

and what attitudes they taught. She often wrote that her model for a good account of culture was a good literary depiction of character. Otherwise Mead explains *Patterns of culture* very well but then over-simplifies it in concluding that Benedict 'wanted to demonstrate what an extraordinary range of cultures had existed and might exist – and she succeeded magnificently' (p. 44).

Mead gives an interesting account of the assemblage of social scientists in government-sponsored research in the Second World War, but she incorrectly implies that Benedict borrowed their interpretations. Benedict criticized Geoffrey Gorer's psychoanalytic interpretation of Japanese culture and she carefully marginalized similar interpretations by Clyde Kluckhohn and Alexander Leighton. Benedict always distanced herself from psychiatric models, as Mead points out, and she used more traditional anthropological analysis for national culture, emphasizing social and political attitudes and institutions. It is odd that Mead omitted commentary on Benedict's Thai, Romanian, and Netherlands papers from both memoirs since other contemporary and recent evaluations of them have been high.

Over half of each memoir is devoted to Benedict's early life before her professional accomplishments. In 1959 Mead reprinted in entirety Benedict's fragmentary diary and journals, and much of her poetry, all written before *Patterns of culture*, as well as a brief autobiography which Benedict wrote at Mead's request in 1935. This material gave a vivid picture of Benedict as introspective and subject to deep depression, a characterization Mead romanticized, yet it also conveyed Benedict's passionate nature and drive for accomplishment. Fifteen years later, in this memoir approximately the same length, yet devoted more to Mead's interpretation and to illustrative selections from the journals and their correspondence, Mead interprets this early period by feminist insights representing Benedict struggling within the constraints on women in her time more than, as in her earlier picture of her, struggling with her own inner self.

The selected passages of their correspondence report primarily Benedict's interchanges with numerous European and American colleagues in an ironic style and depict an aloof and observant Benedict. Unfortunately one such passage lets stand Benedict's early antagonism to A.R. Radcliffe-Brown expressed in a 1932 letter in which she criticized his

comments to her at a professional meeting disparaging the quality of North American fieldwork, without regard to her later high evaluation of his work.

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SEGAL, DANIEL A. & SYLVIA J. YANAGISAKO (eds). *Unwrapping the sacred bundle: reflections on the disciplining of anthropology*. 173 pp., bibliogr. London, Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 2005. £12.95 (paper)

The meaning of this book's title is not obvious. 'The sacred bundle' is a metaphor for North American anthropology's 'four-field model', uniting ethnography, physical and linguistic anthropology, and prehistoric archaeology into one discipline. If 'the disciplining of anthropology' of the subtitle invokes the image of a stern schoolmistress, rod in hand, chastizing a naughty boy, this impression is accurate. The editors of this book severely castigate anthropologists who believe there is still value in holding to the notion of 'holism' and keeping the four fields of anthropology together. It is no great revelation that the vaunted collaboration of the four fields was often uneasy and 'more honour'd in the breach than the observance', even in the golden age of modernity, but in the postmodern era it has become a source of debate and, more recently, of discords, rifts, and acrimony.

Daniel Segal and Sylvia Yanagisako give voice to this bitterness as they open this 'unabashedly interested' volume (p. 14) by accusing their opponents of stifling dissent and threatening the careers of those who question the sanctity of the four-field bundle. This surprised me, because my observation of anthropology since the mid-1970s indicates that those who represent the editors' type of anthropology hold key positions in most American universities, on most important editorial boards, and in the American Anthropological Association.

Their introduction contains a brief but merciless attack on older American anthropology and those who persist in seeing merit in it. Their attempt to associate anthropology's 'much vaunted "holism"' with 'the social evolutionary figure of the division of humanity into a civilizational Self and relatively backward (less and pre-civilized [darker-skinned]) Others' (p. 8) is a travesty of the history and nature of the discipline of American anthropology which, under the guidance of Franz Boas, was dedicated to, and succeeded in, attacking precisely such

views. Furthermore, the editors shamelessly celebrate, and then appropriate, central elements of the Boasian legacy as those of their 'science'! They write of 'the greatest achievements' having been 'to sustain and deepen struggles against a range of mainstream and dominant ideas about humanity, including racial formalism, social evolutionism, bourgeois economism, and naturalized gender hierarchies' (p. 13). If their science has sustained and deepened these struggles, one might hope that they would honour the science that led the way by establishing powerful critiques in the three or four generations before them, but this is far from the case.

Five essays follow the introduction. James Clifford ('Rearticulating anthropology') offers a reasonable presentation of the obvious fact that academic disciplines were not created by the Lord as inviolate, that they have contingent histories, and that other fields besides anthropology – notably all manner of 'literary' studies – have also undergone major shifts in their definitions, orientations, and relationships with neighbouring fields. He presents an interesting, if idiosyncratic, perspective on the fragmentation of anthropology.

Michael Silverstein ('Languages/cultures are dead! Long live the linguistic-cultural') presents a densely packed exposition of historical trends in linguistic and cultural anthropology, focusing on shifting views of 'culture' and 'language'. He sees a major reorientation from 'the taxonomic and museological views', in which it was generally believed that languages and cultures could be counted, categorized, and compared, to a more recent 'postprocessual' perspective, in which no such fixity and certainty is believed possible. This fluid view of a fluid world beset by 'boundary-breaching forces' is actually one shared by linguistic and socio-cultural anthropologists in Michael Silverstein's world and he does not address the tyranny of the four fields as the editors do.

Ian Hodder ('An archaeology of the four-field approach in the United States'), raised professionally in Britain and not to the four-field manner born, represents an interesting anomaly: an archaeologist in a department of social/cultural anthropology arguing against the housing of both species in the same department. He disapproves of the kind of archaeologists lodged in the Stanford Department of Anthropological Sciences but he apparently appreciates the scholars in his current home, the Stanford Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology. Postmodernism and

postprocessualism trump other professional considerations in his case.

In her essay, 'Flexible disciplinarity: beyond the Americanist tradition', Sylvia Yanagisako condemns that tradition in the darkest terms, first by imagining a most dishonourable history for it, then by misrepresenting its nature, range, and potential. She claims that '[t]he forging of this awkward disciplinary project [the four fields] was anything but a historical accident. Rather, it was shaped by a national history of settler colonialism and its accompanying racializing processes of national identity formation' (p. 79). What can be more damning than to be associated *ab initio* and at the very core with 'settler-colonial nationalist [racializing] sentiments' (p. 89)? But this is a fictional history, devised for rhetorical and political purposes, in order to shame and lay low her adversaries: the 'biological anthropologists and archaeologists who employ evolutionary approaches to human diversity' (p. 94). These are the sorts of people, apparently, who once co-habited with the author in the same Stanford Department of Anthropology before its acrimonious division. That this feud underlies this book is also the source of its greatest weakness: the distortion and diminishing of the four-field tradition and older American anthropology in general.

Yanagisako, Segal, and Hodder, in particular, distort and trivialize the 'four-field' approach by associating it solely with evolutionism and reductive biologism. This is painful to read because it was precisely the Boasian Americanist tradition that successfully struggled against the dominant forms of nineteenth-century evolutionism, and set its face most strongly against twentieth-century biologism and racial determinism. Paradoxically, it is precisely because of the unwrapping of this bundle, the fracturing and splintering of the tradition, that biological reductionism and determinism have been able to flourish as they do at present. It was Boas's familiarity with the physical, linguistic, historical, and ethnographic that fitted him and his students to be such devastating critics of cultural evolutionism and racial formalism and determinism. As a result of the loss of this tradition – and it seems lost – there are fewer and fewer well-rounded scholars, trained in these fields and prepared to contradict or correct the socio-biologists – or to work with them creatively. One chapter in the book, however, addresses this issue.

Rena Lederman ('Unchosen grounds: cultivating cross-subfield accents for a public voice') is the maverick. Raised three decades ago

at the once-proud bastion of the four fields, Columbia University (as was the reviewer, two decades earlier), she is the sole voice presenting a sympathetic picture of holism in anthropology, discussing some of its accomplishments, aims, and its current relevance. Lederman writes, '[c]ultivating cross-subfield accents – identifying affinities and openings that make strategic cooperation possible among the subfields – has been, and may continue to be, anthropology's distinctive disciplinary resource for addressing important scholarly and public issues' (p. 50). Lederman covers a lot of ground, offering a complex and nuanced view of the differences, similarities, accomplishments, and relations within and among the sub-fields, but her conclusions are directed to anthropology's *raison d'être* and its role in the world.

Taking the scandal of *Darkness in Eldorado* as the case in point, Lederman illustrates the importance anthropology has in both the academic and the public arena. 'Finally, reflected in our public's eyes, we are still all about foundational inquiry into the essence of "what it means to be human"' (p. 58). Lederman does not want to leave this 'conversation' to the 'strong reductionists' who would 'subsume all knowledge to fundamental (physical) laws' (p. 63), such as E.O. Wilson (pp. 68-9). In her concluding paragraph Lederman writes eloquently of four-field anthropology as 'the ambivalent guardian less of a "sacred bundle" than of a rare nesting ground – a condition of possibility – harboring anti-essentializing evolutionists, hermeneutic realists, and other third kinds' (p. 73). She would like to keep open this 'fragile but powerful possibility' (p. 73). It is to their credit that the editors included Rena Lederman's challenge to their own views in this volume.

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STONE, LINDA & PAUL F. LURQUIN. *A genetic and cultural odyssey: the life and work of L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza*. xxi, 227 pp., maps, figs, illus., bibliogr. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2005. £29.50 (cloth)

This book attempts an intellectual biography of the renowned and controversial Stanford geneticist Luca Cavalli-Sforza. There have been many earlier attempts to use genetic data to study human microevolution, with varying degrees of success (see, e.g., *Man* 28: 153 and 28: 171, 1928); many attempts to model cultural evolution; many retrievals of blood samples as

objects from the field; and certainly many attempts to identify ethnohistoric events in genetic patterns. This book, however, never actually tells us what made Cavalli's work necessarily better; it unfortunately has little interest in situating Cavalli's work within the history of human genetics, or of genetic-based anthropology.

In the 1960s Cavalli-Sforza began to study the genetics of African pygmies, probably inspired by James Neel's work on Amazonians. His early work involved applying multivariate statistical techniques to genetic data from human populations to see who was *more closely related* to whom (assuming that genetic distance was proportional to time since splitting; that splitting was all that populations did; and that culturally defined human groups could unproblematically be considered as natural taxa); later he began to model the transmission of ideas from person to person (assuming they stay reasonably intact and do not mean different things to different people in different contexts); and finally he dreamed up a big science project for human population genetics – the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) – which ultimately failed for its insufficient attention to issues in the relevant cognate fields, notably anthropology and bioethics.

Cavalli-Sforza has been a grand dilettante, in all the senses of that word, over his entire professional life. He visits Central Africa as an explorer and studies its pygmies as a geneticist, not as an anthropologist. He reconstructs the Neolithic as an antiquarian, not as an archaeologist. He models cultural processes as a statistician, not as an ethnologist. In all of these cases, Cavalli's work has been high-profile but low-impact in anthropology. Does this require an explanation, or is it simply to be expected, like the work of a spectrum of anthropological dilettantes, from Sir Grafton Elliot Smith through Thor Heyerdahl, Robert Ardrey, and Erich von Däniken, and right on up to Richard Dawkins and Jared Diamond?

Consistently opposing scientific racism, Cavalli-Sforza has nevertheless never quite understood the fundamental issues that ultimately undid his HGDP and which have recently been admirably analysed by Jenny Reardon in *Race to the finish* (2005). He still regrets his opponents' politicizing the scientific project – as if the programme to take, store, and study the blood of 700 groups of native peoples (which needs to be done before they go extinct, he constantly reminded us) did not constitute an overtly political act.