struggling with their own problems of unification. Time after time he makes it clear that speedy action, decisive action, motivated action are the Afrikaner's only guarantee of survival in Africa. The Passes For Women Bill is conceived in the will to act.

The prime minister is impatient with those among his followers who do not feel driven by the sense of urgency which gives him no reason to be complacent. He handles his cabinet in the true style of the Voortrekker patriarch; he is the elected leader of Afrikanerdom and, for the time being, the guardian of its destiny. He wants to be involved as directly as possible in the decisions of everyone of his ministers, to accelerate movement in establishing permanent guarantees of security.

The debate in the Lower House on the Passes For Women Bill is not making the progress he would like. The stumbling block is not the English-oriented Unionist South African Party, whose hypocritical fulminations he can afford to ignore; it is the low rumblings in sections of the powerful Dutch Reformed Church and in the influential universities. Some academics question the desirability of rejecting morality in formulating racial policy. The most powerful of these are, of course, in UBRA. They have won over to their side half a dozen theologians who use devastating arguments on the morality of the Bill before parliament. Pierre van der Spuy is a theological giant at Stellenbosch, a power to reckon with in the Dutch Reformed Church, and an ardent advocate of segregation, like his friend, Dominie de Villiers of the Groot Kerk. He recognises the Bill as an index of Afrikaner decadence; as the sort of law a people losing faith in the God of its fathers will resort to, in the mistaken belief that they are building for security. Nobody ever dreams that Dr. van der Spuy might split the CNP or walk out of it. The greater the eminence attained by an Afrikaner in his community, the more difficult it becomes for him to act independently. Unlike the English or the Jew, he has no choice of worlds. And if he splits the CNP he might be punished harshly; Afrikanerdom does not treat dissent with much tolerance.

*Dr. Sarel Badenhorst created a South African sensation when he wrote a book in Afrikaans to prove that segregation has no foundations in the scriptures.*

He lost his job as a professor of divinity, was defrocked as an ordained minister of the Dutch Reformed Church and was eventually hounded out of the church. His bank, the *Vereenigde Volksbank* (the United People's Bank), suddenly found faults with the mortgage on his house and he ended up a broken man, economically and socially. He could not cross over to the English or Jewish side; he did not want to. He died in oblivion and liked it that way. It requires a courage which is almost superhuman for an Afrikaner to stand up against the tribe and

few men in any race have that courage. If van der Spuy dares not split the CNP and therefore gives no press interviews, he can mobilise Afrikaner opinion in ways which could topple the leadership of de Haas. He has enough authority in the church and the universities to do this.

But this is not the prime minister's only headache. There are indications that the police are developing a political philosophy of their own. De Haas is convinced that Prinsloo's strategy in disarming the Valley Of A Thousand Hills and other Zulu reserves was dictated by weakness. The Afrikaner cannot afford to be caught or seen in any situation of weakness. Like all young societies, Afrikanerdom lacks self-confidence and is sensitive about its identity, security and everything which concerns the Afrikaner.

South Africa does not have television because this medium will show the Afrikaner naked before the Africans and expose the boils and chancres in wrong places. To conceal Afrikaner weaknesses and project the Afrikaner in the image of a hero and a conqueror is one of the guarantees of security which TV would smash. Prinsloo bungled things at this level. But then, Prinsloo is in a strong position; he enjoys the confidence of the minister in charge of the police while the minister is too valuable a member of the cabinet to be upset with demands for the transference of the Commissioner of Police to another department. De Haas once toyed with the idea of sending Prinsloo as South Africa's ambassador to Holland. The Minister of Justice would not hear a word about it. Well, he will think about it. Prinsloo is not to be trusted.

Problems for the prime minister do not come from his Afrikaners only. The Zulus have begun making ominous noises against the Bill. Both the police and the district commissioners in Natal had reported that the Zulus were not likely to be too deeply involved in campaigns against the Passes For Women Bill. Eager to please Prinsloo, the Natal police argued that the Zulus had not recovered from the shock they received when their guns were seized by the police. The white police in Natal, like the police everywhere in the land, relied on reports they received from the African police under them. Now, the press reports a rash of strikes in Natal. This is a bad sign.

The prime minister, like most Afrikaners, regards the Zulus as the curse God inflicted on South Africa. If there is one mistake which God ever made, it was to create the Zulus. Van Warmelo once called, he remembers, a conference of black leaders to discuss independence for the black reserves. The Zulus staged strikes which wrecked the conference; the black leaders said they did not want the "balkanised independence" offered by the prime minister.

So, if the Zulus withdraw their labour now, they can transform the Bill into an international issue; their example can produce strikes on the Witwatersrand. With a weak man at the top in the police force, it does not surprise the prime minister that the Zulus

have, as they say, begun walking barefooted against the Bill. The prime minister does not trust the Zulus even when they profess loyalty and he thinks those reports about Zulu non-involvement in demonstrations were fed by the Zulu police to their gullible English seniors; he dismisses the reports as part of the continuing treachery which the Zulus inherited from their ancestor, Dingane.

A miracle has taken place in the prime minister's health. The cardiac complaint which once worried him has cleared! His explanation for it is that God cured him so that he might lead Afrikanerdom through the dark valley into which it has been thrown by those powers which have abandoned the white supremacy philosophy. But his doctors quietly say that de Haas enjoys the exercise of authority and that this could explain the improvement in his health. For his part, the prime minister, always a demon for work, now works harder than he has ever done. To keep events under control he spends half of each week in Cape Town, piloting the Bill through parliament and half of it in Pretoria. He flies to the capital with his Minister of Justice, whom he has ordered to instruct the police to be on the look-out for strikes and strike-organisers.

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Race and politics aside, the Dutch Reformed Church has an interest all its own in measures which do violence to morality. A revolt by the black people in the white-led churches is developing which threatens to crack the foundations of christian dogma and theology in South Africa. The Dutch Reformed Church supported the government's policy of corroding the influence of American, British, German, Hollander and Scandinavian missionaries in the black community. These upheld a theology which encouraged liberal attitudes to the race issue on both sides of the colour line and extended the area of the Afrikaner's isolation.

But the DRC was so determined to eradicate Western democratic teachings on the sovereignty of the person and the humanism which these emphasised in theology, it actively encouraged the government to give all possible latitude to the black separatist churches. The latter are interested in the church mainly as an instrument for social reform in the African community; they avoid political commitments and are not adequately equipped for active involvement in the polemics of race. Most of the African clergymen in white-led churches hold university degrees in theology or divinity.

Separatism has imparted a momentum to events which limits the appeal of white theology to the rank and file of the African people. In the old days, the largest black congregations in the urban areas were the Wesleyan Methodists and the Anglicans, both of which were of

British origin. The Anglicans, in particular, had produced a brilliant galaxy of black and white opponents of the government's racial policies and had given the world such famous white names as Arthur Blaxall, Trevor Huddleston, Ambrose Reeves and Michael Scott. Blaxall was a frail man with the courage of a whole pride of lions. Caught distributing funds among the dependents of the underground, Blaxall, then in his seventies, admitted openly that he had committed the crime, which is almost indistinguishable from aiding and abetting treason in South African law, and readied himself for a long jail sentence. His simple defence was that he had done what he believed Christ would have done had he lived in South Africa at the time.

The old fighter was ready to go to prison for the rest of his life if it pleased the rulers to do that and, in view of his age, even to die there if the government of the time wanted that. The government was not going to transform old Father Blaxall into a martyr; they freed him and allowed him to return to Britain where he subsequently died, mourned by thousands of African friends who admired his quiet determination to see that justice was done to all human beings, regardless of race.

In the situation which prevailed at the time, it was possible for the like-minded on both sides of the colour line to develop a communion of minds moving events toward an open society in which no person would be punished for being the child of his parents. The black theologians were involved in the massive black effort at the time to persuade white South Africa to accept the African's ideal of nationhood. This was the age of bridge-building across racial lines. As a result of government policy, these black bridge-builders are isolated from their white allies and, in the atmosphere which exists in the locations, feel free to address themselves to the fundamentals of the christian experience. They have evolved what they call Black Theology.

Father Mlawu Zama speaks for one of the most militant schools in the Black Theology movement. The Black Theologians are agreed on one basic premise: they are committed to a christianity that will have valid and relevant meaning in the African experience. Father Zama, an Anglican, takes the position that the dissection of God into the father, son and holy ghost categories leads to the use of race as a determinant of human categories and does violence to the sacredness of the person.

The *buntu* evaluation of the person has its roots in antiquity, Father Zama teaches; it is the larger truth which the Africans have been translating into experience down the millenia. In the eighteenth century among the Zulus, the Court Poet to Senzangakhona said the nation is a cluster of ideals in the process of becoming a larger ideal.

Shaka founded a nation on the *buntu* ideal, just as Mshweshwe did or as Palo had done before them. Shaka taught that to be a Zulu was a matter of commitment and had nothing to do with blood or

parents; the Zulu was the person committed to weaving the cord of destiny, no matter what his sex or race or colour was. John Dunn had been an Englishman; Cetshwayo elevated him to the position of a provincial governor. If Dunn betrayed the trust, it was because the values of his culture did not give him much of a choice. The treachery was one more powerful argument why *buntu* missionaries should be trained in Africa and sent to Europe and America to civilise the white people and save them from self-defilement!

The Dutch Reformed Church adopts a hostile attitude to black theologians like Father Zama who, it says, are giving ideological symmetry to heathenism. By regarding the person as the source of all authority, some Afrikaner theologians charge, Father Zama and the black theologians who follow him are mortgaging mankind to sin. Theology and politics are so mixed up in South Africa there also are many Afrikaner students of divinity who are alarmed at the consensus of opinion at the level of fundamentals which has emerged in the black community in spite of the government's use of tribalism to separate the black people. The Africans insist that the race quarrel is a war of minds; a collision of ideals of fulfilment; they are evolving methods of struggle based on this evaluation of the race problem. Their attitudes to themselves and the white man are determined by this evaluation; so also, their goals, strategies and priorities.

The outside world does not understand all this; most people in Free Africa do not understand it either. This is not surprising. Black and white have been in contact for the longest time in Southern Africa. In that time the Africans have evolved a synthesis of cultural experiences which is not like anything black-white contact produced anywhere on the continent; the synthesis beats in terms of its own pulse and when it beats, it leaves most outsiders mystified; it leaves some saying the African has lost his feeling for freedom while others charge that he is stupidly patient. Some free Africans are so angry with the black South Africans they take it out on the refugees in their lands.

But the black South Africans insist that they are building for eternity; that they are laying the foundations for a nation which will one day make it impossible for any white man anywhere to punish any African for being the child of his parents. It is this insistence, whose implications create consternation in the Dutch Reformed Church, which convinces the Church and the government that black theology is subversive. Not one voice is raised in the DRC when the government bans Father Mlawu Zama . . . as a communist!

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A war of minds involving black and white christians is an exceedingly complicated matter; everything is complicated where one side uses the *xina* principle while the other relies on the gun.

An idea cannot be killed with a bullet while there are physical limitations to the use of the gun. A balance in African-Afrikaner relations has developed which the government preserves by taking away with the left hand what it gives to the African with the right. Kritzingler calls it giving the illusion of freedom. Pretoria is beginning to be aware that the policy of encouraging tribalism defeats its own ends by stressing the universally valid principles of the *buntu* way of life. If this is producing a consensus of opinion in the black community which evokes identical responses to similar challenges, it enables the African not only to launch a frontal attack on the Afrikaner mind but also to confront the white people with an alternative to the status quo which depends, for its translation into reality, not on white support but on African initiatives.

At the roots of the black experience the differences which used to divide the rural people from the urban, the "tribal" communities from the locations, the educated from the unschooled, the christian from the pagan, the chiefs from the elected political leaders and the Basotho, Xhosa and Zulu from each other have begun to be blurred.

In each language group emphasis is on the jaws which belong together grinding together. Zamaism is bridging the gulfs which keep the separatist churches and the white-led apart. Church rallies organised across denominational lines attract thousands because they speak a language every African understands. *Ubuntu* and *umteto wesintu* have the same meaning in every language. At these gatherings, politics is avoided while emphasis is laid on *ubuntu* or *umteto wesintu* or the eternal person.

The Africans charge that when they stress the values of their own culture, they are doing precisely what the government has been saying they must do all these years; when they incorporate these in the christian experience, they are doing no more than the reformers in Europe did. The Dutch Reformed Church, they say, came into being because the christianity taught by Rome did not serve the best interests of some European peoples. This argument creates difficulties as much for the DRC as for the security police. Largely as a result, policy is not to declare war on the transformations taking place in the black christian community; it is to leave them free to release steam in the rallies and to act only when sedition or conspiracy or treason is established.

In the African community, self-defilement is almost indistinguishable from unforgivable sin. Even the vocally anti-white militants deny that they are racists and, to demonstrate that they have not been contaminated by the poison from the white side, have formed a united front with the Coloureds and the Indians. They argue that they use race as a vehicle for isolating the whites. However, something happens at a conference of Southern African students which gives the white community a traumatic shock. The African students first refused to sit in the same dining room with the whites and eventually pass a motion

expelling the white delegations from the assembly. The black people have never treated the white people like this before.

This humiliation of the whites is noted by *Die Aanslag* which is alarmed to see the blacks put the white man in his place but tells the white students in so many words that the blacks served them right by kicking them in the teeth. Nobody is more concerned over the incident than Colonel Prinsloo, whose feared security police have collected enough information to convince him that the communists have nothing to do with the ferment in the black community; that what the white people are up against is a process of history. He flies to Durban and from there drives to Mkambati Reserve where Magagu Geja ka Bulube lives.

Chief Bulube, I have come to talk to you about the problems of our country; your country and mine. I have come as a concerned Afrikaner and not as a policeman. Some people in Pretoria, men highly placed in government, say the crisis in black-white relations is approaching the moment of decision. In the past, the gun settled everything for black and white. Some say this approach worked in the past, it would work now. Some say, like me, that you and the prime minister should meet and exchange views on a man to man basis. Nobody has given me any mandate to approach you. As chief of the police, I am free to investigate every aspect of security. I have children and I do not want them and yours to grow up looking to an appointment on the battlefield.

Don't you think the meeting would be a little premature?

Premature? After all the blood my people and yours have been shedding in the sixty years from Union? We had our Queenstown, Sharpeville and other shootings; but you also had your Cator Manor, Bashee Bridge and Paarl killings of whites.

Yes; premature. Your people are not as yet ready for a meaningful dialogue.

I could not agree more; but somebody, somewhere has got to start the process moving! Would you believe it if I told you that not one cabinet minister has ever spoken to an educated African? That not one Afrikaner member of parliament has ever heard of Dr. Seme? That very, very few Afrikaner academics have ever read any book or newspaper article written by an African? I admit, we do not know you. I think we should start knowing each other in order to talk to a mutually acceptable point. Please, do not misunderstand me, Chief; I'm not a liberal; I think those people are just a bunch of hypocritical sentimentalists. I love my people and I'm concerned with their future.

After a deep breath Bulube answers: In the sixty years since Union we have been developing an ideal of nationhood, acquiring an experience of nation-building and building a momentum for moving to our goal which your people do not possess.

We want to build a larger nation on the basis of our larger truth; you want a smaller nation founded on a smaller truth. I do not

think there is much common ground for us there. We pleaded with the white man to accept our broader definition of nationhood for fifty years, to no avail. We have decided to proceed to our goal of a larger nation based on the larger truth by ourselves. We think the white man is not important for the purpose of establishing a union of the black peoples of Southern Africa. The only people who matter now are the Africans. If they agree to unite with us, we shall solve the race problem on our terms—in this country, in Rhodesia, in Mozambique and in Angola. Only when we have created the nation after our design would a dialogue be worthwhile.

But, don't you see where you are driving the whites? You force them to close their ranks; you drive them into the laager! Prinsloo is insistent.

Now, now! Colonel! They've never been out of the laager; the whites have always closed their ranks. When we were weak and divided, white unity bothered us; we stood alone then. Things have since changed. At last we speak one political language and have one alternative to the white man's closed society. Our priorities are fixed, no longer by what the whites do to us but by the changes taking place in the world.

We want to establish a satisfying place for ourselves in that world and we do not think the white people can or are able to do anything to help us reach our goal. But this does not mean that I would not want to meet the prime minister. There are things I would like to tell him about his administration which he probably does not know . . . .

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The prime minister is in Pretoria these days. He exercises such control now that the Minister of Justice had to get his personal approval of the permit for the rally which African Christians from many parts of the country plan to hold in Atteridgeville. The granting of the permit is a cosmetic designed to placate people like Dominie de Villiers and his friends. On this particular morning, the prime minister is at his desk. The clock has just struck nine.

People are always on their toes when the prime minister is in Pretoria; he demands hard work from everybody and sets the example. There are times when he starts work at seven in the morning. Most of his cabinet colleagues do not get to their desks before ten o'clock. They have too much time to waste, he says of them.

Piet van der Merwe, that model, always sees to it that he gets to the office at least half an hour before the prime minister's arrival. He enjoys doing this; he feels he is doing his duty in creating the desirable destiny for the Afrikaner. The prime minister is fond of Piet; a relationship almost like that between a father and his son exists

between the two men. In Cape Town, just before flying to Pretoria, he called Piet to his office.

Piet, you get on well with the diplomats from Malawi. Your head is in the right place and the stuff inside is good Afrikaner brains and not mud. I know; I can tell when there's mud in a young person's head. You have a future; one day, you could sit on my chair here. You have the heart and the brains to do it. But, by that time a new generation will be in charge in the black states. I often wonder if it would not be helpful to you to have a stint as our ambassador in Malawi. That place, you know, can be developed into our window on Africa! Only, I need you here, too. What would you do if you were in my position?

Meneer, all I live for is to serve my country and my people.

Well, you'll stay here for awhile yet, but someday you must go to the black states.

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The church rally has attracted thousands of delegates from many parts of the country and the traders in Atteridgeville have never had it so good. Even the women who brave the winds, the heat and the cold of the plateau around the capital city grilling mealie cobs or sheeps' trotters on coal braziers on street corners are doing brisk business. In front of every family with children cold drinks are sold. The women's rally has been going on for three days and the police see nothing wrong with it. The third day is the last the delegates will be in the capital. The first item on the programme is a sunrise prayer meeting on a hill behind Union Buildings. About twenty thousand women join the procession to the meeting place and, after the prayers, the river of womanhood flows, not to Atteridgeville but straight to Union Buildings. Before police in sufficient numbers arrive, the women have surrounded the seat of government and are holding up posters demanding an interview with the prime minister, to whom they say they want to present a petition against the Passes For Women Bill.

Piet's uppermost thought is of the safety of de Haas. He races to the prime minister's office as the women's representatives enter the courtyard.

Meneer, the women have surrounded the place; what do you advise?

Tell them to get out of here and keep that damned door locked! Hear?

Piet hesitates for a while; he is not sure that twenty thousand angry black women can be told to clear out of Union Buildings and be obliging.

Did you hear what I said? I want no damned incidents here! Where's Kritzinger? Where's Prinsloo? Tell them to deal with those hordes and, for God's sake, lock that damned door!

That night the prime minister has a conference with the Minister of Justice, the Police Commissioner and Paul Kritzinger, who is in charge of the Pretoria police district. The temper of the phenomenon is in flames.

What I want to know, he bawls out, is how the women travelled from every part of the country, passed through the Witwatersrand to converge on Union Buildings without any policeman realising what they were up to!

With this, he bangs his hand on his desk, scattering the pages of the memorandum the Minister of Justice submitted earlier in the day and in which he gave a detailed report on the women's demonstration.

Prinsloo, I demand an explanation from you. I hear you have explanations.

Meneer, the problem has more fundamental origins than what appears to be police incompetence; it is part of the world-wide movement in which the black, brown and yellow races are coming into their own . . . .

I don't want to hear any more of that nonsense about fundamental contradictions in the white experience. I've heard enough of it from other people and what I've heard makes me sick!

The prime minister is too angry to want to listen to Prinsloo, whom he does not trust much, in any case, and whom he regards as a dangerous capitulationist.

Isn't there anybody in police headquarters with the brains to do one simple thing, in a simple way: to keep law and order?

That is being done, meneer; but we do not have enough police to watch every black man.

Why should you want to do that?

In their segregated areas the black people have evolved their own principle of unity. We told them to develop along their own lines. They are doing this to its logical extreme and have united themselves on what they call the *Buntu Ideal*.

Why did you allow them to do that?

That is a political question which calls for a political answer. Neither the police nor the army can shoot the *Buntu Ideal* out of existence. This is where christianity served our best interests; it corroded the *Buntu* philosophy. As I have had to point out to the prime minister on another occasion, the liberals and the communists are the putative and not the actual enemies of white civilisation. Like us, they are the products of the culture we inherited from the Greeks, the Romans and the Jews. Like christianity, they helped to corrode the *Buntu Ideal*. As long as the whites attacked the black philosophy from different angles, the blacks were not free to evolve strategies based on their own philosophy or to develop their own weapons. They fought on ground dictated by the white people, formed controllable coalitions with the whites and used weapons borrowed from us. It was always easier for us to deal with their continuing revolt than. Things have since

changed. By separating them from the whites, we gave them the freedom to stand on their own feet and to attack from positions we did not know, using weapons we could not control. This circumstance leaves the police in situations of obvious weakness. Every black man has become either a rebel or a potential rebel and we need a policeman to keep an eye on every black person. With the disparity in black and white numbers, it can be seen that the police are being saddled with a task that is, strictly speaking, not theirs.

Capitulating! Is that what you are advising? That we give up?

No, Mr. Prime Minister. We are caught in what has become a war of minds. The question is whether or not old policies can cope with this development.

When the prime minister mentions the word capitulate, everybody knows that he has reached the limit of provocation. In his view, there is not an uglier crime which a white person can commit than to capitulate to the black or brown or yellow man. But Prinsloo is not the type of Afrikaner whose knees will quake when the phenomenon goes into tantrums. There are Africans, English and Coloureds who regard Prinsloo as an honest man who can be respected in his own right even when people disagree violently with his views. Like most Afrikaners, he certainly thinks in a rut; he sees men and events from the narrow horizons fashionable in his community. He differs from most Afrikaners, however, in that he is not averse to the idea of considering alternative guarantees of Afrikaner survival. If the Afrikaner cannot think in these terms, he argues, he is going to create for himself the type of situation in which the Jews are now caught in the Middle East; he will tie his resources to the demands of perpetual war in a hostile continent.

Kritzinger speaks after Prinsloo. While he agrees with Prinsloo on the value of christianity as an instrument for destroying the *Buntu Ideal*, he urges that the police should develop a programme for defusing the strikes. The prime minister nods approval although he is not sure in his mind if he understands everything implied in Kritzinger's proposal. When the meeting is over the phenomenon walks over to Kritzinger and asks him to stay when the others are gone.

What did you mean by the words "defusing the strikes?"

The strikers are putting us on the defensive in the eyes of the outside world. More police vigilance, I believe, would unearth crimes that would put the strikers on the defensive.

But nobody wants to hear anything in favour of the police . . . nobody in the outside world.

It depends on how things are done, Meneer. The world is crazy about the word freedom just now. The white man must consider the prospect of appearing to bend to the wind; he must go through the motions of freeing the black people without surrendering anything substantive.

Somebody in the United Nations will start screaming about fraud.

It depends on how the strikes are handled. If independence is offered as a response to the strikes, the United Nations will be forced to consider alternatives. The world could then be told that we are doing our best; the strikes would be seen to be a stumbling bloc to progress.

Smuts tried something like that and failed. Why can't the police do their work without going through the motions of capitulating?

Can you shoot the *Buntu Ideal* out of existence or otherwise destroy it without the help of the white missionaries, the liberals and the communists?

Why not? You can't shoot an idea, of course; but to kill it, you don't have to send the missionaries and the communists back into the reserves and the locations.

You can't stop the kaffers from breeding? . . .

No. But what are you driving at?

Then, where do we go from where we are?

Why go anywhere at all? Stand firm where we are and keep our powder dry. That's what our ancestors did and that's what I propose to do. I never think of alternatives, for I know and want none. We have to be frank about these things. We have nothing to hide . . .

The phenomenon stresses the last two words with the confidence of a man with no skeletons in any cupboards. He has lived for Afrikanerdom; the only thing he dreads in life is the humiliation of Afrikanerdom. His whole life has been devoted to the glorification of the Afrikaner and when he sees his people at the height of their power he is assured that everything he did and everything his people did was right because they could not be wrong; not with the destiny especially cast in heaven for them. Kritzinger lacks the assurance of the prime minister; he has many things to hide.

But, meneer, how long can we stand where we are? We have the gun to-day; what if the kaffers have it to-morrow? Angola and Mozambique are now free. What if the black people pool their uranium resources and get some crazy communist to teach them how to manufacture a portable nuclear bomb with a limited explosive capability? Such a weapon could blow a whole factory, a whole block of buildings out of existence . . .

Kritzinger, you worry too much about dangers which do not exist.

The black people, in common with the brown and the yellow races, are in the majority in the world and control most of its natural resources. One day they might become better trading partners of the West than we are.

So what?

It's something to think over, meneer.



Well, Kritzinger, if you want to know how I feel about these things . . . . Let me tell you again, as I have done on many other occasions. I keep my guns oiled. I'll shoot for as long as I am able. If God created us for final destruction, I want to see the Afrikaner go down fighting; every Afrikaner! Capitulate? Never!

I'm not for capitulation, meneer; I would create an illusion of freedom and offer it as a reality and justify the offer and then oil my guns.

He looks at his watch, then says quietly, Meneer, the old girl at the house will start worrying.

Alright, friend, you may go . . . .

The prime minister stretches out his right hand to Kritzinger. He is not sure if he understands fully what the chief of the Pretoria police district was trying to tell him. *Offer an illusion and justify it?* What does that mean in concrete terms, he is asking himself. It sounds like a statement of a fundamental truth; it is so pregnant with meaning it has to be turned over a thousand times in one's mind before its implications are clear. But that is the beauty of having a policeman with an expansive mind. If the phenomenon does not understand the signals Kritzinger has been sending, he is happy there is at least one policeman with the mind which can cope with anything from the English, the Jews, the liberals and, of course, the communists. If these groups could be cut off from all contact with the African people, the strikes could sooner or later be controlled.

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## XIX. Memorandum To Free Africa

*Amanga neqiniso kawahlangani.*

*(Lies and the truth do not go well together.)*

If de Haas dislikes the Hollanders intensely, a fact he never tires of emphasising in conversations with his friend and confidante, Paul Kritzinger, he has an incurable distrust for the Americans. Not exactly without reason, some of the wealthy English in Parktown quietly say. De Haas provides all the inflated investments from South Africa and all the thanks he receives from the Americans are kicks in the teeth for disciplining a few million niggers. De Haas confesses to Kritzinger that he never knows what the Americans are up to when they visit his country; they have been corrupted by liberalism and lost their sense of racial pride. A white American will not hesitate to enter South Africa to spy on the whites for the black people. De Haas tells his friend that he has his own views on what goes on in the American embassy.

As a rule, foreign diplomats are not allowed to enter an African location or a rural reserve without a permit. It is a crime for any non-African to enter any African area without a permit. In spite of these precautions, the American diplomats move in and out of African areas whenever they want to. Not without reason, the Africans quietly say. They want to see the conditions in which their investments operate. Everybody knows the Americans do these things; what galls de Haas is that they do it in such a way that it is impossible to catch them in the act. The smart boys in the security police have produced the theory that after sunset the American diplomats paint their faces black and enter the locations in the dark. De Haas is inclined to believe anything against the Americans and worse against the Hollanders. Kritzinger dismisses the security police theory as palpable nonsense.

At no time has the prime minister been annoyed more intensely by the nose-poking of the Americans than at present. Jona Masondo was a policeman in Benoni. He was a little less than thirty years of age with a young wife and a month-old baby. The three lived in Benoni location. One night the police raided the location; a young African shoved an *intshumentshu* between Masondo's ribs near the

spinal column. Masondo did not die; his right side was paralysed and he spent months in hospital. His condition did not improve and shortly after being discharged from hospital he was endorsed out of the location because he had lost his productive potential. Like his late father, Masondo had been born in a location; endorsement meant that he had to be sent to a rural reserve in Natal which he did not know, and to live among total strangers.

The white experts of the Native Affairs Department discovered that the name Masondo belonged to the Nyambose clan. Jona was transported to the Nyambose reserve where his condition deteriorated until he died. That brought the pittance called a pension to an end. The amount had barely been enough to keep body and soul together among the three members of the Masondo family. The child's health broke down. Hunger dried up its mother's breasts. Day after day the baby would cry until it was hoarse, as its flesh shrank and the bones protruded. The one thing Masondo's wife could not survive was the vacant, hungry and accusing stare in the baby's eyes. She prayed hard, shed scalding tears and made herself a nuisance at the local police station or the native commissioner's office asking for assistance. Nothing availed. One night she sprayed her blankets with paraffin, wrapped herself and her baby in them and set them on fire.

The tiny mound which marks the grave of the woman and her baby has become something very much like a shrine. Students from different parts of the Natal province visit the grave. Magagu Geja kaBulube has visited it, too. Talking to an American journalist one day, he explains the pilgrimage in these terms:

I have never known a more powerful demonstration against race oppression. With people like these, the white man cannot say he has conquered the African . . .

The American looks puzzled.

But Chief, the woman is dead? Who's the winner?

The protester. The world did not understand why we in the rural reserves rejected the independence offered us by the government. Masondo's wife spoke for us with an eloquence nobody can mistake.

Subsequently, the journalist sneaked quietly into the Nyambose reserve, took photographs and made a film which he later showed to his people in the United States. The American papers are full of the Nyambose pictures and the film has become a TV hit. If faces are red every day in the Department of the Interior, which grants visas, the Masondo protest is taken deeply to heart in Free Africa where a new generation of leaders is leaving the universities.

Unlike the first generation of liberators, these young men and women are hostile to the old guard's acceptance of white definitions of the race problem in South Africa and reject the strategies adopted in the last twenty-five years to corrode race humiliation. The old guard which leads Free Africa regarded democracy, one-man-one-vote, race equality, equal pay for equal work and the abolition of the pass laws as

the solution to South Africa's race problem. The underlying assumption was that the integration of the African in a white-oriented society was something to live for. The old leaders ran around the world and shouted themselves hoarse in the United Nations in campaigns to smash race oppression with the might of the conference resolution!

Year in and year out the halls of the United Nations and every other international assembly reverberated with their denunciations of white domination. The humiliating defeats suffered have exhausted the energies of the old guard and soured some of its attitudes to the black people of South Africa, whom it accuses of not fighting with the determination which events demand. It is not unusual for the old guard in the press, the universities, and in politics, to declaim against the black South Africans for what is believed to be their failure to fight white domination the right way. It is not unusual to find these people releasing their frustrations on the refugees from South Africa whom they now attack as parasites who will sponge on Free Africa and fight for liberty with their arses on swivel chairs in the capitals of Free Africa.

The refugees, in most cases, complicate their own position when they attack the new leaders of their people who have accepted the white challenge, redefined the race problem and are establishing a dual authority situation right under the nose of the CNP. There is intense anger among the leaders on the homefront who regard themselves as being in the front line; they resent the attacks made on them by some refugees who lecture them on how to fight white domination from the safe positions guaranteed by foreign flags. The leaders inside South Africa charge that the present generation of their people has given them the mandate to redefine the race problem and evolve appropriate strategies to crush white domination. They are not inclined to pay much attention to refugees whom they regard as having diminishing mandates—that is, mandates valid before Sharpeville.

The rising generation of Free Africans is concerned about these quarrels, which it regards as expressions of the frustration caused by unresearched definitions of South Africa's crisis of colour. It acknowledges that to fight for borrowed ideals, using borrowed weapons on ground chosen by the enemy is a sure invitation to defeat. The young leaders argue that the failure of Free African campaigns against white domination in Southern Africa in general and in South Africa in particular springs from inadequate clarity on the black people's real goals. In 1912 they rejected the ideal of nationhood adopted by the whites and did the same at the Umtata Conference in 1973. Free Africa, the argument continues, should pause and make itself better informed on the real goals of the African people in South Africa.

The young leaders in Free Africa proceed to demand that the black people in South Africa should be taken as they are and not as they should be; that while the urges which motivate thought and action

among them are the same as those in Free Africa, their experience has about it a uniqueness which makes the war of minds a conflict with no parallels in the rest of the continent. Some, in particular those who had their education in South Africa, demand that the Committee for the Co-ordination of Resistance in Southern Africa, which has its offices somewhere in Central Africa, should recast its whole strategy against white domination.

They urge the establishment of direct contact with the Africans in the front line in Southern Africa. The Committee eventually contacts Magagu Geja kaBulube with the request that he should furnish it with information on why the Africans reject the "independence" offered them and why de Haas regards the passing of the women's Pass Bill as a moment of fulfilment for himself and why the Africans oppose it. Further, the Committee requests Magagu to advise it on how it might best help the Africans on the homefront in their struggle against white domination.

This is a new and welcome departure in the attitude of the Committee. In the past, it had adopted the agitatorial approach to the race question in Southern Africa and had defined freedom in terms of slogans borrowed from the white side; it had spoken of African socialism, African humanism and the like. The weapons used to move events to these goals had been borrowed from the whites. Political parties had been formed and resistance movements organised along white lines and strikes and boycotts launched on white bases to make white supremacy expensive to maintain. When the Africans in South Africa showed little enthusiasm for these methods, they were told that these strategies had brought independence to Free Africa and would work in South Africa. The victims of white domination had turned inward to themselves and proceeded to evolve their own strategies and to define their own goals. While the African states gave to freedom a meaning taken over from the white side, they almost went on their knees every year begging the white nations to act against the white minorities in Southern Africa.

The Committee could not help using borrowed weapons against white domination in Southern Africa. The countries which supported it had given to freedom a meaning which split their peoples into capitalists, communists, social democrats, liberals, christians and atheists precisely in the way the white peoples had divided themselves in Europe and the Americas. At this point, the old guard had not given to freedom a meaning that would satisfy in African conditions; they wanted to have what the white man had; he was their exemplar, their paragon of excellence. How could they hope to win against him if he still did the thinking for them, the new generation asked.

The new Africans attached importance to Seme's theory of civilisations in collision. They took note of Bulube's view that while the dominant conflicts between capitalism and communism took place within the framework defined by the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic evalu-

ation of the person, the main ideological quarrels of the twenty-first century would be between the *Buntu* evaluation of the person and the one evolved by the Greeks, the Romans and the Hebrews.

*The crisis of colour in Southern Africa, the new leaders continue, is a decisive climacteric in the global revolution which will determine the relations between black and white in the twenty-first century.*

Because of its importance in this regard, the race quarrel in Southern Africa has begun to be seen in different light by some people in Free Africa. Importance is attached, no longer to the exertion of pressures to force the whites to make more concessions, but to African definitions of the race problem, to African alternatives to the status quo in Southern Africa and to agreement by the black people on final goals. This change in the mood of the young people finds expression in the request from the Committee for a statement of the African's case by people in the front line against white domination.

Bulube prepares a long memorandum which, he hopes, will enable the peoples of Africa to see the race quarrel in South Africa from an altogether different perspective. He prefaces his remarks with the statement that race discrimination, colour prejudice or segregation are the by-products of the effort men have been making in the last six or seven hundred years to find a way by which black and white could live together on the basis of the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic ideal of fulfilment. The effort failed because it rejected the validity of the African's evaluation of the person and denied its legitimacy. Because the whites had the gun, they sought to impose the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic outlook on the Africans.

Slavery, colonialism, segregation and South Africa's racial policies have all been attempts to establish the permanence of the imposition while the slave revolts, African nationalism and the attacks on white policies in Southern Africa are vindications of the unifying *Buntu Ideal* which gives meaning to life in Sub-Saharan Africa.

If the race quarrel is seen as a collision of conflicting philosophies, the obvious way out is for wise men on both sides of the colour line to reconcile the conflicting perspectives. Then, and then only, can black and white work together to evolve programmes which will give to life and freedom a meaning that will satisfy on both sides in the conditions which exist in South Africa, Free Africa and the rest of the world.

Bulube warns Free Africa to take note of the inner dynamics of race conflict. There has been a fundamental switch in government strategy for the perpetuation of white domination. Where, before, emphasis was on the white man remaining master, stress is now laid on independence for the black reserves. The change has come about because of the African's continuing revolt on the one hand and, on the other, Free African and other pressures. Pretoria has decided to react to these pressures by offering the Africans the shadow of freedom and not

its substance. When the Africans reject the offered independence, they refuse to accept the shadow.

Some Afrikaners are concerned about the state of black-white relations, just as some white liberals are. But both have one fatal weakness: they have illusory power and not the real power that the CNP and de Haas have. To form alliances with them or to strike deals with them might have immediate tactical advantages only where there is agreement on the African definition of nationhood. The liberals, like the communists and UBRA, reject this definition. In this setting, the African does not have much of a choice; as Sobukwe often put it, he has to learn the habit of "going it alone" on the homefront.

The change in government strategy calls for corresponding changes in Free African strategies. Where, before, stress was on race equality, emphasis should now be laid on a geopolitical alternative; Free African resources should be mobilised to confront Pretoria with this alternative. The CNP government should be put under pressure in the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and everywhere else in the world, to define the term *independence*; to state in the clearest terms possible the type of freedom it offers the victims of its policies. Among other advantages, this approach will reinforce the black people's demands in South Africa. It would also lay the foundations for a co-ordinated strategy involving the segregated administrations, the OAU and the United Nations.

Bulube makes it clear that the Afrikaner has demonstrated that he is incapable of providing the quality of leadership which will give a satisfying meaning to life among the blacks and the whites. It is the business of the African to assume leadership, which he has done, to create the situations to which the Afrikaner will be forced to respond and to seize the initiative to influence events to goals chosen and determined by the historical owners of the land: the black people. If the Afrikaner does not want to live in societies where perspectives have been reconciled, he is always free to clear out of Africa and go to white countries to live among people who have his skin colour. But if he wants to live in Africa, he must do the things that are done in Africa. Otherwise he is going to create a climate of thinking which will force the black peoples to gang-up against him and work for his ultimate expulsion from Africa.

The white skin alone will not help him much in the final analysis because while Europe and America are white countries, they are more interested in the metals, the oil and other resources owned by the black, brown and yellow races. They will support the Afrikaner only as long as it serves their interests to do this and when their economies necessitate the accommodation of the African, Europe and America will come to terms with the African. Free African policy would be helpful if it developed a way of controlling African resources which will respond to this prospect on the one hand and, on the other,

take advantage of the peculiar relationship into which history threw Africa, the Americas and Western Europe.

Bulube points out that where the race quarrel was seen no longer as a mere collision between biological incompatibles and where it was seen as a clash between conflicting evaluations of the person, emphasis would no longer be on reforms; it would be on building up the African's control of his resources inside South Africa, on co-ordinating his strategies with Free Africa and other forces working for freedom in the world. It would be necessary for Free Africa to create new polarisations in the United Nations on the race quarrel and to confront the Security Council with alternatives it cannot ignore. He warns against the assumption which has gained ground in Free Africa that South Africa's black people will be freed by Free Africa.

As the history of the blacks shows, it is they and they alone who will free themselves; their allies, supporters and friends can only help create the conditions in which victory can come sooner, on terms dictated by the African. Free Africa is not doing the black South Africans a favour when she fights race domination; she is defending the honour of the black race as a whole, where every person of African descent is punished simply because there is African blood in his veins. This is the insult Free Africa must wipe off the face of the continent, regardless of whether or not the Africans in South Africa are free.

If the race problem is seen from the perspectives just outlined, Bulube continues, Free Africa will reinforce the leadership initiatives now being asserted in South Africa instead of asking the white powers to help the United Nations bring about change in South Africa. This background, Bulube explains, provides the setting in which the Passes For Women Bill must be seen. The measure is important, not so much because it limits the freedom of movement for the African woman but because it shows how African labour-power, Afrikaner political dominance and English control of the economy are manipulated to preserve white domination and provide the inflated profits for foreign investors in America, Western Europe and Japan.

The manipulation has created a peculiarly revolutionary situation in the labour-political-financial balance. African policy and diplomacy seek to smash the balance while white policy and diplomacy set out to preserve it. Contradictions have arisen in the conflict which move events to a head-on collision between the united black administrations and the white government.

The white attempt to expel increasing numbers of Africans from the "white" areas into the rural reserves (which can no longer carry their present populations and which are so overcrowded they do not have enough land to produce their own food) is the dynamite which is sure to explode into a conflagration that might hurl black and white into a bloody fight.

The rural administrations are preparing themselves for the

moment of decision; they have formed themselves into a united front and have decided to co-ordinate their policies and actions. When the collision comes, they want to withdraw their labour simultaneously from white industries and paralyse the South African economy; they want to act jointly in refusing to accommodate any more expellees from the white areas; they want, in short, to keep the Afrikaner in the cleft stick he has created for himself.

This sets the Pass Bill in perspective. In the old days, it was beneath the dignity of a self-respecting Afrikaner son of his father to humiliate himself and venture into industry and commerce, which, besides, were dominated by the English and the Jews. Agriculture was the Afrikaner's traditional field. So much importance was attached to it, it continues to this day to be the main determinant of white policy in many walks of life. For example, the parliamentary voting system for members of South Africa's all-white parliament is a case in point. It operates in ways which ensure that the legislature is dominated by the rural, mainly agricultural, areas.

After the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1901 the influx of the Afrikaners into the cities began in earnest. A new class of worker emerged who saw fulfilment in narrowly racial terms but who belonged no longer to rural society but to the cities. He was followed by the Afrikaner entrepreneur, who first pursued aggressively nationalistic economic policies because gold placed him in the position of a seller to the world. Since then, leading economists have been warning that gold should no longer be regarded as the backbone of the country's economy. These warnings have produced changes which cast African-Afrikaner relations in an altogether new mold.

On the one hand there is growing uncertainty about gold continuing to be a vehicle of international monetary exchange. If the nations finally reject gold, South Africa would lose some of the political pressure the production of the precious metal gives her. On the other hand the mineral's depletion in the not-so-distant future constitutes a problem which calls for immediate action.

Government policy now emphasises the development of manufacturing as the new backbone of the economy. This throws the Afrikaner out of his traditional isolationism, right into the maelstrom of international commerce; he finds himself exposed to international pressures against which agriculture and gold protected him. He finds himself increasingly dependent on foreign lands for investment capital, expertise and markets. At the same time a new balance of power is emerging in the world. The whites have lost their dominance; the centre of gravity in international affairs has shifted from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, which is the centre of the non-white world.

Different trading blocs have emerged and each of them sees fulfilment in terms of its own interests. The Western Europeans have joined forces in the European Economic Community while the socialist

lands of Eastern Europe have established their own trading club. China and Japan are exploring the possibilities of a Far Eastern bloc. The Americans are kicking Japan so violently in the teeth each time they are in trouble they leave Tokyo with no alternative other than to establish an independent economic and political position of her own in the world. This has profound implications for black-white relations. It means that Japan might eventually change her attitude to nuclear weapons and decide to become a nuclear power. The world would then have three non-white nuclear states which have a vested interest in the destruction of white arrogance in the conduct of international affairs. But this is not the only red light history is flashing before the Afrikaner.

The Arabs have decided to use their oil as a political weapon against the Jews and in doing this have shown that for the time being at least they possess and control a weapon more powerful in its effects on the international community than the combined nuclear arsenals of all the super-powers. The Afrikaners are particularly uneasy about the growth of Arab unity and power. If they can turn the whole world upside down by withholding their oil what would stop the Free Africans from developing a similar unity and one day using their metal and other mineral resources as political weapons against South Africa's racial policies? What would stop the Arabs transforming themselves into a nuclear power, now that they have enough money from their oil?

Nobody can stop the proliferation of nuclear powers. Who, for example, would blame the Japanese if they agreed to build up Arab nuclear power in return for oil? What would stop the Africans from developing nuclear weapons or buying these with their metals? A combination of non-white trading blocs, the emergence of China and Japan as nuclear powers, the Arab use of oil and the Africans' employment of metals and minerals as political weapons—all these would create a balance of power in the Indian Ocean which would place the Afrikaner in a weak bargaining position with Europe and the Americas.

Whatever the Afrikaner did, for example, he could, because of his numbers alone, never be a very significant factor in American and West European trade. His next bargaining point is the strategic importance of Cape Town on the sea route between the East and Western Europe and North America. If the Africans could create a state that would straddle the southern part of the continent they would reduce Cape Town's strategic value. Bulube stresses this factor in formulating Free African policies.

For the Afrikaner, these changes mean that each year sees his power to bargain with the powers of the West decline; this weakness leaves him with cruelly limited options. To count on continuing Western support he has to transform South Africa into an attractive investment field. He can do this only by tightening his already rigid

control of every department of the African's life and this is where the passes for women come in. In the old days, when gold was the backbone of the economy and agriculture the pillar of racial politics, the white man needed to control the labour of the males and only African men carried the passes. First introduced in the Cape by the British to control cheap African labour which was to substitute slave labour after the emancipation of the slaves originally imported from the Dutch East Indies, the pass to-day determines the position of the African in every walk of life from birth to the grave.

The laws presume him to be a criminal until he produces his pass to prove he is not. The document has transformed the Africans into a caste which lives only to serve the interests of the white man. Race and colour fix the membership of this class and establish the position of the African in South African society. This position is always at the bottom. Its permanence is guaranteed by the race laws, the police and the army. The pass is important because it translates a given philosophy into action. The African's creative and productive potentials are presumed to be the private property of the white man.

The African does not sell his labour, which he does not own; he exchanges it for a wage determined by those who own it. This wage is designed to keep him productive for the longest time possible. To extort maximum advantage from this possession, the white man must control its supply, distribution, use and disposal. The pass, like the law, the police and the army, is an instrument of control; it prescribes the place where the African shall be born, live or die to serve white interests.

If he is to be employed in agriculture and the mines, he must, as a rule, be born in the rural reserves where white policy deliberately keeps the population density at an average of about 117.2 per square mile in order to create the extremes of overcrowding, hunger and deprivation which will force the African to leave the reserve and work for the whites for wages designed to inflate profits for investors in agriculture and mining.

If he is to serve industry, commerce and in domestic service, he must be born in a location which is laid out in a convenient place outside every white city. As in the rural reserve, conditions of extreme poverty, hunger and deprivation are created to force the African to leave the location by day in order to produce wealth for the white man. As in the rural reserves, the pass regulates his movements in such a way that every white city is provided with adequate supplies of cheap labour. The pass determines his movements between where he is born or where he lives and where he works. It is a crime for him to be outside of the area where the pass says he should be at any given moment of his life. If one of his parents dies in Johannesburg where they live, which is about forty or fifty miles from Pretoria where he might be living himself, and he attends the funeral, any policeman might stop him, demand his pass and arrest him if he does not have it

on his person.

He must not and cannot be free; it is a crime for him to be free from the pass.

Once the child of his parents reaches the age of 18 and becomes productive in the eyes of the law, it becomes a crime for him to live with his parents in their home without the permission of the location superintendent. It is a crime for an African from outside to enter a location without a permit or to remain in it for longer than 72 hours without the permission of the white authority. Any African can be "endorsed" out of any location, that is, he can be expelled from it if he is not employed. This means that an African's elderly parents may not live with him unless he has the permission to have them in his house. Sometimes children under 18 are endorsed out of the location because the law says they are not productive and have no right to be in a location, even when their parents live there. The expulsion is intended to reduce the costs of maintaining the location, although a substantial proportion of these is borne by the African in the form of rents, taxation and the fines paid for the infringement of the many Pass Laws.

The African who carries a pass may not be paid the same wage as the whites, the Coloureds or the Indians who, in turn, are paid according to different rates. He may not organise trade unions of his own or join those organised by the whites. If he has to negotiate with his employers he has to form staff associations or organisations according to firms. This enables him to negotiate with his immediate employer and not with the industry. Different employers in the same industry, in the same city, sign different agreements with different staff associations. In this way, the managers can easily weed out the agitators whom the police readily endorse out of the city. The system enables the managers to pay the wages they like and to collect inflated profits. The same principle applies in agriculture, where the African is obliged by law to work for six months every year for the white farmer on whose land his family resides to cover rent, grazing and tilling rights. During the next six months he might seek employment in an urban area. The pass enables the farmer to keep track of his movements in the city and tells the police when the period for his employment in the city has expired, when he must be endorsed out of the urban area.

The conditions created by the pass system call for the continuous tightening of race segregation in order to preserve the caste system and ensure that the whites enjoy their high standard of living and have enough to pay the high profits with which to bribe American, West European and Japanese investors into conniving at the violence white policies do to the person of the African. It is a condition of Afrikaner dominance that these profits should be as high as possible in order to buy the conscience of foreign investors who, in turn, exert leverage on their governments against decisive world action against race discrimination.

This circumstance, however, leaves the Afrikaner in the grip of

a tragic and cruel vice. In order to be able to purchase the conscience of the foreign investors who subsidise his political dominance and placate the English who control the economy on the homefront he has forever to damage his personality by imposing a brutally inhuman tyranny on the African. As the Africans say, he has to fulfil himself in self-defilement. This leaves him a prisoner of those who protect him against attacks in the United Nations, for example.

African policy, Bulube points out, also has to take into account this weakness of the unliberated Afrikaner. In this setting the Afrikaner is only a political manager of an estate he does not own. Historically, the land belongs to the African while capital is owned by the English and foreigners; the Afrikaner owns nothing, other than that which he holds by the sheer force of arms.

But there is no guarantee that what he holds will be his forever. The day is not far when the Africans will have the guns and when they will restore to themselves what was seized from them at the point of the gun. If the Afrikaner can yield no ground, it is because he has none to concede; if he cannot give anything, it is because he owns nothing; he has nothing to give. Thus, when he tries to give freedom to the Africans in the reserves, they turn their backs on him and reject it because whatever he gives cannot be other than hollow, meaningless and of no value. The dilemma creates cataclysmic frustrations in the Afrikaner psyche. It is these which make de Haas a phenomenon and go a long way to explain the Afrikaner's peculiar preoccupation with race and his anger with the outside world. It galls the Afrikaner to find himself treated as the polecat of international affairs and attacked by those very countries whose system of economy he upholds and to provide profits for whom he commits himself to perpetual self-defilement.

The switch to manufacturing creates additional headaches for the Afrikaner. Agriculture and mining swallow up so much cheap African labour the commodity is, strictly speaking, scarce in South Africa. Without it, however, there can be no inflated profits and virtually no bargaining power for the Afrikaner. One solution, taken from the days of British rule, like the pass, is the importation of workers willing to accept low wages. These come from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. In the old days they were imported from as far afield, sometimes, as Angola, Zambia and Rhodesia. As a result the African population in the major industrial areas often has communities from as far afield as Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia, Swaziland and Zambia. The poverty of countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland is still so great thousands of their black citizens are allowed to enter South Africa every year where they prefer to suffer all the humiliations that go with the black skin only to eke out a living.

This practice reduces the black states of Southern Africa to the status of human stud farms where, as in the locations and the

reserves, cheap labour is produced and bred to serve South African mines, industries and farms. In this setting, the governments of the labour-exporting countries function as the business managers of the stud farms. This creates endless debates and serious conflicts in the assemblies of the Free Africans where collaboration with South Africa is assumed to be almost indistinguishable from treason to Africa.

The Afrikaner's weaknesses force him to take advantage of the conflicts both to neutralise Free African hostility to Pretoria's racial policies and to create the goodwill South Africa must have in order to sell her products freely in African markets. She has come out with a brand-new foreign policy for Africa. In the locations it is known derisively as the *New-Look Policy*. South Africa tells all with ears to hear that she wants to make friends with the black states of Africa; that she has plenty of money for aid and to reinforce the New-Look Policy and give it additional appeal she beams especial broadcasts to East, Central and West Africa. The line taken in these is that South Africa is moving her black peoples toward freedom in separate states; that she needs time in which to do this and that she would like the opportunity to have a dialogue with the Free Africans for the purpose of co-ordinating action against common problems. The broadcasts create a type of confusion in Free Africa which encourages splits in the black ranks on how to destroy white domination. The geopolitical alternative, Bulube points out, is designed, not only to unify and consolidate the revolt against white domination in Southern Africa, but also to bridge the gulfs which the New-Look Policy has created.

South Africa devotes a lot of time and energy and spends a lot of money on propaganda in Free Africa not only for political reasons but because she genuinely needs the goodwill of the Free Africans who could be her best customers. At one time she almost succeeded in persuading Tsiranana, a former president of Malagasy, to establish a diplomatic mission in Pretoria and to allow South African investors to build factories in Malagasy and manufacture goods they could sell to Free Africa. Tsiranana received large sums of money for development purposes. The students got wind of the plan, stirred up the workers and the two blew Tsiranana's plan to pieces. As if to rub salt into the wounds, the regime which succeeded Tsiranana's borrowed money from Peking to repay the loan Tsiranana had raised from South Africa! Pretoria regards Free Africa as South Africa's natural market. Every Free African capital south of the Sahara is within a day's flight from Johannesburg. Distance alone would give South Africa a virtual monopoly in the markets of Africa. The Free Africans, however, tend to be fastidious customers; they insist on the abandonment of South Africa's racial policies before they can do real business with Pretoria.

Van Warmelo tried to solve this problem by offering the reserves independence. The Free Africans seemed impressed by the New-Look Policy at the time it was formulated; they even told South Africa that before coming to them for exchanges of views on common

problems, she should have a dialogue with her own black people. Van Warmelo was delighted; he started consolidating some of the reserves into larger blocs, when the Africans blew his policy to pieces by rejecting the independence he offered them. Since then, the New-Look Policy has been encountering heavy weather in parts of Free Africa.

Bulube tells the Committee that the deadlock on "balkanised independence" cannot be broken or the race problem solved by agitating for reforms in the present power-structure. The white man set up this structure for his convenience and not to serve the African. For the black people to see fulfilment in integration in the power-structure is to define the African's destiny in terms dictated by the white minority. And, in any case, the Afrikaner, who is the majority group among the whites, is psychologically not as yet ready for a major readjustment of attitudes on the race question.

In this setting, the answer to the challenge of colour is to confront him with a geopolitical alternative and unite the black peoples of a partitioned South Africa with the Africans of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Together, these people, who number about 60,000,000 blacks and who are bound together by bonds of race, culture and marriage, would together form the largest, wealthiest and most powerful nation in Africa. By straddling the continent from the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, they would control the approaches to Cape Town and reduce its strategic value. Powers like America and the Western European countries would take note of that. A balance of black-white power would be created in which no white man would ever again punish an African for being the child of his parents; no crazy white would dare to bomb unarmed Zambian villages, either.

In a world of proliferating giant-nations, the Africans should see their future from the perspective of giant-nations. The beauty of the geopolitical alternative, Bulube adds, is that it needs acceptance only by the Africans in order to become a political reality; no white man need be asked to change his views or to make concessions or to integrate any African in his society or to give freedom.

Bulube's critics charge that his solution is too idealistic for Africa where tribalism continues to be a fact of black life. Bulube concedes that tribalism is an African problem but points out that it has become a divisive factor largely under the impact of white influences which split men into categories. Christianity, capitalism and the white man's schools transformed human groups into separate islands and stressed individualism. With his sense of community disintegrating, the African clung to every straw which he believed could save him. Tribalism assumed an importance it rarely ever had as a creed of black salvation. The whites used it to set the African lingual groups against each other; the stratagem worked. It made possible the carving up of

Africa into colonies owned by the whites. After independence it brought to power men who saw little beyond the narrow goals the lingual groups set themselves. The same trick is being tried out in South Africa.

This, Bulube continues, calls for co-ordinated action. Africa is only at the beginning of the rebirth into a new destiny. The lingering stress on tribalism weakens Free Africa for effective involvement in Southern Africa or in the solution of problems like the Sahel tragedy or in the exploitation of Africa's resources in ways which will benefit the peoples of Africa. The answer to these problems is for Africa to turn inward, to the essence of *ubuntu* and explore herself ruthlessly in the bid to attain clarity on the truths which have enabled her children to endure so much for so long.

When these truths are known, the synthesis of ideas produced by contact with the white man will project *ubuntu* as the durable ideal which enabled the Africans to survive slavery, colonialism and negrophobia; *ubuntu* will be seen as the basis of unity for which Africa has searched in the last thousand years. People might then speak Woloff or Hausa or Yoruba or Swahili or Shona or Zulu; they might have different customs—all these differences will no longer matter. The important thing will be the fact that the experiences of the Woloff, the Hausa, the Yoruba, the Kikuyu, the Shona or the Zulu will each be seen as a translation of the *Buntu Ideal* into satisfying social action in different environments. When the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa see themselves from the *ubuntu* perspective, they will be ready for the unity they desire. When the *Buntu Ideal* comes into its own, tribalism will wilt away and cease to be a factor of political significance.

Africa needs this unity in order to give effective reinforcement to the black people in Southern Africa where the Africans realise that freedom, like power, is seized and never given. To press for mere reforms is to legalise the thievery by which the Africans lost what belonged to them. That is why they reject the independence offered them in the reserves. But their power to resist is limited by Free Africa's inability to give decisive support on the international plane.

There would, Bulube warns, be no point in Free Africa committing herself to the liberation of the South when the people in the African states were not free. The people who must help Southern Africa must themselves be truly free. The freedom which Free Africa has still has meaning in the lives of the privileged. The tumultuous upheavals going on in parts of the continent are attempts to extend the area of freedom for the deprived in Africa. The extension will take place in two stages. There first must be the period of sloughing off the habits of living and thinking acquired in the house of bondage. The habits were drilled into the generation of the liberators by the schools they attended. The rhetoric of independence still lays stress on freedom



as the thing to live for. Africa has less need for the emphasis on freedom and for more on social responsibility.

The African revolution has not as yet reached its real goals; most of the leaders of Free Africa still see nothing wrong in being the black carbon copies of their former masters. Most of them regard Britain or France or America as their models of perfection. Most of them again are, like their civil servants, christian preachers and ardent churchmen; they see no contradiction in the fact that by urging their people to worship at the altars of the white men's gods they lead them straight to the socio-economic blunders which produced slavery, colonialism and negrophobia.

The black carbon copy leaders will fall into the error of the whites whom they emulate. For some time, they will rule their people in the way the white man lorded it over them. They cannot help doing this because they see freedom and sovereignty from perspectives borrowed from the white side. For them, self-determination means the assumption of the positions held by the former white colonialists.

The abuses their type of freedom is producing creates conflicts and tensions which are alien to the African way of life. A cry is rising from the deprived in Free Africa; it is a cry from the heart of those for whom black carbon copy freedom has no meaning; those whom it crushes precisely in the way the colonialist did. These people feel cheated by the black carbon copy leaders; they want their own type of freedom; the freedom to make the best possible use of their lives and in that way to realise the glory and the promise of being human. They have begun to roll up their sleeves for a massive heave by which they will push the *Buntu* revolution into its next phase, when no person shall be denied the right to make the best possible use of his life. Free Africa is going to go through a protracted period of violent upheaval and the only way to narrow down the area of conflict and dislocations is to stress the unifying power of *ubuntu*. South Africa is already involved in the collision of clashing evaluations of the person and the black people want the final outcome to be determined by themselves, no matter what the cost is. That is why they are rejecting the independence offered them in the reserves.

Against this vast background, Bulube points out, what the white man does in South Africa is relatively unimportant; what matters now is the destiny which the peoples of Southern Africa choose for themselves. Ugly as the future will be into which the Pass Law for women has thrown the African, the enactment of the law is a peripheral issue; the humiliations and the suffering through which the Africans have to go are the blows a people determined to be free must be ready for. The ugly mind which will hurt the African is something which the whites cannot escape; they no longer can help fulfilling themselves by defiling their personality. The African must avoid falling into their error. To agitate for reforms, for race equality in a white-oriented society, is to expose the African to continuing contamination by the

white man's bias for self-defilement. The geopolitical alternative is a precaution against this danger.

The switch to manufacturing, Bulube again warns the Committee, has intensified the shortage of labour and, by doing this, has changed the position of the African woman and changed the whole character of the race quarrel. The transformation calls for corresponding adjustments in Free Africa's policies for Southern Africa.

In the past, the African woman could either be a domestic servant or a professional. The proliferation of factories has changed her into an industrial worker. Already, she has established herself in the plastics, weaving, clothing, canning and many other industries. When the Africans enter a field of employment they do so in large numbers. This leaves them free either to swamp the field or to be in the position one day to withdraw their labour and paralyse industry by themselves, without the support of the Coloureds, the Indians or the white liberals. The pass system was developed to prevent them using their labour as a political weapon.

The women differ from the men in one major respect: the law does not yet require them to carry passes. They are thus free not only to move in and out of urban areas and therefore sell their labour to the highest bidder but also to transform themselves into a new class of black workers which, because it does not carry the passes, is able to sell its labour to the highest bidder, organise itself into trade unions, go on strike and force the employers to sign industrial agreements with it. The prospect strikes at the foundations of white privilege and economic advantage and by doing this cracks or threatens the pillars on which the superstructure of Afrikaner political dominance is built.

Bulube urges the Committee to consider this weakness in the Afrikaner as the condition on which to base strategy. It is a waste of time, he insists, to concentrate on collecting statistics which show how wicked apartheid is. Times were written in Germany exposing the evils Nazism perpetrated against the Jews and what good were they? What is happening in South Africa is a power conflict which is not altogether unrelated to the functioning of Nazism. The power of the Nazis was only smashed when a new alignment of forces emerged in the world. Race discrimination will be crushed when the Africans have created an altogether new balance in black-white relations not only in South Africa, but in the whole of Southern Africa. To help establish this balance is what events call for in Africa.

Bulube warns against people getting excited over events in Southern Africa and losing their sense of judgment. War, whether it be of minds or of peoples, is an ugly thing. Men involve themselves in such a clash not to pay each other compliments, but to destroy those who oppose them or their ideas. The war of minds, which is steadily becoming a shooting war in Southern Africa, is an ugly development and will continue to be ugly for many years to come, as long as people see it as a simple clash of colour.

The collision between the African and the Afrikaner, he repeats, involves ideology, fear, human greed and uncertainty about the future. When the Afrikaner's security in the Cape called for non-discrimination, the white people married African and Malay women. When security needs called for a change of attitude, the Afrikaner committed himself to a self-defiling and self-mutilating form of race prejudice. Bulube sees no reason why the Afrikaner will not be forced to change his attitude when a new balance of forces is created by the black people.

He makes it clear that this does not mean that people should waste time talking about non-violence. History has developed a situation in which violence has become an issue of practical politics in Southern Africa. Those in the position to use force should strike as hard as they can. At the same time those who are not in the position to have the guns should crack the balance based on African labour, Afrikaner economic dominance and English finance-power.

The acid test for the quality of African diplomacy is not the choice between violence and non-violence; it is the acceptance of both as inseparable complements in the crisis which has developed in Southern Africa. This situation must always be seen in the light of the multiple weaknesses on the side of the Afrikaner and calls for confronting the Afrikaners with an alternative or disaster.

The answer to the problems outlined above, Bulube sums up his memorandum, is a geopolitical alternative to the type of independence which is offered by the whites and which Magasela seems prepared to accept; it is the independence which the African chose for himself in 1912. Magasela's attitude is a reaction to the cruel conflict between the African and white ideals of nationhood. The police murdered Magasela's son not so much to stop the manufacture of a portable nuclear bomb, important as that was, as to force the professor to get out of the white man's asphyxiating society at any price and as quickly as possible. With the balkanised reserves out of the way, Pretoria reckons, it might be easier to persuade the Americans to form a naval or even military alliance with the whites. The murder was the type of ugly pressure which the ugly war of minds is producing; it was a deliberate move to stampede Magasela and those Zulus who follow him into legitimising larceny, Bulube says.

Such independence will be a leap to disaster, the chief warns. The overcrowding in the reserves is so acute it will be impossible for them to develop into viable states. To survive at all, they would have to adopt a communist system of economy; if this is what Pretoria is driving the Africans to, it must be warned that it is freeing them only to prepare for war against the whites. To free them and give them a sense of grievance is an invitation to disaster; to offer them the illusion of freedom and withhold its substance is a provocative act. And Pretoria is not stupid; de Haas's government knows what it is doing. Crowd up the

Africans in the reserves, starve them and force them to embrace communism and then ask Washington to line up with the whites against the Africans; make the mess and then ask the Americans to come and clean it up.

Bulube always argues that the Americans are not all so dumb as not to see what Pretoria is up to. For them to gang up with Pretoria could produce an Indian-Chinese-Japanese nuclear club which would join hands with the Africans and possibly the Russians, to keep the Americans out of the Indian Ocean. Alternatively, an American alliance with South Africa would bring about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean, which would threaten the sea routes to the oil fields of the Middle East. Besides, Bulube notes, America and South Africa are geographic rivals for the markets of Free Africa. The day is not far when Free Africa might become a better investment field for America than South Africa. In the final analysis, Free Africa has more resources to offer America than South Africa.

Bulube condenses his ideas on the geopolitical alternative into the following programme:

- i. Independence for all the African people of South Africa on the following bases:
  - a. Partition based on the equitable distribution of the land, the mines, railways, seaports, industries and other resources;
  - b. The payment by the whites of reparations for the violence and the deprivation inflicted on the African people;
- ii. The unification into a new nation or union of all the black peoples of Southern Africa;
- iii. The creation of a viable balance of violence in Southern Africa. The present balance, which is founded on exclusive white possession of the gun must be substituted with a balance based on the portable nuclear bomb. Africa has all the uranium she can ever need to produce the plutonium from which to make the bomb. China and India have the know-how for training the Africans in the manufacture of a portable nuclear bomb; both have a vested interest in seeing white domination blown to pieces not only in Africa but in the Indian Ocean. But race arrogance hurts the man of colour not only in Southern Africa; it hurts him in different parts of the western hemisphere. Free Africa must create the conditions in which her struggle against white domination must have a powerful pull on the thinking of the young black Americans;
- iv. The convention of a conference of the black and white states of Africa to fix a permanent place for the Afrikaner in the African sun;
- v. The rejection of the sham independence now offered by Pretoria and the enlistment of United Nations and Organisation of African