

leadership and called it names taken over from their European experience. After their success in splitting the ANC, they created new classes: the rural bourgeoisie and the urban bourgeoisie. The rural bourgeoisie was the leadership involved in the homelands administrations while the urban bourgeoisie led the Black Consciousness Movement.

These people who claim to be our allies but systematically disrupt our efforts to unite ourselves do all these things not because they are White; they split, divide and categorise us because they are committed to a divisive attitude to the person. It is this attitude which is the enemy of the African committed to the Sudic evaluation of the person. It is to this attitude that we must at all times direct our attention. Some did this and came to the conclusion that the integration of the African peoples in the civilisation built on the pessimistic and devaluative view of the human being, which was developed by the ancient Greeks, Romans and Hebrews, did not suit African conditions and that since we were a conquered people we had to face realities. We could not move at will out of the experience of conquest; we therefore had to create a synthesis of values and on this synthesis build "a new and unique civilization."

Some and the delegates in the Bloemfontein Unity Conference told the world that we Africans were the product of a particular historical experience and that the Whites were the products of a different historical experience. The Bloemfontein Unity Conference set out to build an open, non-racial society based on a communion of like-minded African, Coloured, Asian and White minds. This gathering represented the Northern, functionalist Response; its strategy was to maximise the power of the African monolith as the first precondition for establishing African-Coloured-Asian-White agreement on final goals.

The Southern Response had, at an early stage (1909) begun by creating a communion of the like-minded when it sent a mixed delegation to London to protest against race discrimination in plans for the establishment of the Union of South Africa.

These responses did not have anything to do with class; they translated into political action the bicipitous mind based on blended African and Caucasian perspectives. Christianity and apartheid are in difficulties because they have not as yet studied the two-dimensional mind and have not developed a satisfactory formula for dealing with it on its own terms. The Soviet Union is in similar trouble; its philosophy is so rigid that it does not recognise the simultaneous legitimacy of African self-definitions. It wants the African to define himself as the Whites in Moscow define him. Lt-General Obasanjo of Nigeria has a name for this; he calls it "teleguidance." We call it prescribing destiny for the African.

A lot has been said about prescribing destiny. How does it affect the African today? Let us take and compare the positions of the Jew and the African in the world today. Both have been exposed to extremes of humiliation which few races of men have known. The Jews were once

slaves drawing water and hewing wood for Black men. The Africans were once slaves of White people. In our own generation, Hitler whipped the Jews all over Europe and wherever he had the opportunity, he roasted them alive in his incinerators. Hitler was a White man; he did these things to fellow White men.

The Zulus have this saying: *Yizulu elisusa osemnyango, limphos' emsamo, lithathe osem samo limjik' emnyango* (It is that type of lightning which flings a person at the door to the rear of the hut and throws the one at the rear to the door.) In this aphorism, the Zulus describe a cataclysm or holocaust. Both the Africans and the Jews have gone through different holocausts. The Zulu aphorism teaches that he who has been reduced to the depths of suffering will, if he disciplines himself accordingly, rise to be the teacher of mankind.

Max I. Dimont, who wrote *The Indestructible Jews*, lists the following achievements of the Jews in *Jews, God and History*:

There are approximately three billion people on this earth, of whom twelve million—less than one half of one per cent—are classified as Jews. Statistically, they should hardly be heard of. . . . But the Jews are heard of totally out of proportion to their small numbers. No less than 12 percent of all the Nobel prizes in physics, chemistry, and medicine have gone to Jews. The Jewish contribution to the world's list of great names in religion, science, literature, music, finance, and philosophy is staggering. . . .

From this people (the Jews) sprang Jesus Christ, acclaimed Son of God by more than 850 million Christians. . . .

From this people came Paul, organiser of the Christian Church. . . .

Another Jew is venerated by more than one billion people. He is Karl Marx, whose book *Das Kapital* is the secular gospel of Communists the world over, with Marx himself enshrined in Russia and China. . . . Albert Einstein, the Jewish mathematician, ushered in the atomic age and opened a path to the moon with his theoretical physics. A Jewish psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, lifted the lid of man's mind. . . . three hundred years earlier, a Jewish philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, pried philosophy loose from mysticism, opening a path to rationalism and modern science.

Through the ages, the Jews successively introduced such concepts as prayer, church, redemption, universal education, charity. . . .

In the case of the Jews, history has been that lightning which flings to the top that man who has been at the bottom. But this is precisely what

history is doing in the case of the African. The Jew and the Hellene gave mankind the pessimistic and devaluative evaluation of the human being. The Sudic African evolved and has been developing in the last 10,000 years the Sudic definition of the person. That Africa is becoming increasingly free has brought the Black and White races to the crossroads. From here, the two might divide into two camps and march straight to a head-on collision. The fundamental issue on which they would quarrel would be the attitude to the person. On the other hand the two might work toward the creation of a global communion of minds; toward a synthesis of attitudes to the human being to which both sides would freely give and from which they would freely receive.

The African victims of slavery, colonialism and apartheid are building such a synthesis because they need it and believe that mankind needs it. This synthesis, as everybody knows, was built on the basis of a composite strategy; on negotiation or violence, depending on the challenge the Africans faced in every given situation.

Where the situation demands it, the victims of apartheid will continue to negotiate; and where the need is for armed conflict, nobody should be in any doubt about what they will do: they will lay down their lives and shed other people's blood.

These victims are determined to create for themselves the world in which it will not be a crime to be an African. They are establishing an order in which they will have their own equivalents of the Nobel Prize and win these prizes in large numbers because the civilisation they will have built will not have been developed by the Greeks, Romans and Hebrews. When the time comes for them to have their own prizes, the chances are that for an African to accept the Nobel Prize will be to commit cultural or political suicide.

This takes us back to Mda and Tsotsi, to their efforts to move the Northern and Southern Responses toward convergence. The Northern Response attached maximum importance to the maximisation of African power because it believed that neither the Coloureds nor the Asians nor the Whites would agree to work with the Africans as equals as long as the Black people remained weak. Only when the African was seen to be strong would the privileged groups regard African goodwill as their guarantee of survival.

The Southern Response believed that if the Africans, Coloureds and Asians struggled together and co-ordinated policies and action, they would, through such action, learn the habit of working together against White domination.

As the quotation from Mda shows, the two strategies were not incompatible. Given the time, people would regard them as the two aspects of the mind of the new nation. The Evolving Revolt—from King Cetshwayo who wanted a military alliance, through the Bloemfontein Unity Conference, to the formation of the League and the Unity

Movement—directed events toward convergence. Enchorialism and Nominalism had been eliminated as factors of political significance; Medialism and Monolithism had become the dominant influences.

By 1960, the Northern Response, represented by the Pan-Africanist Congress, had swung over to non-collaboration and had launched the great anti-pass campaign which wrote the Sharpeville Revolt into the history of South Africa. The following year, Nelson R. Mandela sent a letter to Sir De Villiers Graaff, then leader of the now defunct United Party that was the Opposition in the all-White parliament, in which he warned:

The country is becoming an armed camp, the Government is preparing for civil war with increasingly heavy police and military apparatus, the non-White population for a general strike and long-term non-cooperation with the Government. . . .

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We have called on the Government to convene an elected National Convention of representatives of all races without delay, and to charge that Convention with the task of drawing up a new Constitution for this country which would be acceptable to all racial groups.

Vol. III, Document 58

The Freedom Charter and Moscow's will to prescribe destiny had split the ANC and had produced the PAC. The two organisations fought bitter ideological and other wars until they were both banned after the Sharpeville Shootings. The ANC-sponsored Consultative Conference of African Leaders passed a resolution in December, 1960, which said, *inter alia*:

It is its (the Conference's) considered view that the situation is further aggravated by the efforts of the Government to muzzle the political expression of the African people by the banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress.

Vol. III, Document 54

The government's intransigence was making it clear that confrontation could no longer be delayed. But before we discuss this period, let us draw attention to two important features of monolithism.

At the height of the Soweto Rebellion, White journalists in South Africa described the rebellious students as "a new breed of Africans." There is a marked tendency in sections of the White community, which has always opposed the Collective Will, to perpetuate the canard that every revolt against White rule is a new phenomenon. The intention here

is to destroy the element of continuity in the struggle and to represent our fight for freedom as the work of stray agitators.

Between M.B. Yengwa and Ben M. Khoapa there exists the thinking of a whole generation. Yengwa was one of the earliest leaders of the Youth League in Natal. That was in the 1940s. He could by no stretch of the imagination be said to be one of the spokesmen of the Black Consciousness Movement, just as I cannot be. Testifying during the Treason Trial, he told the all-White apartheid court:

The oppressor and the oppressed will always have a struggle; there will always be a struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed. . . . You will never find the oppressed merely sitting down and making no effort to liberate themselves.

—Vol. III, Document 53

Ben Khoapa was one of the ablest spokesmen of the Black Consciousness Movement. In an address to students of the University of Cape Town in June, 1972, he warned:

This is a world of groups. A man's power depends ultimately on the power of his group. This means that oppressed individuals must recognise their common interests and create a group. The oppressor creates a situation from which the oppressed can only extricate themselves by a regroupment.

From this sketch, it is clear that the oppressor and the oppressed must clash. Some men try to avoid the exigencies of the situation by preaching universal brotherhood in a situation of oppression.¹⁰

Yengwa was not the author of the idea that oppressed and oppressor must clash. Cetshwayo and Mvambo before him enunciated the doctrine. There was nothing wrong in Khoapa re-stating a truth for which Yengwa had gone to jail. The children who offered their lives in 1976 in the bid to make it clear that they were determined to rule their country were not a *new breed of people* as the "interpreters" of the African say. In February, 1857, Nongqauza urged her people to sacrifice everything they possessed; to scorch the earth itself and die in order to be reborn into a more satisfying destiny. In White textbooks, Nongqauza is described as a sick woman; her people are given the image of history's idiots for having accepted the challenge with which she confronted them. But those people would not have produced Steve Biko if they had not heeded Nongqauza's call.

Caught in a not dissimilar situation of challenge when Titus conquered the Romans in A.D. 70-71, the Jews behaved as the Xhosa did. Let Solomon Grayzel, a Jewish historian, tell the story himself:

. . . all that was left for the Jews to defend was the Temple area. . . . This was the last stand for Jerusalem. Here the Jews felt they would be invincible, since God would not permit His Holy Place to be destroyed. Regardless of war and famine the sacrifices in the Temple had been going on as usual, until there was nothing to sacrifice.

The history of the Africans in South Africa has yet to be written. Much of what passes for history is a vindication of the White man and no African in his senses will accept that as his history. The Jews who sacrificed everything they possessed until there was nothing to give up are hailed as heroes; and when we Africans do heroic things, people call us names.

But that is not the point pursued at the moment. What we are concerned with is the element of continuity in our struggle. One of the most remarkable issues on which the Northern and Southern Responses moved toward convergence was the federal or confederal structure of society.

The Constitution of the ANC stated that African Kings and Princes and people from the Territories (Transkei and Ciskei) and the Protectorates (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) would be members. The peoples in these lands were committed to different cultures, spoke different languages and defined themselves in different terms. The Unity Conference had regarded them all as "children of one house-hold." They had accepted this new definition of themselves. They accepted this because the Unity Conference recognised the simultaneous legitimacy of their self-definitions; that is: it recognised their right to their different territories and lands. This recognition could be on only one basis: a federal structure for the united nation.

At first, the Northern and Southern responses favoured the division of the country into two states. Writing in *The Guardian* in 1922, Mr. R.V. Selope Thema, the first editor of *The World*, argued the case for "*The Principle of Self Determination*" in these terms:

this principle means the division of the country into two parts to be controlled respectively by Europeans and Africans. That is to say, each race will have its own sovereign rights to manage its affairs in its portion of the country without interference from the other.

—Vol. I, Document 41a

Professor D.D.T. Jabavu gave evidence before the Governor-General's African Conference in 1925. One of the points he made was:

If political segregation were contemplated, the Natives should have their own Magistrates and the machinery of self-government. . . .

Now the Natives had to go back to their own civilization and develop along their own lines. That was logical if territorial segregation was applied, for the land question overshadowed all other questions.

—Vol. I, Document 39c

Seme was, like other early federalists, prepared to challenge the Whites to follow the logic of the policy of segregation. He told the 1933 annual conference of the ANC:

If the advocates of segregation are sincere, let them come out and give the Natives enough land for all their reasonable requirements. Let them draw up a dividing line from North to South or from East to West. Then let the Government order every White man to cross the line and go to his own corner and the Native to go to his own likewise. I beg to ask, if there is any Government in this country which would dare to put such a policy into practice.

—Vol. I, Document 43b

After the abolition of the Cape Vote in 1936, the Southern Response openly advocated federalism, beginning with organisations in each racial group.

We have already shown that the Umtata Conference of Chief Executive Officers committed itself to the ideal of forming the Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa.

Nobody expected the new nation to think alike and agree on everything from the beginning. The people who went to Bloemfontein belonged to language-groups which defined themselves in different terms. Some of them had fought each other before the coming of the Whites. It was natural that they should have a number of areas where they held divergent views. One of the main tasks of the Evolving Revolt was to extend the area of congruency.

Selope Thema and Seme represented the Northern tradition while Jabavu spoke for the Southern. Both traditions rejected segregation; both were ready, however, to discuss partition. If the land could be divided into Black and White states, they believed, they would tolerate no segregation in their state. The convergence of views on partition showed that the new nation was developing its own consensus on what meaning to give to South African citizenship.

Events in the African community were giving to the type of state toward which the Collective Will was moving South Africa the character of what we shall call a synarchy, which is a federal union based on economic integration, political mutualism and cultural autonomy.

This type of state seemed likely to accommodate the needs of all racial

groups; it provided the kind of political structure which would enable them to pool their resources in matters vital to their security and, at the same time, maintain their different cultural identities and develop these as they thought best in their different states.

The question which the movement toward convergence raised was: If the Northern Response, which regarded the Collective Will, the commitment to the creation of "a new and unique civilization," monolithism and the maximisation of African power as guarantees of victory; if the Southerners preferred a strategy which brought together the Africans, Coloureds and Asians and enabled them to develop the poises of collaboration by working together—how could the two traditions be moulded into a single, national strategy?

The bans on the ANC and the PAC came on African Nationalism before the African dialogue on a national strategy had got into its stride.

This provides some of the context in which the quarrel between the functionalists and the militants, between Buthelezi's National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha) and the Black Consciousness Movement (which is a school of thought and not an organisation), needs to be seen.

History sheds light on this quarrel. For many decades the Cape Province was more or less a liberal part of South Africa. Largely as a result, the Cape Africans developed attitudes of co-existence with the other races and techniques for collaboration with the others which made an African-Coloured-Asian united front the obvious weapon to use against White racism. This exposure to living and working closely with Coloureds and Whites in a city like Cape Town made cultural autonomy and organisational federalism readily acceptable to some Cape Africans.

The Whites in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal adopted more angular attitudes to the African. This maximised the appeal to the Blacks of monolithism, a distinct and unifying cultural identity, the Collective Will and a Black Ideal of Nationhood.

However, something more fundamental than debating strategy was involved in the great controversies from the 1920s to the 1960s. The new nation was clearing its mind on what to do with the Whites; it was making up its mind on where to fit the Caucasians in the *larger nation* which it was building.

The Southerners wanted this *larger nation*, which was distinct from the *new nation* built in 1912, to be based on a communion of like-minded Africans, Coloureds, Asians and Whites; they wanted South Africa to be ruled by a like-minded majority.

The Northerners saw South Africa from the perspective of conflicting monoliths and concentrated on building African political, economic and cultural power. While the Northerners, like the Southerners, were committed to the Sudic evaluation of the person, they were always exposed to situations of extreme race provocation. Their preference for Black monolithism responded to race provocation.

The bans on the PAC and ANC combined with the persecution of the NEUM and the AAC to stop the public debate on where to fit the Whites; they brought to a halt the movement toward a consensus on strategies for the creation of a larger South Africa in which it would never again be a crime for a person to be the child of his or her particular parents.

The bans focused attention on an extremely important aspect of the nature of the two Responses; it showed that the two Responses were complements. The bans created a political leadership vacuum which the government hoped to fill with co-operative chiefs. The militant Medialists at the head of the Black Consciousness Movement decided not to collaborate with the government in operating the segregated homelands administrations. This was precisely what the government had wanted the militants to do. By adopting an inflexibly rigid stance of non-collaboration they made it easy for the government to isolate them and crush them in ways which enabled Matanzima in the Transkei and Mangope in Bophuthatswana to march unhampered to the vassalage which Pretoria peddled as independence in unviable mini-states.

The functionalists took a diametrically opposed position. While they declared war on apartheid, they defined the crisis in South Africa as a situation of changing dispositions of power. The united front of White monoliths wanted to keep power in its hands for all time. To change this position the African monolith's first priority was to build African power. Whatever situation offered the Black people power, no matter how limited, had to be consolidated and added on to the Black power-structure. These accretions of limited power would in time place the African monolith in a stronger position to challenge the power of the White monoliths.

The functionalists were determined to make it as difficult for the government to impose "independence" on Natal as they could. This required that they should use the homelands administrations elections to place nationalistic chiefs in office. This strategy placed the functionalists in situations of advantage in the dual-authority crisis apartheid had created.

Conflict rationalisation was the strategy the functionalists used here. The strategy was to be used by the Zulu-speaking functionalists during the Soweto Rebellion. The Zulus in Soweto fought the imposition of Afrikaans as an additional medium of instruction in African schools and rebelled with the other language-groups. While they clashed with the Afrikaner monolith in the Transvaal, the Zulus conciliated the English monolith in Natal. This stance must be seen, among other things, against the fact that Big Business, which is still dominated by the English-speaking, has thrown in its lot with the Africans in demanding the abolition of race discrimination. This has brought Big Business to the left of the government on a major policy issue—which is unique in the capitalist world. The functionalists felt that they were in business to create pro-

blems for apartheid and not to act in ways which reinforced the united front of White monoliths.

The Sharpeville episode marked a turning-point in the relations between Black and White. The Africans asserted determined leadership initiatives to seize power from the Whites. The real importance of this event lies in the fact that after the collapse of the ICU, it was the first political move to assert the Collective Will for the purpose of evoking a nationwide response to similar provocations.

The Soweto Rebellion was a massive assertion of the Collective Will.

The point to note about Sharpeville is that it had taken the new nation nearly fifty years to enable the Collective Will to evoke a national response to similar provocations. The Sharpeville stand hurled Black and White headlong into the era of confrontation.

That one wing of the African political world worked tirelessly for nearly fifty years to give unifying momentum to the Collective Will in the Black community, while its other wing moved events toward African-Coloured solidarity, goes beyond explaining the difficulties of nation-building; it explains the nature of the Evolving Revolt; it tells us that this Revolt is a process. In this process, different forces, disciplined by similar provocations and motivated by the same aspirations, move on different planes to the same goal.

The logic of the Sudic view of the person moves the African victims of race discrimination to the most important point of convergence with the Coloureds and Asians in the conditions created by apartheid. When the South African Students Organisation (SASO) came into being, it opened its doors to Coloured and Asian students as well. The durability of the bonds which SASO and other Black Consciousness Movement organisations developed was tested harshly during the Soweto Rebellion, and the young Africans and Coloureds came out of it all covered in glory.

People offer their lives, not for abstractions, but for vital things, for concrete beliefs which give meaning to their lives. The young Coloured men and women who chose to die by our side demonstrated their commitment to the Consensus on Nationhood whose foundations had been laid by the Medialists.

The consensus expressed a spirit of the times. African functionalists, leaders of the Coloured Labour Party and of the Indian Reform Party, met in Cape Town in January, 1978, where they formally launched the South African Black Alliance.

In 1912, the African monolithists had gone to Bloemfontein where they united the various language-groups into a new nation. In 1978, this nation felt strong enough to join hands with the Coloureds and Asians in order to build the larger nation. In 1935, the leaders of the Southern Response went to Bloemfontein to lay foundations for the larger nation. In 1976, the shedding of African and Coloured blood showed how solid and deep

the foundations of the larger nation were. These are the events which determine thought and action in the African and Coloured communities and not class conflict.

A people involved in an Evolving Revolt that is inspired by a universally valid ideal is like an avalanche; it gains magnitude and momentum as it rolls down a mountain-side. The Evolving Revolt makes provision for and accommodates all adaptations to a constantly changing situation. Because it focuses on the fundamentals of conflict, the Evolving Revolt does not take rigid positions on the operational aspects of apartheid.

The advocates of apartheid, like the Marxists and the Christians, define the person in terms so rigid that they make themselves largely irrelevant in the Evolving Revolt. The exponents of these terms avoid the fundamentals of conflict because if they face them, they know on which side most Africans will go. Largely as a result, they concentrate on the operational aspects of White domination; they focus on race discrimination, pass laws, etc., when Black and White quarrel on the meaning given to South African citizenship and the attitude to the person on which this meaning is based.

But let us not digress too far from the Consensus on Nationhood. On their own, the Africans, Coloureds and Asians brought into being, after nearly 70 years of trying, a representative Black Alliance. Unlike the communist-sponsored Non-European United Front, the Black Alliance is not a front for any group of Whites who manipulate the non-Whites to serve the ends of Soviet foreign policy.

The logic of events on the African and Coloured sides points to a non-racial state as the only choice for South Africa. To say, against this background, that Black racism is the greatest danger in South Africa is a cover-up which the surrogates of Moscow use to disrupt African, Asian and Coloured movement toward a truly non-racial state.

This does not mean that there are no African or Coloured racists. Something would be wrong in these communities if there were none in a state based on racism. But we shall soon come to these.

For the present, let us have a look at the relations between the functionalists and the militants. It has been shown that the Black community is of one mind on the need for a viable form of unity both within itself and with other racial groups and on a non-racial society based on federalism. Medialism steadily developed into a radical movement under pressure from White domination. This increasingly was the case after the abolition of the Cape Vote.

The Natal functionalists decided to extort maximum advantage from the homelands administration which gave them legal platforms to commit illegalities like defying the government's ban on the NCLM's *Inkatha* magazine.

The quarrel on "collaboration" has been allowed to develop without adequate attention being given to it. The commitment to non-

collaboration among the Xhosa-speaking Africans in the main conflict rationalisation also has its roots in the history of Zulu-speaking Africans. If the problem is seen in this light, we all can move a step or two nearer a consensus on strategy as well.

Functionalism was not invented by Buthelezi; it has its origins in Seme himself. The Zulu aphorism on which it is based states:

Inja iwaqeda ngolimi amanzi.

The dog finishes water not by drinking, but by lapping it.

This means that the ciliate mind has many ways of solving a problem; that one should not cease to struggle for the realisation of one's hopes simply because one does not have the tools one would like to have.

Seme did not make a great President when he led the ANC. He was too concerned with building the nation he and his contemporaries had founded, to turn it into an effective monolith, so that in the face of challenges from the White side, some of his schemes were bound to fail. He advocated the establishment of African Congress Clubs, one of whose tasks was to:

bring to the door of every African home the messages of Hope, Co-operation and Good Will from every corner of South Africa, . . . cater for all economic needs of our people, in towns as well as in the country. . . .

The African must be taught to build himself up and not to expect all other people to get out of his way and give him an open road to progress. He has to fight for his freedom so as to learn its great value. . . .

[The African Congress Clubs institution] is a great national insurance system against unemployment and it should ensure the steady progress of the African nation. For this reason we must take every precaution to make it a success and to avoid all chances of failure. Therefore I shall propose that we start by employing the very best and most reliable Europeans to assist us in managing the Congress's business undertakings. The Revenue Department for instance should be placed under an ex-senior officer of the Native Affairs Department, who shall enjoy the full confidence of the African National Congress. . . .

—Vol. I, Document 48

Seme was a realist. He was aware that the inferior education given the African (at the time and at the present) made it impossible for the Black people to acquire given skills. The building of "a new and unique civilization" demanded these skills. Seme was not going to sit down and fold his hands until the day came when the Africans had the required skills; he

was going to buy these from anybody who had them, even from the White side.

THE SUPERMONOLITHISTS

By the beginning of the 1960s, the Collective Will of the African monolith had become enough of a determinant of attitudes to draw in sharp outlines the character of the Evolving Revolt.

A brief recapitulation of the salient points in the evolution of the Revolt will provide the background against which the emergence of the Supermonoliths must be seen.

Contact with the Whites destroyed Enchorialism and political Nominalism and gave the Africans a Bicipitous Mind which developed a Collective Will. This Will spearheaded the revolt against White domination and set events moving toward the restoration to the African of his land and freedom.

The Collective Will was opposed by the will of the united front of White monoliths. The two wills derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed attitudes to the person. The clash between them was fuelled by race.

The performance of the Bicipitous Mind in this setting sheds light on the turn the crisis is taking in South Africa.

Whenever the Africans faced a fundamental challenge, the Bicipitous Mind responded in predictable ways; it simultaneously asserted conciliatory and aggressive leadership initiatives. Its first response to Union was the despatch to London in 1909 of a racially mixed delegation to oppose race discrimination in the constitution of the new Union. The tone of the delegation's representations was conciliatory. Its other answer was the decision to form a new nation whose destiny was to create "a new and unique civilization."

World War II confronted the African monolith with another fundamental challenge. It responded with radical monolithism in the form of the Congress Youth League and radical medialism in the form of the Non-European Unity Movement in 1943.

The Sharpeville Shootings and the bans on the PAC and the ANC created a political leadership vacuum which the Bicipitous Mind promptly filled with the Black Consciousness Movement and the National Cultural Liberation Movement. The Black Consciousness Movement's doctrines were vindicated when African and Coloured students died together in Cape Town during the Soweto Rebellion. The teachings of the Northern tradition were vindicated when the students from all the African's language-groups fought apartheid together and died together to establish their point.

The vindications showed that the radical Medialists and advocates of the Northern tradition were moving toward a convergence of minds when it came to tactics in given situations. One weakness remained: Radical Medialism, which was committed to non-collaboration, had not reached the point where it could recognise functionalism as another aspect of the Bicipitous Mind; where it could recognize the logic of events as moving the African, Coloured and Asian opponents of race oppression toward agreement on a national strategy against apartheid.

Dr. Gool had pleaded as far back as 1935 for this type of strategy. White South Africa's strategy of setting one non-White group against the others complicated movement toward agreement on this strategy. The decision of the Coloured students to die by the side of their African comrades made mincemeat of White attempts to set the Africans and the Coloureds against each other.

Bonds cast in blood cannot be legislated out of existence. What happened in Cape Town and elsewhere during the 1976 rebellion created the need for a quality of leadership which would translate into political action the consensus on final goals which, in the main, Africans and Coloureds and to a lesser extent the Asians, had established before and after the Soweto Rebellion.

As should have been expected, the Bicipitous Mind acted in characteristic ways. In an interview with the *Sunday Express* (Johannesburg, July 16, 1972) Jerry Modisane gave this glimpse of what is going on in the minds of many young Africans:¹⁴

We do not need the co-operation of the White man any more—and we do not want him. We can find liberation from perpetual servitude on our own.

In 1919 the monolithists had gone to Versailles to set in motion the process of isolating the White supremacists on the international plane. How successful they had been was shown by the fact that in the 1970s even Pretoria's Western friends lacked enthusiasm for being seen to identify themselves with the apartheid regime.

From the early 1970s, the Black Consciousness Movement had worked systematically for the isolation of the Whites on the homefront. How far it succeeded was shown by the ways the Coloured community identified itself with the Africans.

In these changes, events were developing a mould in which to create a new consensus of like-minded Africans, Coloureds, Asians and those Whites who rejected the Caucasian will to prescribe destiny for the peoples of colour. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who led the all-African National Cultural Liberation Movement, Mr. Sonny Leon, the head of the Coloured Labour Party and Mr. Y.P. Chinsamy, the president of the In-

dian Reform Party met in Cape Town in March, 1978, and formally established the South African Black Alliance to create the new consensus.

In 1909 the Medialists had sent a mixed delegation to London. Their successors had gone to Bloemfontein in 1935 and argued the case for an African-Coloured-Asian united front against the united front of White monoliths. Their grandchildren had brought into being the Black Consciousness Movement which drew no distinction between Africans, Coloureds and Asians.

These areas defined another area of congruity in African thinking on the quarrel with the Whites; they showed that the so-called "moderates" in the African, Coloured and Asian groups were moving toward a consensus on an African-Coloured-Asian stand against apartheid; they showed, also, that the militants were moving toward the same consensus.

If the two sides finally created a consensus on strategy, they would force South Africa into a collision which would be a war of minds on the first plane, a race war on the second and an ethnic conflict on the third.

It is at this point that Modisane's words assume the harshest possible significance for Black and White in South Africa. When they were powerful in 1910, the Whites rejected the African. During the first half of the 1970s the African staged strikes in the major industrial areas of the Republic which the government could not suppress with the armed might at its disposal. If this established the relativity of White power, it placed Modisane and the South African Students Organisation, which he led, in a position to draw attention to the expendability of the Whites. The African was becoming strong, and when he was strong there were indications that he would reject those Whites who rejected him. The mutual rejection would produce one simple consequence: it would reduce South Africa to ashes.

The mood of counter-rejection must be seen in the context provided by history. This mood is important because it suggests that South Africa is moving toward an explosion which will simultaneously be a war of minds, races and ethnicity. The Sudic Ideal will be at war with the Caucasian Ideal; Black will fight White; Capitalists will clash with Communists while Enchorialists will march barefooted against each other.

History lists the provocations which produced the counter-rejection; at the same time it shows how African attitudes stiffened to the point that some Black people had to regard the Whites as expendable. To understand the development of mutual rejection, let us go back to the wars during the second half of the nineteenth century. This is a long and complicated story. Here we shall outline it only to the extent to which it sheds light on the rejection of the Whites by the non-Whites.

As already pointed out, the Nominalists regarded Christianity as a philosophy that would unify peoples and races. This belief developed a commitment to collaboration which had deep roots in all language-groups. The Africans so committed were given the status of "civilised Natives," and could vote in the Cape and own land in Natal.

The monolithisation of the Afrikaners and the English called for the drastic modification of the policy which had rewarded the "civilised Natives." Modification led events in a straight line to a crisis of survival for the African. Let us have a good look at what happened.

After the Anglo-Afrikaner war of 1899-1901, the "civilised" Africans expressed their attitude to English pressures to unify the various provinces of South Africa in a statement the executive committee of the South African Congress sent to the British in about 1903. Among other things, the Africans declared that:

The black races are too conscious of their dependence upon the white missionaries, and of their obligations towards the British race, and the benefits to be derived by their presence in the general control and guidance of the civil and religious affairs of the country to harbour foolish notions of political ascendancy. The idea [of African unity and independence as preached by Ethiopianism in the 1880s] is too palpably absurd to carry weight with well-informed minds, and tends to obscure the real issues and to injure the people as a class. The common law of the country is amply sufficient to protect the rights of the individual or the Church.

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The bias for collaborating with the English is important not only because it extended the area of isolation for the Afrikaner, but also because when the English betrayed the Africans when the Union of South Africa was formed, there developed a bitterness against collaboration with the Whites which today finds expression in the hostility of the present Black Consciousness Movement, of which the South African Students Organisation (SASO) is one of the leaders, to given forms of co-operation with the Whites. This hostility has traditionally been strongest in the Cape where the Africans had made the greatest strides in education and political advancement. For these reasons, let us pursue the pro-English bias a little.

The South African Native Convention, the "civilised" equivalent of the White Convention which approved Union, met in conference in Bloemfontein from the 24th to the 26th of March, 1909. In its first resolution the Convention made this declaration:

1. This Convention recognises the principle of Union amongst all His Majesty's subjects in the South African colonies to be essential, necessary, and inevitable, the ultimate object of which seeks to promote the future progress and welfare of all.
2. The Imperial Government, of which we are now all loyal citizens, interested in, and sharing alike its responsibilities, is bound by both fundamental and specific obligations towards the natives and coloured races of South Africa to extend to them the same

measure of equitable justice and consideration as is extended to those of European descent under the law.

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At first reading, these professions of loyalty to the English might illustrate the extremes to which the "civilised" could go to accommodate the English. But any scholar or journalist who has familiarised himself with the attitudes of the Africans as expressed in newspaper writings of the times will have noted that the Africans were forging the dialectic of displacement as a weapon with which to crack the foundations of the closed society and neutralise the united front of White monoliths; it was a weapon developed for use in a situation of conflicting monoliths. It is this weapon that the students used to tear off the community of mixed blood from the Whites during the Soweto Rebellion in 1976 and to isolate the Whites.

British greed for diamonds and gold ignored the hand of friendship offered by the African side. Ignored, also, was the potential of the dialectic for changing the course of events when used as a weapon in a situation of conflicting Black and White monoliths.

The British eventually agreed with the Afrikaners to establish the Union of South Africa; to give it the character of a closed society in which the White skin was the definitive qualification for citizenship; to monolithise South African society, create a united front of the White monoliths and form a power-structure based on African labour, the Afrikaner's political potential, and English economic power. The English and the Afrikaner would function as a consortium of resident colonialists, guiding the destinies of the closed society and the conquered Africans.

The Afrikaners wasted no time in translating their political potential into action. Divided into conciliators, led by Louis Botha and Jan Christiaan Smuts, and the nationalists, who followed James Barry Munnik Hertzog, they threw in their lot with the English and sat in the first cabinet of the Union. Two years later, however, the Afrikaner monolith was making it clear that it would be satisfied with nothing less than the displacement of English as the main official language of South Africa. Hertzog, then in charge of schools, gave orders to the effect that Dutch should be the main official language in his province, the Orange Free State.

That moved the conciliators and the nationalists to a head-on collision. Botha dissolved his cabinet and reconstituted it without Hertzog. The latter went to De Wildt, a rural settlement in the Transvaal, where on December 12, 1912, he defined the destiny of the Afrikaner as the establishment of an Afrikaner-type of republic and committed Afrikanerdom to apartheid by insisting on the segregation of every community from every other. The Afrikaners, the English and the Africans were each to develop along their own separate lines.

Less than two years later, the Afrikaner's Nationalist Party, which is basically the group in power today, was formed in Bloemfontein. That gave the Afrikaner monolith a distinctive identity and set it moving in a straight line to conflict with the English monolith.

The moment of decision came in 1922, during the disturbances resulting from the discontent of White workers with conditions in the gold mines around Johannesburg. Smuts suppressed the revolt with a ruthlessness that led eventually to his downfall in 1948.

Afrikaner nationalism first set itself the goal of displacing the English from the position they occupied in the government. In the 1924 elections, Hertzog allied himself with the predominantly English-speaking Labour Party and overthrew the Smuts government. (Smuts had become prime minister after Botha's death in 1918.)

Hertzog was a man with an appointment with destiny. He wasted little time in dislodging the English from their positions of power in the state. The following list of the steps he took and their dates summarise the way he used the dialectic of displacement:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
1925	Afrikaans recognised as the second official language.
1926	Under pressure from Hertzog, the Imperial Conference grants constitutional equality with Britain to the Dominions.
1927	The flag agreement with Britain recognises South Africa's right to have her own flag, side by side with the Union Jack.
1930	White women given the vote.
1931	The Statute of Westminster gives South Africa full freedom to administer her own affairs.
1938	<i>Die Stem van Suid-Afrika</i> becomes the second national anthem, next to <i>God Save The King</i> .

From *This Is South Africa*, issued by the Department of Information, Pretoria, S.A., Dec. 1971, pp. 68-71.



General J.B.M. Hertzog, Prime Minister from 1929-1939.



General J.C. Smuts, Prime Minister from 1919-1924 and from 1939-1948.



Dr. D. F. Malan, Prime Minister from 1948-1954.

1976 South African Yearbook

Hertzog's successors continued the process of displacement after the collapse of his government in 1939 by abolishing appeals to the Privy Council (1950); the cession to South Africa by Britain of the Simonstown Naval Base, the recognition of the South African flag as the only flag of the Union and the recognition of *Die Stem* as the only South African anthem, in 1957; the transformation of South Africa into a republic (1961).

Side by side with these moves were vigorous leadership initiatives asserted by the Afrikaner government to break Britain's stranglehold on South Africa's economy. The government nationalised the ownership of the most important primary resources and set up commissions and parastatal agencies to exploit and control the exploitation of these. The Afrikaners also embarked on a global policy for attracting foreign investments to South Africa, to reduce dependence on the English.

The Afrikaner monolith felt threatened not only by the English but also by the Africans who were owners of the land and had the advantage of numbers on their side. It set out to dispossess the African of whatever bits and pieces of land he still owned, crowded him into rural reserves which he did not own and forced him to sell his labour on the cheapest terms possible. How it did this is the subject of the rest of this chapter.

The dispossession as it took place in the land of the Zulus will be our model because the present author is most familiar with the history of this part of South Africa. There certainly were variations in the techniques used, but all these derived from one fundamental attitude to the person.

The case of the apartheid regime on the land issue is stated in the following quotation from *State of South Africa*¹⁷

The European settlers moved into areas not yet reached by the Bantu invaders or, as was the case in the Northern Provinces, deserted by them. At no time did European settlers deprive the Bantu of their lands....

The areas chosen by Bantu 300 years ago are still in Bantu hands and they were made inalienable Bantu areas by the South African government in 1913....

The official argument used by the advocates of apartheid is that "South Africa has never been exclusively a Black man's country.... Bantu tribes from Central and East Africa invaded South Africa at the time when Europeans landed at the Cape...." We are all familiar with the distortions of the truth used down the generations to justify the transfer of 87 per cent of African land to White ownership and to set aside only 13 per cent for the majority. The "evidence" of history is adduced selectively to prove that the Africans came to South Africa at about the same time that the Whites were settling down at the Cape. Science is placing at the disposal of all concerned techniques for establishing the antiquity of the African experience in South Africa.

Before we get to these techniques and what they tell us, let us make one point clear. While the White man's bias for categorisation divides human beings into groups and classes and inflates racial differences into determinants of policy, the Sudic evaluation of the person insists that the human value which metamorphoses into the human being belongs to no race; it defines the person regardless of where he is born and who his parents were.

The Khoikhoi and the Ba-Twa (the so-called Bushmen) belong to Africa; they are children of Africa and are as precious as any other. Our quarrel with the Whites is not that they dominate the Africans of Bantu origin; we oppose their rule because their bias for categorisation distorts the human personality regardless of who the person is. The important issue for us is the person; we emphasise the primacy of this person regardless of whether or not the person has Bantu, Khoikhoi, Bu-Twa or White or Asian origins.

The Khoikhoi and the Ba-Twa the Whites found beyond the Kei River were Africa's own children; what happened to them when the Whites landed in South Africa set precedents for what the Whites were to do to the Sudic Africans. It is the element of continuity in the White approach which deserves attention. They behaved the same way toward all the children of Africa.

Now for the antiquity of the African experience in South Africa. Colin Legum, the South African journalist who distinguished himself by writing for the London *Observer* on Africa, quotes¹⁸ Monica Wilson, a White South African anthropologist, as saying:

The Portuguese records show that from 1554 there were people "very black in colour" south of the Mtata river [in the Transkei and a little further north] "the country was thickly populated and provided with cattle." From 1593 there is evidence that the people *south* of the Mtata spoke a Nguni language [Zulu], and from 1686 we can place the various Xhosa—speaking tribes known today; they occupied the country from the Buffalo River [East London] northwards. Traditions indicate that the Xhosa, Pandomise, and Thembu were living on the tributaries of the (M)zimvubu near the mountains, before they came to the coast. They may have been there for many generations: we do not know. There is nothing in the recorded traditions to indicate any substantial movement of Nguni [Zulu] people from north of the Drakensberg—much less the Limpopo— within the period covered by the genealogies, *i.e.* since 1300, and it may well have been centuries before that. None of these facts is new; all have been published at one time or another; but their implications appear to have been overlooked by the myth-makers of this generation'; Professor Monica Wilson: *The Early History of Transkei and Ciskei, African Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1959.

Jean Hiernaux, the distinguished French physical anthropologist, tells us in *The People of Africa*¹⁹:

The Iron Age, presumably introduced by Bantu peoples, has been dated back to the fifth century A.D. as far south as Swaziland, and to the ninth century A.D. in the north of South West Africa.... p. 179.

On page 177, Hiernaux notes that "at all the Early Iron Age sites (the region broadly from the Cameroons in the west to Kenya in the east and South Africa in the south) pottery belongs to the same (iron-metallurgical) industrial complex; its regional variants clearly derive from a common tradition." Such sites, he observes, have been found at different points in Southern Africa:

Country	Site	Earliest Carbon 14 Dating
Rhodesia	Mabveni	A.D. 180
Zambia	Kalambo Falls	A.D. 345
	Kalundu	A.D. 300
	Kangonga	A.D. 340
Uganda	Chobi	A.D. 290

Kenya	Urewe	A.D. 270, 320, 390
	Hills Behind Mombasa	A.D. 120, 160, 260, etc.
Tanzania	Bombo Kaburi	A.D. 220
	Uvinza (Pagwa)	A.D. 420

If Bantu or Sudic communities were settled in the Rhodesia-Zambia-Uganda-Kenya-Tanzania region between the years A.D. 180 and A.D. 420, it requires a particularly imaginative reading of history to argue that the Sudic peoples, to the south of the region under discussion, reached South Africa about 300 years ago. Whatever the shortcomings of the apartheid mind might be, it is certainly not unimaginative.

This background provides the framework in which we must view other developments in South Africa; developments which destroyed the African peoples' confidence in the leadership of the Whites in religion. The seizure of African lands was one of these. Defending the ratio of land held by the White minority to that reserved for the Africans, the *Year Book* argues that the Whites did not at any time seize African lands. The records of history tell a different story.

On May 12, 1843, Napier, the British governor of the Cape of Good Hope, announced that Queen Victoria planned "to adopt Natal as one of her colonies." He conferred the title of High Commissioner on Cloete, a Cape Town barrister of Dutch descent, and instructed him to travel to Natal to prepare ground for the take-over of Zulu land. Cloete cut up Natal into British territory to the south of the Tukela River while he expected the Zulus to be satisfied with the portion to the north of the river.

He then proceeded to Zululand where he forced Mpande, the Zulu King, to cede St. Lucia Bay to the British, "although it was obvious that the area could never be turned into a commercial harbour." By October 5, Mpande was left with no alternative other than to sign the treaty in which he was forced to recognise British sovereignty over land seized from the Zulus.

Cloete then returned to Durban where he considered the claims made by various White people on the land he had taken from the Zulus. Donald Morris, the American author of *The Washing of the Spears*, travelled to South Africa and spent some time in Natal where he had access to White records on the events under discussion. He reports that:²⁰

Although only 365 emigrant Boer families were living in Natal, and most of these were in townships, no less than 760 individuals had submitted claims—most of them more than one. A Commandant Rudolph, who had done little farming but a considerable amount of commando riding, laid claim to forty farms totalling 400,000 acres;

Pretorius himself (the leader of the Natal Boers) wanted ten farms. A Mr. Aspeling in Cape Town, who had never lived in Natal, outdid them all by claiming 3,500 square miles. . . .

Cloete ruthlessly disallowed all these claims and gave some 200 families who were able to prove they had occupied the land for at least a year farms of 6,000 acres each. Smaller grants were made to families that had been farming for less than a year.

Sir Harry Smith, governor of the Cape Colony, annexed all the lands between the Orange and Vaal rivers and brought them under British rule as the Orange River Sovereignty on February 3, 1848. This seizure of African lands was in line with a long-established tradition. Jan van Riebeeck had laid down the Liesbeeck River as the boundary between White Africa and Black Africa. In 1778 van Plettenberg had fixed the boundary on the Fish River. During the Great Trek, the ancestors of the Afrikaner had descended on Natal and had occupied Zulu territory in the Weenen area without authorisation by the Zulu government.

These and similar precedents established minority "rights" at the expense of the majority. These "rights", most of which were established illegally, are today what the surrogates of Moscow, Dr. Kissinger and President Carter, want guaranteed by the dispossessed majority. This superpower consensus on guarantees for minority rights is indistinguishable from a demand for the legitimisation by the African people of White larceny.

If minority rights are to be guaranteed, it stands to reason that majority rights, too, must be secured. In the conditions which exist in the Middle World, however, to speak of group rights is to create unnecessary polarisations. The only rights that need to be and should be guaranteed in pluralistic societies are the rights of the individual regardless of race, colour, sex, station in life, class or creed.

The revolt of the converts was a protest against a system of values which connived at or permitted the dispossession of human beings if they happened to have the wrong type of skin complexion.

The divalent morality was to go beyond encouraging dispossession; it was to define final goals in terms which reduced the Africans to the status of the permanently deprived in their own land. The *Year Book* continued:

The South African government has accepted the desire of colonial people for self-rule as a natural right. In contradistinction with colonial powers in Europe, South Africa has its dependent people within her own borders. The granting of independence can, therefore, not follow the political pattern worked out by the colonial powers of Europe. For good reasons colonial people were not represented in the parliaments of the European mother countries. These reasons also hold good for

South Africa. Most multi-national states created in Europe were not a success, but led to friction and the fear of domination.

—pp. 70-71

Every eighth grade schoolboy who does his history homework almost anywhere in the world knows that by 1914 an African deputy from Senegal had been elected to the French National Assembly. Black men were officers in Napoleon's army. Men of African descent sat in French cabinets and were mayors of French cities. The *Year Book* then proceeds to justify apartheid:

It is well-nigh impossible to create one nation out of the different population groups inhabiting the Republic of South Africa. Each group clings to its own culture, language and traditions. This natural trend must be respected. The integration of all population groups in one body politic would have to start at school, but there is no single medium acceptable to all national groups. Western democracy is foreign to Bantu tradition. All over Africa the tendency is towards a one-party state under a black dictator. To adopt the principle of One-Man-One-Vote in South Africa would hand over the culturally advanced groups, *i.e.*, the Whites, Coloureds and Indians, to the mercies of a Bantu leader who might well have communist affiliations. The problem which South African statesmen have to solve is to protect the position of each population group and to give them full opportunities for political, economic and cultural development without doing injustice to or hampering the development of the other population groups. It is a unique problem for the solution of which no precedent exists in the world. The solution is being sought along the lines of parallel development, *i.e.*, each population group should manage its own affairs and, wherever practical, develop into self-governing states which will form a South African Commonwealth. South Africa's policy could rightly be described as Nation Building.

"Nation Building" is closely related to the economic set-up in South Africa and for this reason needs to be seen against the background provided by what the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development called "the basis on which we organise our labour policy for the Bantu." In actual practice "nation building" and the organisation of African labour are synonymous.

"Nation building" is one of apartheid's holy words. South Africa, every spokesman of apartheid will start by saying, is made up of a number of nations. Apartheid seeks to allow each of these nations to develop along its own lines.

Two snags immediately come to the fore. If the idea is to guide the evolution to nationhood, why is it that there is no African input? Na-

tionhood is defined for the Africans by the omnipotent Afrikaner monolith. The land set aside for the African nations is demarcated by the Whites to serve White interests.

The use of euphemisms to conceal the evils of any given system of tyranny was not invented by the White supremacists in South Africa. It was resorted to over and over again by the slaveholders in the United States and the traffickers in human beings in Britain. More than two hundred years ago Malachy Postlethwait wrote²¹ that the enslavement of the Africans was "a Melioration of their Condition; provided living in a civilised Christian Country is better than living among savages. . . . Their Condition," he continued, "is much better [compared] to what it was in their own Country." The areas of "betterment" are examined in the light, not only of the meaning "nation building" gives to the day-to-day lives of the Africans but also of the peculiar economic and quasi-military relationship that apartheid seeks between South Africa and the United States.

Land is the most important area in which "nation building" might be seen at work. South Africa has a land area of 472,359 square miles and is larger than "Germany, France, Italy and Portugal put together," to quote the *Year Book* again. This area is divided into four provinces as follows:

Province	Area in Square Miles
The Cape	278,465
The Transvaal	110,450
The Orange Free State	49,866
Natal	33,578

Like the United States, South Africa has a mixed population whose components are drawn from almost every continent in the world. In 1970 the figures for the main sections of the population stood at:

Group	Population Size
Africans	14,893,000
Whites	3,779,000
Coloureds	1,996,000
Asians	614,000

Each of these groups is divided into two or more ethnic sections. The Africans separate into the Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and Shangane-Tonga-Venda sections, while the White community is made up mainly of the Afrikaners (the descendants of the Dutch, French Huguenot and German settlers), the English and the Jews. There are also Hollanders, Germans, French, Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, etc. The Coloureds, or people of mixed blood, are made up of the Cape Malays or Cape Coloureds, whose

ancestors originally came from the East Indies and served the Dutch as slaves in the Cape of Good Hope, and the Coloureds Proper. The Asians include the dark-skinned, mainly Hindu, Indians, Arabs, Chinese and a handful of Japanese. The Coloureds live mainly in the Western part of the Cape Province, where the Dutch first established their settlement, while the Asians, in particular the Indians and the Arabs, are concentrated in Natal. Like the Africans, the Whites are scattered all over the country though each of the main language groups in each community tends to be dominant in some provinces:

Group	Area Of Preponderance
Zulu	Natal and Transvaal
Xhosa	Cape, Transkei and Ciskei
Sotho-Tswana-Pedi	Orange Free State and Transvaal
Shangane-Tonga-Venda	Central, East and Northern Transvaal
Afrikaans	Orange Free State and Transvaal
English	Natal and the Cape.

The total area reserved for African occupation is about 59,338 square miles or 13% of the total land area of the country²² while the so-called White areas constitute about 87% of the land. The following table shows the distribution of the African majority's 13% of the land in 1971:

Ethnic Group	Population Size	Area Inhabited	Living Space (in morgans)	Number of Reserves
Zulu	3,970,000	Natal	3,585,212m	29
Xhosa	3,907,000	Transkei-Ciskei	5,016,550	19
Tswana	1,702,000	W. Tvl, N. Cape, OFS	4,330,135	19
BaPedi	1,596,000	N. Transvaal	1,947,277	3
Southern Sotho	1,416,000	N. Cape, OFS	50,000	1
Shangane	731,000	N. Transvaal	—	4
Swazi	487,000	E. Transvaal	519,057	3
Venda	360,000	N. Transvaal	935,800	3
Tonga	—	NE. Transvaal	890,716	—
South Ndebele	230,000	N. Transvaal	—	—
North Ndebele	180,000	N. Tvl, Rhodesia	—	—
Other	314,000	—	—	—

The Africans live in the reserves, on White farms and in the urban areas. In 1970 they were distributed as follows:

<i>Area</i>	<i>Numbers</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
Rural Reserves	4.5 million	41.7
Urban (White) Areas	3.1 million	28.7
White Farming Areas	3.2 million	29.6

For many years White policy aimed at making the reserves a vast reservoir of cheap Black labour for the White man's mines, farms, industries and homes. Apartheid set out to stop the influx into the White areas. In spite of intensified control of the movements of the African people the number of Africans in the so-called "White areas" rose from 6,827,000 in 1960 to 7,975,000 in 1970. During the latter year there were about 6,918,000 Africans in the reserves. The increase in the number of Africans in the urban areas constituted one of the earliest defeats of the policy of apartheid. The figures which follow tell how this happened:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Urban African Population</i>
1936	1,245,000
1946	1,856,000
1951	2,328,000
1960	3,192,000
1969	4,000,000(estimate)

Behind these figures lies a revealing story of life in the reserves or "bantustans." In 1969, for example, South Africa had 1,029,000 workers from the Transkei. In other words, nearly all the reserve's most productive manpower was working in South Africa on a more or less permanent basis. In 1970 the South African Institute of Race Relations reported that the density of population in the African reserves averaged 117.2 per square mile as against 34.8 per square mile in the so-called White areas. The overcrowding combined with the exportation to South Africa of productive manpower to create the following position at the food production level²³:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Production Figures</i>	
		<i>1947-48</i>	<i>1967-68</i>
Maize (per million bags)	White	30.4	105.2
	African	3.8	3.7
Sorghum (per million bags)	White	1.8	9.5
	African	1.2	0.7
Livestock (per million units)	White	8.8	7.5
	African	3.6	4.0

The results of the type of nation-building which the apartheid regime seeks to impose on the African people was best described in a statistical summary made by concerned Americans in the late sixties or early seventies:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Africans</i>	<i>Whites</i>
Population (millions)	14.9	3.8
% of population	69	18
% land reserved	13	87
% of income received	18.8	74
Average income/head/year	\$188	\$1,596
Average annual wage in mining (cash only)	\$302	\$5,275
Average annual wage in manufacturing	\$828	\$4,032
Minimum cost of living for family of 5 in city	\$1,075	\$1,075
Life expectancy	35-40	64-70
Infant mortality per 1,000 births	200-250	2-4
No. of pass arrests/year	7-9000,000	0

Comment on the story told by these figures would be superfluous. The only addition one can make is that in a parallel though different situation of deprivation, the Americans in the colonies took to arms and pro-

claimed themselves a sovereign independent people. The Evolving Revolt, the Sharpeville Shootings and the Soweto Rebellion are moving the Africans in the same direction.

Let us see another aspect of African responses to conquest.

The course of dispossession of the African on which the united front of White monoliths embarked exposed Christianity as a soporific for dulling African reactions to conquest and deprivation. The loss of the Cape Vote produced the commitment never again to collaborate with the Whites.

By slow degrees, the Africans of Natal lost most of their rights to own land.

In these changes, the White power-structure destroyed the nascent Black middle class, the class which had been a moderating influence in the Black community; the class which had a vested interest in collaborating with the Whites. Moderatism began to be rejected as a political approach. Everywhere, clamours were raised demanding that the Africans should not collaborate with the Whites in given areas.

One point should be made before tracing the evolution of non-collaboration. Reference has been made to the Southern Response and the Northern Response. These had nothing to do with Xhosa or Zulu or Sotho experiences. It is true that in the South the Xhosa were the dominant community, just as it is true that in Cape Town the Coloureds were the dominant community. The Southern Response was a synthesis of African and Coloured attitudes.

It would be wrong to regard the Northern Responses as a Zulu approach. Johannesburg was the melting-pot in which all language-groups were forced by race humiliation to see salvation for themselves in a rebirth into a new destiny.

Some of the most distinguished names in the evolution of the Northern Response were Xhosa-speaking. The history of the new nation would be incomplete without the names of Dr. A. B. Xuma, A. P. Mda, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and others, while the history of the Southern Response has Northern names like Martin L. Khumalo, Dan Khoza, Gaur Radebe, etc.

When we speak of responses, we refer to movements of ideas in a constantly changing or Evolving Revolt.

But let us return to the clamours for non-collaboration. These clamours were loudest in the Cape, where the Africans suffered the greatest political losses. It was in the midst of these rejections of collaboration that the Congress Youth League came into being to develop a strategy for confronting White domination with "the reality of disaster."

Formed in April, 1944, the League laid great stress on the ideological aspects of the fight against White domination. In the same year, it issued its "Manifesto" which contained the following:²⁴

*The Ideal of National Unity Must Be the
Guiding Ideal of Every Young African's Life*

Our Creed

- a.) We believe in the divine destiny of nations.
- b.) The goal of all our struggles is Africanism and our motto is "Africa's cause must triumph."
- c.) We believe that the national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves. We reject foreign leadership of Africa.
- d.) We may borrow useful ideologies from foreign ideologies, but we reject the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies into Africa.
- e.) We believe that leadership must be the personification and symbol of popular aspirations and ideals.
- f.) We believe that practical leadership must be given to capable men, whatever their status in society.
- g.) We believe in the scientific approach to all African problems.
- h.) We combat moral disintegration among Africans by maintaining and upholding high ethical standards ourselves.
- i.) We believe in the unity of all Africans from the Mediterranean Sea in the North to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the South . . . and that Africans must speak with one voice.

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I was secretary of the subcommittee set up to draft the "Manifesto." The draft which we finally presented to the conference of African youth which met in the Bantu Social Centre on Eloff Street, Johannesburg, reflected the thinking of the more important members of the subcommittee. Anton Mziwakhe Lembede, who was eventually elected the first president of the League was an ascetic idealist; an uncompromising partisan for what he called Africanism. The strong emphasis on moral rectitude which characterises the early pronouncements of the League are to a large extent attributable to his thinking. Ashby Peter Mda, the most perceptive political leader I knew in the forty years of my involvement in African politics was the consistently realistic and anti-racist theoretician of the League. Walter Max Sisulu, for whom I had a high regard and whom I continue to respect in spite of his defection to the Left, was always concerned with the realities and practicalities of race conflict. My own concern was the ideological aspect of the quarrel between Black and White.

The League contributed a new factor to the evolution of the dialectic: the confrontation strategy which could, in Mda's letter²⁵ to G. M. Pitje dated August 24, 1948, "in clear terms set a new pace to the politics of South Africa."