30. In *Black Viewpoint* and *Creativity and Black Development*, the former published by Black Community Programmes and the latter by Saso, in Durban.
31. In *Creativity and Black Development*.
32. *The Concept of the Church in Black Theology* in *Black Theology*, ed., Basil Moore, C. Hurst Co., London, 1973, Pp 112, 113, 117.
33. Ibid.
34. Johannesburg *Star*, (international edition), October 14, 1978.

V. An African Alternative to Apartheid

BLUEPRINT FOR FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Much has been written, first, on the conflict between the psychology of creating "a new and unique civilization" and the psychology of prescribing destiny and, second, on the changing dispositions of power produced by the conflict. Attention will now be given to the type of formula for co-existence which could be a basis for moving like-minded Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites to a consensus on final goals.

It has been said that South Africa is unique in that the African majority is oppressed by a united front of White monoliths which has its own unsolved identity problems. In this setting, White unity is a fragile plant which responds to changing dispositions of power in the African community. It was to this circumstance that the Bloemfontein Unity Conference addressed itself; it was this fact, also, which those Blacks, who rejected the destiny prescribed for the Africans in the Freedom Charter, had in mind when they broke from the ANC and formed the PAC.

The men and women who met in Bloemfontein in 1912 thought in terms of launching an Evolving Revolt which would in time make it impossible for the White minority to impose its will and rule on the majority. To complement the internal revolt, they launched an external campaign from Versailles in 1919 to effect the isolation of the White united front on the international plane. The Afrikaner and English monoliths are now caught in the grip of these pincers.

Their behaviour in this situation demands a recasting of African strategies and tactics.

In general terms, the industry-oriented English are moving away from the united front of White monoliths toward a consensus of the like-minded which will effect the minimum of dislocations in the economic status quo.

While the economic leaders of the English are sending signals of conciliation to the Africans—Natal's Chamber of Commerce is giving effective support to the province's African Chamber of Commerce—a substantial proportion of English in lower echelons voted for the Nasionale Party, which advocates apartheid, in the November, 1977, general elections.

This "contradiction" needs to be seen in perspective; it has its origins in the political impotence of the English. Constituting roughly about a third of the White population, they stand no chance of ever succeeding in using the ballot box to unseat the apartheid regime.

Those among them who do not believe Big Business speaks for them accept political integration with the Afrikaner. Whether or not this means that they are ready for absorption by the Afrikaner is another matter.

What everybody is certain about is that they have joined the White, political united front on terms laid down by the Afrikaner monolith. In a race-conscious society, they do not have much of a choice.

For the African, the united White political front means that the Black monolith does not need to speak to some of the English in one set of terms and to the Afrikaners in another; it means, in other words, that the day might come when an African-Afrikaner agreement on final goals would enable the Afrikaner to impose this agreement on at least a section of the English.

Our main interest at the moment is the economic status quo. In preceding chapters, it was shown that there are fundamental shifts in the centres of power in the White monoliths. Big Business works in close collaboration with the West to establish a Black middle class which would co-operate with similar classes in the Afrikaner and English monoliths and eventually join hands with these in forming a united front of African, Coloured, Asian, Afrikaner and English middle class people.

These would eventually gang up against the masses of the poor, hoard the wealth of South Africa and pass some of it to the West.

Two problems arise for the African and the Afrikaner from this. Both communities are dispossessed in different ways; both are victims of cultural, economic and pychological deprivation on different planes. These hurts have developed in them a response which might be called the temper of the dispossessed—a preoccupation with considerations of destiny which often downgrades economic necessity as a determinant of policy.

The temper of the dispossessed has, in the last sixty-six years, been moving both groups away from the English or Westminster or unitary type of state, toward different goals. The African set himself the ideal of a Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa while the Afrikaner chose a satellite system.

The Afrikaner monolith made grave misreadings of African history and proceeded from this to commit one political blunder after another. He made himself believe that apartheid was his guarantee of survival and security. That made his community͵the most hated White community in the world; it left him isolated on the homefront and on the diplomatic plane.

He spent large sums of money attracting White immigrants when he should have known that the large number of African (and some White, Coloured and Asian) exiles he drove out of the country would organise, write, speak and act against apartheid in ways which would combine with the Evolving Revolt one day to frighten off immigrants to the racial dictatorship he established.

He did all he could to attract foreign investments but made no provision against the possibility that he could one day be caught in the tangles of his own errors. The stoppage of the influx of immigrants is forcing him to build a technical college to produce about 5,000 skilled African workers a year. This has political implications which call for an identity which all races and peoples can accept with honour.

South Africa does not as yet have this identity. Buthelezi's diplomacy seeks to establish this identity via a political solution.

In their search for it, the English established a unitary state which degenerated into a crude racist one. The Afrikaner monolith crushed the unitary state when it gave "independence" to the Transkei and Bophuthatswana and created its satellite system.

Numbers eventually describe the course history takes in the clash between Black and White. As has been shown, the satellite system is under attack from the African people. To take two instances: the strikes by African workers during the first five years of the 1970s combined with the Soweto Rebellion to establish the relativity of White power. At the same time, the Evolving Revolt drove a wedge between Big Business and the government in Pretoria on the issue of abolishing race discrimination. The Africans had no guns then.

The growing unity of the Africans, Coloureds and Asians will in the end destroy the satellite system, as the quarrel between the Transkei and Pretoria has begun to show. When Matanzima and Mangope accepted the vassalage Pretoria offered, they made it known that they had their eyes on the eventual establishment of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa. If we put their opportunism aside for a moment, it will be seen that they moved out of South Africa in order to regroup and unite in a federal union formed on bases laid down by the Africans. When the homelands leaders committed themselves to the eventual formation of the federal union, they sealed the fate of the satellite system.

This definition of the "race" problem brings into view another dimension of the crisis; it shows the Black and White quarrel to be a clash between a narrow national identity which is valid only in the Afrikaner experience and a larger national identity which accommodates Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites and seeks to stabilise economic and political conditions in Southern Africa.

But the united front of White monoliths is on the defensive on other planes. Pretoria's policy of building buffer states on South Africa's northern borders has become a dismal failure. What the Whites dreaded most has become a fact of South African life. The crushing of White domination has given South Africa contiguous borders with Free Africa and created the situation in which arms, hostile propaganda, etc., ˌcan be taken into South Africa virtually at any point along its 4,500-mile border in the north.

An important aspect of the length of the border is that it thins out South Africa's line of defence and ties down productive White manpower to unproductive military duty on the front line. If this lowers production at a critical time in the economy, it combines with the instability which followed the Soweto Rebellion to shake external confidence in South Africa as an investment paradise; it shows the Whites failing to give leadership in a situation of challenge.

These defeats for apartheid must be seen as dimensions of its isolation. These dimensions combine with the Evolving Revolt to change the complexion of the crisis. Race ceases to be the basic cause of conflict and becomes a vehicle used in a quarrel at the level of fundamentals. The abolition of race discrimination or "petty" apartheid ceases to be the problem at issue, just as Black majority rule does. The problem becomes: what is the meaning which freedom and citizenship must have in South Africa? Must the Whites whose minds have been poisoned by racism be expelled to provide room for other Whites who will enter South Africa on terms dictated by the majority?

The Sudic answer is clear and uncompromising. The Whites in South Africa are human and are, for this reason, entitled to a place in the African sun if they seriously want it. Seriously is the operative word. If they want to belong to Africa, they must do the things which are done in Africa; they must stop punishing the African for being the child of his African parents in his own Africa and join hands with him in creating a society in which the person will be equipped, enabled and seen to realise the promise of being human regardless of race, colour, ethnicity, sex and creed. They must, in other words, be constructively involved in the development of a national identity which the like-minded majority of Africans, Coloureds and Asians desire.

If they cannot do this, if they cannot survive in South Africa without prescribing destiny for Black people, then they must be expelled so that the African can be free to invite other Whites from other parts of the world to settle in South Africa with their skills and capital.

No African in his senses expects the South African Whites to abandon their personality-distorting definition of the individual. No White man in his senses should expect Black South Africans to reject the Sudic view of the person—the All-Africa Church Conference has already warned that it is searching for a new dimension of Christianity which will satisfy African conditions—or to dissociate themselves from the Black World's Collective Will. As Seme put it, the best that the African can do is to be involved in the creation of a "new and unique civilization;" to contribute positively to the enrichment of the synthesis of values which sooner or later emerges in situations of Black-White contact and which gives meaning to life in the conditions created by conquest.

If the Afrikaner had something to give, he would co-operate with the African to create the civilisation in which it would not be a crime for a

human being to be the child of his or her particular parents. As things stand, the Afrikaner is making himself the most hated White group in Africa; he has given his name an ugly odour in Africa. If this makes him expendable, his greed gives to his expulsion the character of an ideal young Africans who grow up in the shadow of the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres can live for.

The prospect of expulsion must, however, be also seen in light provided by global power rivalries. Oil and minerals are the main strategic resources over which the great White powers will be quarrelling in the twenty-first century. Africa's mineral potential has barely been touched. This makes Africa the continent of the future. Since her minerals appear to be concentrated in the South, Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular seem destined to be the main fields on which World War III's fiercest battles will be fought.

The Soviet Union is steadily digging in its feet in Mozambique in readiness for the final showdown. West Germany balances this with nuclear installations in Zaire.

German strategy in Southern Africa complements German activity in South America. Large German communities have emerged in South America which have close connections with the fatherland. If World War III broke out, the United States and the Soviet Union would be the principal combatants. Germany would let them bleed each other to the point where, like Britain and France after World War III, they became second-class powers. During the war the West German economy, which could be paralysed by Soviet power, would be reinforced by Germany's satellite settlements in South America and possibly in parts of South Africa and Namibia. The German satellite system would enable Germany to recover swiftly enough after the war to become the dominant power in the world, with the possible collaboration of Japan.

The two countries would form a new axis which could, with the United States and the Soviet Union out of the way, prescribe destiny for Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular.

It must be understood that Germany here refers to West Germany. The framework in which German policy unfolds is informative. Germany continues to be a member of the United Nations. In the world organisation, Japan continues to be treated as a small boy in international affairs in spite of her tremendous economic achievements. While one understands the hostility of the Frontline States, the OAU and the United Nations to chief Kaiser Matanzima's and Lucas Mangope's acceptance of the vassalage which Pretoria peddles as independence, the three organisations have reacted in ways which ignore the internal power dispositions which fix priorities in the African community of South Africa at the moment. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha (National Cultural Liberation Movement) continues to be treated by these organisations as a pariah movement in spite of the fact that it could very well provide South Africa with her first Black government.

The pressure to push peoples rigidly to the left or the right could create a new bloc of nations: a coalition of African, Asian and European nations which would be bound together mainly by the circumstance that they were rejected by the left and humiliated by the right.

Black South Africa, the Transkei, Malawi and some French-speaking countries in West Africa belong to this category; so do Germany, Japan and some South American countries.

Let us have a closer look at this scenario because it has important implications for the crisis in South Africa. Germany's activities outside of the United Nations are ultimately a vote of no confidence in the world organisation's ability to create the disciplined global order which would give satisfying meaning to life for all the peoples of the world. The Germans realise that from the days of the Holy Roman Empire, Europe tried to discipline herself and, subsequently, the world, on the basis of the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic evaluation of the person. The result was that this philosophy moved Europe in cycles of conflict to the first and second world wars.

Germany's defeat in the last two conflagrations raised a fundamental question for the Germans which called for a fundamental answer. Was it worthwhile for Germany to strive to create the global discipline she desired on the basis of a *herrenvolkism* discredited by history, rejected by contemporary mankind and doomed by the proliferation of Black, Brown, Yellow and White nations?

So long as Germany did not have the answer to this question, she could not play a constructive role in the United Nations. For the Germans to regard themselves as a "chosen people" and to proceed from this to prescribe destiny for mankind was a proven invitation to disaster. Western-style democracy was not the answer. It had given the United States the schizophrenia which made it difficult for America to think at the level of fundamentals when it came to stabilising the crisis in Southern Africa.

Democracy was giving the United States a mind which elevated ignorance to the status of a determinant of policy in Africa.

The result was that the mass of the great American people were losing their sense of direction; everywhere, the values on which the United States was established seemed to be caving in; in every walk of life, the person was insecure; he felt threatened and could neither be certain about himself nor organise his personality in ways which gave a satisfying meaning to his life.

These weaknesses had disastrous effects on those aspects of American policy which dealt with Asia and Africa.

The humiliation of American arms in Southeast Asia was not accidental, just as the calamitous handling of the Rhodesian crisis was not. A vacuum had emerged in Caucasian thinking on relations with the Third World which moved the West inexorably to disaster. The West based its policy for dealing with the non-Caucasian peoples of the Third World on the cash value of the person which had produced successful nationalistic revolts against colonialism. Africans, Asians and South Americans were determined to create societies in which the person could make the best possible use of his life, no matter who he was.

In the ten years I was in the United States, Americans allowed me access to practically any department of their lives I wanted to see. One of the problems I came across was that American foreign policy was based on two unresolved and conflicting minds when it came to Africa, Asia and South America.

The side committed to the use of the cash value of the person as a criterion by which to judge human worth refused to see Third World problems from any angle other than perspectives dictated by East-West rivalries. All that was needed to establish the positions of these men was to mention the word *Communism*.

Opposed to these were those who wanted policy to respond to changed power dispositions in Africa, Asia and South America.

The two minds clashed so seriously in the ten years I was in America that it was not unusual for me to talk to a State Department official who would give me one version of the situation in South Africa and meet another, from the CIA, who would describe the same situation in diametrically opposed terms.

Concerned Americans told me that this schizophrenia had led to the humiliation of United States arms in Southeast Asia. I saw no possibility for removing the dangers of the split mind, except by effecting radical changes in America's attitude to the person.

A nation with the mind described above created the disharmonies in the individual personality which guaranteed the humiliation of American arms in Southeast Asia.

Germany was finding, also, that Marxism provided no answer to German problems. Like democracy, it led the world in cycles of conflict to ultimate catastrophe. It had joined hands with the West to split Germany from head to foot; to subject the Germans to a greater humiliation than defeat in two world wars.

The basic weakness in communism was that like the Roman Catholic Church, it elevated dogma into a prison of the mind. Its rigidity was such that it moved those who had been born outside of the Graeco-Romano-Hebraic experience in a straight line to evolving revolts. The logic of these revolts was the expulsion of the Whites from those areas whose resources the Whites needed most.

What this called for was a new and relevant political concept, a democracy of minds. Pessimistic and devaluative definitions of the human being would not produce this approach. What the times called for was a positive and optimistic attitude to the person which would reject the *herrenvolkism* that led to the humiliating fragmentation of Germany, and

encourage an approach which would recognise the simultaneous legitimacy of different self-definitions in different environments. This attitude and the recognition are the only satisfying and reliable guarantees of a truly civilised and disciplined world.

In the years after World War II, Germany devoted more attention to Sudic Africa in order to discover the inner truth which had given durability to the African experience. This attention extended to South Africa, with its minerals on one side and, on the other, the complicated assortment of problems created by White *herrenvolkism*.

The Arnold-Bergstraesser Conference on South Africa was an important climacteric in the endeavour to obtain greater clarity on both the quality of mind which gives durability to the African experience on one plane and, on another, the dispositions of power in the Black community.

The Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut conducted a survey of African attitudes between 1974 and 1977 and concluded:

The outstanding political phenomenon in Black urban politics is without a doubt Gatsha Buthelezi. Without doubt he is the leader of his own group, but the support he enjoys goes far beyond that. Altogether 40.3 percent of his supporters among urban Blacks are not Zulus. . . .

. . . the political direction advocated by Buthelezi represents a force in South Africa as a whole beyond its regional and ethnic concentrations.

These conclusions were described in statistical terms as follows:

Leader or Organisation	Total Support
Buthelezi	43.8%
Nelson Mandela	8.5%
Robert Sobukwe	7.4%
ANC	21.7%
Black Consciousness Movement	5.6%
Chief Kaiser Matanzima	3.6%
Chief Lucas Mangope	2.7%

The report of the researchers, which was presented at the Conference, concluded:

The results of the inquiry show not only that he alone (Buthelezi) of all homeland leaders is a national political figure but that over and above this he is *the* political figure of Black South Africa....

More important is that he is shown not to be a mere tribal leader. Without doubt he is the leader of his own group. But the support he enjoys goes far beyond that. Altogether 40.3% of supporters among urban Blacks are not Zulus.

The report paid attention to the influence of Inkatha in urban African politics. Its findings are informative because liberal circles in the United States take the position that Buthelezi leads rural, Zulu-speaking Africans and that he does not speak for the urban Blacks:

[Inkatha] represents by far the strongest organised political tendency among urban Blacks—the organised core of a much larger body of support for Buthelezi.... Inkatha occupies a key role in the future orientation of the urban black population.

These extracts from *The Natal Mercury* and *The Rand Daily Mail* at about the time of the Conference in June, 1978, give an image of Buthelezi which contrasts sharply with the quality of leadership some Black churchmen offer their people in South Africa. *The Natal Mercury* (July 21, 1978) published this report:

LONDON—The threat of a five-year jail sentence under the Terrorism Act stopped many South Africans from calling for world disinvestment from the Republic, Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), told an appreciative audience at the Royal Commonwealth Society here yesterday.

"That is why you won't hear anyone saying 'no investment,' "he said. "We would like to go to prison for something slightly better than that."

His lordship split hairs a little too finely to explain his fear of going to jail. The disinvestment issue is an integral part of the fight against apartheid. The truly committed would go to jail in protest against investments from abroad. The jail sentences would be as harsh as any passed against other offenders against apartheid's laws. What his lordship has never explained is why he did not go to jail in protest against Biko's murder, which was "something better" than going to prison for demanding disinvestment.

The logic of the report under discussion suggests that the Germans view dependence as one of the factors which works against the emergence of a disciplined world order. Here we get nearer a significant turning-point in the relations between Black and White.

The constructive element to which the German report draws attention is that Germany seems to be moving away from the Western liberal habit of

concentrating on the operational aspects of the crisis in South Africa, toward giving informed attention to the fundamentals of conflict. The Collective Will of African victims of apartheid is one of these fundamentals; the Evolving Revolt is another.

Buthelezi's leadership translates the Collective Will into action. This gives it the character of a third fundamental. The massive urban and rural endorsement Buthelezi continues to receive are evidence that the Evolving Revolt is now a factor to be reckoned with in the crisis. The German report drew attention to this important point. To the extent that it did this, it was both a constructive contribution to the international debate on apartheid and a step toward the co-ordination of internal and external campaigns against apartheid.

The contribution, however, is at best a first step; it identifies a dimension of the crisis which White liberals in South Africa and the West—like the Frontline States, the OAU, the United Nations and the Soviet Bloc—continue to ignore. It does not offer a solution.

This sheds light on other aspects of the role Buthelezi and P. W. Botha can play in the crisis. Buthelezi's first priority is the liberation of his people. Botha's is the security and survival of the Afrikaner. The Africans and the Afrikaners are South Africa's key communities; they hold the secret to the resolution of conflict in South Africa.

The source of Buthelezi's strength in the rural and urban areas is that he defines the quarrel between Black and White in terms which are related to the African's day-to-day struggle. When he tells masses of humble Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and other Africans that White domination is evil because it does violence to their *buntu* or *botho,* everyone of his hearers understands precisely what Buthelezi is saying and where he is leading them. He tells his people that government policy demands that the Africans should *develop along their own lines* and proceeds from this to ask the Zulus to gather at Ulundi in July 1979, to see where *their own lines* were set on fire by the British. Even the most illiterate Zulu knows precisely what happened when the British set Ulundi, the Zulu capital, on fire on July 4, 1879.

Against this vast background, we might be seeing a pattern emerge. The Germans in Europe whom defeat and fragmentation humiliated, the Africans in South Africa whom defeat and fragmentation humiliated, and the Japanese who are humiliated by being treated as the small boys of the international community are being given a vested interest in ganging-up to create a united front of the fragmented and the humiliated.

This gives added significance to the Bergstraesser Conference's focus on Buthelezi. The report under discussion showed that South Africa, as a racially mixed nation, had two wills: the Collective Will of the Blacks and the Uncertain Will of the Whites. The Collective Will has survived sixty-six years of brutal attacks by the united front of White monoliths and emerged strong enough to split this united front, disorient the satellite system, create the united front of African, Coloured and Asian victims of apartheid and—through the strikes in the early 1970s, the rise of Inkatha and the Soweto Rebellion—to establish the relativity of White power. That opens the way to a political solution, via a crisis of dual-authority conflict.

The White community's Uncertain Will has lost the war of minds. The absurd offers of vassalage in unviable mini-states led Matanzima to a head-on quarrel with the apartheid regime. Mangope stated publicly that he was leaving South Africa as the first step toward the formation of the Federal Union. Big Business has shifted significantly to the left of the government. The Afrikaner monolith has admitted, through its request to the Africans, Coloureds and Asians to join the South African army, that the united front of White monoliths can no longer defend South Africa. The fundamental weakness which emerges from all this is that the apartheid regime lied to the Afrikaner people when it said apartheid would guarantee Afrikaner security and survival. What proves it lied is the fact that Whites emigrate from South Africa at the rate of three to four thousand a year.

The problem before Buthelezi and P.W. Botha emerges in clearer outlines at this point. Buthelezi has no voice in the United Nations. While Botha's government is a member of the United Nations, it is treated as a polecat of international politics. Buthelezi and Botha have a vested interest in seeing to it that South Africa is not reduced to ashes; their duty is to evolve a quality of diplomacy and statesmanship which will enable all South Africans to stand shoulder to shoulder to prevent superpower rivalry from transforming South Africa into the main battlefield in the war for South Africa's minerals.

Germany is in the position to play a key role in the development of the diplomacy just described. She has access to Buthelezi, just as she has access to Botha. The Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut report prepared ground for what one might call an African-German-Afrikaner confrontation of minds on alternative guarantees of Afrikaner survival, on differences in majority rule in a unitary state, a federal union and a racial dictatorship and on a Black-White defence policy. Germany's role here could be that of a catalyst, helping to move events toward both a Black-White consensus on final goals and the creation of a like-minded majority of Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites.

Buthelezi's and Botha's peoples are not friends. For this reason, we cannot dream of a conversation of two minds between the two men. For some years Buthelezi had been making appeals to Vorster to convene a constitutional conference where all races together could hammer out a formula for co-existence which all could accept with honour. The Afrikaners have rejected these appeals and relied on shooting the Africans into submission. But the point has now been reached when no power on the White side can stop the momentum of the Evolving Revolt;

the African rejects the abolition of "petty apartheid" and wants to determine his life in his own country.

This aspiration sets the spotlight on the fact that the Black-White quarrel has deeper origins than the history of African-Afrikaner relations; it has its roots in values which determine the destiny of the person regardless of whether he is an African, an Asian, a Caucasian or à Coloured.

While the quarrels which embitter relations between the African and the Afrikaner are real and deepseated; while the wounds history cut into the psyche and personality of the two groups continue to fester, neither the Africans nor the Afrikaners can afford to become appendages of the West or the Soviet Bloc. To be enemies with both or either would be suicidal.

Graeco-Romano-Hebraic civilisation is in serious trouble. A *Washington Post* report gave a masterly diagnosis of the trouble when it publicly expressed distress over Christianity's failure, after 2,000 years, to persuade the human race that love for neighbours should be accepted as a guarantee of peace.

The teaching cannot and will not prevent men and events from moving in cycles of conflict to final disaster as long as it is based on a pessimistic and devaluative attitude to the person. As the Inquisition, slavery, colonialism, Nazism, apartheid and the drift to global wars show, Christianity itself might one day destroy Graeco-Romano-Hebraic civilisation because it defines the person in terms which transform this civilisation into a prison of the mind.

What happens when a civilisation becomes a prison of the mind might be seen in the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States was founded on a clearly stated moral ideal. This concept of nationhood went side by side with the commitment to the cash value of the person as a criterion by which to judge worth.

The schizophrenia which developed from this was one of the basic reasons for the humiliation of American arms in South Vietnam; it made it impossible for Washington to interpret the crisis in Southeast Asia in terms that were valid in the Vietnamese experience.

What the above situation calls for is the exertion of informed pressures on points of maximum weakness in the apartheid structure to encourage movement toward a constructive confrontation of African and Afrikaner minds—toward a face-to-face confrontation between Buthelezi and Botha on a Black-White defence policy, majority rule and alternative guarantees of survival for the Afrikaner.

Western economic pressures could be used to persuade Botha to do the statesmanlike thing and meet Buthelezi, either by himself or together with those leaders of the African people on the homefront who are committed to a political solution.

1976 South African Yearbook

Kissinger meets Vorster in South Africa in 1976.

This meeting, in itself, would not solve the "race" problem; it would at best be the beginning of an unfolding process. The meeting would be an announcement to the world that statesmanship had taken control where the politicians had failed.

The Americans enter the picture here. Their mood at present is to tell the victims of apartheid that they have limited power.

Not much importance should be attached to talk of the United States as the mightiest nation on earth. In terms of material power, the United States is the most powerful nation on earth at the moment. But America also has fatal weaknesses. One of these is that her mind is split by the demands of the moral ideal on which the United States is founded and the commitment to the cash value of the person on which the American economic system is based.

The schizophrenia was one of the basic reasons for the humiliation of United States arms in South Vietnam; it made it impossible for Washington to interpret the war in South Vietnam in terms which were valid in the Vietnamese experience. Defining the problem in Vietnam in American terms was a sure invitation to disaster.

The same mistake is being made in South Africa. Option 2 of the *Range of Policy Options* in the *Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (National Security Study Memorandum 39) made these observations:

The Whites are here [in Southern Africa] to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the Blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the White regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the Black states [a total of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the Black states] help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. [1]

In 1977, the Carter Administration sent Vice President Mondale to meet South African Prime Minister John Vorster in an effort to set in motion the process which would move Black and White visibly toward a political solution. In the American view, the natural thing was to engage in talks with Vorster since he was in power. This was based on a grave misreading of the South African situation.

Vorster was not the master of the Afrikaner monolith. He derived his power from the policy-making stratum of Afrikaner society who, in turn, think, act and formulate policy in the name of the Afrikaner people.

This stratum is made of people like John Vorster himself and the institutions they control. The latter include Afrikaner universities, churches, cultural organisations, banks, insurance companies and other financial houses, chambers of commerce and industry, the press, political organisations, etc.

The people involved in these institutions number approximately 12,000. Regardless of their number, they are important because they speak effectively in the name of the Afrikaner monolith. Like the monolith, they see everything in South Africa from the perspective of survival; they regard themselves as a threatened people; they live in fear of being crushed by the Africans and the English.

To ask Vorster to initiate movement to a political solution without saying anything or much about the Afrikaner's *survival problem* guaranteed a negative response from Vorster, his government and the leadership stratum in the Afrikaner monolith. To impress this stratum, there at least had to be corresponding moves to pin down the leaders of the Africans, Coloureds and Asians. Pretoria does not trust Washington any more than she trusts London.

The assumption that Vorster would respond to the dangling of carrots by the West was wrong; that was why the Mondale mission failed.

The schizophrenia has brought the American mind to virtual paralysis when it comes to thinking on South Africa. The United States cannot assert vigorous initiatives to reinforce African revolutionaries committed to the observance of human rights because the multinational corporations regard that as bad for business on one plane and, on the other, America's allies will scream: "Jackal diplomacy again!"

America's political name is not very good in Africa. The United States asserted vigorous initiatives to stop the admission of Maoist China into the United Nations. The Free Africans, many of whom survived on American aid of some form or another, used their vote to admit China. The message they sent to the United States in particular and the West generally was that in the view of the ex-colonial peoples, there was no relationship between aid and opposition to race humiliation.

The United States has not faced the implications of this African attitude; it has not developed a viable philosophy for dealing with the problems the implications create, and is therefore not ready for coping with the crisis in South Africa as it moves toward World War III.

In blunt language, the schizophrenia in the mind of the United States incapacitates this great nation for leading events effectively toward a political solution where the Africans—like Free Africa, Coloureds and Asians—are strongest.

Graeco-Romano-Hebraic civilisation is in trouble also in the Soviet Bloc. Eurocommunism is the product of a fundamental split in the mind of the Marxists on the transformation of Communism into a prison of the mind.

This transformation forced Maoist China to reject the destiny the Soviet Union prescribed for her. President Neto of Angola had no sooner assumed control of his country than he made it known that he did not think a mixed socialist-capitalist economy was a bad thing for Angola.

If the weaknesses in the West and the East require that the African and the Afrikaner should tie themselves to neither side, they also require that there should be a revolution in the Afrikaner's thinking on South Africa and the West.

The West created the crisis in which South Africa is caught; it kicked Paul Kruger in the teeth in his moment of humiliation after the 1899-1900 war; today it does not matter how many genuflexions the Afrikaner makes to prove that he belongs to the West, the Occident uses one criterion in judging him: the cash value of the person.

This criterion, and not the White skin, demands that the West, like the Soviet Bloc, should prescribe destiny for the African and the Afrikaner. But these communities have shown throughout their history that they will allow nobody to prescribe destiny for them.

If this defines another area of congruity in African and Afrikaner experiences, it is one more argument for a consensus on final goals; one more demand for a fundamental answer to a fundamental challenge; one more reason for a multiple strategy, and one more justification for moving events to a political solution.

The ideological, strategic and psychological wars won by the African require that the Afrikaner monolith should be confronted with clearly stated alternatives on every conceivable plane both to give constructive purpose to the polarisations emerging in this community and to reinforce movement toward a unifying national identity.

The United States re-enters the picture at this point. There are indications that the United States would like to involve itself constructively in the normalisation of the situation in Southern Africa. Instead of asserting uninformed leadership initiatives that—like the defeat in South Vietnam, the Chinese admission into the United Nations and the Mondale interview with Vorster in Vienna—eventually prove abortive, the United States seems to be accepting a supportive role in Africa. Emphasis in Washington is coming to be laid more and more on African solutions to African problems. This could very well be another step in the co-ordination.

Co-ordination in this direction would mean that United States investors in South Africa would band together to create a controlled economic crisis there. They would tell Big Business in the Republic that they would withhold credits against gold, diamonds and other commodities for a given period until Botha listened to Buthelezi's case for the convention of a constitutional conference to hammer out a formula for co-existence which all races could accept with honour. This is the only course open to any serious Western advocate of a political solution; it is the only way of averting the tragedies we see in Rhodesia.

The United States could use the temporary, credit-withdrawal weapon in another way. Washington could make it clear to Pretoria that if the apartheid regime fired on Africans demonstrating peacefully against race humiliation or in support of calls for a constitutional conference, the United States, and possibly the West as a whole, would suspend credits as a deterrent against government violence.

For, as we have tried to show, the African's Evolving Revolt is a struggle for the right to develop and operate legal institutions by which to transform Southern Africa into a stable and co-operating economic and political community. Apartheid opposes this intention and advocates a fragmentation of Southern Africa which can only extend the area of conflict and instability in the region.

FORMULA FOR CO-EXISTENCE

What the African has been saying in the last hundred years covered in the present analysis of his thinking is that the prescribed destiny humiliates him as much when it is imposed by the West as when it is imposed by the East; that the stratification of the Afrikaners and the English into monoliths is a weakness in the White power-structure which argues the case for accelerating movement toward a political solution; and, finally, that the Evolving Revolt has brought the Whites to their moment of decision; to the point of no-return in their drift to disaster.

What the Africans want can be stated in a few words. The Collective Will seeks to re-structure South African society in such a way that the person can be equipped, enabled and seen to realise the full promise of being human regardless of who his parents were.

The war in Rhodesia and uncertainty about the future in Namibia have opened South Africa's 4,500-mile border with Free Africa to attacks from virtually any point. Five million Whites are incapable of defending this border and manning the country's industries. Apartheid deceived the White people when it said it would enable them to secure borders and run industry.

To produce the desired results, re-structuring has to take place simultaneously at the economic and political levels. The temper of the dispossessed will not accept anything less.

Included in the redistribution of wealth are: extending the area of nationalisation, co-ownership of the vehicles for transforming primary resources into wealth, reparations for dispossession in order to create a satisfactory relationship between Black and White, and a Black-White consensus on the establishment of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of South Africa.

It has been said that the movements of a monolith to its goal constitute a process. This gives the crisis the character of a clash between conflicting processes. The answer to this clash is a counter-process which will redefine the "race" problem and use diplomatic, political and economic pressures to speed up the establishment of a satisfactory balance of Black-White power.

The main ingredients of the counter-process have begun to emerge in clearer outlines in the crisis. Monolithal conflicts on the White side have been complicated by the circumstance that the Afrikaners and the English cannot reconcile the clash between economic necessity and the imperatives of Afrikaner "survival."This surrenders the initiative to influence events to the African.

But to extort maximum advantage from the initiative, the African has to launch a political offensive to create new monolithal alignments.

The formula for co-existence which follows is not a solution; it is a list of starting points in organising and launching the counter-process:

i. *The redefinition of the "race" problem.*

The crisis in South Africa needs to be recognised as a war of minds which can be resolved by a multiple strategy which allows for the use of every weapon available to the African.

ii. *The creation of a state based on the primacy of the person.*

Southern Africa is inhabited by peoples with different racial and cultural identities. Most of these define fulfilment in their terms and want to do this for as long as they live. They all have the right to define themselves in their terms. But individually, they are too small to establish viable communities. Getting any blocs to combine to impose destiny on others is unthinkable. The only viable basis for a unifying national identity is emphasis on the primacy of the person.

This basis rejects the principle of "separate freedoms," which is apartheid in a new guise, and limits the Afrikaner's role as oppressor in a larger federation of Southern African states.

Where the intention is to build a larger and stronger nation, whatever limits any community's ability to contribute constructively to the new experiment should be rejected.

The argument and propaganda for armed struggle are skilfully forged weapons for use in forcing the Africans, Coloureds and Asians to fight apartheid, not on political and diplomatic planes where they are stronger, but on ground where they are most vulnerable and where they will always be dependent on the West, the Soviet Union or Cuba for arms and expertise.

This point is so important for South Africa and the rest of the subcontinent that it needs to be stated in different terms. It is clear from African history in the last hundred years and the logic of events from this key community in the years since 1912 that the unitary state is no guarantee of security for anybody. The British imposed the unitary state on South Africa in 1910 and, by doing this, incited the Afrikaner to work for its destruction, as the existence of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana as "independent" states shows.

The Afrikaner monolith is trying to fill the power-vacuum created by the collapse of the unitary state with a satellite system in which a multiplicity of unviable Black mini-states will forever orbit around a central Afrikaner state to give permanence to Afrikaner domination.

The satellite system will be crushed by the African majority for obvious reasons. It is conceived in dishonesty and greed. The Afrikaner monolith lies to the world when it says it wants to give the African what it wants for the Afrikaner. The Afrikaner wants security for himself; security involves owning enough territory and resources to support a growing population. None of the plans published by the government and Afrikaner intellectuals give the African a fair proportion of land and resources to support a growing population.

Take the distribution of land and resources in Natal as an example. Durban has always belonged historically and geographically to Natal and the Zulu people; the latter have all the qualities of nationhood—an ideal of nationhood, a distinctive national identity, a well-known pattern of government, a culture of its own, territory with clearly drawn boundaries, a philosophy for defining the person, an established diplomatic tradition, a national will and a capacity for resisting attempts to destroy its nationhood. In spite of this, the Afrikaners excise Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the railway corridor from Durban to Charlestown and Southern Natal from Kwa Zulu and reserve these for the White minority.

Parallels of the excision exist in virtually every homeland. The idea behind it is to give a meaning to the Afrikaner ideal of *die wit man moet baas bly*, which will impress the uninformed in the conditions created by the extension of the area of freedom in Africa and the emergence of the Third World as a factor to reckon with in international politics.

Substance is given to this dishonesty by the fact that the Africans in the so-called Black homelands have no say in the delineation of boundaries for their "states." Everywhere, the rule is to prescribe destiny for the Black man, who is expected to prostrate himself before the Whites in gratitude for what is a standing insult to the Black race as a whole.

A fact which has to be faced is that whatever the Afrikaner says, he does not want the Africans to have that security which he wants for himself. As long as the dishonesty on this plane remains, Black and White will continue to move in different directions; they will be powerless to stop the reduction of South Africa to ashes.

If the unitary state and the satellite system are invitations to disaster; if they give the majority a vested interest in working for the expulsion of the Whites—Ian Smith said there would be no majority rule in Rhodesia in a thousand years; in less than a thousand days, Whites were fleeing the country by the thousand—the answer which events call for is not moving in circles to perpetuate the dishonesty of the Afrikaner; it is to take note of the fact that the Soweto Rebellion established the relativity of Afrikaner power. In doing this, the Rebellion cracked the foundations of

White power and demonstrated that the irresistible momentum of majority power, fuelled by Sudic anger, will eventually destroy the satellite system.

In short, the Rebellion created a power-vacuum which neither the Afrikaner monolith nor the united front of White monoliths can fill, without the consent of the African people. In simple language, this means that the Afrikaner monolith has lost the decisive battles of the war of minds; that the centre of gravity in the dispositions of Black and White power in South Africa has shifted from the Afrikaner monolith to the Black majority.

This situation focuses attention on two aspects of Black-White relations. Whites cannot stop the reduction of South Africa to ashes if the Collective Will rejects prescribed destiny. The Soweto Rebellion showed that there now are limitations to White power. The Africans asserted the Collective Will for more than a year and, in doing this, gave expression to the mood of ungovernability which apartheid had produced among them.

On the White side, Big Business, which had no love for the African, moved significantly to the left of the government on the crucial issue of race discrimination and reinforced this movement by asserting leadership initiatives in abolishing race discrimination in given areas of employment, home ownership, entertainment and eating.

While the 1978 East London conference of the Cape division of the ruling party was suppressing a Stellenbosch University motion for a recasting of government policy for urban Africans, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, chairman of the largely anti-African organisation in the Afrikaner monolith, *Die Broederbond* (The Brothers' League), and Mr. Willem de Klerk, editor of the pro-government daily, *Die Transvaler,* which is published in Johannesburg, were planning to meet or were meeting African leaders of Soweto like Dr. Nthato Motlana and Dr. Maurice Nyembezi in efforts to bridge the chasm that divides the Africans and the Afrikaners.

In 1977 Police Minister Kruger had warned Buthelezi against admitting non-Zulus into the NCLM. Buthelezi made it known that he would ignore the warning.

The significant fact these developments draw attention to is that a crack, possibly invisible to those who see the crisis from Caucasian perspectives, has developed in the White community's ability to impose and enforce its will; a vacuum has emerged in the Afrikaner monolith's thinking on the problems created for the Afrikaner by apartheid.

The vacuum changes the character of the quarrel between Black and White on this plane. If the Viljoen and de Klerk initiatives mean anything, they tell us that sections of the leadership stratum in the Afrikaans community are now ready to exchange views with some Africans. This does not mean that an open split has developed in the Afrikaner community; it means that some Afrikaners have begun to give thought to alternative guarantees of survival for their people; that these Afrikaners are concerned over the prospect that South Africa might one day be reduced to ashes because of the evils of apartheid.

The incipient uncertainty about the efficacy of apartheid as a guarantee of survival calls for an African offensive which would be directed at the mind of the Afrikaner to enable him to see in the creation of a new balance in the dispositions of Black and White power the only reliable guarantee of survival for Afrikanerdom.

Armed struggle will not create this balance for the present; talking to the Afrikaner, negotiating with him if necessary and at all times moving events visibly to a political solution might create it.

Military and political weapons are not incompatibles in the conditions created by apartheid; this book argues that they are complements and shows that moving events to a political solution is as courageous, legitimate and honourable a course of action as armed struggle.

For years the United States and Maoist China had no kind word for each other. While they hurled polemical insults at each other on many planes, they also were negotiating secretly in remote Warsaw, Poland, in efforts to discover real areas of congruity in their peoples' interests.

The crisis in South Africa has reached the point where the Africans on the frontline negotiate where it is possible, just as they laid down their lives when need for this arose. Peoples who have been fighting each other for more than three hundred years cannot and will not suddenly forget the cruelties and humiliations inflicted on them by history. The developing crack in the mind of the Afrikaner monolith on the need to consult with the African could be transformed into a factor of political significance in the crisis. People who do not as yet have guns could do worse than deepen the crack. Merely to say, "We shall not collaborate!" when non-collaboration gave Matanzima the green light to accept vassalage does not solve our problem at the level of fundamentals. The logic of our bicipitous mind and the Evolving Revolt demands that we should always be ready with political and military choices; that we should work as much for an *evolving transfer of power* to the majority as we should be ready to take up arms when these become available. In the context provided by the prospect that South Africa might be one of the main battlefields of World War III, Buthelezi's and Botha's priorities are not altogether irreconcilable. This calls for a serious and informed confrontation of minds between the African and the Afrikaner for the purposes of: a) creating a Black-White consensus on a unifying national identity, b) signing a Black-White treaty to solve the Afrikaner's *survival problem,* c) realising that majority rule means one thing in a unitary state, another in a race dictatorship like the one we have in South Africa and a third in a federal union, and d) ensuring that Black-White unity prevents South Africa from becoming a battlefield in a war over Africa's resources.

In blunt language again, history tells us that a united front of like-minded Africans, Coloureds, Asians, Afrikaners, English, etc., is the only guarantee that South Africa shall not be reduced to ashes.

Buthelezi and Botha have a responsibility here to see to it that South Africa does not become one of the battlefields of World War III, to lead South Africa along safer routes to a better future. A face-to-face meeting between Buthelezi and Botha might be a turning-point in the drift to disaster.

Buthelezi is in a position to obtain a Black mandate for offering the Afrikaner an alternative guarantee of survival. Buthelezi wants this alternative negotiated; that is why he calls for a constitutional conference.

Above all, Buthelezi has the mandate to use the military potential of the Zulu people to contribute if conditions change, to the defence of South Africa as a whole. Afrikanerdom needs this potential, just as all South Africa needs it. On the other hand the Afrikaner has the ability to procure arms. Buthelezi needs this ability, just as all South Africa needs it. Redefining the "race" problem could produce a synthesis of needs or a consensus on the defence of South Africa which could eliminate the need for an armed struggle and move Black and White to a political solution, to the realisation that no prescribed destiny will ever work in South Africa because it will at all times act against the will of the African people.

The African people's will, as their history in the last hundred years shows, is an evolving attitude; it is a mode of adapting to the demands of a changing situation; it is a habit of thinking and a lifestyle designed to create new and relevant cultural and political anchors in the conditions created by conquest. No disarmed and deprived nation ever made these adaptations overnight.

The last armed protest the Zulu section of our people made was in 1905-06 when Bhambada ka Mancinza refused to pay taxes to a government in which he was not represented. In the seventy years which followed, our various language-groups unified themselves into a new nation on the basis of a clearly stated philosophy, and set themselves equally clearly stated goals. They developed a readily recognisable strategy for moving to these goals.

Largely as a result, they can be said today to be the only community which has developed a realistic and viable plan for normalising relations between Black and White—for creating a political order which all races can accept with honour. The secret of Inkatha's growth and Buthelezi's influence lies in the fact that they adhere to this plan and move Black and White to their goals in spite of unparalleled difficulties inside South Africa and abroad.

The Collective Will brings us to the last word on the armed struggle. While this Will is aggressive where the African people are strong, it conciliates where they are weak. One day, large-scale flows of arms from across the borders of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to South Africa will place the Africans in a situation of obvious strength. This strength will be able to destroy South Africa from within.

The Afrikaner has made himself the most hated White group in the Republic. Afrikaner farmers are placed in isolated corners of the country. The White army and police are altogether inadequate for the purpose of protecting every farm, manning the borders, keeping order in the urban areas and ensuring that South Africa is safe for the White man. That between three and four thousand Whites per year are fleeing the country while they can, shows that some Whites, who include Afrikaners, have reached the point where they realise that the relativity of White power is now a fact of South African life.

Botha, his government and the leadership stratum in the Afrikaner monolith do not realise that they live in a changed world; they think they can shoot their way to security and see no need for changes to accommodate the aspirations of Africans, Coloureds and Asians as long as Israeli and German technology promises them the nuclear bomb.

But the nuclear bomb will be as effective in protecting the status quo as the Maginot Line was in preventing the German conquest of France in World War II. The Africans do not need to have guns to crush apartheid; they have the option to paralyse the economy in general and the mines in particular with a stay-at-home strike.

From 1912 to the present, they have been patiently and consistently building the potential to bring the South African economy to a halt. In the final analysis, White South Africa does not have the potential to stop the African majority if and when it decides to paralyse the economy. Buthelezi has been told by his people on several occasions to warn the Whites that if they do not abandon their racial policies, the Africans will withdraw their labour. Buthelezi's response to this has been that his people's options are his options.

This warning must be seen against developments in Rhodesia. Joshua Nkomo started his political career as what most Whites would describe as a moderate. White intransigence drove him from this position to acceptance of the armed revolt as the only answer to race oppression in his country. This acceptance was the final option open to his people and Nkomo was obliged to make it his option.

South Africa is fortunate in one respect: the time has not yet come for Africans to commit themselves to armed struggle. The existence of viable options is one factor responsible for this. The options open to the Afrikaner monolith are another deterrent. But the day is coming when the African will choose the military argument.

The interval between now and the day of decision gives the African and the Afrikaner, who are South Africa's key communities, a little more time to run as fast as they can toward a negotiated solution. But running is precisely what Botha and his government are incapable of doing, as the failure of the Mondale-Vorster discussions shows. This calls for an

overhaul of Free African, Frontline, OAU, Third World and Western attitudes to the crisis; for a re-evaluation of power dispositions in the Afrikaner community and for a strategy which will hit apartheid where it is weakest.

The structure of the Afrikaner monolith is the Afrikaner's point of greatest strength and maximum vulnerability. Its stratification into the apartheid regime, the leadership stratum and the rank-and-file combines with its political potential to give it a number of options. Only two will be mentioned here.

If Pretoria seriously wanted to split and crush the South African Black Alliance, for example, it would offer the whole of Natal to the Zulus and *at the same time* urge the Coloureds and the Asians to identify themselves with the Whites. In spite of everything that has been written in this discussion, there still are Coloureds and Asians who would jump for the opportunity to be identified with the Whites. So-called progressive Indian organisations in Natal continue to sit on the fence when it comes to joining the SABA in the hope that Pretoria might offer them better terms than the three-tiered government and second-class citizenship.

Declaring Natal an autonomous Zulu state would have a number of advantages for the Afrikaner monolith. Natal is not Afrikaner country; for apartheid's purposes, it is Zulu-English-Asian territory. By restoring Natal to the Zulus, Pretoria would get rid of South Africa's most "troublesome" communities: the Zulus, English and Asians.

Natal's English are more or less traditional secessionists while Pretoria regards the Asians as a potential fifth-column on the Indian Ocean, precisely in the way that the United States viewed the Japanese-Americans on the West coast as probable allies of Japan during the second World War.

Pretoria regards the Zulus as the only African community which has consistently never accepted defeat and which is not likely to. To get these communities out of "White" South Africa would leave the Afrikaner free to create the order he desires.

In the climate of hostility to Buthelezi which exists in sections of Free Africa, the OAU, the United Nations and among groups of Western liberals and Moscow surrogates, the Zulus might be forced into the position where they would join the English secessionists, accept provincial autonomy and eventually secede from South Africa to form the nucleus of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa. The nucleus would include Natal, Lesotho, Swaziland and Transkei (including Ciskei) and would form a strategically placed nation in Southeast Africa controlling the ports of Durban and Richards Bay and with the potential to develop St. Lucia Bay into a major naval base. The establishment of the nucleus would confront Free Africa, the OAU, the Frontline States, the United Nations and Western liberals with awkward choices. In addition, the nucleus would have enough resources to build a powerful army to protect its freedom.

The second option concerns Matanzima and Mangope. If the Afrikaner monolith felt really cornered, it would not hesitate to offer Matanzima and Mangope terms of alliance which would place these two men in better positions to secure their power. They would accept arms from Botha to protect their "independence."

An important aspect of this option is that if Botha's knees quaked at the prospect of an accommodation with the Africans, the Afrikaner monolith is not incapable of rejecting him and choosing a leader with the courage to strike a deal with the Africans. The Afrikaner's allergy to race equality it was said in an earlier chapter, is a variable which responds to the demands of survival. If the Afrikaner's *survival problem* demands the rejection of Botha, the Afrikaner monolith will throw him out, just as it rejected Hertzog and Smuts.

For there is only one situation in which the Afrikaner monolith can have no options: when it comes face to face with what it regards as threats to its survival. The Arnold-Bergstraesser initiative, if combined with a controlled economic crisis which would be supported at least by American, British, Canadian, French and West German investors, would be one such threat.

The inner logic of developments in the Afrikaner monolith suggests that armed struggle would for a long time to come play into the hands of the apartheid regime; at the same time it makes it clear that Afrikanerdom is most vulnerable on the political and diplomatic planes. If this conclusion does anything, it argues the case for the co-ordination of internal and external campaigns against apartheid for the purpose of moving events visibly and effectively toward a political solution; toward a disciplined social order in South Africa which will be based on the primacy of the person, the simultaneous legitimacy of different cultural self-definitions and political federalism. In the final analysis, this order is the only basis for a national identity which will enable the African and the Afrikaner in the first instance, and elsewhere, the Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites, to prevent the reduction of South Africa to ashes if war finally comes to that country.

The question this raises is: Where can the start be made to move all races toward the national identity under discussion? The "race" problem has to be redefined. Stress has to be laid, not on "petty apartheid," which is one way of perpetuating the status quo, but on the development of a Black-White policy for preventing the reduction of South Africa to ashes; on the creation of a Black-White consensus on a joint policy for coping with external threats.

Such a consensus is possible only with acknowledgement of the fact that the attitudes which inspire Sudic and Graeco-Romano-Hebraic civilisations are polarities which have brought into being the African perspective and the Caucasian perspective. Where the African perspective attaches maximum importance to the fundamentals of conflict, the White

perspective sets the greatest store by the operational aspects of race conflict.

In these conditions, the first precondition for a consensus on the prevention of South Africa's reduction to ashes is a formula for co-existence which all races can accept with honour. The second is open and effective support for this formula by the Frontline States, the OAU and the rest of the international community. External groups cannot define destiny for Black and White in South Africa. In the final analysis, they would have to accept what Black and White agreed upon. Their support is necessary only to the extent that the vacuum in Western thinking on the crisis subjects all new ideas from South Africa to approval by Free Africa, the OAU and the Frontline States, which have not done all their homework on power dispositions inside South Africa.

Now for the formula for co-existence.

A UNIFYING NATIONAL IDENTITY

The answer to the crisis in South Africa is a process which will redefine the "race" problem, produce a formula for co-existence which will be acceptable to all races and peoples and create a consensus of the like-minded for the purpose of stabilising economic and political conditions in Southern Africa as a whole. This process will move coterminously on two planes: inside South Africa and in the rest of Southern Africa.

The Programme of Principles for moving people and events toward the resolution of conflict in the sub-continent includes:

i. *The redefinition of the "race" problem.*
    The crisis in South Africa needs to be recognised as a war of minds that can be settled by a serious and informed confrontation in order to move events visibly and effectively to a political solution. Free Africa has shown that she is more effective on the political plane than in armed struggles.

ii. *The creation of a state based on the primacy of the person.*
    Southern Africa is inhabited by peoples with different racial and cultural backgrounds. Most of these define fulfillment in their terms and want to do this for as long as they need these self-definitions. Others want to prescribe destiny for their neighbours. Emphasis on the primacy of the person will create a synarchy, which is an open, non-racial state based on the primacy of the person, the simultaneous legitimacy of cultural self-definitions, political federalism, economic mutualism and cultural autonomy.

iii. *The development of a unifying Formula for Co-Existence for Southern Africa.*
    The racial, economic and other problemns which afflict all the races, peoples and nations of Southern Africa are related and inseparable aspects of a larger Southern African problem which calls for a larger Southern African solution, hammered out by all the races, peoples and nations which have made Southern Africa their home. Such a larger solution or Formula for Co-Existence is the transformation of all the races, nations and peoples of the sub-continent into a co-operating economic and political community.

iv. *Phased movement toward the unification of all the nations, peoples and races of Southern Africa into the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.*
    The federal union would be large, wealthy and powerful enough to ensure that Southern Africa does not become the football of international politics. At the same time, it would reconcile the conflicts created by apartheid's fragmentation of the African community.

v. *The convention by the Security Council of the Southern African Treaty Conference at which all the races, nations and peoples of the sub-continent will start working together on the Formula for Co-Existence.*
    No power or combination of powers would start war in Southern Africa if all the peoples of the region were seen effectively negotiating a formula for co-existence in their part of the world. The Security Council is the only body with enough authority to call for such a gathering.

vi. *The establishment of a Stabilisation Fund to revitalise and normalise all the economies of Southern Africa which have been affected adversely or paralysed by race conflict.*
    The economies of Southern Africa cannot be treated in isolation from each other; they dovetail and interlock at so many points that they can be stabilised only if they are treated as a unity.

vii. *The formation of a Southern African Development Authority to guide development in an open, person-centred society.*
    While conflict features prominently in African-Afrikaner relations, there also are important areas of congruity in the experiences of the two communities. One of these is the mixed economy developed mainly by the Afrikaner monolith. This eliminates the need for extensive radical nationalisation and creates the conditions which would facilitate the systematic redistribution of wealth. To produce the desired results, the redistribution should be related to conditions in other parts of the sub-continent.

viii. *Proportional Partition as the basis for the establishment of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of South Africa.*
To resolve the war of minds and establish a democracy of cultures, each self-defining community must have enough power—that is, enough land and other forms of wealth—to ensure that its wishes are respected and to establish a Collective Sovereignty which will unify by constantly reinforcing the disparate sovereignties of the autonomous states of the Federal Union.

ix. *Relevant guarantees of security for all sections of the population which have a survival problem.*
Proposals for the resolution of conflict which ignore the Afrikaner's *survival problem* are most likely to fail. The Afrikaner's definition of the "race" quarrel needs to be confronted with a clearly stated alternative to apartheid as a guarantee of survival. But the Afrikaners are not the only community which feels threatened. The Asians have reason to fear being crushed between any two monoliths; they have the right to demand guarantees of security, even when these might be dissimilar to those which would satisfy the Afrikaner.

x. *The radical redistribution of land and other forms of wealth on the basis of mutualism.*
The abolition of race discrimination, without social and economic justice to those whom the White man's racial policies deprived for more than a century, would be a mockery of freedom. Those who benefited from the exploitation and humiliation of the African either have to pay reparations or integrate the African in the economy on the principle of co-ownership.

xi. *The principle of a mixed economy to be preserved in South Africa.*
An important area of congruity in the African and Afrikaner experiences is the nationalisation by different Afrikaner governments, of a number of primary resources. This laid foundations for mutualism and would facilitate the redistribution of wealth.

xii. *The re-unification of Kwa Zulu and "White" Natal into an autonomous nonracial state which could unite with Swaziland, Lesotho, Transkei and Ciskei to form, if need arises, the nucleus of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.*

Such a course would have obvious advantages and disadvantages. Let us start with the latter, because they can be readily disposed of. Some of Buthelezi's critics would charge that by moving farther away from the unitary state he would be extending the area of "collaboration" with the apartheid regime.

But, as he himself has often pointed out, the Africans had nothing to do with the formation of the unitary state. It was imposed on them, as on the Afrikaners, by the British. Sections of Cape African opinion which followed the Jabavu tradition of collaboration have rejected working with the Whites.

If the quarrel between Black and White is a war of minds, there is no possibility that the majority will ever accept the destiny prescribed for it by the minority. In like manner, it is not likely that the latter will give up their attitude to the person. If current indications are any guide, the minds in collision are moving Black and White to a war whose final outcome will be the ruin of South Africa and the expulsion of the Whites.

After the overthrow of White rule, the peoples of Southern Africa would still have to come together in a federal union because of intertwining economic and defence needs.

The advantages of a federal union for the sub-continent are overwhelming. To begin with, by re-unifying Natal and seceding in order to form the nucleus state, the NCLM would transform the nucleus into a majority-ruled federation. The transformation could keep the nucleus out of the war to which the apartheid regime is driving South Africa.

The complete encirclement of "White" South Africa by Black states would reinforce the Black minority which would remain in the White state, and extend the area of race equality.

The commitment to proportional partition and secession would give focus to the thinking of the masses of the African people. The divided mind on the strike during the Soweto Rebellion arose partly from the circumstance that the leaders have not as yet confronted the advocates of White supremacy with a clearly stated geopolitical alternative to the status quo. There is a vacuum in African thinking on the geopolitical goal toward which the Black people are being led.

Movement toward the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa would be in three stages. There would first be the creation of the consensus on final goals which would be followed by the convention of a constitutional conference of all races to give legal form to the formula for co-existence produced by the consensus. The second stage would be the establishment of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of South Africa. This would lead eventually to the formation of the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

The involvement of the Coloured community on the side of the Africans during the Soweto Rebellion, the formation of the South