

deracialization, he was warning it, in a sense, that unless it changes its outlook it might find difficulty in making its way through the swift political currents that will precede the collapse of apartheid.

The race factor affects political groups in the republic in a most peculiar way. It compels every one of them to fight, equally energetically, on a number of fronts at the same time. To reach the top, the Communist has to fight the Afrikaner nationalist, seek to destroy the capitalist in the United Party, undermine the Liberal, and sabotage the African nationalist. This dissipation of energy simultaneously retards political progress and reflects the nature of the basic conflicts in the whole crisis. It is one of the biggest problems facing the opponents of the government.

PART

IV

FACING THE FUTURE

18 • A POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE
TO APARTHEID

THE most important single fact to emerge from the reviews of African nationalism and its Afrikaner counterpart is that in spite of temperamental, historical, and ideological differences the basic urges that have motivated thought and action on both sides are not irreconcilable.

The Afrikaner nationalist yearns for a place in the African sun. Since this is a fundamental human urge, the Afrikaner has as much right to satisfy it in Africa as the Negro does, by means of citizenship, in the United States. And for his part, the African wants that freedom of body, mind, and spirit that will enable him to make the best possible use of his life. Now, these aspirations are not mutually exclusive, for they give content and meaning to the human experience and express man's basic desire to live. What cannot be reconciled are the ideological, cultural, and other preferences by which the two powerful groups hope to move to their moments of fulfillment.

The second fact is that in spite of the paucity of Communist numbers Communism *is* a factor to reckon with in the South African situation. It wants neither the Afrikaner nor the African to move to his moment of fulfillment on terms not dictated by it. Throughout its history, it has shown that it is prepared to play one group against the other for the ultimate purpose of destroy-

ing both in order to remain the only dominant influence in South African life.

To the uncommitted African, Communism is acceptable for a number of reasons, the most striking of which is that it sees creation, life, and the human experience from limited perspectives. But when these prove inadequate, Communism does not examine its premises, but insists on maintaining its closed mind. Therefore, it can never be in the wrong; it is always the other man, the other group, who differs and so holds a monopoly on vice. It justifies itself not by approaching the truth objectively but by destroying the nonconformist. And the African is not a stranger to this destruction of the personality in order to justify an ideological preference.

Second, Communism sets the greatest store by the group, ignoring the fact that the group can be as fallible as the individual. But because it is more powerful, its capacity for doing harm is infinitely greater, for Communism allows no checks on the abuse of power by the group. History shows that where it was allowed complete freedom to do what it liked, the group was brutal, callous, and often corrupt. Communism stipulates that there can be no rottenness in it; otherwise, it would make provision for its authority to be limited. People who are emerging from one form of group domination want to tread warily in order not to land themselves in another form of it.

Third, Communism is a dehumanizing philosophy of vengeance. Its starting point is hatred for the capitalist; it sees in his destruction the only condition for its own success. This hatred, this constant threat to the capitalist, keeps a perpetual cloud of war hovering above humanity's head, and it also serves as the gravest danger to the freedom and security of those peoples who have just won their liberty and who are beginning to give visible meaning to it in the light of their own experience. This is not a form of defense for the capitalist, who is often just as unscrupulous a materialist as any Communist dictator. It is to say merely that the capitalist is an individual with as much right to life—and not the exploitation of his fellow men—as the Communist.

When Communism has liquidated the capitalist, it establishes a dictatorship in which the ordinary worker becomes the slave of the Communist masters. The individual is, of course, promised the paradise of the classless society where no man exploits another, but the price for that is the destruction of the individual. Therefore, any way of life that accepts vengeance as a virtue will destroy liberty—and especially in Africa, where there is every possible reason to hate and seek vengeance.

Finally, the limited horizons from which Communism sees life and the contempt it has for the individual—expressed most clearly in its preference for dictatorship—restrict the enlargement of the human personality. The fixed stereotypes it prescribes—which were evolved, really, for conditions in Europe—will cripple this growth and make the African a second-class European instead of the equal of every other human being.

For freedom for the African can be real only when it works for the continuous enlargement of his personality. The generations in the house of bondage awakened in him a dimension that makes this a condition of survival. As long as the growth of his personality is not crippled, he will enlarge it and equip himself for the task of creating a civilization that will be the finest tribute to the genius of man, something far better and nobler than the Communist paradise. Communism does not, however, recognize the African's right to this growth. Its repeated betrayal of his fight against apartheid, so clearly revealed in its insistence on the African's fighting on its terms, is not just a piece of political bungling. On the contrary, it is a systematic attempt to destroy those notions of liberty that do not suit the Communist pattern, to give to freedom the form of content that will transform the individual into a stereotype with built-in hatreds and deliberately limited perspectives. Africa cannot make her distinctive contribution to human advancement if her mind is so imprisoned.

The third conclusion is that parity in the power reserves means that the phase of African reasonableness in the approach to the race crisis is coming to an end. Events have placed him in the

position where his initiatives will henceforth set the pace of movement toward his goals. In this situation, he will want to alter the balance of power reserves in his favor. This, then, is the real significance of training saboteurs, and it is not unreasonable to expect that conditions of instability will be intensified even further, making it possible for anything to happen at any time.

The government's answer to these dangers is to arm the white community to the teeth. Since women are being trained openly in the use of firearms, the crisis mood is deliberately being developed in the white community. The tensions that result from this on both sides of the color line make a collision inevitable; and when it comes, it is difficult to see how the independent African states can fold their arms and do no more than cheer the black peoples from the sidelines. Africa's honor, self-respect, and dignity are at stake in the fight against apartheid. The West African high command is not being established to flatter African vanity, nor did the Winniba secret conference of dependent peoples, which met in Ghana toward the middle of 1961, assemble for purposes of mutual admiration. It agreed on the need for the various political groups opposing race oppressions in each country to present a united front; it stressed the need for the regional coordination of resistance against white domination and emphasized the importance of concerted, simultaneous action. These are danger signs no sane man can mistake. The peoples of Africa are determined to cleanse their continent of the scourge of apartheid. And when the explosion comes in the republic, the independent states will be involved directly or indirectly. This will mean war in Africa. It is difficult to imagine America or Russia remaining neutral in a war to decide the fate of the most important continent in the ideological struggle.

The fourth conclusion is that the relative stability in South Africa is the result not of a fortuitous combination of circumstances but of systematic planning over a period of about fifty years. This has produced a tradition of realistic statesmanship among Africans, which will still respond to positive attempts to

find a feasible solution to the race problem. The area of its effectiveness is getting smaller each day, but there is no doubt that the tradition itself is deeply rooted in the life of the African people. The consequent malleability to which this gives rise remains one very hopeful factor in the race crisis.

Finally, property is likely to be the next point of concerted attack by the black and white opponents of apartheid. This is the plane where race oppression's vulnerability is great. For the first time in the history of South Africa within the last fifty years, the possibility is now real that the opponents of apartheid may reach real agreement on strategy. In the past, unity could not be forged, largely because there was no *modus vivendi* all major anti-apartheid groups on the nonwhite side could accept with confidence. Violence to property is the new unifying factor because, among other things, it insures the fair distribution of suffering and hits the race oppressor where it hurts most. Finally, manpower sacrifices would be on the minimal side, and no very great skill in the use of fire would be required. All these considerations attract the militant African nationalists. The Communists too can support the destruction of capitalist property with a very clean conscience, as well as the Trotskyites, who have long seen in this weapon the only real means of driving a little more common sense into the "granite" heads of the Afrikaner nationalists.

All these factors combine to emphasize one truth: That bullets will not save apartheid from its deserved fate; that, at the same time, they will not establish that peace and stability every section of the nation needs to make better use of its life. Once the problem is viewed from all these angles, it becomes possible to see apartheid in clearer light. It then emerges as a phenomenon that is too complex to be dismissed as a mere political outlook or an ideological aberration. It is seen primarily as a way of life evolved in unusual circumstances for the purpose of guaranteeing survival to the Afrikaner and winning his right to a place in the South African sun. Fundamentalism, absolutism, repudiation, and race hatred are the main pillars of this life—not because the Afrikaner is incorrigibly backward, wicked, dishonest, or callous,

but because they are integral parts of the only political heritage it was his lot to inherit from history. The trek into the interior and the decades in the wild plains of Southern Africa cut him off from the main stream of European civilization. His numerical weakness exposed him to the danger of extinction. And the turbulent events overseas, liberalized European attitudes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, bypassed him. He was involved in a different kind of turbulence: He was fighting for survival against Dingane, Moshoeshoe, and Sekhukhuni.

The image of a changed Europe was to be brought to him by the officials of the Dutch Government, for he had turned his back on Holland and no longer regarded himself as bound to her. Then came the English, who were a different people, upholding an alien culture. They, too, adhered to a liberal outlook on life, and their economic and military superiority made them as great a threat to his survival as the African was. His guarantee of security in this situation was to hold on to whatever was his own with a fierce tenacity: the fundamentalist dynamic, group exclusiveness, self-consciousness, repudiation, the temper of the slave owner, a blind love for his people, language, and history, and fearlessness. These were integral parts of his culture and make-up, and their validity sprang from the fact that they had brought him to his moment of fulfillment.

The damage these attributes have wrought on the relations between black and white in the republic and the embarrassments they have caused in the Commonwealth in particular and the free world generally are thus not just the visible expressions of a delinquent group mind. They are a desperate attempt to give permanent and valid meaning to life in an environment the Afrikaner believes, rightly or wrongly, to be hostile. But this tragic groping away from insecurity is not unique among the Afrikaners, not an exclusively Afrikaans aberration. Wherever men, women, and children battle for survival instead of living; wherever they are hungry, cold, despised, neglected, or threatened—then they either grope away from insecurity or march toward security. The distinction is an important one for two

reasons: The one process is basically negative, often motivated by hatred and vengeance; the other is positive. Second, groping implies a lack of method or order in moving toward declared goals—an absence of sound guiding ideals. Wherever this is the case, collisions become inevitable. Marching, however, connotes orderly, principled movement.

In Africa at the moment, the two processes are taking place simultaneously in opposite directions. This is particularly the case in the republic of South Africa. Apartheid gropes away from insecurity, African nationalism marches to freedom. In this situation the prospects of a collision require no emphasis.

We have seen how men groped away from insecurity in Europe after the Industrial Revolution to evolve Communism. The hunger and insecurity following World War I produced Nazism and fascism. From the cleft historical stick in South Africa, there has emerged a familiar groping. Its name is apartheid, and it moves toward final disaster along a pattern that is too well known to make Dr. Verwoerd convincing when he says apartheid means justice for all. But the immediate danger is no less important, for apartheid has transformed South Africa into one of the most sensitive spots on the globe. Since what happens in South Africa affects the continent intimately, Africa itself is turned into a sensitive continent. Mankind cannot afford too many such areas. Their increase creates instability, real progress is retarded, insecurity follows. Then, more people join the groping stampede, the Communists add to the confusion, and the vicious circle that develops culminates inevitably in war.

If apartheid is viewed in this light, three other conclusions become possible. First, it is seen as an attempt to fill the vacuum that has existed in the relations between black and white from the days of the Dutch East India Company. Second, the tension it generates in the community of nations place it in the position where it cannot remain a domestic matter for South Africa, if only because humanity has an inescapable obligation to regard it as one of its most urgent problems. Third, mankind cannot solve the problem it creates merely by raising arms in impotent

horror or by ganging up with the African against the whites, since that would be simply to emulate Dr. Verwoerd. Racialism is a wicked thing from the white or the African side of the color line, because it debases the personality of man by corrupting the racist and degrading his victim. An immoral act on the white side does not become a virtue on the African; viciousness is no cure for wickedness. No, an evil is conquered by producing a better idea. Thus, the real answer to white racialism is an ethic whose strength will spring from its having the same meaning on both sides of the color line.

If apartheid threatens to engulf the continent in an ugly racial war, it also confronts the African statesman with an inescapable challenge—one that faces the free world too. The problem for the African statesman is not how to get the Afrikaner out of Africa, since there is no room for such thinking in a people with an awakened moral dimension. Rather, the problem is how to integrate him in the life of the nation and enable him to become the wanted and welcome neighbor of all his countrymen, instead of being regarded as a menace to their security and happiness.

If apartheid is seen in this light, the obvious answer to the problem it creates is to shift the center of social, political, cultural, and economic gravity from reliance on the unity and power of the like-colored group, as a guarantee of security and survival, to the unity and power of the like-minded individuals, regardless of race or color. This is not an easy thing to do because it entails corroding the crusts of prejudice in such ways as to convince both the African and the whites that democratic values, given the same meaning on both sides of the color line, are better bonds of national unity and more reliable guarantees of security for the individual and the group than race consciousness or blood affinities. The alternative is war. Finally, then, the answer lies in realizing that the real issue at stake in the race crisis is not the mere winning of a political victory; it is to enable men, fellow citizens, to see the truth.

All this means a clean break with much of the past on both

sides of the color line—a revolution in the minds of men, women, and children. It entails the acceptance of a new sense of nationhood—one that will allow no human being to be punished for belonging to a particular racial group. In that setup, not only would the individual be free to make the best possible use of his life, but it would be society's duty to see to it that he was enabled to do so to the best of his ability. Then, too, the positive aspects of the various traditions that give meaning to life among the peoples who have made South Africa their home would be recognized as the different, desirable, and legitimate expressions of the varied genius of a mixed nation whose peoples were bound together by loyalties with the same meaning on both sides of the color line. The sum total would, in the end, be a cultural amalgam, which would have the only claim to being recognized as a truly South African culture.

Blood links need not forever remain the only bonds of unity among men. The most powerful nations in the world today are mixed communities whose peoples are knit together not by race or color but by the values of life they cherish together. South Africa is ripe for a nonracial type of unity. In the social order envisaged above, the African will not see in threats to Afrikaner survival the guarantees of his own security. Where citizenship has a nonracial meaning, the various groups will see in threats to any one of them a danger to themselves. The collective strength of the whole will be at the disposal of all the component groups. The African, the Afrikaner, the Asian, the colored, the British, and the Jew will then march arm in arm to defend together those things they value most and that have the same meaning in their lives—their country, their freedom, and their independence. The reserves of power each group has will be there to facilitate collaboration. Education in the schools will be oriented in a different direction.

The ultimate aim in all this would be to give a new and more positive meaning to life; to free the thinking of all our peoples from the grip of fears that belong to the childhood days of the nation; to release the creative energies of all groups for the pur-

pose of exploiting the wealth of the country for the good of all, and to close a chapter in our history in order to march to a more satisfying future. Above all, the intention would be to build a nation dedicated to the ideal of enlarging the human personality in ways that will make peace, security, prosperity, and contentment the birthright of every South African. This is the ideal this book has been written to present as the alternative to apartheid. It is an attainable end, given the will, the leadership, and the concern for realities. It prescribes that each racial group should discard the irreconcilable angularities in its own attitudes to facilitate agreement on ultimate objectives. These irreconcilables are expendable, particularly where the alternative would be war.

Movement toward the above goal has of necessity to be on two planes that complement each other. There has got to be a good deal of demolition—a clearing of the physical, mental, and spiritual debris accumulated by the temper of the slave owner over the generations. There must also be the will to reconstruct. The destruction of apartheid will not be an end; it will be only a process of clearing the way for something better for all. To get the best results for all, black and white initiatives would have to be coordinated and harnessed in establishing the social order in whose maintenance all groups will feel they have a vested interest.

Coordination has a special importance for South Africa at this moment in her history. It has the potential to become the most powerful influence capable of challenging apartheid successfully without sharpening racial antagonisms to dangerous extremes. This power has got to be built up *now* so that when apartheid collapses there will be a solid bloc of tested and effective non-racial opinion both to prevent the excesses of passion that have ruined the Congo and to entrench the democratic tradition against political disrupters who would use chaos to advance their own ideological ends. But coordination has another use. Race oppression has wrought so much harm in the relations between black and white that we should be ready for riots, strikes, and other disturbances immediately after apartheid's collapse. Coordination, however, will narrow down the area of racial

violence and preserve stability because it will be supported by people from all the racial groups. In short, there must be built a strong sector of opinion that will function as a nonracial buffer, strong enough to check racialism from either side and constructive enough in its purpose to fill the political vacuum that will be created by apartheid's fall.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that in a mixed society a purely African victory will project the racial dynamic as the decisive factor in the freedom struggle. If this were allowed to happen, it would weaken the loyalties based on values, perpetuate the tradition of relying on group power and loyalty, and give a new lease on life to race conflict in conditions where pogroms could ultimately become inevitable. We have seen how the reluctance to build up coordination as an effective force has led to a very important change of African attitudes to violence. If the dilly-dallying continues, we might wake up one day to find that the two moods of African nationalism have vanished and that in their place there is a solid bloc of racial opinion. When it challenges apartheid, it will ask for no quarter, as it will expect to be given none. There is danger here, though, for the African himself. Inasmuch as white domination is failing because it can not break the spirit of the African people, a victorious African nationalism inspired by hatred could never be in the position to drive the white man or the Indian into the sea without reckoning with a world opinion that, as Dr. Verwoerd has learned, can be cripplingly hostile. For democracy's victory to be complete, it has got to be won by all the peoples who make up the South African nation working in concert.

Reconstruction connotes the laying of new foundations in place of the old. The long history of conflict between black and white teaches that neither side can destroy the other without losing a lot, materially and spiritually. Where this has proved to be the case, the sensible thing is to abandon policies based on conflict, sit down in an effort to agree on how best to live together, and seek to build on new foundations. The British tried this in 1852, when they gave the Cape a nonracial right to vote.

In 1912, the Africans pledged themselves to fight for the extension of the area of liberty. But it was to take nearly fifty years after the first Bloemfontein Conference for the Afrikaner authors of *Delayed Action* to realize that in the final reckoning agreement on ultimate objectives is the only reliable guarantee of survival for the white minority in a predominantly black continent. One cannot read *Delayed Action* without being impressed by the sense of responsibility and the moral courage that inspired its writing or by the sincerity with which most contributors uphold the dignity of the person, regardless of race or color. Here is the resurgence of a spirit many feared had long died in the Afrikaans community. The persecution Maynier suffered is being atoned for.

These developments indicate positive movements toward a constructive goal, which gives hope to South Africa. They are milestones to guide all of us toward a just society, and the tradition they give expression to has its roots deep in the history of the African, the Afrikaner, and the British. That it has not been dominant in South African life is due mainly to the fact that its advocates worked virtually in isolation in their respective communities. But the crisis in which the country is caught necessitates an urgent revision of strategy. It is no longer realistic to denounce apartheid from within one's racial group; as a matter of fact, to do so might be to invite defeat. Decisive, coordinated, nonracial action is what the times call for if the country has to be saved. The British nonracialist, the African advocate of race equality, and the Afrikaner democrat must join hands across the racial or linguistic fences in a vast and irresistible movement of moral and political protest against injustice. Those who are committed to the same values of life have the duty to stand together in defending them against attacks from all sides. Such an upsurge of opinion has the highest potential to return South Africa to the path of democratic sanity, to the only destiny we can look to as a mixed nation.

We cannot forever be wrangling about the fact that one human being is black, another brown or white. It does not

really take anybody far. Over the last three hundred years, it has been tried, but it has not made life richer for black or white. On the contrary, at a time when the country should be gearing its economy to satisfying the markets opening up in Africa, the republic is face to face with disaster from inside and outside. It cannot be otherwise when most of the country's best brains waste more time planning how to erect double doors to public places for the separation of one race from the others. The problems that clamor for solution pass by relatively neglected—for example, the fight to raise the standards of living for all our peoples; the need to remove ignorance, poverty, and disease from our national life; and, with our nonracial resources, the opportunity of furnishing the rest of sub-Saharan Africa with trained personnel and leading the continent to the realization of a fuller and richer life. These are the great challenges that clamor for a coordinated answer from black, brown, and white alike. We cannot tackle them successfully as long as we see our problems from the perspective of the ghetto mentality by which Dr. Verwoerd sets so much store.

Now that the goal has been defined, the question that rises is this: How can black and white move toward it with any hope of success? It can be done in two clear ways. The first is to confront apartheid immediately with economic disaster. Sweet words, appeals to reason, moral pleas, angry denunciations, or threats not backed by decisive action will not make Dr. Verwoerd and his followers abandon apartheid. It is too vital an ingredient in the make-up of Afrikaner nationalism. Since the separation of one from the other cannot be effected without catastrophe of some kind, the choice is limited only to economic disaster and war. It would require an advanced form of insanity for anybody inside the republic to advocate the use of war as a solution to South Africa's race problem because an explosion in this part of the continent could quite conceivably ignite a world conflagration and saddle black and white in the republic with problems of incalculable complexity.

Although well-aimed economic pressures from inside and out-

side would crack the superstructure of apartheid without producing unnecessary bloodshed or widening the area of violence, the government has shown quite clearly that its answer to agitations for reform is the bullet. Therefore, internal demands for change can be pressed only to a very limited point unless we want bloodshed, for where the state is well armed and the Africans are unarmed, it makes little sense to choose to fight on ground where defeat is a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the first people to feel the shock of economic disaster would be the Africans themselves. Millions of them live well below the subsistence level, and any collapse in the economy would send them onto the streets. This, some people feel, militates against the use of economic disaster against apartheid. The African, however, sees the problem from a wholly different angle. To him, apartheid is but the continuation of the temper of the slave owner he has been fighting on and off the battlefield for nearly three hundred years. He is on a crusade; he has paid dearly in the fight to protect his being and uphold his dignity, and it has been a fierce war, fought by every man, woman, and child, every day of their lives, on every imaginable plane. So an economic blow will not bring in new or unknown types of suffering because when you go to war, you don't expect to be treated with much consideration by your enemy.

Against this background, the African attitude emerges in clearer outlines. The people argue that they are very much in the position of the Jews in Hitler's concentration camps, from which there was no escape. If the prisoners could have spoken their minds, not an inconsiderable number of them would probably have said that each time they heard the noise of Allied bombers over the camps, their hopes were raised. If given the choice between the bombardment of their camps and the return to their bases of the Allied planes, those prisoners would have elected to perish in the knowledge that this would shorten the wicked rule of the Nazis. This is precisely the attitude of the Africans. To us too, it would be better to perish from hunger rather than perpetuate our humiliation and poverty by accepting the bread

crumbs from the Afrikaner nationalist's bloodstained hand. It would be better to suffer acutely for a short while to bring our misery to an end than to feel less pain indefinitely out of false consideration for our welfare.

The Afrikaner nationalist will change his mind about apartheid only when he clearly sees that it hurts him, that it threatens his survival. Apartheid has got to be pushed to such an extremity that the Afrikaner will see in it a threat to his security, for then, and then only, will he change his mind.

The second thing to do to move black and white toward the goal outlined in this chapter is to have a program of reconstruction that complements the first. It would be based on coordinated black and white initiatives. Its aims would be to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of apartheid, to give the Afrikaner nationalist an alternative loyalty, to extend to him that respect and security that are his because he is a member of the human family, and to free him from the grip of race hatred and the temper of the slave owner. His history shows that it was not until he came face to face with the reality of disaster that he reassessed his position and adapted himself to the demands of changed situations. If the intention is not to destroy him, effective pressures can be exerted with a clear conscience—particularly if he is given alternatives that are morally sound and acclaimed by humanity, do not injure his self-respect, and extricate him from the claws of a Frankenstein he has created for himself. For it was not until he had come face to face with disaster in the first South African republic that he decided to come to terms with the British. History might be repeating itself now, since he is face to face with disaster again. The chances are that he might make his peace with the Africans, but we have got to push him to this point with the irresistible determination of just men.

The suggestions that follow are designed to facilitate demolition. A separate program of reconstruction will be given later.

1. Apartheid should be outlawed. This should be done to serve the limited purpose of confronting it with that type of economic disaster which will bring about its collapse without impairing

the physical unity of the nation. Provision should be made for speedy reconstruction.

2. The free world should know that external pressures remain the only weapon which can destroy apartheid without producing bloodshed on a vast scale internally. The apartheid government cannot reply to a Swedish boycott by shooting Africans. On the other hand, the actual loss of external markets forces it, as the sensational relaxation of liquor laws shows, to adopt more reasonable policies at home.

3. The United Nations should take over the mandated territory of South-West Africa and prepare it for independence within a prescribed period. The excision of such a large part of the apartheid empire, now that the chance to incorporate the protectorates has been lost, will confront the Afrikaner nationalist with that type of disaster which should make him pause to ask himself if apartheid still pays. Again, he cannot murder children at Sharpeville when the United Nations acts in the mandated territory.

4. The dock workers of the world should blacklist apartheid ships and refuse to handle goods of apartheid manufacture. The Christian church in the free world should raise its voice powerfully in support of this type of action. It would make nonviolence effective. The church has up to now not distinguished itself in the fight to defend its principles against apartheid's attacks on it. It is time the church moved in.

5. America should be pressed to stop subsidizing apartheid by buying gold procured under apartheid conditions.

6. African states like Nyasaland should refrain from exporting labor to the gold mines of the republic.

7. Free-world universities should translate their opposition to apartheid's degradation of the human personality by resorting to more effective action. For example, they could insist that for every white student accepted from South Africa, a nonwhite should also be given a passport. International student associations should sever relations with South African student unions supporting apartheid.

8. The United Nations should adopt a more constructive attitude toward the race crisis. It should send to the republic a powerful

good-offices commission to make an authoritative study of the local situation, on the spot, for the purpose of working out a formula or a program of reform likely to be supported from both sides of the color line. A program of reconciliation worked on the spot could be a formidable weapon when used as an alternative to apartheid. United Nations denunciations of race oppression would cease to be negative; they would have focus.

9. If South Africa continues to be deaf to reason—she is deaf simply because the free world allows her to be—the free world should make it impossible for her to continue to be a member of the United Nations.

10. Internally, encouragement should be given to the habit of thinking in nonracial terms on both sides of the color line. Properly trained African clergymen should be appointed to white congregations willing to have them. Nonracialism should be encouraged on every possible plane. A white community which showed it was changing its attitude would encourage sections of African opinion to want to negotiate a settlement. A start could be made in this direction by representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church meeting those of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation for the purpose of examining together the moral foundations of the relations between black and white.

11. The African, for his part, should resist the temptation to gang up on a racial basis against the whites. Whenever the opportunity presents itself for an honorable settlement of the race problem, he should show a readiness to consider it on its own merits. He must be willing not only to shoulder responsibility but to give leadership to both black and white.

12. The real friends of South Africa should insure that the legal and political structure of the nonracial society to replace apartheid is a federal constitution, which makes provision for four types of federating provinces—those in which Afrikaner initiatives are the dominant influence, those in which the African has the biggest say, those in which the British are the key factor, and the nonracial provinces.

The chief value of this program lies in the fact that the pressures and crises it advocates can always be stopped the moment

apartheid changes its attitudes. Second, those who exert these pressures will keep the initiative to influence events in their hands. The Africans and the whites who oppose apartheid are then placed in the position to effect a peaceful revolution, which is what South Africa really needs. Finally, the successful exertion of these pressures would be proof of democracy's effectiveness in one of Africa's most challenging situations.

The last suggestion in the program outlined above belongs more appropriately to the phase of reconstruction. But because demolition and reconstruction are complementary, it has been included here to give focus to internal and external pressures against apartheid. The Afrikaner's fear of being swamped by the Africans in a nonracial society constitutes a challenge that any statesmanlike approach to South Africa's race crisis must take into account.

The federal constitution—not an original idea, since quite a number of organizations and leading personalities have advocated it from both sides of the color line—would ensure that the Afrikaans minority had areas in the country it could regard as its "homelands." Within these, it would be free to develop its culture and language and, at the same time, make its distinctive contribution to the progress and prosperity of the whole.

In each ethnic province, the language and culture of the dominant group would become the main influences, and nonracial areas would, of course, be free to adopt cultural patterns of their choice. This arrangement gives each culture not only the soil, as it were, in which to nurture itself, but the room for adapting itself to changing circumstances, and it places a premium on collaboration, more or less in the way the different Swiss cultural groups have one loyalty but different homelands. Thus, the Afrikaans areas would not discriminate against the African, nor would he expect the Afrikaner to be treated differently in the black provinces. The principle would apply to every other ethnic group as well, and this process of give and take would develop the habit of interdependence. It would cement real national unity.

We are dealing here with a very complicated human situation, in which there is no short cut to success, no magic formula, which can transform South Africa overnight into a paradise for everybody. We have to take into account the difficulties inherent in the whole race crisis and the factors favoring change. Out of these, we have to evolve a course of action that will enable people on both sides to realize where their interests are identical; a course that will make them move as far forward, without war, as they can, in unity. If some people prefer to move as individuals, as the liberals are doing; if others feel securer when they march as groups, as some nationalists on both sides prefer to do—statesmanship should encourage both for moving forward rather than block them by an inflexible and doctrinaire adherence to the narrower aspects of ideological propriety.

The Afrikaner nationalist who rejects Verwoerdism and who accepts race equality in a federal structure is already moving forward. There has already been awakened in him the sense of real South African nationhood. He is already struggling to come to terms with reality. And if he is prepared to accept democracy within a given constitutional framework, we should rejoice at that and meet him halfway. He has covered a long distance by repudiating the narrower loyalties that his group prescribes for a good South African. Therefore, efforts should at all times be concentrated on enabling him to see the democratic truth in increasingly clearer light, since this is the essence of democracy and good neighborliness, and a similar attitude should be adopted toward the African nationalist. It is difficult to see how national unity can be created unless this approach is adopted.

The real aim behind the federal ideal is to balance conflicting ethnic or cultural interests, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure their harmonious coordination as a guarantee of viability for the state. A community that had its cultural and linguistic roots firmly established in its homelands would be in no danger of cultural swamping. The right to secede would moderate the rapacity of a racial majority that had oppressive inclinations. Besides, the power reserves are likely to be with us for a long

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pose of exploiting the wealth of the country for the good of all, and to close a chapter in our history in order to march to a more satisfying future. Above all, the intention would be to build a nation dedicated to the ideal of enlarging the human personality in ways that will make peace, security, prosperity, and contentment the birthright of every South African. This is the ideal this book has been written to present as the alternative to apartheid. It is an attainable end, given the will, the leadership, and the concern for realities. It prescribes that each racial group should discard the irreconcilable angularities in its own attitudes to facilitate agreement on ultimate objectives. These irreconcilables are expendable, particularly where the alternative would be war.

Movement toward the above goal has of necessity to be on two planes that complement each other. There has got to be a good deal of demolition—a clearing of the physical, mental, and spiritual debris accumulated by the temper of the slave owner over the generations. There must also be the will to reconstruct. The destruction of apartheid will not be an end; it will be only a process of clearing the way for something better for all. To get the best results for all, black and white initiatives would have to be coordinated and harnessed in establishing the social order in whose maintenance all groups will feel they have a vested interest.

Coordination has a special importance for South Africa at this moment in her history. It has the potential to become the most powerful influence capable of challenging apartheid successfully without sharpening racial antagonisms to dangerous extremes. This power has got to be built up *now* so that when apartheid collapses there will be a solid bloc of tested and effective non-racial opinion both to prevent the excesses of passion that have ruined the Congo and to entrench the democratic tradition against political disrupters who would use chaos to advance their own ideological ends. But coordination has another use. Race oppression has wrought so much harm in the relations between black and white that we should be ready for riots, strikes, and other disturbances immediately after apartheid's collapse. Coordination, however, will narrow down the area of racial

violence and preserve stability because it will be supported by people from all the racial groups. In short, there must be built a strong sector of opinion that will function as a nonracial buffer, strong enough to check racialism from either side and constructive enough in its purpose to fill the political vacuum that will be created by apartheid's fall.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that in a mixed society a purely African victory will project the racial dynamic as the decisive factor in the freedom struggle. If this were allowed to happen, it would weaken the loyalties based on values, perpetuate the tradition of relying on group power and loyalty, and give a new lease on life to race conflict in conditions where pogroms could ultimately become inevitable. We have seen how the reluctance to build up coordination as an effective force has led to a very important change of African attitudes to violence. If the dilly-dallying continues, we might wake up one day to find that the two moods of African nationalism have vanished and that in their place there is a solid bloc of racial opinion. When it challenges apartheid, it will ask for no quarter, as it will expect to be given none. There is danger here, though, for the African himself. Inasmuch as white domination is failing because it can not break the spirit of the African people, a victorious African nationalism inspired by hatred could never be in the position to drive the white man or the Indian into the sea without reckoning with a world opinion that, as Dr. Verwoerd has learned, can be cripplingly hostile. For democracy's victory to be complete, it has got to be won by all the peoples who make up the South African nation working in concert.

Reconstruction connotes the laying of new foundations in place of the old. The long history of conflict between black and white teaches that neither side can destroy the other without losing a lot, materially and spiritually. Where this has proved to be the case, the sensible thing is to abandon policies based on conflict, sit down in an effort to agree on how best to live together, and seek to build on new foundations. The British tried this in 1852, when they gave the Cape a nonracial right to vote.

In 1912, the Africans pledged themselves to fight for the extension of the area of liberty. But it was to take nearly fifty years after the first Bloemfontein Conference for the Afrikaner authors of *Delayed Action* to realize that in the final reckoning agreement on ultimate objectives is the only reliable guarantee of survival for the white minority in a predominantly black continent. One cannot read *Delayed Action* without being impressed by the sense of responsibility and the moral courage that inspired its writing or by the sincerity with which most contributors uphold the dignity of the person, regardless of race or color. Here is the resurgence of a spirit many feared had long died in the Afrikaans community. The persecution Maynier suffered is being atoned for.

These developments indicate positive movements toward a constructive goal, which gives hope to South Africa. They are milestones to guide all of us toward a just society, and the tradition they give expression to has its roots deep in the history of the African, the Afrikaner, and the British. That it has not been dominant in South African life is due mainly to the fact that its advocates worked virtually in isolation in their respective communities. But the crisis in which the country is caught necessitates an urgent revision of strategy. It is no longer realistic to denounce apartheid from within one's racial group; as a matter of fact, to do so might be to invite defeat. Decisive, coordinated, nonracial action is what the times call for if the country has to be saved. The British nonracialist, the African advocate of race equality, and the Afrikaner democrat must join hands across the racial or linguistic fences in a vast and irresistible movement of moral and political protest against injustice. Those who are committed to the same values of life have the duty to stand together in defending them against attacks from all sides. Such an upsurge of opinion has the highest potential to return South Africa to the path of democratic sanity, to the only destiny we can look to as a mixed nation.

We cannot forever be wrangling about the fact that one human being is black, another brown or white. It does not

really take anybody far. Over the last three hundred years, it has been tried, but it has not made life richer for black or white. On the contrary, at a time when the country should be gearing its economy to satisfying the markets opening up in Africa, the republic is face to face with disaster from inside and outside. It cannot be otherwise when most of the country's best brains waste more time planning how to erect double doors to public places for the separation of one race from the others. The problems that clamor for solution pass by relatively neglected—for example, the fight to raise the standards of living for all our peoples; the need to remove ignorance, poverty, and disease from our national life; and, with our nonracial resources, the opportunity of furnishing the rest of sub-Saharan Africa with trained personnel and leading the continent to the realization of a fuller and richer life. These are the great challenges that clamor for a coordinated answer from black, brown, and white alike. We cannot tackle them successfully as long as we see our problems from the perspective of the ghetto mentality by which Dr. Verwoerd sets so much store.

Now that the goal has been defined, the question that rises is this: How can black and white move toward it with any hope of success? It can be done in two clear ways. The first is to confront apartheid immediately with economic disaster. Sweet words, appeals to reason, moral pleas, angry denunciations, or threats not backed by decisive action will not make Dr. Verwoerd and his followers abandon apartheid. It is too vital an ingredient in the make-up of Afrikaner nationalism. Since the separation of one from the other cannot be effected without catastrophe of some kind, the choice is limited only to economic disaster and war. It would require an advanced form of insanity for anybody inside the republic to advocate the use of war as a solution to South Africa's race problem because an explosion in this part of the continent could quite conceivably ignite a world conflagration and saddle black and white in the republic with problems of incalculable complexity.

Although well-aimed economic pressures from inside and out-

side would crack the superstructure of apartheid without producing unnecessary bloodshed or widening the area of violence, the government has shown quite clearly that its answer to agitations for reform is the bullet. Therefore, internal demands for change can be pressed only to a very limited point unless we want bloodshed, for where the state is well armed and the Africans are unarmed, it makes little sense to choose to fight on ground where defeat is a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the first people to feel the shock of economic disaster would be the Africans themselves. Millions of them live well below the subsistence level, and any collapse in the economy would send them onto the streets. This, some people feel, militates against the use of economic disaster against apartheid. The African, however, sees the problem from a wholly different angle. To him, apartheid is but the continuation of the temper of the slave owner he has been fighting on and off the battlefield for nearly three hundred years. He is on a crusade; he has paid dearly in the fight to protect his being and uphold his dignity, and it has been a fierce war, fought by every man, woman, and child, every day of their lives, on every imaginable plane. So an economic blow will not bring in new or unknown types of suffering because when you go to war, you don't expect to be treated with much consideration by your enemy.

Against this background, the African attitude emerges in clearer outlines. The people argue that they are very much in the position of the Jews in Hitler's concentration camps, from which there was no escape. If the prisoners could have spoken their minds, not an inconsiderable number of them would probably have said that each time they heard the noise of Allied bombers over the camps, their hopes were raised. If given the choice between the bombardment of their camps and the return to their bases of the Allied planes, those prisoners would have elected to perish in the knowledge that this would shorten the wicked rule of the Nazis. This is precisely the attitude of the Africans. To us too, it would be better to perish from hunger rather than perpetuate our humiliation and poverty by accepting the bread

crumbs from the Afrikaner nationalist's bloodstained hand. It would be better to suffer acutely for a short while to bring our misery to an end than to feel less pain indefinitely out of false consideration for our welfare.

The Afrikaner nationalist will change his mind about apartheid only when he clearly sees that it hurts him, that it threatens his survival. Apartheid has got to be pushed to such an extremity that the Afrikaner will see in it a threat to his security, for then, and then only, will he change his mind.

The second thing to do to move black and white toward the goal outlined in this chapter is to have a program of reconstruction that complements the first. It would be based on coordinated black and white initiatives. Its aims would be to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of apartheid, to give the Afrikaner nationalist an alternative loyalty, to extend to him that respect and security that are his because he is a member of the human family, and to free him from the grip of race hatred and the temper of the slave owner. His history shows that it was not until he came face to face with the reality of disaster that he reassessed his position and adapted himself to the demands of changed situations. If the intention is not to destroy him, effective pressures can be exerted with a clear conscience—particularly if he is given alternatives that are morally sound and acclaimed by humanity, do not injure his self-respect, and extricate him from the claws of a Frankenstein he has created for himself. For it was not until he had come face to face with disaster in the first South African republic that he decided to come to terms with the British. History might be repeating itself now, since he is face to face with disaster again. The chances are that he might make his peace with the Africans, but we have got to push him to this point with the irresistible determination of just men.

The suggestions that follow are designed to facilitate demolition. A separate program of reconstruction will be given later.

1. Apartheid should be outlawed. This should be done to serve the limited purpose of confronting it with that type of economic disaster which will bring about its collapse without impairing

the physical unity of the nation. Provision should be made for speedy reconstruction.

2. The free world should know that external pressures remain the only weapon which can destroy apartheid without producing bloodshed on a vast scale internally. The apartheid government cannot reply to a Swedish boycott by shooting Africans. On the other hand, the actual loss of external markets forces it, as the sensational relaxation of liquor laws shows, to adopt more reasonable policies at home.

3. The United Nations should take over the mandated territory of South-West Africa and prepare it for independence within a prescribed period. The excision of such a large part of the apartheid empire, now that the chance to incorporate the protectorates has been lost, will confront the Afrikaner nationalist with that type of disaster which should make him pause to ask himself if apartheid still pays. Again, he cannot murder children at Sharpeville when the United Nations acts in the mandated territory.

4. The dock workers of the world should blacklist apartheid ships and refuse to handle goods of apartheid manufacture. The Christian church in the free world should raise its voice powerfully in support of this type of action. It would make nonviolence effective. The church has up to now not distinguished itself in the fight to defend its principles against apartheid's attacks on it. It is time the church moved in.

5. America should be pressed to stop subsidizing apartheid by buying gold procured under apartheid conditions.

6. African states like Nyasaland should refrain from exporting labor to the gold mines of the republic.

7. Free-world universities should translate their opposition to apartheid's degradation of the human personality by resorting to more effective action. For example, they could insist that for every white student accepted from South Africa, a nonwhite should also be given a passport. International student associations should sever relations with South African student unions supporting apartheid.

8. The United Nations should adopt a more constructive attitude toward the race crisis. It should send to the republic a powerful

good-offices commission to make an authoritative study of the local situation, on the spot, for the purpose of working out a formula or a program of reform likely to be supported from both sides of the color line. A program of reconciliation worked on the spot could be a formidable weapon when used as an alternative to apartheid. United Nations denunciations of race oppression would cease to be negative; they would have focus.

9. If South Africa continues to be deaf to reason—she is deaf simply because the free world allows her to be—the free world should make it impossible for her to continue to be a member of the United Nations.

10. Internally, encouragement should be given to the habit of thinking in nonracial terms on both sides of the color line. Properly trained African clergymen should be appointed to white congregations willing to have them. Nonracialism should be encouraged on every possible plane. A white community which showed it was changing its attitude would encourage sections of African opinion to want to negotiate a settlement. A start could be made in this direction by representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church meeting those of the Interdenominational African Ministers Federation for the purpose of examining together the moral foundations of the relations between black and white.

11. The African, for his part, should resist the temptation to gang up on a racial basis against the whites. Whenever the opportunity presents itself for an honorable settlement of the race problem, he should show a readiness to consider it on its own merits. He must be willing not only to shoulder responsibility but to give leadership to both black and white.

12. The real friends of South Africa should insure that the legal and political structure of the nonracial society to replace apartheid is a federal constitution, which makes provision for four types of federating provinces—those in which Afrikaner initiatives are the dominant influence, those in which the African has the biggest say, those in which the British are the key factor, and the nonracial provinces.

The chief value of this program lies in the fact that the pressures and crises it advocates can always be stopped the moment

apartheid changes its attitudes. Second, those who exert these pressures will keep the initiative to influence events in their hands. The Africans and the whites who oppose apartheid are then placed in the position to effect a peaceful revolution, which is what South Africa really needs. Finally, the successful exertion of these pressures would be proof of democracy's effectiveness in one of Africa's most challenging situations.

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time, working to modify racial angularities; although their forms will definitely change in a free society, their effectiveness will not be entirely destroyed. For a long time after emancipation, the white community will still have the skills without which a modern state cannot be run. The "acceptors" in the African community will not suddenly elect to abandon the cultural amalgam built on borrowings from all sides of the color line. As more Africans enter the skilled trades, more wealth will be created, and it will be in the interests of the Afrikaner farmer to have a contented black community able and willing to buy his produce. If a collective racial mind has not developed among the Africans when political conditions favored it, it is doubtful that it will suddenly emerge when every African has the opportunity to make better use of his life in a society that has rejected race prejudice.

We are merely at the beginning of a great experiment in human relationships. It has taken us three centuries to get to this point. Three hundred years from today people will most probably no longer be thinking in terms of race. They will just be South Africans. The narrow loyalties that belong to the childhood days of any nation will possibly have been outgrown, and men will have learned that the individual has an intrinsic value transcending race. They will concentrate on developing it for the purpose of enlarging the human personality and enriching life. But until the advent of that happy day, every nerve should be strained to do what is just and possible—to lay the solid foundations from which a great African nation will rise.

Some Afrikaner nationalists might argue in all sincerity that the homelands in a federal republic would be no guarantee of survival for Afrikanerdom. The homelands idea, of course, is borrowed from their side; but if they think it is good for the African, surely it must be good for them too. If, however, what they mean is that their domination of the African is the only guarantee of survival they will accept, then we might as well face the fact frankly that salvation for the African would lie in preparing for war as the only solution to the race problem.

If they want to have the lion's share of the land of Africa and shunt the African majority to the eroded and crowded reserves, the black man will not have much of a choice other than to teach himself and his children to know no rest until they drive the last Afrikaner out of South Africa, back to Europe. These realities must be faced because people are thinking and talking about them. If the Afrikaner nationalist is determined to keep by force of arms what he holds, he should realize that the African will one day seize by force that which was taken away from him. The emergence of African states will have been in vain if it does not enable them to supply arms to the Africans in the republic to redress a historical injustice. Force provokes force. It might not be today; it must come sooner or later.

Afrikaner nationalists might say that, human nature being what it is, the African would have every reason to want to avenge himself on the whites the moment he had the power to do it, and this would rob the federal ideal of whatever value it might have. It must be conceded at the very outset that in the last analysis man has not as yet evolved a foolproof and permanent guarantee of survival for himself. Since apartheid itself has not done this for the Afrikaner in Africa, what chance of survival do one and a half million people have against two hundred million black people? No, treaties, conventions, armies, and laws are no permanent guarantees; the only reliable ones in human relations are the willing mind and the consenting heart, and it is these that the Afrikaner is offered in this study.


The point about human nature might be pursued a little further. It is true that it is the same among all races of man; it is characterized by greed, selfishness, and hatred—just as it is by love, magnanimity, and justice. What matters, however, is not that there is this mixture of vice and virtue in the human bosom. Man was created like that, and nobody can do anything about it. What is important is that exposure to given conditions makes man either virtuous or wicked. The factors that determine his conduct are many and complicated—among others, his environment, his culture, and his temperament. Thus, if the Afrikaner national-

ist sees the race problem from the angle of survival, it does not follow that the African, who has been affected by different influences, will view it only from the same angle. If fulfillment for the Afrikaner nationalist lies in limiting the growth of his personality and that of his neighbors, there is no valid reason why the African nationalist, who has been brought up in a different tradition, should not see fulfillment for himself in its enlargement.

No attempt is made here to deny that some Africans are thinking seriously of, and planning for, vengeance. Others are thinking in the opposite direction. That is how human communities behave. Forces are at work in the African community that move thought in different directions. This is as things should be in a racial group that has been affected in the way we have been by so many conflicting influences. The wise thing to do, then, is to note that there is as yet no collective, racial mind on the African side and to be grateful that this is the case. It is to use this advantage to reinforce those who reject racialism among the black peoples and to cooperate sincerely and effectively with them to narrow down the area of race hatred and lead South Africa along safer routes to a better future.

The concrete first steps to take to achieve this end on the plane of reconstruction include the following:

1. The immediate establishment of a nonracial, democratic, coalition government.
2. The division of the country into a number of culturally autonomous provinces. (See map)
3. The union of these provinces into a federal republic.
4. Voluntary union with the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and the mandated territory of South-West Africa.
5. Universal adult suffrage for all on a common voters' roll.
6. Entrenched guarantees of personal liberty and individual rights.
7. The restoration of the Commonwealth connection.
8. Friendly alliances with the states of Africa.



Map of South Africa, showing the boundaries of the suggested autonomous provinces, including Swaziland and Basutoland

9. Provision for territories and peoples who would later like to join the federal republic.
10. The immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the bans, and the return of all political exiles to their homes.
11. The procurement of active United Nations assistance in establishing the federal republic as an additional protection to the minorities and a precaution against the dislocation of the country's economy.
12. A minimum wage for all unskilled labor.
13. The recognition of the right of all workers to organize and bargain collectively for higher wages and better working conditions.
14. The redistribution of the land along the following lines:
 - a. Heavy taxation on all land not used economically.
 - b. The repeal of all laws restricting the ownership of land.
 - c. The recognition of the right to ownership of the land by any man working it.
 - d. The cutting up of large and unused farm lands into small holdings for the purpose of settling those who want to work the land.
 - e. The extension of Land Bank facilities to all farmers, regardless of race.
15. The encouragement of cooperative enterprise in the urban and rural areas.
16. The break-up of the reserves into farming communities in order to settle in these places only people attracted to the life of peasants.
17. The scientific training and distribution of labor to raise the country's productive potential.
18. The co-ownership of the sources of wealth and of the media for producing and distributing it to ensure that it is shared equitably.
19. An economy geared to the need to raise the standard of living for all citizens without delay.
20. A social security system which included:
 - a. A home ownership plan for all married couples.
 - b. A cheap system of food distribution to place larger and

- better quantities of it at the disposal of the largest number possible.
- c. A national health, unemployment, old age insurance scheme.
 21. Cheaper transportation for the working classes.
 22. A uniform system of free, compulsory education for all.
 23. Abolition of the color bar in every walk of life.
 24. A positive approach to Afrikaner nationalism.
 25. A joint white-nonwhite campaign to restore to South Africa her good name and standing among the nations.
 26. The establishment of machinery to make certain that the individual is enabled to make the best possible use of his life, regardless of race.
 27. The modernization of the penal system.
 28. The recognition of the right to secede.

This program has not been advanced by any political party. It is presented here solely as a basis for discussion, and it is intended to show which way constructive thinking on the race problem could be directed. Its chief merit is that it stands good chances of being supported by people from all sides of the color line.

A few specific points might require explanation, of which the federal constitution is one. It would cut up the republic of South Africa into no less than thirteen provinces of about the same size each. Both the African and predominantly white groups of provinces would, to start with, have more or less similar problems; but to avoid polarization along racial lines and to facilitate agreement, there would be a catalytic, nonracial cluster of states between the first two. The mere geographic division of the country, however, would be useless by itself. To be effective, it would have to reflect a balance in the economic forces as well. The Afrikaner, who is predominantly a farmer, would control the main granaries of the country. The British would exercise power over two of the most important industrial areas and seaports. And the African provinces would have authority over the vast coal fields of Natal. Between the economic power reserves controlled by

the Africans and the whites, there would be the vast industrial areas of the Witwatersrand and the western Cape, which would be in the nonracial zone.

It is probably on the political plane that the balance would face its severest tests. The mere giving of the vote to every adult citizen could very well become incitement to the African underprivileged to gang up against the privileged minorities. Some minority groups are convinced that this would happen. To meet this objection, the provinces would have the right to veto certain types of legislation which, in their view, threatened their cultural autonomy. The federal principle would be useless in an atmosphere charged with race hatred unless it was reinforced by the veto in clearly defined fields of legislation. After twenty-five years, the veto could be dropped.

No effort is being made here to avoid realities. The white community has, as a whole, been uncompromisingly hostile to any suggestion that the franchise be extended to nonwhites. The argument used to justify this is that it would bring about the swamping of the whites in a tide of color, and this argument has got to be answered. In the first place, it is dangerously unrealistic. The real issue before South Africa is no longer whether or not the African will have the franchise, since the extension of the area of liberty on the continent makes it only a matter of time before the African gets it. If he gets it with the assistance of the whites, the chances are that he might reject the temptation to develop a collective racial mind. If he gets it in spite of white opposition, that could very well be a victory for black racialism.

Ten years ago, there would have been a good case for the qualified vote. Then the power dispositions in Africa were differently oriented. All that has changed now. The African in the republic now has a choice of worlds. If his country continues to treat him with contempt, he can switch his loyalties to Pan-Africanism and regard Accra, Lagos, or even Conakry as his spiritual home. The Pan-African cosmos is essentially the world of the black man, and it holds out to him the promise of fulfillment on terms that do not injure his self-respect. It welcomes

him and assures him of the support of millions who have had the same experience he has had. If he finally turned to them, the fate of the white man in South Africa would be sealed. And if Pan-Africanism is not attractive enough, there is Moscow or Peking. If he turned toward them, the white minority would still stand to lose catastrophically.

White South Africa has to realize that it cannot keep the loyalty of the African as long as its racial policies are a standing insult to him. It must also realize that it now has serious rivals for his loyalty. Although it is a tribute to his maturity and common sense that he has up to now maintained a realistic attitude and not fallen for the offers from outside, this position, it must be noted, will not last for a long time. The African's realism gives the white man his last chance to bridge the gulf between himself and his black countrymen, and he can do this only by offering something more real, permanent, and attractive than anything Pan-Africanism or Communism can promise. The only thing he has left now is the unqualified franchise.

The problem may also be seen from a slightly different angle. Ten years ago, there would have been better chances of getting the African to accept the qualified franchise. The estrangement between black and white had not reached its present extremes, and the social structure of the country then had built-in shock absorbers and safety valves. If the African could not vote in parliamentary elections, he could invest his money in land and trade in the towns like everybody else. If he was not on the common roll of voters in the Cape, he at least had token representation in Parliament and the Cape provincial council; if he was not a skilled worker himself, he could send his children to the best British universities in the land.

These safety valves combined with the racial power reserves to discourage the rapid development of the revolutionary temper. Up to the 1930's, the word "extremist" had connotations in the African community that were almost as odious as those it had among the whites. With the possible exception of A. W. G. Champion of the ICU, few African leaders felt complimented when described as agitators. But when the Afrikaner nationalists

took power, they smashed the shock absorbers and plugged the safety valves; in their place, they set up a solid mental wall of unreason. No matter how reasonable African demands are, they stand no chance of being reasonably considered by the present government; what it prescribes, and only that, is to be accepted. And this, in turn, has created a climate in which most Africans regard policies of moderation as a waste of time, as an encouragement to apartheid. In this situation, the African regards the qualified franchise as a subtle process of getting the whites to gang up against him, with the aid of the more privileged nonwhite groups.

Statesmanship would give the vote to every citizen beyond a certain age and at the same time entrench in law a Bill of Rights to curb racialism from either side. Such a bill would protect the individual against power abuses, on the one hand, and, on the other, insure that the courts of law were also the courts of justice. The granting of the franchise on these terms would have the effect of encouraging African nationalism to abandon the agitational approach and to concentrate on using political power to improve the living conditions of the black people.

An aspect of the franchise debate that will become increasingly important in the years ahead might as well be given attention now. Although the ruling community always warns the African that he must earn his right to equal citizenship, there is no constitutional machinery by which to tell when an African is fit to vote. There are no legal conditions he has to satisfy in order to earn the franchise. In the absence of these, it becomes extremely difficult to understand precisely what the white man means when he talks of the African's earning citizenship rights. The real danger in this argument, however, is not in its vagueness, not in its dishonesty, but in its ignoring of the fact that as the African's capacity to influence events increases, while that of the whites diminishes, the white man, too, will have to earn the good will and trust of the African. It is about time serious attention was given to this fact, for both sides will have to give and take on a wider scale if black and white are to live together in Africa.

The extension of the area of political freedom would serve a limited purpose if it was unaccompanied by a corresponding extension of the area of economic contentment. Where the gulf between poverty and wealth has followed racial lines for generations, it would not be enough for the state merely to guarantee the individual the right to make better use of his life. The laws must insure that the wealth is distributed and shared equitably, since the extremes of undiluted capitalism and Communism are not suitable for South African conditions. A welfare state would provide a practical system, halfway between the two.

The problem of distributing wealth might be seen from another angle. The whites are the "haves" in South African society; to a very large extent, they own the land and its wealth, and their property also serves as an instrument by which they perpetuate their dominance over the African. In other words, property is a political weapon used for the oppression of the African. Where the two moods of African nationalism agreed on the use of violence as a weapon in the race crisis, property would obviously be the first target to attack, largely for reasons given elsewhere in this study. But once this happened, the Communists would come in to press for the destruction of property on a vast scale to weaken capitalism. As capitalism and race oppression go hand in hand, the African nationalist would most probably find himself compelled to become an economic iconoclast, demolishing property in order to cripple the racialists. In doing this, of course, he would be playing the Communist game of destroying the wealth he would later need to give stability to his rule.

But then, the situation in South Africa is charged with explosive emotions, and people, unfortunately, do not adopt a rational attitude in every crisis. African nationalism would probably resist with difficulty the temptation to use violence to property as a weapon in the race fight. This would give it a vested interest in hating property on the white side. The average African would come to believe that property stands between him and economic security. After gaining political power, he would want to declare war on property, and his numbers would ensure

that he had his way. The outcome would be a victory for Communist attitudes toward property—or a forceful seizure of it.

Statesmanship could steal a march on the Communists, however, by offering the African a vested interest in property. It could extend to him the right to buy land anywhere and to build on it and give him the assistance to do it. It could ensure that the African workers in the gold mines, in industry, and in commerce became shareholders. The worker who knew that he was one of the owners of the establishment that employed him would be interested in protecting the concern, not in destroying it, and property would no longer be a political and economic instrument for his oppression, but a form of wealth in his hands. On this plane, a solid and nonracial core of property owners would emerge to enhance African nationalism's sense of responsibility and weaken the Communist appeal. The worker and his boss would stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the concern in which they had similar interests. This is what is meant by co-ownership.

It would not be wholly improper to conclude a chapter in which guiding ideals are discussed with a slightly emotional note. For a long time, Afrikaner nationalism rode the wind, a conquering force. Then the wheel of history turned. African nationalism rose, and it is now riding the wind, a conquering force. But man was not created to be forever crushed between conquest and counterconquest. His rightful destiny is to make the best possible use of his life. The program outlined in this chapter is designed to enable him to start doing just that. It seeks to bring to an end the age of the conquerors from both sides of the color line and to usher in the era of collaboration by enabling man, in his black, brown, and white forms, to make better use of his life, by building a powerful and truly united nation out of all the peoples who have made South Africa their home.

19 • THE DANGER OF SWAMPING

RACIAL fears constitute an important ingredient in the average white South African's approach to the race problem. He supports apartheid in one form or another because it gives him security in employment, in politics, and in every other field of activity, because it guarantees that despite the paucity of his numbers he is in control of the country. If he were to share political power with the African, he would be swamped at the polls, black men would marry white girls, standards of performance at work would be lowered, and he would have to forego the comfort and the high standard of living he has won for himself. If he lost these, the next thing for him to do would be to quit. And that would be the end of him. To prevent this happening, he must concentrate all political power and economic initiatives in his hands. This, he believes, is his only guarantee of security.

He has, therefore, built high protective walls around himself to make certain that the African does not come anywhere near sharing political power with him. Not a single African today has the vote. Certain jobs are earmarked for people with a white skin, no matter what their qualifications or standards of efficiency. And the African is being systematically deprived of ownership rights to land he has owned in some cases for nearly a hundred years. Moreover, movement into and out of the urban areas is rigidly controlled; the security police work twenty-four hours

every day to keep a sharp eye on the activities of so-called agitators; and any determined demonstration against race oppression is suppressed with the bullet. True, a number of Afrikaner nationalists admit that the system they have imposed on the African is not just. But if they did not hold on to it, they argue, the sluice gates of vengeance would be opened, and the country would be drowned in a terrible blood bath. In other words, the race consciousness they have developed with such assiduity has now become a Frankenstein that holds its creators prisoners.

For these reasons, it is important that the factors against swamping from the African side should be outlined. In the last chapter, the federal principle was given as a guarantee of cultural survival, but here we shall consider those influences which militate against the type of disaster the Afrikaner nationalist fears.

Revolutions of the past have generally been guided by ideals or goals. When people rise up against a particular way of life, they are basically rejecting the principle on which it is based, for they cannot rise successfully if they are willing to accept the principle against which they revolt. Professor Keppel-Jones has said somewhere that revolutions are inspired by ideals that are the exact opposite of those against which people rise.

In South Africa, the ruling community is committed to the principle that the white man must remain master. The opposite of this may appear to be the doctrine that the black man must remain master. But it is not. Rather, it is that the individual must be the master. For the white man here is a group, and the real opposite of the group approach is the *individual* perspective.

When the first African converts to Christianity were baptized, more often than not their own people repudiated them. They were outcasts, with no right to call themselves by their family names, and their lives were often in danger. They often had to find refuge in mission stations, where they lived under the guidance of missionaries. In the Cape, where opinion was particularly harsh against the convert, the Christians were forced not only to give up their family names but refused any African names. Yet these men and women were so determined to guide their

lives by the new values that they took on Western names. That is how we come to have the Bams, Wauchopes, the Philips, etc. These are real African families with a long history of association with the Christian tradition.

The adoption of these names was an act of final repudiation of the group approach. Jabavu the elder could not be persuaded that the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912 was not perpetuating the group approach. The leaders of this assembly themselves were the products of the new tradition. Some, as has already been said, came directly from a refugee family which had been threatened with death for its acceptance of the white man's values of life. The revolution whose foundations these men laid saw men and events basically from the perspective of the individual.

In the years to follow, this tradition took deep root in the African community. It is not by accident that there has been so much tolerance from the African side or that so much emphasis has been laid on the realistic approach. These people were brought up on a tradition that respects the person of the individual, and over the years they have been translating this respect into the refusal to develop race hatred by way of an answer to white racialism. They feel that in their moral dimension they have something precious on which to build a better society. This awareness cushions them against every calamity from outside; nothing that apartheid is capable of doing will break their spirit.

In their political institutions, they have given expression to this awareness. In the fifty years since Union, not one important African political organization has pledged itself to throwing the white man into the sea. All of them, barring the ICU, which never sat down to work out a philosophy of struggle, evinced a strong humanistic bias. The result of this is that in spite of incredible provocation, the African in the South African republic is not angry. But he is indignant against race oppression; for him, apartheid is wicked, and he will know no rest until he has wiped it off the face of his country. Although he is determined to do this, he draws the distinction between the person of the

Afrikaner and the attitude of the Afrikaner. The person is sacred—so the religion of his ancestors taught; it cannot be changed. Attitudes, however, are things of the mind, acquired attributes, which can be changed once the right argument has been used.

In the half century following the establishment of the Union, his political behavior and policies were basically empirical because he drew the distinction between the person and the attribute. He respected the former even when he was indignant with the latter, and this led to his avoiding heroic short cuts that promised dramatic successes. It developed a sense of responsibility and a regard for realities that largely explains the fact that South Africa is a relatively peaceful country.

It is therefore difficult to see how a people whose culture is based on ideals opposed to racialism, whose history has been characterized by a strong, humanistic, and realistic bias, and whose outlook on life is inspired by a visible and powerful desire to create a better world can suddenly turn around, repudiate everything in their past, and see in race hatred the light that will lead them to their moment of fulfillment.

The white man in general and the Afrikaner nationalist in particular are in a different position. In their homes, schools, universities, the Afrikaans churches, the press, and Parliament, they are constantly bombarded with propaganda to the effect that the fear of the African is the beginning of political, economic, and social wisdom. Hatred and vengeance for them are their instinctive reactions in almost any situation similar to the African's. The latter, on the other hand, having been brought up in a wholly different atmosphere and tradition, sees men and events from an altogether different angle. The tragedy in the republic is that the white community—its press and politicians, in particular—does not know the African; it does not understand the motivating urges that stir deepest in his bosom. And it cannot when the chasm dividing the races is so deep and when there is no open exchange of ideas. As a result, it relies on ignorant generalizations and half-truths and uses these as the bases on

which to formulate its policies toward the African. It is hardly surprising that in this situation the whites expect the African to react as they do.

People whose humanity was denied, who were degraded for centuries as a matter of policy—which continent did not buy African slaves?—and yet survived did not have much of a choice. To defend their being and ensure their survival, their resistance had of necessity to be basically humanistic. Now, too, in the conflict between the racial and humanistic dynamics, the African does not have much of a choice: He has to take his stand on the side of humanism because it holds out better hopes of enabling him to make the best possible use of his life. The moral dimension is a spiritual instinct aroused by a historical experience, a historical habit of mind. It is the basic dynamic that moves him to his moment of fulfillment.

So when the African chooses race equality, he is choosing a route into the future that will allow of the enlargement of his personality. He is not taking up a tactical position to destroy the white man so that he can impose a black dictatorship. He is making a declaration of faith. As a matter of fact, in his march into the future the African does not think the white man in South Africa is terribly important for his survival—or so important that policies should be aimed at keeping a watch on the whites. Life is too vast and the opportunities too great to allow of time being wasted on hatreds that belong to the childhood days of the human race.

Other factors militate against swamping, the most important of which is the economic. In South Africa today, there is not a single African home that has not been integrated into the white man's economy in one way or the other. In the marshy hinterland around Ingwavuma and in northern Natal, where there are people who have never seen a white man or had a glimpse of a train on rails, paraffin and sugar are used, taxes have to be paid. As might be expected, the vast concentrations of population in the urban areas are completely dependent on the white man's economy, but to a very large extent, the people on

the reserves are also dependent on it—to say nothing of those on the farms. The advent of freedom will not transform these people overnight into a self-sufficient community; it will only bring them wider opportunities to make better use of their lives. While doing this, they will need money, food, and a roof beneath which to sleep. Therefore, in strict self-interest alone, they will be compelled to retain the good will of the white man—who has the technical skills, the know-how, for maintaining the nation in a healthy condition, producing food for the millions, creating wealth, and distributing it. He has been trained to do these things, but the African has not. If, after emancipation, the African tried silly tricks on the white man, the latter could reply by crippling the economy in ways that are too catastrophic to contemplate—for example, pack up and leave the country. Just that and nothing more, and the African would be in for very serious trouble. The good thing about the African nationalist in the republic, whether he belongs to the heroic or realistic school, is that he knows this truth only too well.

It would take time after the emancipation to carry out reconstruction programs. There would be the difficulties of adjusting to changed conditions—riots and strikes, for instance, the inevitable pains of birth into freedom. A stable economy would of course contribute considerably toward their curtailment; but in order to keep the economy stable, the African nationalist would be forced to collaborate with the white community in plans to distribute wealth equitably. If he did not, the Communists would be there to make things awkward for him. Thus, the harsh fact that emerges from this is that no matter how indignant the African is with the white man's present policies, he needs him for economic survival as desperately as the white needs the African and his good will for physical security.

The second factor against swamping is defense. In the event of another world war, say between the West and the Communist countries, both sides would strain every nerve to control the strategically important Cape, situated halfway on the main route

linking the East with the West. If South Africa chose to be neutral, she would need a very strong army to defend her neutral position and guard all her borders. But because that army could never be produced from the 3 million or so white citizens, she would have to draw very heavily for manpower upon the African community. And if she sided with the West, she would be in danger of direct attack from the Communists, and again she would need a powerful army to protect her boundaries. Whether or not war came, however, South Africa already has a Communist problem. After independence, it would be magnified and would present awkward challenges in its bid to force the African government to surrender the country to control by Moscow. The only effective answer to that challenge would be the coordination of black and white initiatives in the defense of liberty.

The third factor to bear in mind is that the African wants to take over the country as a going concern, not as a shambles. It is in his interest to ensure that neither his goals nor his methods upset the delicate balances that preserve peace between the races. Taking over in this context means that the moment the vote is given to every African, the center of political gravity will shift from the white side to the African. The disparity in numbers alone will move events in this direction.

Finally, world opinion has shown very clearly that it dislikes race oppression intensely. In the United Nations today, South Africa stands virtually alone in the defense of white supremacy. Her virtual expulsion from the Commonwealth indicates that even within this family of nations, which still has its Notting Hills and Naga problems, race oppression is strongly disapproved. This attitude is not taken up because the culprits are white, since mankind will pronounce equally severely against African racialists. A complicating factor for the African rulers of South Africa, if they became racialistic, would be that they would need to do trade with the West—certainly to a fair degree. Since they would most probably need skilled manpower, machine tools,

loans, and capital, it is difficult to see the West rushing to supply these commodities to places where the whites were being oppressed.

The unfortunate events in the Congo are hurled at the advocates of a wider area of liberty in South Africa to justify the fears of swamping on the white side. The first answer to this is that the real cause of explosions like the ones in the Congo and Angola is the restriction of the area of liberty and the narrowing down of the opportunities for the individual to make better use of his life. In other words, oppression bears so heavily upon people that in the end they make desperate bids to break the shackles which tie them to slavery.

But the real point to be made here is that the critics of the advocates of freedom for all miss one very vital fact about South Africa. There is a basic difference between the Africans of the republic and those of the Congo: The latter do not have as long a history and experience of contact between black and white as the former. Integration has not taken place on as vast an area in the lives of the Congolese. In three hundred years, black and white have affected each other so deeply that traditions and attitudes uniquely South African have grown and developed.

One visible result of this is that the Africans have developed their nationalism and allowed it deliberately to grow along two parallel lines. The other is that about fifty years ago the various African communities met at Bloemfontein, where they declared war on tribalism. They decided to emerge as a new people in history, with a new purpose in life and a new cultural pattern. The program adopted by the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in 1958 incorporated principles which the Africans of the Union had accepted in 1912. One outcome of this was that a tradition of nonracial collaboration had developed which was practically without a parallel in sub-Saharan Africa. The other was that a tradition of struggle had developed which was based on a deep-seated respect for realities. The relatively little blood

shed in the freedom struggle arises from the sense of realism developed over the centuries.

The point can never be emphasized too often that the series of compromises which made African unity possible in 1912 continue to be a moderating influence and will remain so for some time to come. By the time they lose their potency, the Africans and the whites will have learned what Professor Leonard Thompson, formerly of Rhodes University, used to call "the habit of collaboration."

The oppression of the whites could very well boomerang on African nationalism. The attack by one group on any other could widen the fissions that always exist in all the communities of the republic. Even the Indian community, which is the smallest, has its bitter feuds and delicate problems. On the African side, there are few things which are dreaded in the way the disruption of unity is. The feeling is that race consciousness against the whites might ultimately, when it has broken white resistance, become a Frankenstein that would set the Xosas against the Sutu and the Sutu against the Zulus. The result would be that the work of the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912 would be undone, and the sacrifices of half a century trying to build a new people would have been in vain.

Neither individuals nor nations commit themselves to a way of life for the fun of destroying themselves. They take particular courses into the future in response to particular compulsions. The African has not rejected racialism in favor of equality out of a sentimental and naïve regard for the white skin. Born into humiliation, he finds a realistic attitude a necessity for him. If he thought in terms of swamping, he would keep the whites a solid bloc for the longest time possible, for each time he has cracked their unity, it has occurred when he staged powerful, peaceful demonstrations against race oppression. If he became racialistic, he would unify them and justify the use of military power against his defenseless women and children. The state would then be given the chance to scatter the various groups,

ultimately destroy every trace of the unity agreed upon in 1912, and reduce the African people to a position of absolute impotency. Apartheid would be given a new lease on a virtually trouble-free life.

Finally, in this list of reasons that militate against swamping is the fact that there is no room for race hatred in African culture. As pointed out elsewhere in this study, the religion of the Sutu-nguni group (before the advent of the white man) revered the individual as the incarnation of a future ancestral spirit. The white man's conquest of the African was not so complete that it made the latter abandon everything precious in his culture: He adhered to his regard for the human personality. Even when he was crushed by white racialism, he was, because of his numbers, never driven to that point of desperation where he could see salvation only from the perspective of race. The African can claim, in all fairness, that he does not have a tradition of race hatred. It has never been a potent ingredient in his history or culture. And then, of course, the African has always had alternative weapons to fight race oppression: The buying of time to build up power reserves forced the republic out of the Commonwealth, and the isolation of white South Africa has led to humiliating defeats at the United Nations. Although the internal use of nonviolent resistance has not brought about the repeal of oppressive laws, it has certainly split the white community from time to time. The result has been the emergence of a climate of opinion that has put apartheid on the defensive almost on every plane. The serious and almost dramatic modification of the liquor laws is not an act of Afrikaner magnanimity; it is a realistic bowing to irresistible pressures, the result of fifty years of planning and adapting strategy to the demands of a complex situation.

No effort is made here to deny that powerful islands of anti-white feeling exist in South Africa. It would be most abnormal if they did not. Since the hatred of the Afrikaner nationalist burns with a fierceness that has to be seen to be believed, a reaction was bound to occur. One only has to come in contact with the police—or, better still, to be jailed and thus be left in their power—to

realize how deep-seated, vicious, and depraved this hatred is. It is impossible for a human being to go inside a South African jail for nonwhites and walk out of it the same person: Each experience with the police is an adventure into hatred.

The remarkable thing is, however, that in spite of it all there are still only islands of antiwhiteism. It is true that under the pressure of apartheid they are widening and might develop into a new political tradition in South Africa.

When all these things have been taken into account, the area of tolerance still remains sufficiently wide to justify bold and positive experiments to extend the area of liberty. The possibility is greater that the majority of the African people will want to busy themselves more with improving their lot, or adapting themselves to the demands of the changed situation, than with wasting their time emulating the race-hating advocates of apartheid. This advantage will not be there indefinitely. A new era of turbulence is opening, and nobody can say how it will affect South Africa. One can, however, be certain about one thing—speed and effective action can still stop bloodshed in South Africa.