WITH LABORATION. ATTEMBUTED TO THEIR DE CHE POWER OF THE BRITISH INHERIT A SITUATION . 17 WITH LABORATION. ATTIMBUTED TO THEIR PSEING WT | EUPERN AVILLED TO THEIR PSEING WT | pany and the Boers. De Mist was appalled by the callous brutality of the Boers toward the man of color: They did not behave like a civilized community. He attributed their attitude largely THE BOVIA to the fact that they had been cut off from the main stream JUNILIZA 2 · THE BRITISH INHERIT A SITUATION of European civilization for a long time. In order for them to WIN OF develop a humane attitude, he felt, they had to be educated NWAME'S HIGHIGH MISSON: UNSTAVET A UNIFING and civilized. Accordingly, he introduced reforms in the Govern-PINTERN OF ASSUMEN NATIONALISM GON JOINES ment and the schools designed to bring the Boers more in line BOERS. with the main stream of European thought. Storms of protest HBORAL ATGENSES INTO THE rose the moment he promulgated these, and even the Dutch Reformed Church joined in the popular clamor against de Mist. Such opposition, coupled with Maynier's expulsion and the TIKE the rest of the world, most South Africans believe that Trekboer's expressed desire for national fulfillment, was a clear Great Britain introduced liberal attitudes to the man of A repudiation of that Holland which had begun to go "liberal" color in the Cape. Some of Afrikaner nationalism's apoloin its evaluations of the human personality. If the Dutch had gists still swear that this was done to bribe the Africans for the not been finally driven out of the Cape in 1806, there is no valid purpose of getting them to gang up with her against the Boers. 1BETUALING reason to suggest that their brand of liberalism would not have Because a lot of bitterness, hatred, and confusion has developed, been repudiated as completely as was that of the British. What a brief recapitulation of the salient facts about this formative the Boers objected to, basically, was a way of life. Who upheld FULL GAMER period in South African history will help place events in their it was not decisively important; what mattered was that it threatproper perspective. -ened those values which they cherished most and were not GO TO As far back as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, willing to abandon. Repudiation was, in the circumstances pre-Maynier had been driven out of office at Graaff-Reinet because thin vailing at the time, the most effective form of protest for a he had acted on the principle that the African had a dignity of Novement. minority. People moved away from the center of oppression, tistorica his own as a human being, which had to be respected. Although since the land beyond was largely in the hands of Africans who his predecessor had not been wholly unsympathetic to the idea did not have guns. Beyond the boundaries prescribed by Cape of treating the African in a humane way, Maynier's expulsion UH Town, the Trekboers could be free to do what they liked, once was a calculated demonstration against a very definite stand on they had broken African resistance. NIMERIEN a vital issue taken by a Dutch civil servant. It was into this situation that the British moved when they After this event, the Napoleonic Wars brought the British to took over the Cape. Their coming merely accelerated a process the Cape to forestall the French. The Treaty of Amiens (1802) of thinking and action among the Boers that was already moving restored the Cape to the Dutch, who ruled it under a departin a clearly defined direction. What dramatized their impact on ment of the Batavian Republic. Shortly after the restoration, the Boers was the fact that they were foreigners who spoke a the republic sent out Commissioner de Mist to modernize the different language and upheld unpopular cultural values. By sucadministration of the Cape and fill the political vacuum that ceeding the authorities who had ruled from Cape Town and had wrought so much harm in the relations between the com-Holland, they were presumed to be heirs to the sins of their RESELTION OF A WAY LA, AZONA OF MAPOCAL

WAY OF THE BRITISH INHERIT A SITUATION . 19 of every right-thinking white person to uphold the dignity of (The pagan was the enemy of Christ/His attacks on the whites and his defense of his freedom and his lands constituted a threat to the Christian way of life. When the Boers shot their way into his territory, they were carrying out (a divine mission) exactly in the way the Israelites had done when they smote their enemies, whom they regarded as the enemies of God. Here Christianity was being used effectively to pave the way for racial and

their group or race consciousness as the first condition of survival. The Boers regarded their situation and their mission as similar to that of the Israelites. On the other hand, the British drew the distinction between

his race.

moral and economic necessity. But the Boers found it difficult to do this where the man of color was concerned. The result was that while the Britons maintained a fairly flexible attitude, which continually adapted itself to the demands of a changing situation, the fundamentalist approach forced the Boers to have one inflexible code of morals between white and white and another between black and white.

As the years went by, the conflicts in these attitudes became

(increasingly irreconcilable.) In 1772, the British courts had ruled

that slaves would be freed upon landing on British soil. About

economic policy. The Israelites had maintained the purity of

their doctrines by remaining inflexibly exclusivist, by regarding

14,000 men and women were freed as a result. A little more than ten years later, the Anti-Slavery Committee launched its campaign designed to limit the importation of slaves into the in the British Empire.

These external developments affected the position at the Cape drastically. In 1805, the Cape population was estimated at 25,000 whites and 29,000 slaves. First, the Earl of Caledon decreed that the circuit judges should pay more attention to the grievances

of the slaves; then, the improvement in their working conditions

BOERS REPUBLATION OF THE WANGETO WITY THATE. 18 . AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID predecessors in office. As a result, their arrival did little to per-

suade the Boers to change their minds about repudiation. At the same time, a very important development was gradually coming to the fore to shatter whatever accord still remained between the Boers and the British. Slavery was on its way out in the British Empire, and its effects were becoming increasingly visible in the policies of the Cape government. British governors began modifying the conditions under which the slaves worked; Sir John Cradock, for example, decreed that the number of lashes inflicted on a slave as punishment should be decreased. The Boers disliked reforms like these, for they saw in them an attempt to weaken the authority and prestige of the white man, a sinister threat to their supremacy and survival. They STATE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE

could remain the black man's superiors only when the law al-

lowed them to do what they liked with their slaves. From the

nature of both the short-term and long-term reforms, it was be-

coming clear that British policy aimed finally at creating a nation

in which economic, political, and cultural homogeneity would

be entrenched powerfully enough by usage to neutralize racial

antagonisms and lead to the creation of a social order in which

black and white initiatives could be harnessed for the more suc-

cessful exploitation of the country's wealth.\It so happened that moral considerations and the pressure of public opinion in Britain tended to favor movement in this direction. But moral considerations had never figured prominently as an influence in determining the relations between the Boers and the Africans, In the eyes of most Boers, a white Christian was under the obligation to use Christian standards almost exclusively in his dealings with white Christians. As guardians of the Christian tradition, the whites had the right to lay down the law for the pagan descendants of Noah. Because of a curse, the people of Africa had been born into sin; slavery was the punishment, the mark

of permanent inferiority to the white race. For the white people

to identify themselves with the blacks was to degrade them-

selves and flout the divine intention; it was the right and duty

OBES! BULESIATUCK ENTERICATION OF THE THEORY: OUTROBE AND MARGENTURES: PARTICIANS CONTROLED AS PAGANCIE. EMMONIC DROOM POWNED ON WAGE PLATHER CHYCRY! AT PUKANIERS OPPRASO CHESS.

AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS APARTHEID

and the fact that they could purchase their freedom on relatively more generous terms confronted the Cape with a new and difficult problem-the shortage of labor.) Slavery had corrupted the white man and, as Baron van Imhoff had pointed out in 1743, largely incapacitated him for hard work. Since every young white man regarded himself as a gentleman, emancipation was to find him either unwilling or unable to exert himself in ways which could prevent the collapse of the settlement's economy.

To gear the Cape's economy to the coming changeover, the government produced the Hottentot Proclamation of 1800. Most South Africans regard this British law as having introduced the pass system and migratory labor. It broke up the tribal system and forced the Hottentots out of their reserves to offer themselves as laborers on white farms and elsewhere.) It became a crime for a Hottentot to be in the white area unless he was employed there; it became compulsory for him to carry a pass showing that he was either in employment or on legitimate business. Written contracts were introduced that bound the Africans to serve for periods agreed upon.

This proclamation, seen from another angle, illustrates how contradictory white intentions were toward the Africans. In 1778, van Plettenberg, a Cape governor, had attempted to persuade the Africans to agree that race segregation, when it came to residence, was best for all. In a tour he made that year, he had assured the Africans that if they kept to their side of the boundary he and they were said to have agreed upon, the whites would stick to theirs. Economic pressures, however, made mincemeat of this policy and helped to create the impression in the African mind that the white man pledged his word to break it the moment he could afford to do so without harming himself. The story of van Riebeeck's fences was being repeated all over again, and it is being done today in the Bantustan policy.

Three years after the Caledon Proclamation had become law, Governor Cradock decreed that Hottentot children born on a white farm should be apprenticed to the farmer for ten years before they were free to seek employment elsewhere. The attempts to cushion the Cape's economy against emancipation, therefore, created a situation in which the government made laws to insure that economic slavery came in to replace praedial slavery. The new policy cast the relations between the whites and the Africans into an altogether new mold. Up to that time, the wars between black and white had been fought mainly over the land question; now, the growing shortage of labor and the expanding economy made it imperative that more Africans be brought under white control. Only in this way would they work for the white man on terms that suited him. In the wars that followed, the fight was no longer for driving the Africans off the land or pushing them into the interior; the intention was to bring them under white rule. But the white man soon found himself caught in a vicious circle; for, in order to prosper, he had to wage almost perpetual war against all the black peoples in southern Africa. Since the needs of his economy demanded that no sovereign independent African state survive anywhere near his borders, the wars with the Xosas, Sutu, and Zulus, which continued with brief intervals of peace almost up to the end of the nineteenth century, were to a large extent the inevitable result of supplanting a praedial slavery with an economic one.

The year 1814 opened one of the most explosive periods in South African history. Lord Charles Somerset arrived at the Cape to head its government. Two years later, he issued a proclamation requiring all slaves to be registered. In 1823, he decreed that proper marriages had to be arranged for the slaves. Work on Sunday was forbidden. The slaves worked for a fixed number of hours per day. A maximum form of punishment was prescribed. The slaves were no longer to be separated from their families when sold. Their right to personal property was recognized. This proclamation, more widely known as the Slaves' Magna Carta, provoked a storm of protest from the white side. The British Government, acting partly upon missionary pressure in South Africa and a large number of sympathetic groups in England, ignored the protests.

Three years later, Governor Bourke, who acted for Somerset while the latter was in England, issued another proclamation, which established the office of slave protector, made it compulsory for the farmers to pay their slaves for Sunday work, and made it easier for the slaves to purchase their freedom. The white community protested very strongly against this law. Their main argument was that the people overseas did not understand South Africa's problems; they knew the African and were therefore best qualified to deal with him. Surprisingly enough, the argument is still used today in answer to world criticism of apartheid. By that time, however, British opinion was determined to smash the institution of slavery. In desperation, the whites in the Cape demanded representative government as a guarantee that Britain would not interfere in their domestic affairs.

Two other important events had taken place after Somerset's arrival, both of which affected profoundly the attitudes of the Boers. The first had been the coming of Dr. John Philip, in 1819, to supervise the work of the London Missionary Society -the significance of which will be discussed in the following chapter. Here, discussion must be confined to the British settlers, who arrived in 1820.

They were not the only minority group to arrive from Europe. There had first been the French Huguenots and then the Germans. They are important because their presence affected British policy in the Cape; unlike the French Huguenots, who were virtual refugees and were, for this reason, willing to lose their identity in the Boer community, the British settlers had not repudiated Great Britain or Europe. They regarded themselves as an integral part of the large Anglo-Saxon community in the world. Its culture and economic, military, and political power were, in the ultimate reckoning, their final guarantees of security. For these reasons, they were less ready to lose their identity in the Cape than were the Huguenots.

Their arrival created quite a different set of problems for the Boers. Until then, Dutch had remained the main official language. Although Somerset had made attempts to reform the government by introducing British ideas and practices, the small numbers of English-speaking people had militated against too bold a program of Anglicization. The arrival of the settlers encouraged him to decree, in 1822, that English would be the Cape's official language after 1827. This led to a head-on collision with the Dutch-Huguenot community and produced the first language struggle. But Somerset was so determined to Anglicize the Boers that he even discouraged the practice of importing ministers from Holland to fill vacant pulpits. He preferred men from Scotland whose doctrines were identical with those of the Dutch Reformed Church. The Dutch monetary system was scrapped, and English coins came into circulation. By 1827, the British judicial system had been adopted.

The wounds cut into the soul of the Boers by all these developments are apparent to this day. British attitudes toward the Boers, Somerset's policy of Anglicization, and Britain's determination to destroy slavery and elevate the man of color to the position at least of equality before the law-all stimulated the conflict of initiatives within the white community itself. The Boers believed that Britain wanted to reduce them to the position of political, economic, and cultural vassalage. This they would not allow, no matter what happened. Their answer was to struggle to assert Boer initiatives as the dominant influences in the white community. Thus were the foundations laid for the long and bitter conflict between the Boers and the British, which led both sides to war and culminated in the Union Prime Minister's decision not to apply for membership in the Commonwealth.

## 3 · DR. PHILIP AND THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

R. JOHN PHILIP landed at the Cape when the pattern of the relations among the various racial groups was more or less fixed. The possession of guns had enabled the whites to assert their initiatives so successfully that the Hottentots had been cowed into submission. But although they had only the spear, the Xosa Africans were in no mood to lie down on their stomachs while their lands were pillaged and their women raped by the white marauders. The clashes had been very fierce, but it was becoming clear that the side with the best arms would ultimately carry the day. And inside the white community, a fierce struggle was on to assert group initiatives as the dominant influence in government.

Dr. Philip viewed all these developments with a great deal of concern. The assertion of racial initiatives, he realized, would always drive black and white into two armed camps, and the result would be either the decimation of the African or the expulsion of the whites from the soil of Africa. There could be no hope for Christianity in this situation. In his view, the Cape's greatest need was not conquest or counterconquest, but the establishment of a bridge of accord across the color line to enable men and women who worshiped at the same altar to stand together in the defense of those things they cherished most.

He found in Christian values the sort of bridge that would achieve the end he had in mind.

The wars had oversimplified the real issues in the conflict between black and white. The whites had marched as a group into African territory; the blacks had defended themselves as a group. This made white unity an indispensable condition of success. That, in turn, had the effect of justifying and reinforcing Boer attitudes. To Philip, this tendency to view men from the perspective of the group would in time have the effect of making it extremely difficult for black and white to agree on the meaning of citizenship. And where this agreement could not be reached, the outlook for Christian missions would be bleak. To pave the way for a common Christian citizenship, Philip insisted on regarding moral values as having a validity that transcended race. It was not enough, however, merely to pay lip service to these values. To make an impression, they had to give form to the relations between black and white; they had to find expression in the legislative program of the government.

Philip had reached the Cape when the collapse of slavery could not be delayed much longer. While applying himself to the task of accelerating the movement toward its final abolition, he prepared himself for a protracted fight against the pass and migratory labor systems. First, he attacked the British Government's policy of perpetuating slavery in a new guise. He denounced the uprooting of the Africans from their reserves and their being forced to work for the whites against their wishes. This, he said, was not the sort of conduct to expect from a community that called itself Christian. He was outraged by Boer callousness and brutality in dealing with the Africans. No Christian should tolerate this sort of thing. He agreed that it was desirable to civilize the African. But, he insisted, this could be done successfully by giving the African enough land to live on, by recognizing his right to sell his labor where he liked, and by respecting his right to determine his life. He encouraged those Africans who had embraced the Christian faith to settle

in mission reserves; he taught them that, like every human being created in the image of God, they had an inherent dignity.

As was to be expected, his activities made him extremely unpopular with the farmers. They accused him of seeking to rob them of their labor. Any emphasis on human rights, they said, spoiled the Africans and made them think they were the equals of the white man. They took on airs and became rebellious and threatened to upset the social structure which the white man had established at the Cape. The farmers then organized campaigns to get the mission reserves broken up and the Africans dispersed. They exerted pressure on the government to curb Philip's activities. But he replied by carrying the fight right into the House of Commons, where he had powerful friends, and he wrote extensively on conditions in the Cape. His "Researches in South Africa," in which he described conditions as he had seen them, made a deep impression on British opinion. The most outstanding result of his agitations was that the British Government instructed Governor Bourke to pass the now famous Ordinance No. 50 of 1828. This law abolished the previous proclamations limiting the freedom of movement of the Hottentots. Their right to buy land was recognized, and they were no longer forced to work. They became the equals of the white man in the eyes of the law. Dr. Philip pressed the British Government to include a clause in the proclamation saying that it could not be amended or repealed without the consent of the British Government.

But Dr. Philip's most important contribution to the solution of the race problem was not his success in persuading the British Government to get Ordinance No. 50 promulgated at the Cape -important as that was in a situation where the possession of the gun gave the initiative to the white man. It was, first, in the way he introduced a new dynamic into the conflict between black and white. By attacking the white rulers from the perspective of moral values, he built a nonracial bridge for the likeminded on both sides of the color line to coordinate their reserves of power and march together against race oppression.

This moral dynamic differed from the liberalism of Maynier and de Mist in that it relied, for its support, not on the ruling minority but on the good will of decent men and women on both sides of the color line. In Maynier's day, it had been possible for the white supremacists to throttle liberalism in the white community and to ostracize the nonconformists. The humanistic dynamic facilitated the coordination of black and white initiatives on the basis of values accepted by both sides. Because of this, the time would come when it would be the guiding influence in the lives of millions of oppressed people. Then, no power on the side of the white minority could withhold from the Africans the liberty that was their birthright.

Second, it had long been evident that where racial initiatives were pushed to the fore as the decisive factors giving momentum and direction to life in South Africa, victory for one side could, in the end, mean the destruction of the other. Because the African did not have the guns, he was at a disadvantage. Dr. Philip saw no valid reason why the oppressed should not have an effective alternative. By vigorously using the moral dynamic to weaken white supremacy, he fought on ground where the enemy was most vulnerable and in that way gave the Africans a choice of weapons in the fight against race oppression. The African could thus reject reliance on war and bloodshed as a means of winning his freedom; he could try moral pressures instead. Since these had worked where his own armies had failed, they were not the sort of thing to brush aside lightly; certainly not in a situation where the only alternative was the gun.

Third, by showing the Africans that the alternative weapon worked efficaciously, Dr. Philip created a climate of opinion that made it possible for large numbers of people to recover from the shocks of defeat, shake off their despair, and regroup once more for an attack on the citadels of oppression. It is no accident that the founders of the African National Congress, nearly a hundred years after Philip had first set his foot in South Africa, rejected race as a unifying factor and committed themselves to a unity based on values of life that would have the same meaning among all the African communities.

Fourth, Dr. Philip's victorious stand on moral values projected ideals with the same meaning on both sides of the color line as the only initiatives that could span the racial, cultural, and ideological chasms. This, in turn, threw into bold relief one fundamental fact in the South African crisis—that beneath the republic's troubles lie irreconcilable values of life, not the conflict of color.

Finally, his successes emphasized the differences in the approach of the Boers and the British to the race question. These derived ultimately from the conflict between two historic dynamics—the fundamentalism whose roots lay in the absolutism that had characterized political and religious thought in Europe before, during, and shortly after the Inquisition, and the empiricism of a seafaring and commercial island-nation whose unity and internal power had been built on the tradition of compromise.

The flexibility of the empiricist dynamic allowed for change, growth, and adjustment. It did not hold out bloodshed as the only means by which to effect reforms. The Boer's inflexibility, on the other hand, left the African with war as the only means of recovering what he had lost. Since he was not armed, it seemed to him that fundamentalism would condemn him to perpetual ruin. Thus, when he showed a bias in favor of the side with flexibility, he was not expressing a racial preference. He was choosing between a way of life that held out hope of security in the future and one that did not; between an attitude that promised him the possibility of making better use of his life if he adapted himself to the demands of a changing situation and one that frustrated life's purpose for him. The fact that both attitudes were upheld by white groups was immaterial, for both white groups had come to South Africa as conquerors. The fact to which the African attached importance was simply this: After the conquest, what will happen to me and my children? If the empiricist outlook of the British prevailed, the

African's future was not dark; if the Boer's fundamentalism became the dominant influence, there would be no future worth talking about. This, in the final analysis, was the fact that decided African attitudes toward the white groups, as was soon to be shown.

An altogether new chapter opened in Dr. Philip's life after the emancipation of the slaves in the Cape. While he rejoiced that the area of human liberty was being extended, he insisted that the mere act of freeing the slaves was not enough. It would serve only a limited purpose if it did not lead to the recasting of policy toward the nonwhites. The pressures he exerted along these lines led to the appointment of the Aborigines Committee by the British Parliament. The committee sat from 1835 to the following year, and its job was to recommend policies to be adopted in dealings with the aborigines. Dr. Philip took with him to London three men to give evidence before the committee. One was a white, a former civil servant; the other two were a Xosa and a Hottentot. The evidence these men gave in London was most damaging to the farmers, who resented it bitterly. One result of Dr. Philip's representations was that the right of the Xosas to land which the farmers had taken by force was recognized. To insure that some of the colonial boundaries were properly moved back, Stockenstroom, the other white man in the group that went to London, was appointed lieutenantgovernor of the area in which the restoration of the land was to take place.

All these developments made a very deep impression on the African community. By his courage and integrity, Dr. Philip had been able to restore to them what their own arms had been unable to recover. But he did not live to see the visible results of his activities among the Africans. It would, however, not be in accord with the facts to conclude that Dr. Philip introduced the principle of nonracial citizenship. Not even the British did that. Maynier in the eighteenth century and de Mist in the nineteenth had laid the foundations for the tradition to which the principle was to give content. The culprits on the white side

were neither the Dutch nor the British; they were the French revolutionaries who forced European civilization to take a new turn into the future.

Nor would it be correct to argue that the principle around which Dr. Philip crystallized what came to be known as the liberal tradition was the invention of the white man alone. Acting quite independently at the Cape, Dr. Philip had come to the conclusion that common citizenship, to use modern parlance, was the guarantee of stability without which Christianity would be jeopardized in a mixed nation. But acting equally independently, Shaka, the Zulu king, had arrived at the conclusion that common citizenship was the main guarantee of security for the Zulu state.

This is how he had come to this decision: Some of the 1820 British settlers had passed on to Natal, where they learned that the land belonged to the warlike, Zulu-speaking Africans. Their leader was King Shaka, who lived at Dukuza, where the town of Stanger is now situated. When the leaders of the settlers got to Shaka, they requested him to allow them to settle on Zulu territory. Shaka was impressed with their technological know-how and he thought they were fine fellows to have as neighbors. He granted them usufructory rights to land around the Durban bay, for the concept of private land ownership was unknown in Zulu law. When the Zulus talked of giving land, they had in mind usufructory rights and nothing beyond that. The land belonged to their ancestors; the living could thus not own it or give it away.

Shaka wielded absolute power. This circumstance had accustomed him to the need to face and deal in realities. When the settlers killed an ox merely by pointing their "fire-spitting stick" at it, Shaka was quick to grasp the significance of this for the Zulu state, whose soldiers used the spear only. He decided that it would be wise to come to terms with the whites and initiated moves to establish diplomatic relations with the Court of St. James's. In February, 1828, he sent Sotobe "and some others

... to visit, on his behalf, the King of Great Britain." Thus, the granting of usufructory rights and the sending of the diplomatic mission (which never reached London) offered the British settlers citizenship in the Zulu state in return for access to their skills.

The fact that the tradition based on the principle of common, nonracial citizenship has fought, won, or lost political and other battles does not in any way invalidate the fact of its being an integral part of the South African way of life. It lays claim to as brilliant a galaxy of talent, drawn from all the major groups in the nation, as any political tradition in the history of the republic. Thus, when Mr. Eric Louw, South Africa's Minister for External Affairs, rises in the United Nations to repeat the timeworn argument that apartheid is South Africa's traditional way of life, he tells the truth with a sense of economy that gives a distorted picture of the actual position in this country.

The debate on the nature of the foundations on which to base the relations between black and white has been going on, on both sides of the color line, practically from the day Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape. It has always centered around the question whether black or white or coordinated initiatives would shape the course of events. During the eighteenth century, this controversy was often conducted on the battlefields. This was the case during a large part of the nineteenth century too. The creation of the Union altered the platforms from which it was to be pursued. It came to be carried on in the South African Parliament, in the many resistance groups formed to resist white domination, and, ultimately, in the United Nations.

<sup>1</sup> Gibson, The Story of the Zulus, p. 35.