

effective in the new direction taken after the Maritzburg conference. When he no longer took a clearly antagonistic stand against violence to property, he was merely accepting the inevitable. Because he could not change the violence from the White side, ~~he could not change the violence from the White side~~ he could not stop it ^{growing} ~~growing~~ ^{from} among his people. If he ^d ~~did~~ he would be rejected promptly. This ^{was} ~~is~~ the bitter dilemma facing the moderate in South Africa ^{then} ~~today~~.

I was under no illusions about the ^{implications} ~~implications~~ of the failure of non-violence. Civil war would ultimately ^{be the} ~~only~~ argument in the great dispute over the status of a man if he was not White in South Africa. It was clear from the draconian laws ^{enacted} ~~and~~ the threats made by cabinet ministers that the government clearly wanted a showdown with the African people as soon as possible, before the rest of Africa moved in to confront apartheid, with the reality of disaster. The elimination of all ground ~~where~~ ^{on} apartheid could be opposed peacefully was proof of this. People with ^{genuinely} ~~genuinely~~ democratic views were being banned, gaoled, exiled, ^{detained} ~~detained~~ or ^{their} ~~their~~ passports withdrawn in a deliberate bid to ^{silence} ~~silence~~ criticism of the government. This had had the effect of driving large numbers of groups underground where violence was the only possible argument to use against apartheid. Luthuli weighed ^{all} ~~all~~ these possibilities in his mind. After the award of the Nobel Peace Prize he bought himself a farm in the Swaziland Protectorate. While there I saw his wife busy at work on it. If civil war broke out, would Luthuli withdraw from the clash and spend his last years in peace? It was most unlikely. He was the type of ^a ~~of~~ man who would want to fall by the side of his humblest follower. At the same time he had a large family. He did not have much faith ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~course~~ events would take ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ immediate future. The purchase of a farm was a precautionary ~~one~~.

measure to safeguard their future .

While all these things happened, Nelson Mandela consolidated his position in the underground in readiness for taking over from Luthuli. The Maritzburg conference gave him status. This was followed by a systematic campaign to recruit students, mainly from Fort Hare, who were sent to Iron Curtain countries for study purposes. These would be the elite core surrounding Mandela when he took over the leadership of the African people after Luthuli. He himself was subsequently sent on a tour of Africa to establish personal contact with foreign governments. While Mandela was out of the country, the communists called off their sabotage campaign. They were going to wait until he returned.

The significance of all this lay here: The point had been reached where the communists regarded Luthuli as expendable. Efforts were made to "deracialise" the organisations which had once been controlled by known communists. Deracialisation would merely facilitate control and give the new group mass. Mandela would lead it. The new times necessitated a change of line. Luthuli himself had been a great champion of multi-racialism. He had even gone on record against those African who chose the non-racialism of the Liberal Party. They made themselves ineffective, he said, when they collaborated in one organisation with the Whites who had the vote. If the communists ordered "deracialisation", Luthuli's position would be further weakened.

On his return Mandela told the ANC "deracialised" executive that he was no longer a multi-racialist and that he accepted the assertion of African initiatives as paramount. He did not know he was digging his ^{political} ~~political~~ grave among the communist multi-racialists. A ^{whispering} ~~whispering~~ campaign against him was started. He was accused of having become a PAC chauvinist. Shortly after ^{that} ~~that~~ he was betrayed to the ^{Police} ~~Police~~. The people who betrayed him all known for the Police saw no point in shielding communist treachery.

The difficulties facing Luthuli throw into the boldest relief the real dangers in the South African situation. On the one hand a totalitarian government has been steadily crushing the African moderate while the communists exploited his position of weakness to entrench themselves. Both sides used him in different ways to pave the way for a showdown. Now that this was clearly in sight, the tragedy of his situation emerged in the clearest outlines possible. A position was arising when he might realise that he served best the communist cause when he thought he was farthest from doing this. This, in turn, threw light on a deeper tragedy. Apartheid is so wicked it can drive a man of undoubted Christian integrity like Albert Luthuli to collaborate actively with the communists simply because Afrikaner Nationalism is wholly unresponsive to moral or peaceful pressures. He can be compelled by communism's demonstrations of apparent power to ^{risk} ~~run~~ splatting his own people in a desperate bid to stem the tide of race oppression. When all these techniques fail the spectre of ultimate civil war emerges and hovers menacingly over South Africa. This is not a personal defeat for Luthuli or for the African people. It is a major defeat for democracy. If war finally comes, it is unlikely to be only a racial war. It will involve ideological sides as well. Nobody can say if it will not catch on in the rest of the continent.

Each time I visited Luthuli I found his position becoming increasingly difficult. His people demanded that insistence on non-violence should not be an excuse for inactivity; ~~for a~~ ^{for} a passive reaction to the bans on him. He should give proofs of its effectiveness. The Free World, after showering him with honours, expected him to be the martyr for peace. The government moved events toward a bloody climax. Although the Free World feared, rightly, that if blood was shed in South Africa the possibility was very real that this would produce a conflagration on the continent and possibly in the world, it did not take decisive steps to vindicate Luthuli or those who fought to extend the area of freedom in the republic. America

~~cheerfully bought South African gold and in that way helped to keep apartheid going. The British Ambassador obligingly took the segregatory line at the most important parties he gave~~

A few weeks before he flew to Oslo, toward the end of

1961, I called on him to congratulate him on the Nobel award.

During our conversations I outlined to him the significance of the award for him, and for our struggle. He would be given stature and prestige he could use to reinforce the image of a non-racial, as distinct from a ²multi-racial, alternative to apartheid. He could become a new rallying-point for most opponents of the government from both sides of the colour line. If he did this a bloc of non-racial opinion would ^eemerge which would be strong enough to meet racialism from either side. It would be powerful enough to give the country a real choice of alternatives. The non-racial image of nationhood would be projected powerfully to the fore as a clear alternative to apartheid. He listened carefully. When he replied he surprised me with the request that I should put down my ideas on paper and send these to him. A bigger surprise followed. He asked me to imagine myself in his position in Oslo. Could I then put on paper the things I would like to tell the world from that platform? He made it clear that he was going to ask other people to make suggestions. He was kind enough to give me most of the names of these without my asking for them. Some of them were known communists or communist sympathisers. I agreed to prepare the documents, which I sent to him in due course. I later read his Oslo speech as published in the Press. He had incorporated in it some of my suggestions. The policy of leaving the door open to reconciliation was paying dividends at last. It was obvious that he had wanted to make a speech which would not be repudiated from the African side at least. He had been under no obligation to go out of his way to ask a man like me to help him with ideas if he thought his communist allies had all the best. In his moment of personal

triumph he seemed in mood to declare his own position as a non-ideological man. This was a long move from the days of our quarrel. At last he was realising that the things I had said had been pronounced in earnest. A few days later the Norwegian diplomat arranging this trip to Norway invited Yengwa, Bhengu and myself to meet him secretly. He said he had been asked by Luthuli to meet the three of us because we were his closest friends in Durban and knew ^{how} his mind worked and had ^{our} political ears to the ground. For me, this was a surprise. I had thought our friendship had ended with the exchange of unpleasantries in ^{Manilal Gandhi's} ~~various~~ paper. Luthuli, I ^{was learning,} ~~know,~~ was a greater man than I. It was possible that collaboration with the communists had been a tactical move ^() the realistic choice in the face of Free World impotency. The immediate racial threat had to be disposed of first. Ideological tangles could be straightened ^d later, after victory. In this mood, the Zulu nobleman was impressed by demonstrations of apparent power. The communists had sailed into this ^{situation} ~~existing~~ to pose as uncompromising opponents of race oppression. They had impressed Luthuli with their apparent power. He saw effective allies in them and he therefore went along with them. The possibility of his being pushed ^{beyond} ~~to~~ the point of no return before he had got out of the ideological entanglements was, strictly speaking, not one of his major problems. If the democratic pass could be lost in the process, it would be because the Free World failed to give proofs of practical effectiveness; to confront Luthuli with visible demonstrations of strength. In this sense he remained the battered symbol, no longer of resistance, but of the African's shattered hopes, of his defeats and, ultimately, his despair. From there what else did the African have to turn to? The Sabotage Bill ^{eliminated} ~~annihilated~~ all ground for peaceful agitations for reform. The spectacle of violence and bloodshed hovered over the South African ^{scene} ~~arena~~.

they will allow the brazen violation of the ideals they claim to uphold simply because it is Black men who suffer, I would see no alternative for the African but to think in terms of the appointment on the battlefield and prepare for war. The Afrikaner nationalist is already doing this. Those who oppose him delude themselves when they think he will yield to the polite pressures exerted on him by the West. His answer is to arm to the teeth. It is our lives which he messes ; it is the graves of our fathers which he desecrates ; it is our womanhood whom he insults ; it is our very being which he seeks to destroy. Merely to expel him from international organisation will not make him change his mind. The only language he will understand is to confront him with disaster.

The Sharpeville butcheries had pushed me away from non-violence. I accepted violence to property as a legitimate argument in the race dispute. If a man attempted to rape my daughter, I would have to defend her—even if this meant killing him. Violence to property led me on to accepting violence to the person also as a permissible argument. Although I had been pushed to this extremity, I continually found myself lapsing into pessimism about the efficacy of sabotage. We could not use it against a modern dictatorship and rely on it alone to bring us to our goal. I was still trying to sort out my own thinking on this plane when new troubles began to show on the horizon. It had become clear to me, in 1959-60, that in a situation of narrowing choices, political action would sooner or later be impracticable. The government had made up its mind to crush all opposition from the African side. I felt that where we were in no position to stop the drift toward a police state; the ground from which we would have to continue the struggle would be the minds of men. We had to do everything in our power to get the nations to do something about apartheid. One way of doing this would be to speak to the world through the written word. My profession suited me for carrying on the struggle on this plane. I feared that the day might come when all the leaders of the African people would be gaoled ; when the voice of my people would no longer be heard adequately outside. To ensure that, it was heard even while we were in gaol, I decided to write my first book on apartheid—AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID published in New York by Praeger in 1960. I was then facing trial for having been on the continuation committee which later organised the stay-at-home strike in 1961 and forced the government to declare a state of emergency.

~~Prisoners of New York in 1950!~~ The police subsequently came to the house and asked me questions on my working habits. This made it clear that a ban was in the offing. They later raided my house and seized some of my notes. Fortunately, I made them in duplicate and kept the carbon copy in a secret place. After the raid I decided to cross the border quietly, at a time when nobody would be suspicious about my final intentions to settle down in the British Protectorate of Swaziland.

I had arranged with my family that I would return occasionally to Inanda. This I did. My intention was to give the Security Police the impression that I had not gone into exile and to keep them guessing until my plans had been completed. My father had been a policeman and I had a working knowledge of their thought-habits. As soon as the signal came from Durban indicating that the bans were ready, I cut off my visits home. A few weeks later, the police nailed a series of three bans on my front door because there was nobody in the house when ^{they came}. These prohibited me from attending meetings, addressing gatherings or from leaving the Inanda district. I was not allowed to go to certain places or to communicate with certain persons. I was to report regularly to the police at Inanda. All sorts of restrictions were placed on my movements. The provision which almost crushed me was the one which made it a crime for me to "prepare in any way whatsoever" material which could be "published in any way whatsoever". If the police came to my house and found me editing notes for a sermon prepared and to be delivered by somebody else, I would be committing a crime for which I could be sent to gaol for five years. If they found me writing any article for a grandmothers' magazine on the treatment of carbuncles used by my grandmother, I could spend another five years in gaol. Every penny which I had ever earned in my life had been strictly from the written word.

I knew no other job. If I stayed in South Africa it means that I would not be able to earn my living. Very many White editors friendly to me and for whom I had written over the years were so frightened by government plans to gag them that they did not feel free to accept too many articles from me. This was the first of two cruel blows. The second was to realize that after 25 years of pleading with Black and White and particularly with my people to be guided by principles with a universal validity in their efforts to solve the race problem; after being on the side of reason for so long; after a known record of conciliation between Black and White, I could be accused of and ^{be} banned because the state believed that the things I did would bring about conflict between the African and the White man.

The bans came as some sort of finale to a tragedy enacted over 25 years of my life. I had tried hard in that period to develop and draw out the beautiful, the decent and the sane in me and in my neighbour because I knew fully how much lying, hatred, cruelty, meanness and selfishness lay locked in our bosoms as ordinary human beings. I did not believe I had superior virtue on my side. I had not set out like Diogenes of old to light a lantern in broad daylight to discover honest men. I did it because I had learnt the very painful way that this was the main condition of survival for me personally, for my people and for the human race, the only way of freeing myself from a degrading experience. I was appalled by the sufferings the strong inflicted on the weak. I did not think I was in any way better than those who thrived on the humiliation of others. I was reacting to a situation which hurt me personally. To thrive on the ruin of others was degrading to the victims, to me and to the perpetrators of the degradation. The mass degradation of human beings was the most tragic thing in the human experience. The world was not a better place because of Sharpeville or of what happened in Belsen and other Nazi concentration camps.

lay the rottenness of its depravity; the lie in its soul which made it one of the most evil creeds ever produced by the mind of Man.

I had been given enough time to prepare myself for the bans. I had made myself believe that I was ready for them. But when they came, they stunned me - - - not because they changed my life but because they confronted me with the ultimate ugliness of wartheid. I was shocked by its limitless capacity for destruction. The bans accused me of working for conflict between Black and White --- I, who had preached non-violence until the African had been physically shot down in the mass at Sharpeville. I was accused of aiding and abetting communism --- I, who had spent 25 years exposing the evils of communist totalitarianism. I had never in all my post-Adams life done anything to set White against Black or to widen the gulf between them. On the contrary I had tried very hard to make reason prevail in the relations between them. To accuse me of helping the communists and for this reason to deny me the right to earn my living left me aghast. I just did not understand what it meant. It seemed that words had ceased to have their meaning. Who, in all South Africa, did not know my public and private attitude to communism? I asked these questions in the moments of transient bitterness in which I was caught shortly after the bans. When my mind cleared up I saw the whole tragedy in better light. Of what value was the truth to people whose whole life had been corrupted by the lie in their soul? If it suited them to smear me, to lie against me, to frame me, to damage my character, they would brand me a communist ---- the bans were issued under the Suppression of Communism Act --- even though that made Lenin turn in his grave. Such was their morality. So desperate were they. Any lie, any fabrication was valid if it could serve the purpose of destroying a hated opponent.

As I thought over the bans certain things

began to

Europe in a gigantic bid to remove the blot on the human experience which apartheid constitutes, to rehabilitate the advocate of apartheid and to teach him to know shame once more.

I got news of the ban about 72 hours before the borders were closed. The control posts were to operate from July 1, 1963. The end of June was on a Sunday. On Saturday morning I telephoned my wife in Durban telling her to be at Nongoma - almost halfway between Durban and Swaziland - the following day at 10 o'clock. I spoke in very clear accents saying that I would send my car to pick her up and asked her to be on the look-out for it. I told her that I had not changed its registration numbers because I looked forward to returning home. She was not to bother about the borders because after coeing me --- I had been ill for some weeks --- I said I would like to go to Durban with her for treatment by a specialist. She understood everything. She mentioned the bans. I shouted a few unprintables about their author (whoever he was) and assured her that I would return home and settle down to a quiet life as Luthuli had done. That was good for the Special Branch men who tapped telephones. I borrowed a car from a friend and asked another friend to drive it by a less popular road to Nongoma in Natal the following morning. That night (Saturday) June 29 I hired a man to take my own car and drive as far as Vryheid along the main road from Swaziland to Durban. This was the road I usually took when going home. He was to keep moving between Vryheid, Dundee and, if possible, Ladysmith. He was always to travel by day so that the police should keep track of the car the whole of Sunday. And indeed - as I was to learn when they questioned friends where my car stopped on the road - they alerted almost every police station along the road as far afield as Ladysmith, beyond which my car had never passed. While they were busy trailing it, Eleanor was coming safely up the little-used Nongoma-Manzini road. She later told me that a police van had been twice to the bus rank

where she

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There she was to wait for my car in Nongoma. When she saw the police she got herself driven out of the town to a spot where she was picked up by my friend from Swaziland. She crossed the border exactly nine hours before it was closed---on June 30, 1963. With the exception of a few clothes and blankets, she had left behind everything we had possessed. The children had been brought over two days earlier.

With the family out of harm's way, I sat down and made preparations for carrying on the struggle against apartheid--- on the new plane I had chosen for myself. I tried to apply my mind to the question which many people asked in South Africa: Faced with a government which was impervious to reason, unresponsive to moral pressures and ready to use bloodshed to crush peaceful agitations for reform what did the defenceless have to do to ensure that justice was done to them? The obvious answer was that they should continue to fight and continue to make the supreme sacrifice. But how would they fight? How did a man who detested war fight apartheid with any hope of success in a situation where the state dispossessed and deculturated the African as a matter of policy? Where, as in Sharpeville, it resorted to mass murder to silence peaceful opposition? There was the law under which a citizen could be detained for successive periods of 90 days each without trial or ~~without~~ a formal charge being preferred. House imprisonment had been introduced. What shattered me, however, was the law against sabotage for political purposes, which imposed the death sentence. Since then a number of African fighters for freedom had ^{ve} been sent to the gallows for protesting against injustice in the only way open to them. Political opposition above ground had been virtually eliminated. Responsible leaders had been banned or gaoled ^{or} and their organisations declared illegal.

By hanging political opponents the apartheid state had made it clear that its intention was to push South Africa to ^{bloodshed} ~~to~~ to preserve White supremacy. Faced with this

situation

sections of the African people, in common with non-African opponents of apartheid, organised themselves into underground groups for sabotage in some cases and for para-military action in others. A disturbing feature in this development was that very many of them were not subject to the ~~the~~ discipline of some of the established political organisations then operating underground. Much of the arson which had destroyed sugar plantations in Natal had been the work of independent groups who took it upon themselves to fight apartheid in their own way. ~~Because they were small, untrained and closely-knit they had escaped the attention of the police.~~ They had the potential to get out of control and complicate the first round of the bloodbath or make it impossible for Black and White to negotiate a settlement.

It seemed to me that what was needed was to put pressure on non-racial organisations and political parties to pool their resources and agree ^{on} a minimum programme of opposing apartheid. They would ^{have to} put aside controversial issues like universal adult suffrage and would ^{have to} concentrate on the single aim of overthrowing apartheid. If Albert Luthuli, Mangaliso Sobukwe, Alan Paton, Jan Steytler, Archbishop Hurley, Albert Geyser and many others stood side by side in a united national movement of protest against injustice, they would keep opposition to race oppression alive and give ^{internal} focus to external pressures against Verwoerdism. They would together constitute a powerful bloc of non-racial opinion which would be able to take over the reins of government after the collapse of apartheid.

After creating the united front they would prepare for a national convention where Black and White would negotiate a settlement to the race problem and agree on how best to live together. The agreement produced by the convention would be adopted by both the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity as their statement of policy on South Africa.

For its part, the United Nations would establish a permanent Commission on Racism which would co-ordinate campaigns against race hatred in the world. In South Africa it would have the specific task of seeing to it that the programme to be recommended by the committee of experts was carried out. It would help move events in South Africa toward a negotiated solution. It could even arrange a truce between the Africans and the government whereby either side would retreat, suspend courses which sharpened conflict and try to create an atmosphere in which it would be possible to argue across the conference table. The government could be asked to abolish the Pass Laws, lift the bans on democratic leaders and organisations, stop the political trials, suspend the arrests of political opponents, and guarantee safe conduct to the convention and agree to call it. The Africans, for their part, could suspend the sabotage campaigns, the despatch overseas of young men for training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare, ease pressure on the government in the United Nations and stop the international boycotts of South African goods for the duration of the truce.

If the government co-operated in calling the convention; if, in other words, it took the initiative to get Black and White to agree on a solution to the race problem, the Commission on Racism would give help in bringing about change with the minimum of unavoidable dislocations. If the government was intransigent, the United Nations would wait until the International Court of Justice had given judgment on the complaint brought against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia. This waiting would be designed to ensure maximum unity in enforcing United Nations decisions on South-West Africa. After the judgment it would occupy South-West Africa and establish a permanent presence there. If South Africa resisted the occupation, the United Nations would blockade South African ports until apartheid collapsed. If South Africa allowed the United Nations military presence to enter South-West Africa, the United Nations would authorise

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willing or sympathetic nations to organise, under the
auspices of the international body, a ^{naval} blockade of South
African ports. A volunteer fleet organised by nations
determined to rid the world of the curse of apartheid
would wrench the initiative from the Great Western Powers
and pave the way for a decisive showdown with apartheid.
As long as the United Nations relies heavily on America,
Great Britain, France or West Germany or the Commonwealth
for giving teeth to its decisions against apartheid, we are
least likely to see effective action taken. We must think
in terms of by-passing those Powers which delay the crushing
of the Verwoerd regime or of forcing them to collaborate
in destroying apartheid. ~~even if to retain the initiative~~
~~to influence events in their hands~~ One course which suggests
itself is the organisation of a voluntary fleet by friendly
Powers ~~and~~ to serve notice on America and Britain that if
they drag their feet the Allies Against Apartheid will
place a sizeable force at the disposal of the United Nations
to move ~~xx~~ events in South Africa to the moment of decision.

The armada thus ~~raised~~ brought together on a
non-ideological basis would not be handicapped by the
economic, racial, cultural and other ties which militate
against decisive action by the Great Powers of the West. The
chances are that South Africa would use armed force to
break the blockade and clear her shores of the ships of
the Allies Against Apartheid. The South African navy would
hit back---but this would be little more than a token of
defiance. The diplomatic isolation of the country is now
so complete that one cannot think of any Great Power which
would rush to the defence of apartheid. The chances are good
that most Great Powers would at least secretly give
encouragement to those fighting to destroy apartheid. Thus,
even if the resistance were determined, it would be of
limited duration.

America, Britain, Russia and China all want apartheid
crushed. If the West discouraged decisive action ~~against~~
~~apartheid~~, it is difficult to see why Russia would not want

to demonstrate to the Africans that she means business when she condemns apartheid as ~~unjust~~ insulting to the people of Africa. China would require little persuasion to involve herself in the naval blockade--- not when she has made spectacular efforts to "win friends and influence people" in Africa. In the final analysis it is difficult to imagine America sitting down and doing nothing while Russia remained free to help organise the Allies Against Apartheid.

The organisation of sufficient force to crush apartheid with the minimum of unavoidable dislocations is one of the most important functions of the Organisation for African Unity. For this reason, it might not be wholly wise to concentrate too much on the training of saboteurs, very many of whom sooner or later fall into police hands---because of the perfect/~~secret service~~ ^{secret service} organised by Verwoerd. If money was spent in organising a voluntary naval force and training personnel for it, ~~the~~ the problem would be tackled with a greater sense of realism.

The naval blockade by itself would serve a limited purpose. After the collapse of apartheid--- Verwoerd has mesmerised the world into believing that he is invincible even when he stands alone--- the United Nations would send in an international police force to disarm the White community, deracialise the army, facilitate the creation of a non-racial society, prevent the excesses of ~~passion~~ passion from either racial side, maintain law and order, protect the minorities and ensure that coordinated non-racial initiatives become the dominant influence in South African life.

A period of adaptation to change, to give both sides enough time to cool down and adapt to the requirements of living in a non-racial society, would be guaranteed by the international force. During this time South Africa would ^{be} divided into cultural zones with autonomy

A

in cultural matters. There would be zones in which dominant ethnic groups would perpetuate their cultures. There would also be non-racial zones where non-racial initiatives would predominate. This arrangement would remain until Black and White had given up race consciousness and had learned the habit of living together in a non-racial society. After that the vote would then be given one value in every case.

In other words, I saw a solution for the race problem in a phased programme of movement toward the non-racial society. This multiple solution allowed of rapid change and showed where possible beginnings could be made. It provided for continuous movement to final goals and enabled The Africans, the Whites, the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity ~~UNA~~ to collaborate effectively in moving events to a given goal.

From this position of internal weakness we had to spot ^{vulnerable} points in the enemy's defences. We had to regroup and launch limited offensives until we could mobilise enough strength to overwhelm apartheid. I was thinking in terms of a long-term programme of action which would enable us to rise from defeat and confront apartheid at last with the reality of disaster.

I was attracted to the idea of taking up a realistic attitude to what was then happening in the Reserves - - - particularly in the Transkei. The government had set out to demarcate about seven rural reserves as African homelands (or Bantustans) which could, if they liked, one day attain independence - - on the other side of a hundred years from to-day government spokesmen said. It made sense to me to involve ourselves fully in Bantustan politics and to use the political and legislative institutions in these as platforms from where to continue opposition to apartheid. Initially the government would make every effort to ensure that pro-apartheid regimes were in charge. Our task would be to prepare to throw these out of power and substitute them with anti-apartheid governments which would waste little time in pressing for real independence. If Verwoerd refused to free them then apartheid would be exposed for the humbug it is. If he set them free they would be valuable ground from which to operate or agitate against apartheid. It was of the greatest tactical importance that these beachheads into the heart of South Africa should be controlled by governments ^{They could connect the African community directly with the United Nations} favourably disposed to us. It was equally important that the Bantustans should be given all possible economic help to lessen their dependence on South Africa and wean them away from Verwoerd.

Against this background the training of saboteurs abroad seemed to me to be a ^{partial} running away from the real challenges which apartheid presents as

possible and incorporated into the consolidated Bantustans. We could then have a direct overland route linking Nongoma and Mbabane directly with Dar-es-Salaam or the rest of Free Africa - a sort of geographical umbilical cord to succour the consolidated state. The immediate goal in all this would be to build up an African state with the potential to base its relations with Verwoerd's South Africa on the critical balance which preserves the peace between Israel and the Arab states. We have tried the United Nations and made endless appeals to the Free World to make Verwoerd see better reason on the race question. Our failure compels us to turn more and more to our own resources and to realise that justice can never be done to us unless we are prepared and ready to confront apartheid with the reality of disaster. Freedom, we must always remember, has its roots deep in the graves of martyrs.² We have to use ~~these~~^{our} resources wisely to ensure respect for our wishes. Verwoerd is intransigent because the balance of forces is overwhelmingly in his favour. To alter this, we have to bring the borders of Free Africa to his. This will not be easy to do. But since it is our main guarantee of moving events at a pace that suits us, we have to put together our best brains to plan this operation. We must persuade friendly nations to work with us to ensure that we build up the requisite balance which we could use to impose a perpetual psychological and political strain on White South Africa. It could help corrode Verwoerdism and encourage the Whites to react somewhat realistically to world hostility to apartheid. It could place us in the position where we could have better chances of convincing the Afrikaners that in the final analysis African goodwill is their main guarantee of survival in Africa. Without the critical balance they will not come to terms with this fact.

The consolidated state would merely be the

nucleus of a greater, federal structure. It would be the first stone in the foundation of a state with the potential to be as wealthy and as powerful as the United States. The gravest injustice apartheid has inflicted on us is that it frustrated life's purpose for us and keep^s us poor and backward when we could have made our lives better. South Africa is about as old as America. By comparison she is not too poorly endowed when it comes to natural resources. In about the same time the values which give content to the American way of life have buoyed ^{up the United States} ~~her way~~ to the position of leadership in the world while South Africa has, in spite of her economic strength, moved steadily toward the blood bath.

The White man, acting by himself will not correct this. He will not of his own free will respect our will to fulfil ourselves. We have to mobilise all our resources to assert our will and destroy the system which sets a ceiling beyond which we might not make ourselves better men and women. But this requires careful planning, over a long period of years if necessary.

The nucleus or foundation would be a cultural federation without a unitary constitutional structure. The White man cannot and must not be pushed out of South Africa. This would harm the African himself most - spiritually and otherwise. The great revolution now raging over the continent is victorious because it springs from a moral ideal; because it regards the individual as a precious end in himself and seeks to widen the area within which he might make better use of his life. This evaluation of the human personality is basically spiritual and precludes all possibility of discrimination based on race. To revert to racialism in the hour of victory would be to betray the revolution, and to tread the slippery path to the moral depravity which we find so repugnant in apartheid. In our thinking we must be ready to give effective leadership

COMMUNITY - - which would embrace South Africa, the protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, South-West Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Southern and Northern Rhodesia. If Black and White pooled their resources to establish the COMMUNITY, its economic potential would be such that within a century it would be one of the wealthiest and mightiest Powers of the world. The Afrikaner would be integrated as fully and securely within the ZAMBEZI COMMUNITY as the Jew or the Irish is in American life to-day. If, however, he arrogated to himself the wealth of Africa and exploited her peoples, the COMMUNITY would be large and powerful enough to drill commonsense into his head. For there can be no thought whatsoever of partition. The soil of Africa belongs to ~~the~~ the people of Africa. None of it can be alienated and ceded to a minority which regards itself as foreign to Africa or which refuses to identify itself with the people of Africa. Partition can never be just. It would be an insult to Africa which future generations would have to wipe off the slate of history. Even if we were to be forced into it, we would yield under duress and protest, determined to right the injustice as soon as we were strong enough to do this. The consolidation of the Bantustan state and the creation of the critical balance would merely be stepping stones to the larger, unified federation.

Disengagement abroad involved acceptance of the fact that external pressures against apartheid must be related to a clearly defined goal, movement to which would be prescribed in a programme of liberation. Much of the energy expended in the fight against apartheid is wasted because there is no master programme which guides thought and action. It was because I felt the need for a programme very strongly that I thought in terms of the ZAMBEZI COMMUNITY and of the critical balance. We had exerted diplomatic pressures and succeeded in isolating apartheid in the

serious attention can be given to the ways by which apartheid can be finally crushed. In my first book I confined myself to an analysis of its origins and to a declaration of final goals without stating how these might be attained. The limited scope of an autobiography precludes the detailed discussion of strategy. For this reason I shall confine myself to a ^{recapitulation} ~~statement~~ of principles on which to base it in the hope that these might help guide action to the goals most people in the world, in common with us, desire.

- i. Behind South Africa's race crisis is the conflict between two irreconcilable outlooks on life---between the one which sets the greatest store by race or the group and the other which attaches maximum importance to the individual. Race oppression and economic injustice are merely the visible expressions of the basic clash.
- ii. By churning up racial passions, disrupting the agencies for international co-operation and straining the economics of African states eager to free their continent from the course of racism, apartheid transforms Africa into a sensitive area ~~of the world~~ and compels men to think in terms of war. In this respect it constitutes a threat to peace.
- iii. The problems created by race consciousness over the last three centuries are too complicated to be solved in one day or merely by granting every African the vote. ~~They would not be solved readily even if the United Nations sent in an international police force supported by America's seventh fleets.~~
- iv. The physical destruction of apartheid and its substitution with a socio-political structure in which no person shall be punished for belonging to a particular racial, cultural or lingual group are inseparable complements. It is of the greatest importance that we should plan as much for victory against apartheid ^{as} for the complicated problems this will create.
- v. The use of terrorism and violence by Black and White has forced both into the first round of the bloodbath from which they can be extricated only by external intervention/...iv

intervention.

vi. To produce the desired results, intervention must compel the opposing sides, by the use of armed force if necessary, to meet and agree on ultimate objectives---on the meaning of South African citizenship. An imposed solution would defeat its own purpose. The African people, in common with most Indians and Coloureds and a very substantial section of the White community, desire change. They differ widely on its nature and extent. This, in turn, helps to keep the Verwoerd government in power. It banishes, gaols or bans those who try to bridge the gulfs dividing the South Africans. It stands in the way of a feasible solution. The first condition of solving the race problem is to force the Verwoerd regime out of power. This can no longer be done by any section of the enfranchised White community. The secret police are too powerful for this to happen. The leaders of the non-Whites have all been silenced or rendered ineffective. It can be done by the United Nations acting in common with the Organisation for African Unity, the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Canada as the first six countries with the strongest cultural or economic links with South Africa. They can exert decisive economic or diplomatic ^{pressures} to topple the Verwoerd regime and must be pressed hard to do this.

vii. Pressure must be in the direction of compelling the various groups to meet in a national convention to iron out their differences and possibly produce a "treaty" between Black and ^{white} where ^{would} by both races ~~they~~ agree on how to regulate the relations between them for their mutual good. Twenty-five years of political activity on both sides of the colour line convince me that the convention would reach agreement on basic goals. In spite of apartheid large sections/both sides of the colour line are too deeply aware of the interdependence of Black and White and want to agree on final goals. A plebiscite on the issue would produce surprising results.

viii. The formula agreed upon by the convention would be backed by the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity and be guaranteed by the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Holland as the countries with the closest cultural links with South Africa.

ix. One of the first steps toward successful intervention ^{would be collaboration between the} ~~is the establishment of a~~ United Nations ^{and} ~~Committee,~~ ^{with representatives of} the OAU, to work out a phased programme of intervention and prepare ground for the national convention.

x. If possible a political truce, called under the auspices of the United Nations, would precede the 'convention for' purposes of creating the atmosphere most conducive to agreement. ~~For their part, the various opponents of Apartheid would agree to suspend their boycotts and other campaigns organised abroad for the duration of the negotiations. On the homefront they would also suspend their campaigns of sabotage and similar activities for the same period. For its part, the government would temporarily suspend the Pass arrests. It would lift the bans on representative leaders and guarantee their safe conduct for purposes of participating in the Convention.~~

xi. The truce would enable both sides to disengage from conflict; to go through a period of cooling down and to retreat honourably from present positions to allow international initiatives to restore the situation to normalcy wherever possible and to establish some form of dialogue between the government and its opponents.

xii. The chances of the Verwoerd government agreeing to allow the convention or bring about peaceful change are so slender, however, that the intervening authority should be ready to use the mailed fist or the olive leaf as the situation demands. If present indications are any guide the first prerequisite for a real solution to the race-problem will be the ^{overthrow} ~~destruction~~ of the Verwoerd regime.

- xiii. From the African side there would have to be forthcoming a measure of flexibility and realistic acceptance of the fact that agreement on ultimate objectives was more important than universal adult suffrage at this stage. Emphasis would be ~~on~~ moving ~~on~~ rapidly forward to a non-racial society without exacerbating disruptive conflicts.
- xiv. It must be agreed that survival for any community lies not in the assertion of its particular historical experience at the expense of the others but in reconciling them and accepting them as the composite parts of a larger, South African experience.
- xv. The goal of all agitation against apartheid is to establish a society in which the citizen, regardless of race, colour, sex or cultural commitment, shall be free and enabled to make the best possible use of his life and be no longer punished for his ethnic origins or for reasons he cannot change.
- xvi. It is of the greatest importance that those who oppose apartheid should themselves be clear on ultimate goals and work toward them according to a phased programme which will build up unity and mutual confidence among them while widening ideological fissures in the White community to keep non-racialism alive and ready it for taking over when apartheid collapses.
- xvii. The establishment of a federal state within which the various cultural groups shall have enough territory to perpetuate their way of life without the danger of being swamped by the numerically stronger communities.
- xviii. The temporary limitation of sovereignty of the individual on the franchise issue, ~~leading to the leading of the vote in favour of the minority which seeks guarantees of security for a mutually agreed period~~ ^{temporary} Parity in the numbers of White and non-White representatives in the national legislature would enable both sides to start life afresh in an atmosphere where both could learn the habit of race collaboration.

xix. The close co-ordination of United Nations and OAU policies and action against apartheid is a guarantee of orderly movement toward freedom.

xx. Europe and America have deep-rooted economic and cultural links with all the peoples of South Africa. If the world came to be divided on the basis of race one day, these links---which are an important factor---could be damaged. It is neither in the interest of the African nor the European nor the American to allow this to happen. For this reason little time should be wasted on resolving the South African race crisis.

xxi. The United Nations, the Organisation for African Unity and the Free World should go, ^{far as} possible to bring about a peaceful solution, but if these attempts prove unsuccessful it should be appreciated that Mao Tse-tung's China committed herself publicly at Mashi ⁽¹⁹⁶³⁾ to the use of force in resolving the race crisis.

When I look back on the twenty-five years of fighting race oppression, certain things stand out ^{boldly} in my mind. I started my adult life intent on living as a reasonable man. In a society where reason was respected more in the breach than ⁱⁿ the observance, I had my full share of bruises, disappointments and defeats. If I were to start life all over again in similar circumstances, I would do the things I did and once more suffer the defeats. This is the price one has to pay for endeavouring to be guided by reason in a race-conscious society. I would still say that in the fight against racism, the decisive battle has to be won in the mind of the individual citizen before the war is carried into the midst of society. The individual has to reject racism together with its basic proportions and rewards before he can hope to ^{swing} society toward a just order. I tried hard to throw race hatred out of my being, not because I was a virtuous man but because it distorted my vision of the world around me and stunted the growth of my personality. This is what it is doing to-day to the Afrikaner Nationalist. I opposed it when it came from the White side and fought it among my own people. In like manner, I opposed both apartheid and communism. They were both totalitarian and regarded the individual as expendable/...vii