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recognition of the individual's right to make the best possible use of his life. The African Personality grew out of a deep-seated yearning for fulfilment. It was the exact opposite of the Totalitarian Personality. Its main justification was that it thrived because it was persuasive and not coercive.

This school regarded the African as non-racial. To be an African was a question of cultural choice or ideological preference. They worked for the unity of the like-minded of Africa in the direction of regional federations which would one day belong to an African Commonwealth in which the continent's various peoples would be free to make better use of their lives and employ their varied gifts for their good and the benefit of the human race.

While the heroic school looked more and more to Ghana almost for everything, from guidance to financial support and liberation, the realistic wing saw salvation in an association of states in which Nigeria and Tanganyika played a leading role. If a Southern African region was contemplated, they felt safer following Nyerere than when they took the Accra line.

NYERERE OR MKRUMAH?

One of the sequels to the Accra Conference was that the various dissidents then in revolt against the communist domination of the ANC decided to take a co-ordinated stand. They formed themselves into the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and looked to Accra for inspiration, guidance and support. (This was in 1959.)

THE PAC spoke with two voices on the race question inside its inaugural conference held in the hall where the funeral service for Lembede had been held. Mangaliso R. Sobukwe, the leader of the PAC, pointed out clearly in his address that Pan-Africanism had regard for the individual and not for race. Madzunya, the leader of the heroic wing, did not define his position then. His rank and file followers who spoke from the floor - they had come in force from Alexandra Township - made it clear that to them race was important. Some time after this he and Sobukwe went to address a meeting in Durban. Madzunya was asked to state his attitude to the non-Africans. With characteristic frankness he rose up to say that he wanted an Africanistic state in which the Black people would rule. Pressed to say what he would do with the Coloured people in that situation he said he could give no guarantees.

NYERERE OR MKRUMAH?

Nkrumah's alleged medial position at the Accra Conference thus gave the PAC two minds from the very beginning. I was very sympathetic to the PAC for two additional reasons. They tried to carry on from where the Congress Youth League had stopped. I was interested in Sobukwe's humanistic approach. I was convinced that if wise pressures were exerted on the PAC it could be a democratic influence. If people merely sniped at it, I could very well see how Sobukwe would be pushed out and the racialists would be in the ascendancy. I dreaded the prospect of producing an African Verwoerd. I was not the type ^{which} would stop merely at raising ~~its~~ arms in holy horror. A nation was not built that way. I throw in my lot with the realistic side to strengthen the humanists.

Nkrumah vs Liberal

That got me into very serious trouble with some Liberals - certainly with that section which was hostile to the PAC. The Liberals rejected racialism in all its forms. Some of them saw in the PAC a racialistic organisation. They criticised me sharply for lending my support to the PAC when I was a leader of the Liberal Party. I was shaken rather badly by these criticisms because the leadership of the Party had been kept fully informed on my relations with the PAC. A few months earlier the national executive of the Party which had met in Durban had been only too ready to pay my air fare to Queenstown where the PAC inaugural conference was originally to have met. From there the Party had been willing to fly me to Johannesburg to be on time for our conference. By a series of events with which I was not connected, the PAC finally decided to meet in Johannesburg. This was at about the time we also gathered there.

Secondly, when I agreed to lead the Party's delegation to Accra I had regarded South African Liberalism as a liberating influence whose function was not only to oppose apartheid and lead us to freedom but also to exert persuasive pressures on both sides of the colour line to give to freedom a meaning the Africans and the Whites could accept.

The remarkable thing about the attacks on me was that Black and White spoke with one mind. Some of my bitterest critics were African members of the Party. The pressure was so heavy that I felt constrained to offer to resign the positions I held as an officer of the Party. I could then be free to carry on the nation-building

task I had chosen for myself more freely. I was determined to remain a loyal member of the Party. My resignation was not accepted.

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Sobukwe had served his political apprenticeship in the Congress Youth League. He had graduated from Fort Hare University College with a degree in arts. His parents had been poor workers in Grahamstown who by ~~virtue~~ ^{merit} and sheer strength of character had seen him through school. When he graduated he took up teaching posts, mainly in the Transvaal. He differed from very many political leaders of his age in that he was a convinced Christian and a devout churchman.

He was, in spite of his ^{young} age, a preacher in the Methodist Church. When he left the day schools he accepted a post as lecturer in the African Studies section of the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg. A

humanist who never sold or watered down his principles, Sobukwe was acclaimed by his followers and by those who knew him outside the movement as the keeper of its conscience. He and I admired and respected each other and I shared fully the belief that he was the keeper of the PAC's

conscience. He had not been in the forefront of the nationalistic revolt against Luthuli's policy of active collaboration with the communists. But as the revolt gained momentum he was drawn

increasingly into it. When the rebels decided to break away from the ANC he was by no means the most colourful personality among them. Potlako Leballo and Josias Madzunya were certainly in the forefront.

But as the various rebel groups in the different provinces came together, they showed a marked preference for Sobukwe, in the belief that his

developed moral conscience, his regard for principle and his humanism would be stabilising factors in the leadership of the PAC. To

these qualities he added a responsible militancy which made him the man of the moment. Thus, when the inaugural conference of the PAC met in

Orlando in 1959, he was the unanimous choice of the delegates.

In my other book (AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID, Praeger, 1963) I have described the events which stemmed from the Orlando conference and culminated in the Sharpeville shootings. Sobukwe wanted an

anti-Pass campaign which could confront apartheid with the reality of disaster. Unlike most of his colleagues, he wanted to make adequate

preparations for it. Some of his supporters accepted this line. The more impatient argued that the campaign would gain momentum as it went along. All of them agreed on the need to alert opinion in the African

States and, if possible, to ask for moral and material aid. This support was essential in view of the expected reactions of the Verwoerd regime. The snag at the time was how to get the letters out of the country. I knew an ~~foreign friend~~ ^{foreign friend} who had helped some of my friends get their letters out of the country secretly, to stop them falling into the hands of the South African Government. I told the PAC leaders that I could approach him with the request to arrange to get the letters safely out of the country. He raised no objections whatsoever.

In time the PAC gave me a bundle of 13 letters to various African governments for delivery to ~~my friend~~ ^{my friend}.

The reply to the Ghanaian letter marked a fatal turning-point in the history of the PAC. Ghana welcomed the PAC's determination to have a showdown with apartheid and promised moral aid and financial relief for those who would suffer as a result of the campaign. She did not take long to translate her word into deeds.

The effect on the majority of the PAC executive committee was electrical.

They rejected Sobukwe's idea of a carefully planned campaign in favour of a spectacular demonstration along the lines of what Lumumba had done in the former Belgian Congo. Early in 1960, Sobukwe, Leballo and

J.D. Nyasose (the PAC labour secretary) visited me and spent about four days in my house at Inanda to discuss their plans for action against the Passos. I was very sorry they had decided to try to take the citadels

of apartheid by unplanned storm. I had very serious doubts about

the wisdom of this course. Sobukwe confessed to me that he had his own reservations but that he had been overruled by the majority. The

majority at the time was influenced heavily by Aera. Ghana then

had the most cursory familiarity with the actualities of the South Africa race crises. I could not help asking myself, when the three

men talked, if Sobukwe was not being unwittingly sacrificed in the bid to

dramatise the Ghana line on the issue of liberation. The subsequent

arrival ^{and pronouncements} of the Ghanaian, Barden, in Basutoland and his trip to Swaziland did little to make me change my mind.

I appealed to the three men at least to try to give mass to their campaign by getting Luthuli to collaborate with them in staging it.

They had been handled so treacherously by the ANC and the communists that they wanted to have nothing to do with Luthuli. Sobukwe was

always the man who respected facts. In the end he agreed to acquaint

Luthuli with the intentions of the PAC and to leave it to him to say

whether or not he would lend support. For my part, I had undertaken to approach key Liberal personalities to ensure that they threw in their weight on the side of the PAC campaign. This I did and the results are now history. For their part, Sobukwe, Loballo and Nyaose also kept their word. They wrote to Luthuli as we had agreed. He did not reply to them himself. He instructed Duma Nokwe, then secretary of the ANC, who dismissed the PAC letter and campaign with contempt. Subsequently, the Sharpeville massacres were written into the annals of the PAC.

Luthuli and his advisers called for a day of mourning for those who had lost their lives in the shootings. The stay-at-home ^{strike} was a remarkable success, judged by South African conditions. The government reply was to declare a state of emergency and ban both the ANC and the PAC for a year. Luthuli was arrested on the allegation that he had burnt his Pass and incited others to do this. He came under increasing pressure from his younger followers to adopt a more militant line against the White Supremacists. In Southern Natal the women in the rural areas had gone on the offensive against the laws designed to regulate the influx of Africans into the urban areas. They had set vattle plantations on fire and destroyed dipping tanks. In my own district, Inanda, they carried stones in broad daylight to wreck or fill the dipping tanks and not one of them was arrested.

These women were, in most cases, not connected with any political organisation. They were rising in spontaneous demonstrations against the injustice they felt in their lives.

~~However,~~ The bans on the PAC and the ANC had left no other effective political organisation ^{— apart from the Liberals —} to influence the course of events. African leaders saw danger in the spontaneous demonstrations. If they got out of hand, South Africa could be involved in an ugly blood-bath. Feelers were thrown out in efforts to bring about a new regrouping of forces. Increasing numbers of people talked of the need for a united African front against apartheid. The communists, ever determined to influence events, promptly gave their support to the clamour for a united front. A new factor was creeping into the political situation on the African side. A large number of African countries had become free and they were exerting pressure on White South Africa which reinforced the African community's policy of isolating the race oppressors in the world. Year by year in the

United Nations South Africa had lost friends. The militants in the African community were pressing for unity and direct action against apartheid as the area of its isolation widened. In answer to these clamours Luthuli, Professor Matthews, the Reverend N.B. Tantsi, W. B. Ngakeno and Duma Nokwe, all former Congressmen, issued a call to a unity conference. Quite a number of people received their invitations. I was not considered. I was not unhappy with this development. I was aware that the underground communists had taken the initiative in giving direction to the clamour for unity. I did not think unity was what we needed. Co-ordination was the thing. I did not want to involve myself in ways which could help the communists. My Liberal friends contacted me to ask if I had been invited. I lacked enthusiasm for attending the conference. The communists did not fight to solve the race problem; they were interested in sharpening conflict. I said to my friends I would, however, go if invited. I was later informed that Luthuli had said he would be happy to see me attend the conference. This came as a surprise to me. I was aware that he was not terribly comfortable working with some of his communist colleagues. At the same time the Zulu nobleman in him would not turn against them while the battle raged. His lieutenants were bitter against me for my hostility to the communists. They accused me of smelling communism everywhere. This amused me because very, very few of them had ever taken the trouble to read serious expositions of the Marxist doctrine. Their knowledge of communism was as good as that of the security police - which was not worth crowing about. Luthuli himself often said he had not read communist literature. I had not only read it, I had studied communism during the greater part of a quarter of a century.

I was addressing a large and mixed audience in the Caxton Hall, Durban, one evening when two former Congressmen walked in. I thought that slightly peculiar. The communists had put a ban on Congressmen attending my meetings. For a Congressman to say anything good about me had become an act of heresy. Some independent spirits at Lamontville had asked me to speak to them on my experiences in Accra. The police banned the meeting. Attempts were made to meet in a clandestine session. When news of this got to the communists, the heretics were told to have nothing to do with me. They never heard about Accra.

After the meeting the two men came to me and handed me a long

envelope, adding that they had been instructed by Lutuli to deliver it to me personally; that he was very sorry the invitation had been sent late; that, however, he hoped very much I would find the time to go to Johannesburg. I was puzzled by his keenness to see me attend ~~the~~ what to me would most probably be a communist-dominated gathering. He knew that outside his circle there were people who listened when I spoke. At the Bloemfontein conference of African leaders, called in 1953 to express views on the Tomlinson Report, which was meant to be apartheid's bluebook for African prosperity, I had opposed very firmly and successfully his and his side's attempts to incorporate into the statement issued by the assembly, remarks which would identify the nearly four hundred leaders with the Freedom Charter. If I went to Johannesburg, I would not suddenly see virtue in the communists; not after they had systematically wrecked our major efforts to crush race oppression.

Two things could then have been happening, I thought. Either, he was beginning to be a disillusioned man. He probably was realising that he and the communists were not, as I had said, going the same direction. Or, he was once more a tool in their hands, being used to lure me into a trap to destroy me politically. I could not decide what he was doing, exactly. Hyacinth Bhengu and I went up to him to find out ~~what~~ what was in his mind. He gave us a most cordial reception. The idea of a unity conference had come originally from Church leaders (who had taken the initiative in calling the Tomlinson conference) but they had not been able to go too far with it then, he said. They had become involved in delicate negotiations with the government which were likely to be prejudiced if they called a political conference. Certain men had decided to act from where the clergymen had stopped. I wanted to know why it was that only former members of the banned ANC had sent out the invitations, giving the impression that the conference was a party stunt. He was not fully informed, but he believed people had had in mind the idea of sending the invitations out quickly. To do this they had fallen on the names of those who were more like-minded. He implored us to attend the conference.

I was meeting him for the first time in years. He was a different man. I realised that he was quite definitely out of touch with the main stream of events. He was battling to retain the initiative in his hands. He was aware that some people in the ANC

played on the enthusiasm of the militants to commit the African people to futile courses. He was determined not to allow this sort of thing to happen. Bhengu and I agreed that we should stand by him and support him. 22

The eagerness to form new regroupings in the effort to stop the drift to disaster was not confined to the African community. A number of people in the Afrikaans community had been shaken very badly by the Sharpeville massacres. Foremost among these were a group of academic personalities in the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA) the Afrikaans equivalent to the South African Institute of Race Relations. They wanted to explore the possibilities of disengagement from the drift to the bloodbath. They conducted extensive tours of the country and met, spoke to and questioned a number of African leaders in every walk of life. In some ways they represented a fairly wide cross-section of progressive Afrikaner opinion. Professor Cillie of Stellenbosch, for example, impressed me when I met the team as having ideas on the race problem which were nearest to mine. While Professor N. J. Olivier, also of Stellenbosch, was moving toward an enlightened view of the race question, the fact of the separateness of human beings still coloured much of his thinking. Where Professor Cillie attached importance to the universal experience, Professor Olivier had not as yet outgrown the habit of thinking largely in terms of the particular. In between the two was Professor Sadie, a man of principle who seemed to be struggling to move over from being an intellectual non-racialist to being the practical brother of his neighbour. I met them more than once when they visited Durban. They also met Luthuli and a number of prominent Africans. Professor Ross, then in the Free State, described to me the dilemma of the Afrikaner who was struggling to apply universal standards in his relations with the man of colour. He felt that apartheid was bad for the country. But a few rebels on the White side would be useless if they challenged it by themselves without the support of a correspondingly determined group among the Africans. The government would isolate the white rebels and smash them and that would be the end of men who thought as the SABRA group I was meeting did. As I sat among the largely academic men - - - I enjoyed talking to them tremendously; They were cultured, decent men, most of whom made transparently honest efforts to approach every issue discussed objectively - - - I realised that

they and the African would take a long time to join hands to return South Africa to the path of sanity. They had been brought up within the high racial walls which kept them separated from the African. Their knowledge of developments on the African side was confined largely to books, newspapers, racial and political propaganda and the extremely limited contact with the African at the master-servant level and not much beyond. They struggled honestly to overcome this handicap. Before they had succeeded I could not see how they could appreciate the motivating urges which determined African conduct from situation to situation. Professor Olivier, for example, advanced the thesis that it would make things very much easier for people like him if the Africans had their first loyalty to South Africa and did not look to the rest of Africa for help in solving the race problem. The obvious reply was: What ^{was} there in our humiliation to which we ^{could} be loyal? Most of them dreaded the notion of being branded as Liberals. At the same time there was not much in the Afrikaner tradition which could be held out as equivalent to Liberalism in the English and African sections of the nation. Finally, I noticed that most of the SABRA-men who had been bold enough to try to explore the possibilities of non-racial collaboration on a wider area had not, in the final analysis, outgrown the habit of thinking in racial or group categories. In other words although they were very much concerned with the turn events were taking, they were not then ripe for effective collaboration with the African to lead South Africa along safer routes to a better future. They were still intellectual non-racialists. Thus, when Verwoerd opened fire on them they retreated to the comfort of their former positions as respectable and largely conforming members of the Afrikaans community. I would, however, be surprised to be told that this meant the end of the desire for disengagement among them. Their school of thought had even by then committed itself too deeply to accepting the need for an alternative to apartheid. Some ^{from their side} ~~had~~ had published "DELAYED ACTION" which was a reasoned Afrikaner rejection of apartheid. Since then ^{some of them} they have supported Professor Geyser in his fight against race discrimination in the Dutch Reformed Church. A few ^{have} ~~have~~ played no small part in the formation of the Christian Institute, a non-racial organisation which fosters Christian co-operation. What could possibly be the most determined Afrikaner demonstration against apartheid is the regular publication, in Afrikaans and English,

of the monthly journal, PRO-VERITATE, which consistently and aggressively debunks the proposition that apartheid has scriptural foundations.

The English-speaking Churches also did a little ^{heart-}heart-searching in efforts to give visible meaning to Christian ideals within their structures. The recent formation of the Christian Institute is one

outcome of this re-evaluation of positions. In the view of most Africans, however, the Church cannot be a decisive factor working for the resolution of the race crisis because in spite of belated and somewhat half-hearted efforts to take a stand against the immorality of apartheid, it is itself sick with the disease of race prejudice. Bishop Zulu had to be shunted to the backwoods of the Transkei because the

extremely devout White Anglicans of the Zululand diocese would not have tolerated a nigger for a bishop! The Nederuits Hervormde Kerk

does not even want the sight of niggers in its houses of worship. When Professor Albert Geyser said this was unchristian he was black-listed and in the end excuses were found for defrocking him, declaring him a heretic and, finally exerting pressures which cost him his job. It was only when he took the Kerk to court that it began to retreat.

I had been a strong advocate of non-violence up to the time of the Sharpeville massacres. I had taken up this position because it was the duty of the man who embraced reason to settle his differences with his neighbour across the conference table. But to say this was the only factor influencing my thinking would be ^{to} tell only a part of the story. We were weak, unarmed and with practically no friends in the world. For us to think in terms of violence—even in the form of sabotage—when we could get neither the training nor the arms at the time made little sense to me. Even after the emergence of a few friendly African states, the moral conscience militated against the ready acceptance of violence. I was by no means a pacifist. I believed in going as far as I could with non-violence. But when a man tried to rape my daughter, I believed it was my duty to defend her in every way possible. If killing him was the only way to protect her, I saw no valid reason why I should not finish him off. In doing this, I felt, I would be obeying a higher moral law which enjoined on the strong the responsibility to defend the weak.

An altogether new situation developed after Sharpeville.

I saw Press pictures of unarmed men, women and little girls lying ^{of Sharpeville} dead on the streets for no reason other than the fact that they had dared to say they were hungry. A valued friend of mine bought a copy of Bishop Reeves' book on the Sharpeville shootings and gave it to me. I read it over and over again. I was not terribly impressed with his presentation of the African's case. What left an indelible imprint on my mind were the excellent pictures which told our tragic story more eloquently than words ever could. It was the duty of the state to protect little girls. When it mowed them down with machine-gun fire simply because they had joined their mothers in saying they were hungry and sick because of government policies, I became convinced

that/.....

that the state had declared war on the African community. Little girls were shot on the streets in war. Another crisis of the soul developed. What was I to do in the situation created by apartheid? What was the duty of the democrat then? Was it to fold his hands and watch the state wage war on defenceless women and little girls? Or to defend the women and the children? What was I to do when I came across an ammunition dump at the entrance to an African location? If I rejected violence I had to leave it severely alone. But when a short while later the police used the ammunition to murder little girls, how could I lay my right hand on my bosom and disclaim all responsibility? To be neutral in a situation involving violence to children was to connive at the committal of crimes against humanity. To adhere to ineffectual methods in this situation was to encourage crimes against humanity. Reason made it clear to me that I would be wrong to do violence to property. It said also that I would be right to protect children. Where the government acted either in a warlike way or resorted to action which was devoid of moral content, I did not seem to have much of a choice. I would have to obey a higher, moral law and blow up the dump, save the children and pay the price for this. Since the state had declared war on us, my duty was to use more effective arguments in the quarrel on race. I accepted violence as one of these.

The moral conscience and the approach based on reason would be hypocritical mockeries if they made men evade the moment of choice. Sharpeville was my moment of choice. It confronted me with the ugliest perversity of the mind corrupted by race arrogance. I had seen this sort of thing in my own people in the Indo-African riots. It had disgusted and distressed me. When I saw the dead bodies of little girls mown down by machine-gun fire, my blood boiled. It did not matter to me much that they were Black. It would have boiled if they were White or Asian. Society reaches the ultimate in depravity when it allows the state to kill little girls on the streets. Reason

collapsed in the face of the ugliness of the actuality. I decided that I would be on the side of those who would shed blood to defend little girls. This created embarrassing contradictions in my position. How could I, who had consistently refused to separate ends from means, use bloodshed to uphold the moral conscience? I battled to convince myself that I had lost the initiative to choose my weapons. Prior to this I had not deceived myself into imagining that a government which was impervious to reason and unresponsive to moral pressure would be shaken by peaceful demonstrations from us only. I believed that the conscience of humanity was ^{our} ally; that it could, if awakened, have irresistible power. But when it failed us at the critical hour we had no other ^{immediately effective} ~~available~~ weapon left. We had to defend ourselves with our very being; we had to be ready to give up our lives, our possessions, and everything we prized to wipe the curse of apartheid from the face of our land. The collapse of reason did not lead me to the abandonment of my regard for the moral conscience. On the contrary, the conscience triumphed when I refused to agree that we should set ourselves the goal of avenging Sharpeville. Very many people on my side of the colour line swore to avenge the tragedy. I could not bring myself to the point where I could start all over again and hate the group. I did not emerge from the Sharpeville experience with an enlarged personality. I came out a smaller man whose personality had been constricted by the collapse of reason. I was ready to shed blood when need arose because this had become the only way to do my duty by little girls. I am bitter against apartheid as much because of its depravity as because it forces me and others to make bitterly cruel choices. I want to be a better person for my own good and that of my family and my neighbours. Apartheid says I must not and cannot be. This is the ultimate tragedy of our situation. I can understand why,

in the face of this, some Africans see fulfilment for themselves only in finally pushing the White man into the sea. To understand in this context means neither to condone nor to approve. I understand because I disapprove uncompromisingly of any outlook which transforms ordinary persons into ogres. I love little girls. I love them when they are Black or Brown or White. I adore them because they are creation's loveliest gift to mankind. I reject anti-Whiteism because it leads finally to the depravity which produces it; to the murder by strong Black men of little White or Asian girls. Whoever murders little girls in any situation in any part of the world is my mortal foe. I had been shaken very badly by the bloodshed I had seen during the Indo-African riots. It had awakened in me a passionate hatred of violence. When I found myself face to face with the choice between embracing ^{violence} and sacrificing little girls ~~and~~, when I chose to be ready to soak my hands in the blood of my neighbour and possibly kill white little girls, it became impossible for me to know precisely what had triumphed in me — the moral conscience or the brute in the human make-up. Little Black and White girls did not know that they were congenital enemies. They wanted to love and be loved; to eat, play, sleep and grow. The choice was a bitter one. Why should I have to be an ogre to survive? Professor Leo Kuper and his wife, Hilda, were a couple it was my privilege to regard as friends. They had two lovely little girls - about the age of my own children - of whom I was very fond. If I resorted to violence and terrorism I could one day blow up a bus in which they were travelling from school. What difference would there be between me and the Polish guards who decapitated a Jewish nursing mother? I understood the cynicism of the communist in the face of the callousness and depravity of some of Europe's ruling classes up to the time of the Russian revolution. But here again to understand was not to approve. I could not kill Leo's children in order to save mine. The terrible choice tore me in two. I was never to recover from its impact.

In no other sub-Saharan country had economic, cultural and biological integration taken place on as vast a scale, in as permanent a form and over as long a period as in South Africa. Nowhere else has this fact ^{been} denied with greater vehemence. In no other country, with the possible exception of the territories under the Portuguese, was the African's personality attacked with greater ruthlessness. And yet it was in South Africa that the Black man had made the greatest strides in trying to meet the white man part of the way. Largely as a result of these contradictions apartheid had driven Black and White to the position where they were losing the initiative to avoid involvement in a bloody clash. The subsequent emergence of the POQO ^{in 1961} ~~in 1961~~ ^{which} was evidence that we were already caught in the first round of the bloodbath. Movement toward the climax did not make sense for anybody. It would certainly give the white ^S the opportunity to shoot more Africans to reduce their numbers. At the same time it would make anti-Whiteism the new unifying factor in the African community. In so far as the Africans were concerned, this could force the United Nations to intervene. At the same time this was not likely to happen before the white army had taken a heavy toll of African life ~~by~~ because the latter were unarmed. The situation deteriorated until to-day we find that political murders are on the increase on the African side. Nobody makes any secret of this both in the urban locations and the rural areas. Government supporters have been murdered or strangled ^{in cold blood} ~~in cold blood~~ without their killers being found out. The evidence given in POQO cases ~~now~~ ^{has} before the law courts ^(seen in 1963-4) and the incredibly large number of ^{POQO-men} ~~murderers~~ arrested (more than 2,000 according to government spokesmen in May 1963) indicate that this movement is more extensively organised than was suspected to be the case before the Paarl murders this ^{year} ~~year~~.

Sabotage and other illegal underground activity are on the increase practically in every major urban area. Secret cadres continue to be formed to substitute those smashed by the police in the great swoops on P.O. In some of the largest urban locations "gymnastic" groups have been brought into being where selected young men are given secret military ^{training}. Sabotage is the most important subject on the curriculum. The most advanced ^u ~~men~~ ^{or are sent out of the} are trained to manufacture home-made bombs ^{country}.

All talk of non-violence is now taboo in the African community. Albert Luthuli himself now dare not open his mouth on non-violence not even if he were free to do this, which he is not as a result of the bans on him. Secret lists are being compiled of Whites who hurt the African and who will have to be punished for their crimes on the day of reckoning. We were driving with a number of my friends one evening toward Chesterville near Durban when a White man involved himself in an argument with an African. This was the red flag. In a few minutes scores of Africans ^{bashing} were ~~bashing~~ the White man in a determined effort to smash life out of him. In Johannesburg a White girl who drove through the location with her arm hanging out was dragged by Africans without any Black man coming to help. In Pretoria and Johannesburg young schoolboys faced trial for acts of sabotage during the middle of 1963. The Pretoria case was a very sad one because some of the boys were hardly out of their swaddling clothes, speaking metaphorically, to serve the long prison sentences prescribed by the law.

Things are not better on the White side. Here, as among the Africans, one also gets the feeling of relentless movement toward catastrophe. Professional men are fleeing the country in droves before the worst overtakes them. It is true that their numbers are being replaced by those whom the Africans call the "butchers from Kenya". The government, more than any other section of the White community, realises fully that all these developments

explosion is what is happening in the underground. Nothing more than the most cursory outline can be attempted in the conditions which prevail at the moment.

Up to about a year ago it would be said that the underground movement was divided into at least four groups: the ANC communist side, led by "Umkhonto weSizwe" (Spear of the Nation), the politically and racially mixed Committee for National Liberation, POQO and a vaguely defined group with strong Trotskyite sympathies. All these organisations received assistance or encouragement, directly or indirectly, from a number of foreign countries. There was even a group organised on religious lines which ^{derived} its inspiration from the Algerian revolution!

Police pressure, inexperience and the exigencies of the race situation in South Africa have shoved most of these organisations to the background. At the time of writing (1963) we can speak of only three of these — POQO, Umkhonto weSizwe and the Yui Chiu Chan (YCC).

POQO has made the deepest ^{and widest impact in the African} ~~community because of its simple and sharply defined attitude to the white~~ ^{and a newcomer to the underground} ~~and the association of Chinese initiatives in~~ ^{the African} impact in the African community because of its simple and sharply defined attitude to the White man, the Asian and the Coloured. It regards them as enemies. At Paarl (1962) it promptly murdered Coloured girls found in bed with Africans in the men's hostel. White and Asian girls would have suffered a similar fate. It wants to have no dealings whatsoever with non-Africans. It arose out of a doctrinal controversy which shook the now banned PAC badly after Sharpeville. Pan-Africanism insisted on asserting African initiatives. This meant that in practice the Africans would not collaborate with the non-Africans — at least not before victory. Mangaliso Sobukwe, a practising Christian and a humanist, had insisted from the beginning (in 1959) that the exclusion of non-Africans from the PAC was purely a tactical

position to be abandoned when the Pan-Africanist socialist State was established. Madzunya, who led the opposite faction in the PAC had no time whatsoever for the non-Africans.

The cleavage widened after the arrest of the PAC leaders, with the Madzunya group in the ascendancy. Emphasis came more and more to be on asserting ^{exclusively} African initiatives. Non-violence was rejected on the score that peaceful demonstrators at Sharpeville had been killed by White violence. The disciples of Madzunya told their followers that the African had to stand alone, to "go it alone" because he suffered alone. The Nguni (Zulu and Xhosa word for ~~alone~~ alone is PODO.

One of the ~~trivial~~ incidents that transformed PODO into a distinct political movement was the decision by the government to move hundreds of Africans out of the Western Cape into the Bantustans. The PAC was the strongest African political organisation in Cape Town where it had worked in the closest collaboration with Patrick Duncan and other White Liberals during the 1960 demonstrations. The removal threat created a crisis in the PAC which had by then gone underground. One wing, remembering the help given by sections of the White community during the state of emergency in 1960, rejected race exclusiveness. The other, reacting sharply to the threat of being removed from the Western Cape, clamoured for a new and more effective method of struggle. At a series of secret conferences at different places the Africans from the Western Cape pressed for race exclusiveness and for the open use of terrorism. Contrary to police propaganda, the ^{PODO faction} did not carry Natal, the Transvaal and the Free State with them—though sections in these provinces were sympathetic. Faced with opposition with the PAC, the terroristic group ~~PODO~~ stood aside and called itself PODO, to distinguish itself from the PAC sections

which were still involved in the controversy on race and the avoidance of terrorism. It took up the view that it would proceed on its own to attack White supremacy directly. It regarded the PAC as too moderate to free the African. Potlako Leballo is said to have travelled (incognito) extensively over South Africa to try and return the angry P000 young men into the PAC fold. P000, if the evidence of its members is to be believed, takes pride in its belief in and use of violence and terrorism. Its methods of recruiting are less selective than those of Umkhonto. It has a marked preference for the brave, the bloodthirsty and, of course, the ^{determined} ~~trained~~ without much regard for their grasp of the mind of the enemy. In Court, some P000 adherents have said that superstitious rites were used to endow them with especial power to overcome their enemies. While the discipline and moral ^e were very good, P000 ~~y~~ lacked the requisite training and experience in underground work against a modern police State. The slightest pressure broke many of them down and they started squealing. Where the communist ^s preferred sophisticated, urbanised youths who had known terror from the White side, P000 happily recruited unsophisticated rurals who often broke down the moment the White man tightened the screw on them. One catastrophic result of this is that it has been possible for the police to net in no less than 2,000 men (May 1963).

^{underground}
P000, like the communist, ^s is organised in cells. These are divided into the active and the passive. The active are made up of the dedicated young men — some of whom have already been given the death sentence — who take the oath to do whatever they are ordered to do in complete obedience. The others, mainly professional and business men and women, provide the funds, the food and the clothing.

Its goal of ^{st-} ~~dramaticing~~ ^{apart} its hostility to ~~start~~ ^{parted} to the point of murdering Whites and pushing the Asians into the sea had

racism

of life gives it a mass appeal which Umkhonto — led as it is
mainly by Whites and Asians — is not likely to have. P.O.O. argues
that while the White man is the exploiter and oppressor, the Asian
joins readily in the exploitation of the African. He is as race-
conscious as the White man. He treats the African with contempt.
Wherever possible he tries to squeeze out the African entrepreneur by
every means and used his financial power to gain the advantage
over the Black man. In his establishments, almost in every town, he
sees to it that the African is employed only in menial jobs ^{by} ~~where~~
whereas the Africans constitute the bulk of his customers. In
Grey Street, the Asian commercial centre in Durban, there is not
a single African behind the counter whereas the bulk of trade
in this area is with the Africans. When the Asian employs Africans
in better capacities, it is as touts in the streets. As the latter
are mostly women, the pride of the African is offended deeply,
in a country where the African woman is a subject of bitter
controversy on both sides of the colour line. P.O.O. regards the
employment of women in touting capacities as deliberate humiliation
of the African people.

It is not easy to answer the question how P.O.O. has
been affected by the mass arrests. There is no doubt at all that
they have been a serious setback to its programme of rising against
white domination. Some of its ablest, younger leaders are likely
to serve long prison sentences. A few have escaped the country. Some of
the best of them remain in the country. The savagery of the anti-
sabotage and other laws is creating a tradition of martyrdom which
has placed the P.O.O. ideal well on the road to immortality. As more
young men are gaoled, they are hardened in their hostility to
the White man. A corps of leaders nurtured on suffering ^{and race hatred} will

in the end emerge which will not know the language of compromise. The longer the struggle continues the more it will swing people toward anti-Whiteism.

The ~~communist resistance works on the~~ ^{plan} ~~political and the para-military~~. The communist resistance works ~~works~~ on two planes: the political and the para-military. The underground ANC does not conceal its associations with Umkhonto weSizwe, Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the ANC identified Umkhonto with the ANC and were not corrected. It does not hide its associations with well-known communists. Nor does it refrain from making it known, by sending frequent statements to the Press, that it is very much alive. As an organisation, the ANC is not ^{is present} ~~is~~ communist. The leadership—Luthuli was ^{skipped} ~~skipped~~ to the background long ago—is predominantly communist. This fact was not concealed in the days before the bans. The ANC continues to be ^{used as} the political wing; the very vital link with the masses of the African people—~~mainly in the urban locations~~. The ANC, at the branch level, is now dominated by men who accepted the Freedom Charter in 1956. These saw nothing wrong ^{with} ~~in~~ working with the communists. Since then two developments have strengthened their hand. There has been a ruthless purge of all moderates, Luthuli-men, advocates of non-violence and the nationally-minded in the ranks of the leaders. Secondly, very many urban locations, in which vast number of Africans are concentrated, have been organised according to a well-known plan. Each location is divided into wards, each of which is under a leader trained especially in cells ^{which were} instructed by communist leaders. Each location is led by a committee whose members do not know each other. They know only the contact man ^{he} ~~he~~ is the link between them. He receives orders from the regional communist authority and transmits those through his contacts to the factories or the locations or the domestic servants. The machinery works wonderfully efficiently. On more than ~~one~~ ^{in spite of the arrest of the leaders} ~~one~~

occasion the communists ~~have~~ demonstrated that they could summon thousands to a meeting in Currie's Fountain, Durban, at extremely short notice.

Group leaders are selected very carefully from former members of the ANC. They are divided into cadres each one of which is given intensive training under a trusted— usually White or Indian— communist. Some of the most promising of them are awarded "scholarships" to study in Iron Curtain countries. At first the Patrice Lumumba university in Russia was the favourite destination. Since then Czechoslovakia has attracted a fair number. Peking uses the colour factor and is fast becoming ^{the} centre which cannot be ignored. Widely divergent estimates of the numbers of men and women awarded these "scholarships" have been given. Most of these are sheer guess work. The actual people who know precisely how many "students" have been sent out are the ANC underground top leaders with communist sympathies. They are disciplined and dedicated men who do not open their ^{mouths} ~~mouths~~ wide on the slightest provocation or after the first glass of sherry. Let it suffice to say, however, that if reports collected from various colleges and universities are any guide, the number of people going out is sufficient to give the communists a sizeable corps of trained leaders in the near future. Not all the "students" who leave South Africa go in for sabotage. Very many of them are prepared for positions of leadership in the professions, politics, labour, etc.

The line taken in the locations is to throw the African community into a crisis mood. The rank and file are told that the day of reckoning is at hand; that they should be ready for it; that they must ask no questions and, finally, that they must at all times be ready to do exactly as they are ordered by the leaders who will emerge at the right time. There are very strict orders against amateurish dabbling in sabotage. Care is taken to avoid collisions with the police wherever this is possible at

this stage. The para-military wing is organised differently. In the larger locations "gymnasia" are organised where carefully selected young men are given training in subjects ~~like~~ like physical training; The ablest of them are carefully hand-picked, pushed into secret cadres which are governed by a code of discipline and secrecy so rigid and airtight the police have not up to now - the Rivonia arrests notwithstanding - ^{been able to crack it} For a number of years the White communist boss of the Transkei was a very respectable businessman and a well-known friend of very many police and government chiefs. He ~~was~~ ^{travelled} in and out of the Transkei ~~travelling~~ to Tanganyika and Russia whenever he liked. The discipline of the communist para-military wing seems to be too good even for the South African police, whose leaders are not among the world's top fools.

The pupils of the "gymnasia" selected for advanced training attend regular classes where they are subjected to thorough indoctrination in communist theory and sabotage. They graduate into Umkhonto. As a result of all this training, the communist saboteurs are less loud-mouthed than P.O. and have, consequently, not sacrificed as many of their people as P.O. has done. Equal thoroughness is insisted upon in the rural areas where it is more difficult to organise people into cells or call regular meetings. The plan is to persuade urban workers from the same rural area to belong to one group or ward. They are under the care of a trained leader. From among themselves they select sub-leaders who spread the gospel in the rural areas and who come, ultimately, under the direct authority of the ward leader. The line here is also to wait for the day of reckoning.

It might be profitable to weigh ^{briefly} the strong and weak points of P.O. and Umkhonto for purposes not only ^{of} speculating on which organisation is likely to be in the ~~winning~~ ~~position~~

ascendancy at the critical moment but also for determining the extent to which the underground is likely to influence the course of events above ground.

Umkhonto is handicapped heavily by the fact that it has a mixed or predominantly non-African leadership at the top and that its lower echelons are mixed—partly as a precaution against chauvinistic deviationism and partly because Marxism recognises no race. In South Africa, where class and race are all mixed up, the non-African communists find themselves in a situation of bewildering perplexity. They do not have the numbers. They belong to privileged racial class^{es} no matter how much they might seek to identify themselves with the African workers. This conduces toward danger to which we shall come shortly.

The inner conflicts and contradictions in the communist camp militate against a bold programme of sabotage. Efforts up to now have been concentrated largely on electric pylons, Pass offices or communications at points of relatively minor importance. Huge industrial concerns which are the lifeblood of the apartheid economy are practically untouched. The critics of Umkhonto attribute this to the fact that in the last analysis the communists do not want a real collapse of apartheid^{at this stage} as this would surrender victory to African Nationalism—to which the overwhelming majority of Black men is still committed.

As already shown, POC's performance is amateurish by comparison. But there is little doubt that it has on its side more permanent advantages. Apart from its daring and determination—whether or not we believe in bloodshed—it is by far the extremest organisation the African people have produced so far. Its pulse beats in harmony with ^{those} of a very large number of people who have suffered and lost much under apartheid. Thus, the ^{first} advantage