

Mda's thinking, which most young men and women in the League shared, set out to corrode the leadership provided by the Old Guard which believed in collaboration because of the voting rights enjoyed by the Africans in the Cape and the land rights the English extended to the Africans in Natal. The generation to which Mda and I belonged had been born into dispossession; we grew up in dispossession; our thinking and behaviour were influenced by the temper of the dispossessed. Our first priority was to destroy the leadership which believed in collaboration on terms dictated by the Whites. Mda expressed our viewpoint in the letter referred to above in these terms:

The clash is inevitable, because the Congress senior leadership reflects the dying order of pseudo-liberalism and conservatism, of appeasement and compromises. The Youth League reflects the new spirit of a self-conscious Africa, striving to break age-old oppression and liberate the national forces of progress.

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The League set out to move events to the moment of decision; to redefine the race problem and make majority rule the central issue in the quarrel between Black and White. The League's first priority was what Mda called the *politicisation* of the African people. This meant that as a people we should draw the distinction between the fundamentals of conflict and the operational aspects of race oppression; that we should concentrate on fundamentals and refuse to waste time on the functional aspects of White domination. To spend all our energy and time on these aspects was to accept White definitions of the race problem and to collaborate in our humiliation.

Up to the formation of the League the Old Guard had regarded the operational aspects of White domination—the abolition of the Cape Vote, residential segregation, the Pass Laws, the Differential Wage, etc.—as the issues on which Black and White quarrelled. This departure from the spirit of the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912, this collaborationist approach, surrendered the initiative to influence events to the Whites. The Whites would do the thinking for the African as long as the latter defined the race problem in operational terms. The African would continue to be oppressed by consent.

The League rejected the emphasis on the operational aspects and concentrated on fundamentals. The December, 1949, annual conference of the ANC discussed a statement to be issued on the preparations made by the Whites for the tercentenary anniversary celebrations of the landing of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape in 1652. The Old Guard adopted positions which Ntsu Mokhehle, the Youth League leader from Lesotho, characterised as being "inclined towards the Whiteman's point of view." Mda agreed with Mokhehle and rejected references to the anniversary

which suggested collaboration. He drew attention to the fundamentals of conflict and indicated that a statement of the African position in non-collaborative terms would signify<sup>26</sup>

not only our challenge to the Whiteman's point of view but also an inflexible determination on the part of the African to struggle for National Freedom. . . . in spite of the odds heavily loaded against the African by an enemy highly organised and armed with a perfected technique of domination.

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Concentrating on the fundamentals of conflict was designed, among other things, to create a vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa. The League planned to fill this vacuum with an African alternative to apartheid; with a translation into geopolitical terms of the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood.

The creation of the vacuum led to a violent clash between the League and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Lembede even demanded the expulsion of the Black communists from the ANC. But Lembede missed one vital point: the communists were, like the Christians, products of the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic evaluation of the person. One could not throw them out of the ANC without expelling the Christians.

I opposed the expulsion of the communists because it seemed to me a tactic for dealing with the operational aspects of what I was to call albification. If we were to deal successfully with the communists, we had to straighten out our thinking on the conflict between the black and the White attitudes to the person. I was certain in my mind that at the time our people were not ready for a decisive stand against the Christian assessment of the human being. Where our first priority was to politicise them for the purpose of creating the vacuum in White thinking, we had to avoid making too many enemies on the African side.

By the middle of the 1950s the communists were strong enough in the ANC to be able to impose the Freedom Charter on the African organisation. This document, which was first adopted in Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 26, 1956 set out to supplant the Bloemfontein Ideal of Nationhood and, in its place, to give the Africans a goal which provided for guarantees for minority rights. The Charter did not say a word on the 1912 Ideal of Nationhood; at the same time it said a lot about minority rights which it regarded as "national rights."

The adherents to the Bloemfontein Ideal rejected the Charter's definition of nationhood and argued that by adopting the Charter as a statement of policy, the ANC had renounced its position of custodian of the 1912 Ideal. They broke away and formed themselves into the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

## BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT

The statements of the leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement shed light on the situation of ungovernability.

The emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement was an important turning-point in the crisis in South Africa; it showed the Bicipitous Mind giving fundamental answers to a fundamental problem.

On March 21, 1960, the PAC led the Africans in the main industrial areas in a nation-wide demonstration against the Pass Laws. The government's answer was to write the Sharpeville Shootings into our history and to ban the PAC and the ANC.

The bans created a political leadership vacuum on the African side which the government hoped to fill with co-operative chiefs. The Africans countered with a two-pronged offensive which aimed at making it difficult for the government to bring all the homelands institutions under the control of the surrogates of Pretoria. In Natal, the Zulu-speaking Africans persuaded Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to stand for election as chief executive officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA), not only to make it impossible for collaborative chiefs to endorse apartheid, but also to use the ZTA to build a new political power-base and rededicate the Natal Africans to the Bloemfontein Ideal, which the apartheid regime sought to destroy.

At about the same time—the last years of the 1960s—a ferment developed in African student organisations which led to the severance of African links with the White National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the formation of a non-White South African Students Organisation (SASO). SASO developed into the spearhead of what came to be known as the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).

The BCM was not an organisation; it was a school of thought and reflected the climate of thinking in the African community in the 1960s. It laid stress on self-reliance in the African community, collaboration among the Africans, people of mixed blood and the Asians, and the isolation of the Whites on the homefront. At the same time the BCM asserted vigorous leadership initiatives to deepen the vacuum created by the League.

The Black Consciousness Movement influenced behaviour in many departments of African life. The Black Theology school of thought came into being to give to Christianity a meaning that would be valid and satisfactory on the African side of the colour line. The government believed that the Federal Theological Seminary in Alice produced the theological agitators who gave to Christianity an English-oriented meaning which was designed to destroy the political power of the Afrikaner. The government denounced the Black Theologians as "communists" and eventually closed down the Theological Seminary.

On the economic plane, Black traders organised themselves into the National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC) which set out to use the African's purchasing power as a weapon for the establishment of a satisfying place for the Africans in the economy. NAFCOC was instrumental in establishing the mainly Black-owned African Bank of South Africa to challenge White dominance in the economy.

Workers' organisations were formed in the major industrial areas of the country. Some of these were involved in the wave of strikes which swept Natal in particular and South Africa generally from 1971 to 1975.

These strikes have a special importance. In terms of South African law, it is a crime for Africans to stage a strike. The law is so bitterly hostile to African strikes that the police do not always draw the distinction between the strike as an economic weapon and the strike as an act of treason. In spite of this, the Africans were able to organise demonstrations for higher pay and improved working conditions which have important political implications for the future of South Africa.

During the 1974 budget debate on the Labour Vote Dr. A. Boraine, then the Progressive Party's spokesman on Labour, quoted the following from figures supplied by the Department of Labour:

Year	Number Of Strikes
1973	246
1974	374

Another dimension of the dialectic was emerging here. The unification of the traders' organisation and the formation of the African Bank threatened to displace the Afrikaner from the position he was establishing for himself in the economy. The two developments laid the foundation for an economic alliance between the Africans as workers and consumers and big business, which was mainly English. The strikes showed that the dialectic had pushed the African to the point where he had begun to experiment with the use of the strike as a political weapon.

That in 1974 alone, strikes averaged more than one work-stoppage per day—the majority of the strikes were organised by the Africans—brought to light an extremely important feature of the dialectic. The strikes were damaging to apartheid; they tarnished South Africa's reputation as a paradise for foreign investors. The government went to known extremes to suppress them. The fact that in spite of everything it did, it failed to stop them brought to view a new point of weakness in the White power-structure: the government had begun to lose some of its ability to impose its will on the Africans.

This weakness was drawn in the sharpest outlines possible by the Soweto Rebellion which continued for more than a year in spite of un-

precedented shootings of the Africans to suppress it. The mood of ungovernability which the rebellion expressed paralysed the authority of the Whites in Soweto and forced the government to withdraw its order imposing Afrikaans as a second medium of instruction in Transvaal schools for the Black race.

The dialectic had displaced White authority in the church, isolated the White supremacists on the international plane, driven a wedge between the people of mixed blood and the Whites, and brought the African to the point where he began to launch economic offensives to displace Afrikaner power at this level and, finally, to rebel and create a situation of ungovernability.

Those sections of the White press, like some White authors who specialised in "interpreting" developments on the African side, rushed to see in the ungovernability, the mood of "a new type of African." The statements of the leaders of the "new type" told a different story; they told mankind that the Evolving Revolt had taken one more step toward majority rule and that the Africans were determined to reach their goal no matter who opposed them; that they were rejecting all forms of collaboration with the Whites. In 1972, Mr. Jerry Modisane was elected president of the South African Students Association, whose approach to the race quarrel has had a profound effect on the thinking of Black students. In an interview with the Johannesburg *Sunday Express* (July 16, 1972) Mr. Modisane is reported to have said:

We do not need the co-operation of the White man any more—and we do not want him. We can find liberation from perpetual servitude on our own.

Writing in *Creativity and Black Development*, a South African Students Association publication, Mafika Pascal Gwala made this angry protest against the distortion of African history by the Whites:

We are commonly told of our barbaric aggressions, of intertribal friction and of the need to christianize and civilise us. This White attitude towards the Black man's past impels that a struggle against White interpretation of history become an absolute necessity.<sup>27</sup>

Gwala's rejection of White interpretations of African history did not stop at the above. He condemned those Africans, particularly in Francophone Africa, who accepted French cultural inspirations. He continued:

With the regaining of freedom the leadership sector that only yesterday had been talking of Negritude looked up to Paris for all its cultural needs; French ways of thinking and behaviour were enhanced. Corrup-

tion and scandal mongering thrived while the people starved and suffered. The rebels of yesterday have become the good boys of today's Paris.

Gwala consistently exhorted his readers to guard against

the deviating tendency of judging reality through a distorting mirror of the White world. . . . A truly conscious student will thence fight for his human dignity too. He will stand against White preaching of free enquiry while they [the Whites] enforce obscurantist outlook(s) on the university campus. He will expose the danger of those books in which equality is made synonymous with privilege. He will not accept lies and inverted truths that are expounded in the name of democracy. Let me add, an abstracted democracy. . . . Some of our [South African] Blacks are not innocent of the crime of fostering White attitudes in their contact with other Blacks. We can no more tolerate. . . . Black selling whiteness to fellow Black.

To Ben J. Langa, then editor of the volume of essays under discussion, the humiliation of the Africans called for "a new spirit of human-beingness" in the Black people's "struggle for identity." Turning his back on White culture, Langa continued (page 63):

Black people now need . . . evolvment of a new Culture—a Black culture that will want to liberate them [from] the shackles of perpetual servitude and subordination. In so many ways have they clearly demonstrated their total abomination of the system that deprives them of a decent living when they so deserve it.

All this and our common oppression should be enough reason why we should come together and found our new Black culture. We don't seek another europe, one europe is enough. . . .

Art by Blacks must be for Black people. It must not be for White consumption and be meaningless pieces of irrelevant "art" hanging in Parktown North,<sup>28</sup> Berea or Houghton. . . . Our art . . . must derive its life in the communes and ghettos where there are no Rembrandts, Picassos or Da Vincis. Black artists must expose the ills of the world, reflect answers to these ills. . . . We must reach for a true new Black culture and true humanity will be our reward.

One of the features of the revolution in African thinking as revealed in the writings of youth leaders is the element of ruthless self-criticism.

Another voice from the ranks of the Black Consciousness Movement was raised. Barney Pitso was president of SASO at the time of Biko's speech in Cape Town. He was thinking in terms of a functional monolithism which would work for Black disengagement from the White cultural experience.

The Black person must realise that he is on his own. . . . In order that a group of people can bring about a change there must be an identity of interests. . . . Any identical interest between Black and White is effectively blurred by the colour question. The Blacks . . . must be deeply rooted in their own being and see themselves as a functional monolithic structure. This means that Black people must build themselves to a position of non-dependence on Whites. They must work toward a self-sufficient political, social and economic unit. . . . The way to the future is not through directionless and arrogant multi-racialism but through a purposeful and positive unilateral approach. Black man, you are on your own. . . .

Functional monolithism was no longer interested in concessions and reforms or in integrating the African in the White man's economy. It set itself the goal of destroying the power-structure itself and to replace it with a new society based on an ideal of fulfillment and nationhood which had its roots in the African experience. If the White man felt he could not accept this, there always were the American, British and other Western air forces to airlift the Whites out of South Africa as happened in the crisis which developed after the independence of Zaire. Nixon's threat that his administration would not condone violence in Southern Africa thus did not address itself to the realities of the Black-White crisis.

A commentator in the September-October 1972 issue of the SASO *Newsletter* expressed the African mood in these terms:

... We Black people should all the time keep in mind that South Africa is our country and that *all* of it belongs to us. The arrogance that makes White people travel all the way from Holland to come and balkanise our country and shift us around has to be destroyed. Our kindness has been misused and our hospitality turned against us. Whereas Whites were mere guests to us on their arrival in this country they have now pushed us out to a 13% corner of the land and are acting as bad hosts in the rest of the country.

The answer to the White problem, the commentator proceeded, was "to provide our own initiative and to act at our own pace and not that created for us by the system." This expressed a mood shared by increasing numbers of people in Free Africa. As the area of freedom widened on the continent it became increasingly clear that the circle of hostility to the White man was growing.

The will to isolate the Whites found expression in the formation in 1971 of the Black Peoples Convention which set out to unite in action Africans, people of mixed blood and Asians behind this programme of principles:

- to liberate and emancipate Blacks from psychological and physical oppression;
- to create a humanitarian society where justice is meted out equally to all;
- to co-operate with existing agencies with the same ideals;
- to re-orientate the theological system with a view of making religion relevant to the aspirations of the Black people;
- to formulate and implement an education policy of Blacks, by Blacks for Blacks.

Ben A. Khoapa became one of the ablest exponents of the philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement. In an address to students of the University of Cape Town in June, 1972, he defined<sup>29</sup> himself as one of those

people who are seeing increasingly the futility of devoting a major portion of their time to talking and intellectualising about things that prove unhelpful to both sides because we see things differently. . . .

The Black people, he continued, must

do whatever they conceive they must do as if Whites did not exist at all. . . . The question of the presence or absence of White people is a tactical matter which can only be answered in a concrete way by reference to the long-term and short-term interests of Blacks. . . . We are caught just now in an impossible historical situation, and that fact, which terrifies some and leads others to despair, gives our struggle a grandeur, a nobility, and a certain tragedy which makes it of moment to the world. . . . Blacks must organise and use their group strength to wrest control of every organisation and institution within reach. . . . This is a world of groups. A man's power depends ultimately on the power of his group. This means that oppressed individuals must recognise their common interests and create a group. . . . that the oppressor and the oppressed must clash. Some men try to avoid the exigencies of the situation by preaching universal brotherhood. But it is a mystification to preach universal brotherhood in a situation of oppression. Paradoxically, a prerequisite for human solidarity is a feeling of non-solidarity with men who stand in the way of solidarity. . . . The oppressed can only bring about a future of universal brotherhood in proportion as they feel and exhibit group solidarity among themselves and cease to

feel solidarity with the enemies of human solidarity. . . . History has charged us with the cruel responsibility of going to the very gate of racism in order to destroy racism—to the gate, not further.

Those with whom Khoapa belonged, the Sharpeville Generation, took pains to point out why they had turned their backs on the White man:

Preoccupation with the White man leads to blunders, confusion in the ranks and demoralisation; it obscures the issues. It is possible for example to be free, creative and happy without being in the presence of White people. It is also possible to be free, creative and happy in groups which are not all Black. Neither separation nor integration confronts the system in its totality for both share the same root postulates. In one way both deplore the fact that White people do not love Black people. But love is irrelevant. History is a struggle, not an orgy.

The crucial factor responsible for marching to “the gate of racism” was the value-system to which the Whites, both the liberals and the advocates of apartheid, were committed. “One of its most shattering characteristics,”<sup>30</sup> wrote Njabulo Ndebele, a perspicacious spokesman of the Sharpeville Generation, was that it “tends to be extremely acquisitive.” It transforms people into prisoners of possessions. Ndebele continued:

The urban Blacks have joined this acquisitive world. . . . People do not matter; it is things that matter. Things make people; people no longer make things. . . . People no longer approach work and matter with a creative bent, because their handling of matter is no longer a means of self-expression, it is now a barren conformity to an impersonal acquisitive norm. An acquisitive society is also characterised by its purposelessness. There is no intrinsic purpose behind this blind acquisition of material things; indeed, acquisition is an end in itself. That is why after having acquired out of conformity, one has no value for that which one has acquired, because it has no intrinsic value for one: . . . the Whites cannot help but acquire, and in doing so, these Whites may be ignorant of the injustices they perpetrate, having been rendered feelingless by the blind urge to acquire. The Blacks must assert their human dignity and rebel against an institution which relegates them to the status of things.

The “rebellion” must be a gigantic and all-embracing leap into the future; a bid to seize the moment that will carry the Black people to a satisfying destiny. Its priorities range over every department of African life. J. Dumo Baqwa, another member of the Sharpeville Generation, lists them in the following quotations from Robert Williams, a black American theologian:<sup>31</sup>

The will to leave the ideals and standards of Western culture behind and the courage to risk the creation of new modes of thought and new institutions based on the Black experience; a return to the songs and dances and rituals that speak of solidarity and survival and hope; a thorough-going re-evaluation of the moral and spiritual values of the African past; an astringent reassertion of the life-force and wisdom of the elders and ancestors; a resolve to re-establish and sustain those family ties and communal bonds that form the basis of Black humanism and dignity; the forging and reshaping of an idiom of expression, a form of effective communicating that will lead to a representation of the life and reality characteristic of the Black experience.

The quotation from the Black American theologian is of interest for two reasons. Williams was invited by SASO to deliver the keynote address to its third Students’ Council Conference at Hammanskraal in 1972 but was refused a visa by the South African government. His address was nevertheless presented to the students.

The invitation must be seen as an African bid to establish effective bonds with the Black Americans for the purpose of reinforcing the “rebellion.” While the Sharpeville Generation emphasised its commitment to Black Consciousness, its spokesmen took pains to deny that there was a “close parallel” between it and the Black Power movement in the United States, for example.

The denial must be seen in perspective. While there were striking similarities in the positions of the Black people in South Africa and the United States in given directions, elsewhere there also were fundamental differences. Apart from the differences in historical backgrounds, the two communities moved into the future at two different levels. In South Africa, the main inspiration against White domination was the *uBuntu* ideal of fulfillment whereas the Black American saw his future largely in terms defined by the White experience.

Thus, while at given levels the daishiki revolution laid stress on *re-africanisation*, in South Africa the quest was for a satisfying meaning of *regeneration*. Policy among the Africans in South Africa sought to give a valid meaning to *uBuntu* in situations of Black-White conflict. The Black Americans were still searching for a satisfying definition of the ideal which they translated into experience. Some Afrikaners took advantage of this difference to stress the importance of closer links between the Black Americans and the Afrikaners, and not the Africans. One assumption was that the Afrikaner and the Black Muslim, for example, were committed to a brand of race exclusiveness which the Africans reject; and that this exclusiveness moved the Afrikaners and some Black Americans to a future not without identical goals. The Sharpeville Generation

countered this interpretation of the Black American's position by making it clear, as Khoapa did, that racism as such was not an end; that it was a vehicle for the creation of a world based on values with a universal meaning. Ndebele supported Khoapa by adding that:

It is important . . . that the Blacks cultivate and develop a philosophy of nature and of life that will centre around the concept of human worth and human dignity. . . .

Ndebele went out of his way to explain that the Black Consciousness revolution searches "for a new culture" which will

. . . explore intellectual avenues and channel them towards the realisation of our aspirations thereby bringing about a new way of life that is more human and humane.

For this culture to thrive, the African had to be ready for drastic changes in his outlook on life; he should re-evaluate the religious experience forced on him by the White conqueror. This is how Ndebele approached the problem:

. . . the Blacks must turn their backs on all the Western Churches; they have been shorn of all emotional content. A genuine religion will spring out of the Blacks' own circumstances, just as a genuine philosophy of life should. It should be a religion that will find God through man; and not man through God. . . . If the Whites do not want to change their attitudes, let the Blacks advance and leave them behind; and when they have been left behind, let them be waited for on the day they realise the value of the change. The important thing to realise is that what the Blacks are striving for is more valuable than racial hatred.

The attacks on the Christian Church were a rejection of the divalent morality which had one meaning in dealings between Black and White and another in relations between White and White. The Africans wanted a mature morality which would be simultaneously valid on both sides of the colour line.

The leaders of the Christian church in Africa had set out to discover a *universal dimension* because the White-led church did not have it; the church failed because it did not define the person in universally valid terms. It said he was a creature when the Suidic experience regarded him as a self-defining value.

A crisis of disenchantment with Christianity was emerging in the search. But the All-Africa Church Conference would not find the *universal dimension* so long as it refused to face the fact that the Suidic and Graeco-Romano-Hebraic evaluations of the person were polarities; that the African Christian is a contradiction in perspectives and that the Christian Nominalist is a product of conflicting perspectives.

The crisis of disenchantment was an evolving process. In 1975, the All-Africa Church Conference was casting around for a *universal dimension*. By 1977, the outlines of the crisis had emerged most clearly in the church in South Africa. Black Protestant leaders had embraced the philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement and had brought into being the Black Theology school of thought which set out to give to Christian values a relevant meaning on the African side of the colour line.

A particularly significant feature of the crisis in the land of apartheid was the "identity" quarrel inside the Roman Catholic Church. The roots of this quarrel could be traced to Roman Catholic teachings on authority and the person. Writing in *The Washington Post* of December 30, 1977, Pierre Haski of Agence France-Presse made this report:

JOHANNESBURG—A crisis is brewing within the South African Roman Catholic Church between the bishops, most of whom are White, and Black African priests who support the philosophy of Black Consciousness. . . .

The conflict has reached such proportions that some Black clergymen are considering training their own Black priests outside the authority of the bishops, according to well informed church sources. . . .

The Black church leaders wanted an Africanization of teaching so they could "recover their identity."

The crisis of disenchantment set out to discover a *universal dimension* which would enable the Africans to *recover their identity*. In other words, the crisis of disillusionment was a collision inside the Catholic Church, between interpretations of the Christian philosophy which clashed because they were based on diametrically opposed evaluations of the person.

The collision produced the Christian Nominalist whose mind was cast in a Christian mould while his psyche was shaped by his Suidic view of the person. Forced by conquest out of his Suidic environment and rejected by

the Whites, he turned inward, to himself, for the fundamental inspiration which would enable him to build for himself and his people the world after their design; the world in which they would realise the promise of being human.

The point to be noted about the Nominalist is that he is a product of conflict between a civilisation which lays emphasis on the primacy of the person and recognises the simultaneous legitimacy, validity and importance of all cultural self-definitions, and another, which defines the person in devaluative terms and works for the diminution of his worth as a human being. Nominalism sets out to bridge the chasm between the two outlooks by creating a synthesis of perceptions which will have universal validity.

The Nominalist emerges in all situations of contact and conflict between Black and White in Africa. Up to now, the Christian Nominalist has featured prominently in the clash of colour because Christian missionaries arrived in Africa before the Marxists did. The search for a *universal dimension* and the commitment to the recovery of the African people's *identity* have begun to establish the irrelevance of the White missionary in Africa. Christianity is on the defensive because it used a divalent morality to destroy the African's *identity*.

Like Christianity, Marxism is a product of the devaluative, Graeco-Romano-Hebraic evaluation of the person. Where Christianity discovered the African "savage" generations ago, Marxism is beginning to discover the ideological "heathen" in our time. Marxist missionaries overwork themselves making converts from the ideological "heathens" and proselytes from the Christian Nominalists.

Unlike the other spokesmen of the Black Consciousness Movement, whose thinking has been influenced to a large extent by SASO, Njabulo Ndebele goes out of his way to castigate not only the educated Africans who have accepted albification—the imposition of Caucasian values on the African—but also the largely unschooled in the separatist churches. These people reject albification at the level of church leadership but accept the Christian evaluation of the person to which they try to give a Sudic meaning. The syncretism works for the continuous extension of the area of fragmentation in the African community. Ndebele reacts to this by proposing an alternative religion:

We have seen how religion has seemingly been used as a substitute for political expression. In being thus, religion in the Black community has become barren, because it has no intellectual content to it. Thus, the many sects we see are a perpetuation of bondage. The Blacks must obliterate all these sects. On the other hand, the Blacks must turn their back on all the Western Churches; they have been shorn of all emotional content. A genuine religion will spring out of the Blacks' own circumstances, just as a genuine philosophy of life should.

Black theologians are as vehement in their attacks on Christianity's pessimistic evaluation of the person as are the theoreticians of the Black Consciousness Movement. The Reverend Sabelo Ntswa attacks albification in the Christian church in these terms:

Now traditional Christianity, as taught us by our know-all White tutors, has set out to teach us a lot about our shortcomings and little about the positive and essentially good nature of man....

We must also remember that the individualistic approach of the missionaries is due to their having come from an individualistic society; hence their failure to understand our communal- and man-centred society, which is the hallmark of the black world....

And all the White, imbibed values in our life-style as Black people will never die unless my brothers will sit up and heed the call of Black Theology and just for a moment forget the vulgar fish-and-chips and Coca-Cola way of life we have inherited from the White world....

Blacks, therefore, with their tremendous sense of community in their culture, have the responsibility of building this into the very fabric of the life of the Church.<sup>32</sup>

The government conveniently ignores the fundamental criticisms of the Caucasian evaluation of the person which guide the African people's Evolving Revolt and blames all attacks on White domination on communist instigation. The Reverend Mokgethi Motlhabi, also writing in *Black Theology*, starts by tracing the origins of racism in South Africa which, he says, arose from quarrels over land. The Africans, he continues, lost on the battlefield because of their poorer technology. This leads him to the following conclusion<sup>33</sup>:

If racial prejudice exists as a myth to preserve a structure in which a few have a monopoly of power and wealth, then it is the concept of a few having a monopoly of power and wealth which must be attacked....

In every instance the structure is supported by a myth. In the political power structure the myth of racism is crucial, as is also the myth of communism—*i.e.* every person who questions this political structure is labelled a "subversive communistic agitator."

...God is neither our servant, to be treated as we choose, nor our master, to treat us as he chooses, but our comrade and friend in the struggle for freedom....

Africa has a value system which makes people more important than time and speed. The West has a value system which makes speed more crucial than people....We cannot have the authoritarians who try to tell us what we believe or what to believe and who have the power to reward or punish us.

The situation of ungovernability is the most remarkable development in South Africa's crisis of colour. It shows that the Evolving Revolt organised in 1912 has developed enough momentum to make a frontal attack on White domination. The attack cracked the unity of the White monoliths and forced Big Business to oppose race discrimination and to come out in support of the Africans on this issue. At the same time it exposed the gravity of one of the fundamental weaknesses in the White power-structure: the paucity of White numbers. Up to the time of this writing, fifteen months after the first eruption of violence in Soweto on June 16, 1976, White authority has not been fully restored in Soweto where riots erupt on the slightest provocation. The government's failure to pacify the township shows that there are limits to White power; that the gun is no guarantee of White dominance or security when opposed by a determined Black majority.

Of especial importance in considering ungovernability is the evolution of the student revolt. The students did not defy White authority for the first time on June 16. For more than five years before this date they had been rebelling and rioting in different parts of the country. The government failed to suppress these revolts, many of which were violent.

In 1976 the Black Peoples' Convention issued *Focus On South Africa*, a bulletin in which it expressed its attitude to the crisis in South Africa. The Convention, which worked in close collaboration with the South African Students Organisation, was the leading political organisation in the Black Consciousness Movement. Among other things, the bulletin said:

Violence in Black schools has been reported to be caused by a number of factors, listed as follows: dissatisfaction with food, draconian rules and regulations, teaching, the lack of books, the behaviour of the masters, etc.

The above expressed factors are however not the fundamental factors. These are just secondary factors which emanate from deep resentment of the system of education dictated to Blacks, without their prior consultation, by the fascist and racist White-minority regime in South Africa. This deep resentment and rejection of this oppressive and slave educational system has brought about confrontation between the designers of the system and the consumers of the evil system. The events listed below are but a few.

- May, 1972—University of the North students walk off the campus after a speech given during a graduation ceremony against the type of education given to Blacks. The walkout is joined by students from the University of Zululand and Fort Hare University. The struggle is also joined by students at the University of Western Cape (meant for so-called Coloured students).
- April, 1975—All boys at Nchawe High School at Hammanskraal near Pretoria were detained by police after buildings were damaged during a protest against inadequate food and sleeping facilities. Later 122 were found guilty of public violence and 87 were to receive cuts (lashes).
- May, 1975—The Nathaniel Nyalusa (High) School, Grahamstown, came to a halt for several weeks. The trouble was started by students' protest(s) against staff misconduct, inferior education and shortage of textbooks. Nineteen teachers who left the school were dismissed.
- September, 1975—About 500 students at Blythwood School in the Transkei went on a rampage after complaining that their food smelt of oil. They cut off the power, assaulted a teacher and broke windows. After an inquiry 56 pupils were suspended.
- October, 1975—Nearly 350 boys at the largest African high school in the Cape, Healdtown High School, near Fort Beaufort, walked out after a week of violence.
- October, 1975—In a revolt at a vocational school at Nongoma, Zululand, a pupil was shot in the stomach by police, a vehicle was overturned and one had its tires slashed.
- November, 1975—Thirty pupils from Moroka High School, Thaba Nchu, were treated in hospital after a "disturbance" caused when girls refused to attend a Sunday Service.
- April, 1976—A high school at Waterval in the Eastern Transvaal failed to re-open after the holidays following boycotts and strikes by students and staff in sympathy with 142 boys expelled during the first term.
- May, 1976—400 African students stoned two Security Police cars and two teachers have since been arrested under (the) Terrorism Act. This happened at Siyamukela High School, Madadeni, Newcastle.



- May, 1976—More than 200 students at the University of Zululand stoned Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's car during a graduation ceremony at the campus. The students carried placards which read: "We reject Vorster's puppets." This was clearly the students' rejection of Vorster's government's policy of separate ethnic homelands.
- May, 1976—More than 120 boys were suspended from Lourdes High School near Umzimkhulu after a fight at the school.
- June, 1976—The burning of a police vehicle in Soweto and other acts of violence, culminating in growing strikes against the enforced use of Afrikaans as a medium for instruction.

An unpublicised cause of ungovernability was the government's contradictory translations of its own policies into action. Apartheid had insisted all along that it set out to enable the African to *develop along his own lines*. These lines were laid down by Afrikaner cultural leaders in Black universities; by a system of education developed and applied by Afrikaners for the purpose of afrikanerising African thought.

When the Africans tried to show that Afrikaner definitions of the African were as irrelevant as the lines laid down by the advocates of apartheid, the police moved in. In June, 1976, the Black People's Convention held a seminar on economic policy. Its members met at St. Joseph's Catechetical Centre, in Mafeking. The seminar resolved that the policy of the Convention would be Black Communalism which it defined as "an economic system based on the principle of sharing, laying emphasis on community ownership of land and its wealth and riches."

In approving the policy, the seminar noted:

- That Black Communalism, as defined, is a modified version of the traditional African economic lifestyle, which is being geared to meet the demands of a highly industrialised and modern economy;
- The sharing envisaged will not necessarily be monitored by the state, but may well be either between groups of individuals or specific communities within the state, or all the communities comprising the state.
- As in the traditional outlook, sharing should imply not only the sharing of property and wealth, but also of services, which would result in the systematic division of labour. This would manifest itself in the economic system of the country.

This perfectly harmless junior high school attempt to develop economic theory in response to the challenge that the African should develop along

his own lines is regarded as proof of Marxist indoctrination and punished accordingly.

At this writing, the government has not banned the Convention. What it has done has been to use a wide variety of stratagems to destroy the leadership of this mainly young people's organisation.

The National Cultural Liberation Movement which, according to White press reports, had a paid-up membership of over 120,000 in 1976-77, proclaims in its constitution that:

we have many things to copy from the Western economic, political and educational patterns of development and [strive] for the promotion of African patterns of thought and the achievement of African Humanism otherwise commonly known in Nguni languages as *ubuntu* and in Sotho languages as *botho*.

The Nguni and Sotho words have one and the same meaning. Literally: the art or practice of being human; virtue. The philosophy which the Nguni and Sotho experiences translate into action teaches that highest virtue consists in the person identifying himself with his neighbour; in regarding himself as the obverse side of a reality to which his neighbour is the reverse; it insists that the person is a self-defining value which is above race, colour and ethnicity.

For the Zulu, Sotho and Xhosa to live together, work together and pool their resources to solve common problems is what *Buntu* and *Botho* regard as the moral things to do; to act as Buntu and Botho teach is, in African eyes, to develop along their own lines.

In spite of this, Police Minister Jimmy Kruger summoned Chief Buthelezi, the president of the National Cultural Liberation Movement, to Pretoria in September, 1977, where, according to a report in the international edition of the *Johannesburg Star* (September 24, 1977), the minister warned Buthelezi that "there will be trouble if Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement) continued to accept non-Zulus as members."

Government policy here seeks to force the Africans to segregate themselves from each other even when this is in conflict with their system of morality or lines of development. The same government rejects the Judaeo-Christian teaching on the brotherhood of Man on the score that the Black man cannot be the brother of the White man.

The contradictions in which apartheid is caught here need to be seen from the perspective of history. The Crusades set out to conquer the pagan world for Christ and, as subsequent events were to show, collect the goodies of this world for the Europeans. The age of discovery extended the area to be conquered. Colonialism imposed the European attitude to the person on peoples of non-European descent.

But this attitude could not give a satisfying meaning to life among all groups in a racially and culturally mixed world; it could not cope with the imperatives of co-existence in pluralistic societies. The demands of co-existence strained and cracked it and led to the eventual expulsion of the White conquerors from many parts of the non-European world.

The Whites could not be expelled from the Middle World for a number of reasons. In America they were in the majority. Although a minority in South Africa, they were armed in such a way as to make their expulsion costly.

The Americans tackled the problems of racial and cultural co-existence by rejecting race as a determinant of public policy; they recognised the validated principle as the truth. This was an important development in the evolution of the American commonwealth; it opened doors to the accommodation of Black self-definitions if the Black people wanted to define themselves in their own terms.

The Whites went to the opposite extreme in South Africa. They rejected the logic of their religion's teaching on the brotherhood of Man on one side and, on the other, rejected the logic of the Buntu or Sudic evaluation of the person. That created a vacuum in their thinking on co-existence which produced the contradictions under discussion.

The vacuum raised the spectre of the Whites being eventually expelled from South Africa, not by force of arms but, as some militants say, by a scorched-earth policy which would starve them out of the country; by wrecking the economy in ways which would make it no longer worthwhile for the Whites to live in South Africa.



Newsweek

Schoolboy killed in Soweto rebellion, June 1976.



Time

Steve Biko's body after autopsy.

## A COLLECTIVE RESPONSE

While the Southern and Northern approaches developed different answers to the challenge of conquest, they were the reactions of the same bicipitous mind to the same provocation. In the South, the clash between Sudic and Caucasian civilisations moved the Coloureds and the Africans toward the ideal of a *Larger Nation* while it drove the various Black language-groups in the North toward the ideal of a *New Nation*.

The two ideals responded to rejection of the Africans, Coloureds and Asians by the Whites. The side committed to the establishment of the *Larger Nation* believed that the answer to the situation created by conquest was the establishment of a consensus of the like-minded which would transcend race and colour.

The Whites rejected this ideal when they formed the Union of South Africa and brought into being a closed society in which the White skin became *the* qualification for citizenship. The African answer to this was the rejection of destiny as prescribed by the Whites. The various language-groups in South Africa, the Protectorates, the Transkei and the Ciskei welded themselves into a *New Nation* on the basis of a clearly stated philosophy. The destiny of this nation was to create "a new and unique civilization," a civilisation in which the person of African descent would never again be punished for being the child of his particular parents.

It is not without significance that in 1943 the advocates of the two ideals reacted in identical ways to the challenge of World War II, when they formed the Congress Youth League and the Non-European Unity Movement. Equally significant were Mda's and Tsotsi's efforts to move the two wings toward convergence.

By crushing radical Monolithism and militant Medialism from 1960 onward, apartheid drove the main anti-apartheid organisations underground where violence was the only political argument they could use. Each political organisation produced its official or related underground. *Pogo* was associated with the PAC while the ANC had the Spear of the Nation. The more radical members of the Liberal Party of South Africa banded themselves with other radicals to form the African Resistance Movement which had the distinction of producing the first anti-apartheid martyr on the White side. John Harris was hanged by the apartheid regime for his direct attacks on the White power-structure.

The government crushed all resistance groups and created the political leadership vacuum which has frequently been mentioned in this discussion. The bicipitous mind accepted the challenge. Its isolationist aspect took its stand on non-collaboration while the Monolithists attacked on the basis of functionalism. The non-collaborationists failed to stop the Transkei and Bophuthatswana from accepting "independence"; the functionalists stopped Chief Charles Hlengwa in Natal from accepting "independence."

It has been said that the non-collaborators reached their moment of glory in the Soweto Rebellion. It must be said that the functionalists reached their moment of glory on November 7-8, 1973, when the chief executive officers of the main homelands administrations met in Umtata and committed themselves to the ideal of establishing the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

A day or two later, Buthelezi spoke in East London (November 10, 1973) and defined functionalism's goals in these terms:

We no longer think we should be preoccupied with begging for more reforms. . . . We dream now of . . . an alternative to what our White rulers have propounded so far. . . . This means a nonracial society in which every human being will have the right and opportunity to make the best possible use of his life. . . . Only through a Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa can the Black man, the White man, the Brown man, each translate the great principles handed down to each one of them by their ancestors into satisfying social, economic and cultural action. The Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa will guarantee the identity and cultural autonomy of every racial, ethnic or cultural group. . . .

Buthelezi wanted an internal, all-inclusive dialogue to hammer out a formula for co-existence which all races could accept with honour. The vehicle that could produce such a formula was a constitutional conference, which Buthelezi asked the prime minister to convene.

Again, the Whites rejected the African people's demand. Buthelezi warned that the Africans would withdraw their labour if White South Africa did not listen when the Black people spoke. A few months later, the Soweto Rebellion broke out.

Every African language-group was involved in the rebellion as the lists of the dead and the jailed testify. The Coloureds joined in this fight and laid down their lives as freely as the Africans did. Young Asians had gone to jail with our young people. In these events, a Collective Response was developing which was an African, Coloured and Asian answer to race humiliation.

The Collective Response was a part of a larger response; it was part of the Black world's answer to the peculiar relationship which emerged in situations of contact and conflict between the peoples of African and Caucasian descent. This larger Collective Response set out to create the world in which the peoples of African descent would be equipped, enabled and seen to discover more satisfying dimensions of being human.

The Black Writers Conference which met in Rome set out to discover this dimension. So did the African Students' Conference which met in Ghana in the 1960s. The satisfying dimension was the "universal dimension" for which the All-Africa Church Conference said it was looking at

its Nairobi sessions in 1975. It was this dimension also which Lt.-General Olusegun Obasanjo was looking for when he rejected teleguidance at the Khartoum conference of the OAU in 1978.

These searches were rejections of the prescribed destiny. This gave to the crisis in South Africa the character of a war of minds and a conflict of wills; a collision between the Black World's Collective Response and the Caucasian World's bias for prescribing destiny for others.

South Africa's crisis was the decisive battle of the long-drawn war of minds. The relations between Black and White in the world would change after the collapse of apartheid, for, in the final analysis, the war of minds is a collision between conflicting attitudes to the person and not between classes. There is a positive side to the collision. The Africans who were forced out of the Sudafrican World created a synthesis of outlooks in order to survive in the situation of Black-White conflict. The Afrikaners' ancestors developed a parallel synthesis. The existence of these syntheses is an important area of congruity in the experience of the African and the Afrikaner. It means that the African and the Afrikaner who walked out of their worlds to create new worlds for themselves need to develop a unifying relationship which will transform Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community, which will include all races.

History confronts the Afrikaner with a momentous choice. If he wants to, he can join hands with the African in leading Africa in the new experiment with freedom which she has launched. That would guarantee him a permanent place in the African sun.

If he wants to, he can spend the rest of his life planning to build separate lavatories for Blacks and Whites. As the history of Caucasian civilisation shows, this will eventually destroy him.

His answer must of necessity be the creation of a synthesis of syntheses which, as Shaka taught, will be based on political self-determinism, economic integration and cultural autonomy which, as our history teaches, will draw the difference between the fundamentals of conflict and the operational aspects of conquest—between opposing attitudes to the person and vehicles like race discrimination, political oppression, economic exploitation and cultural asphyxiation.

The problem we are dealing with here is no longer one of race oppression or colour prejudice; it is one of building a nation; it is one of re-aligning forces for the purpose of moving to majority rule. Our problem is to identify the forces involved in the war of minds, to attain clarity on their interactions and to re-align them for the purpose of creating a national identity which will be acceptable to the Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites who have made Southern Africa their home.

The African must give leadership in moving events to the above goal. For good or for worse, the White man must effect a revolution in his thinking; he must teach himself the habit of playing a supportive role in the prescription of final goals if he wants to secure his position in

Southern Africa. The evil days when we were taught that we were savages and ideological heathens who had to be saved by Jesus Christ and Karl Marx are gone never to return. This is an important index of changing power dispositions.

The main submission made in what has been written up to now is that the pessimistic or devaluative attitude to the person guarantees its own failure in racially or culturally mixed societies; that apartheid, which translates this attitude into action in South Africa, creates the conditions which have begun to destroy White rule.

This setting gives to the crisis the character of a war of African and Caucasian minds which the African is now winning. The first round of decisive battles he fought and won were on the ideological plane. He rejected the prescribed destiny, set himself the goal of establishing "a new and unique civilization," created a vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa, and set out to fill the void with the ideal of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

He proceeded from these victories to make strategic conquests. He cracked the foundations of the united front of White monoliths, forced Big Business to move to the left of the government on the abolition of race discrimination, sealed in blood the unity of the African and Coloured communities, established the relativity of Afrikaner power and effected the isolation of the White supremacists on the international plane.

The third battle the African has won is the psychological one. He has emerged victorious in the conflict between the psychology of prescribing destiny and the psychology of "creating a new and unique civilization." This change is of fundamental importance for all involved or interested in the crisis in South Africa. On the African side it means that the psychology based on the Sudic evaluation of the person has created a new psychology of survival in the conditions created by conquest: it has brought into being a synthesis of carry-overs from Sudic psychology and the psychology of proletarianisation.

The synthesis is essentially a psychology of rising from a fall. Conflict rationalisation is the philosophy of rising from a fall.

When opposing psychologies collide, the irresistible momentum of numbers in a race-conscious society gives the many, first, the potential and, later, the capability to expel the few. African numbers place the African on the winning side.

The failure of the White minority to impose its will and stop the strikes in 1973-74, which created a bad impression among foreign investors, was followed by the Soweto Rebellion, which continued for nearly two years in spite of determined government efforts to suppress it.

Reference was made in an earlier chapter to the rise in the numbers of Whites fleeing South Africa. There is also a fall in the numbers of White immigrants. This has created a crisis at the level of skilled work which has forced the apartheid regime to do some fundamental thinking on the use

of African labour to fill the vacuum caused by the stoppage of the influx of skilled workers from White countries.

The international edition of the *Johannesburg Star* (October 14, 1978) reported that the Department of Education and Training planned to spend about R 40-million over two years to build more educational institutions for the Africans. The following was of particular interest in the report:

The technical college [to be established by the plans] is scheduled to be opened in January, 1980 with a projected cost of R 30-million. . . . Engineering training for an enrollment of 5,000 is being offered.

One of Big Business's main concerns was the collapse of the policy of importing skilled White labour. The government offered attractive terms to would-be White settlers. Internal and external attacks on apartheid have combined with the Evolving Revolt to convince Whites who would want to emigrate to the Republic that South Africa is the wrong country to settle in at the moment.

The Associated Chambers of Commerce faced the implications of these realities at their annual conference held in Pietermaritzburg in October 1978. The conference demanded "an end to the subsidisation of White immigration."

The admission into skilled jobs every year of about 5,000 African technicians will place the Black population in a more advantageous position to use its labour as a political weapon.

That increasing numbers of Whites have begun to flee the country or avoid emigrating to the Republic is evidence that the African has created conditions on the homefront which increase White uncertainty about the future of South Africa.

The Afrikaner's reactions to these changing dispositions of power are informative. In the southern winter of 1978, the chairman of *Die Broederbond*, one of the groups which make policy in the Afrikaner monolith, joined hands with the editor of the pro-apartheid Johannesburg daily, *Die Transvaler*, to find an alternative to apartheid which would be based on "maximum consensus." This decision was supported by another Afrikaner organisation, *Die Rapportryers*.<sup>34</sup>

Members of the Afrikaans cultural body, the *Rapportryers*, have come out in favour of contact with Africans, Indians and Coloured people—subject to certain conditions.

A week later *The Star* reported that the Afrikaanse Studentebond—the Afrikaner students' organisation—had decided to launch a programme for establishing contacts "with other races and groups which hold opposing views."

These developments do not indicate that the walls of Jericho are falling. What they show is that the crisis in all South Africa now confronts the Afrikaner monolith with a fundamental challenge which calls for a fundamental answer; they show, also, that groups are emerging in the Afrikaans community which seek to extend the area of contact between Black and White.

This development calls for the introduction of additional dimensions to the strategies adopted on the homefront and in foreign lands against apartheid. Political offensives should be launched to encourage Afrikaner rejections of apartheid and to fill the vacuum thus created with a clearly stated alternative to the status quo.

It calls, also, for the realisation that African victories on the ideological, strategic and psychological planes draw in sharper outlines the last battle the African has to win: the political battle; the battle for the establishment of majority rule—for the transfer of political power to the majority and the establishment of a society in which no person shall be punished for being the child of his or her particular parents. In this society, the person will be equipped, enabled and seen to realise the promise of being human regardless of race, colour, ethnicity, sex or creed.

This brings us to truly crucial points in the crisis. In historical terms, the Soweto Rebellion brought the era of race politics to an end and forced South Africa into the politics of confrontation. In the new dispensation, Black and White might be involved in a confrontation of minds or a confrontation of arms.

Ideology and power dispositions will be key factors in the politics of confrontation. Ideology will define purpose and prescribe final goals while power will give impact and momentum to movement toward these goals.

Ideology and power are inseparable complements in a monolith. For a monolith or combination of monoliths to be able to impose its will, it must have a clear vision, singlemindedness of purpose, and control of decisive power.

Afrikaner power remained invincible as long as it guaranteed profits to English entrepreneurs and had an absolute capability for crushing any African rebellion against White rule. Since the beginning of the 1970s the African's bicipitous mind organised the strikes which demonstrated that the government had a limited ability to discipline African workers and in that way guarantee profits. The Soweto Rebellion showed that the government's capability for suppressing rebellion is relative.

These developing weaknesses must be seen against conflicting psychologies of fulfillment on the White side. Our model will be the strategies used by Afrikaner and English churches. During the early years of the armed struggle on the borders of South Africa, the English-oriented Protestant churches announced that they would not encourage their followers to enlist for service against Black guerrillas. From then on,

they moved away from policies which reinforced apartheid, toward a more or less central position in the clash between Black and White. They even established a united theological training centre in Alice which developed into a fount of the Black Consciousness Movement's Black Theology.

The government eventually closed down the seminary, which found a home in the Transkei for a while. It quarrelled with the Matanzima regime and ended up in Edendale, in Natal.

Here, the English Protestant churches were in effect using their resources to reinforce the African's psychology of creating "a new and unique civilization." Their flexibility contrasted sharply with the rigidity of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Afrikaans community.

Younger members of the Coloured community had intensified their attacks on the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts which gave to the Coloureds the identity of a community born in sin. The slur had always been bitterly resented by the Coloured community and played no small part in enabling the Coloured students to throw in their lot with the Africans in the Soweto Rebellion.

African and Coloured theologians intensified their attacks on Afrikaner cultural organisations, including Die Broederbond, for their support of racism and demanded the re-unification of the Black and White sections of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the largest of Dutch Reformed Church denominations. The Afrikaner monolith would not tolerate this. NGK endorsement of re-unification would be tantamount to acceptance of race equality and recognition of the African's right to create "a new and unique civilization."

From the above, the predominantly English churches can be seen moving in directions which are different from those taken by the DRC. If this does anything, it shows the spiritual leadership echelons in the two monoliths drifting toward divergence on race discrimination. Big Business is rejecting racism.

In October, 1978, the Progressive Federal Party announced that it would call a national conference to consider plans for the transformation of South Africa into a federal state.

These splits together constitute a fundamental weakness in the united front of White monoliths; they give to the force of White unity the character of a variable which responds to changing dispositions of Black-White power, and damage the White side's capability for giving meaningful leadership in the conditions created by the relativity of Afrikaner power.

All these problems which the united front is having are overshadowed by blows to the Afrikaner self-image which threaten to shatter the psychology of *kragdadigheid*. The Afrikaner was taught and believed that his leaders were paragons of human excellence; that they were God-fearing, unwavering in their loyalty to their Afrikaner people, and un-

shakeable in their faith, and that they were morally unimpeachable patriots and patriarchs who could not be bought with wine, money or women.

The corruption and thuggery associated with the scandal which rocked the apartheid regime in 1978 shattered this image. The Afrikaners had largely condoned the murder of politically committed Africans detained by the police; they were outraged when murder seemed likely to be used in circumstances which suggested that it might become a political weapon against fellow Afrikaners.

The exposure of what the power-drunk incarnations of virtue did behind the scenes hurled the Afrikaner headlong into a crisis of self-definition which brought him face-to-face with the lie in his soul which had brought about the collapse of the Outward-looking Policy, the failure of the satellite system, the defection of Big Business, the drying up of the flow of immigrants, the diplomatic isolation of the apartheid regime and the establishment of the relativity of Afrikaner power.

A familiar pattern was unfolding in these events. From the beginnings of Caucasian civilisation, the definition of the person in devaluative and pessimistic terms had been an historic error which created catastrophic disharmonies in society and the human personality. These disharmonies had emerged in the Afrikaner monolith to crack the psychology of *kragdadigheid* and corrode the Afrikaner's sense of realities.

The offer of vassalage in mini-states which could not maintain themselves went beyond being an unrealistic pipedream; it was the product of a mind which had lost its sense of realities. It defined one dimension of the vacuum in White thinking on the "race" problem on one plane and, on another, demonstrated that the united front of White monoliths had lost the war of minds.

The relevant conclusion in this setting is that while the logic of White rule leads Black and White to an appointment on the battlefield, the victories scored by the Collective Will and the Evolving Revolt in the last sixty-six years give the political option the nature of a viable shortcut to majority rule and the stabilisation of conditions in South Africa.

One other fact must be noted. The splits developing in the White monoliths—Buthelezi has his own troubles with the Black Consciousness Movement—respond mainly to the demands of adnation. Neither *kragdadigheid* nor economic necessity can stop natural growth. Each monolith is dividing into diehards who reject race equality or collaboration and the advocates of accommodation across the colour line.

The accommodationists are the raw material out of which to build a like-minded majority of Africans, Afrikaners and English in the first instance. This majority would have the power to develop a viable alternative to the status quo which White liberals were never able to do because they came mainly from the English side.

Today's accommodationists are a different political breed. Their

Afrikaner section is not made up of individual do-gooders who hope to atone for Afrikaner injustices against the Blacks by joining racially mixed groups. They are members or leaders of important, opinion-forming organisations in the Afrikaner monolith; they are loyal Afrikaners who have been forced by the logic of events to realise that majority goodwill is the only reliable guarantee of Afrikaner survival in South Africa. Their existence is a relatively new development in the crisis and is one more argument for a political solution based on a consensus of the like-minded of all races.

The value of this consensus cannot be over-emphasised. By giving the like-minded a single goal, it could be made to impart a unifying momentum to events which could at least narrow down the area of bloodshed if the crisis got out of control.

The prospects of narrowing the area of bloodshed are underlined by the monolithic stratifications of South African society and the fact that, on the important question of abolishing race discrimination, the Afrikaners and English have begun to have two minds. South Africa is unique in having a ruling race with two divergent minds on a major policy issue. It is to this unique situation that the political option must be addressed. The development of a viable political solution and strategy together might be said to be a short-cut to majority rule in the conditions which exist in the political battle.

As has been stated throughout the present discussion, the stress on a political solution must not be construed to be a condemnation of the military argument. It is an attempt to draw attention to the need for a strategy which will focus attacks on points of maximum vulnerability in apartheid. The angularities in the imperatives of monolithal survival on the White side are one such weakness.

The difficulties discussed in this chapter must be seen in context. The Afrikaner's problems spring partly from the fact that he wants to be a child of Africa on one hand and, on the other, to retain a European identity which hurts the Africans. This gives his people the character of political Siamese twins whose brains function in opposite directions. It is to this political dualism to which we must address ourselves in dealing with the "independent" homelands.

Free Africa and the rest of the international community need to see the peoples who "accept independence" as victims of political Siamism, as communities caught in a situation of tragic contradictions. If they were seen in this light, international policy would note that the Africans were not a party to the unitary state established by the British and that it is no crime for them to tear down the Westminster type of structure in any way which might suit their peculiar situation. This policy would proceed to lay down clearly stated conditions for the acceptance of the "secessionists" by the international community. One of these conditions would be commitment to a larger union of peoples which would create a new balance of

Black and White power on one hand and, on the other, form a united front of Black states which supply labour to "White" South Africa. The other could be the commitment by the "secessionists" to withdraw their labour from South Africa if and when the Black South Africans staged a national stay-at-home strike.

The most effective weapon the African controls in the political battle is a stay-at-home strike which would paralyse South Africa's economy, immobilise the seaports on the Cape sea route, and stop the production of strategic minerals for the West. The strike could be reinforced by a crisis of dual-authority conflict in the homelands—to wreck the satellite system and destroy its ability to supply cheap labour to the master-state.

The changed dispositions of power argue the case for a multiple strategy which will address itself to the weaknesses which have emerged in the united front of White monoliths and, at the same time, provide scope for the simultaneous use of political, economic, military and other weapons against apartheid. Such a strategy would also provide for the co-ordination of internal and external campaigns against racism and for clarity on the goals the majority has set itself.

The point to note about the changing dispositions of power is that the Northern and Southern aspects of the African's bicipitous mind converge, first, at the point of isolating the White supremacists and, second, on the use of African, Coloured and Asian labour as a political weapon.

The convergence is the matrix in which the will to expel the Whites will continue to grow as long as the Afrikaner monolith makes it a crime for the African to be the child of his or her particular parents.

The fundamental question raised by the ideological outlooks described in the first two chapters and the mutually exclusive strategies outlined in Chapters Three and Four is whether or not there is room in South Africa for an ideal of fulfillment which has one meaning in dealings between White and White and another when it comes to relations between Black and White.

For sixty-six years, the African majority has been saying there is no room for such a divalent philosophy. They have since been joined by a growing number of Coloureds and Asians.

The evidence of these changes is that the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic attitude to the person is incapable of giving a satisfying meaning to life for all races in a mixed society; that it cannot cope with the demands of co-existence in the conditions which exist in Southern Africa; that the vacuum it has created calls for a vital African-Afrikaner relationship which will transform all the peoples, nations and races of Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community.

Constructive involvement in the creation of this community is a challenge of belonging to Africa which the Afrikaner must face in his own interest. The next chapter describes this involvement.

#### NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. Johannesburg *Star*, February 10, 1975.
2. *Ibid.*, October 23, 1976.
3. *Ibid.*
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